CAT Verbal Mock Test - 1


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This mock test of CAT Verbal Mock Test - 1 for CAT helps you for every CAT entrance exam. This contains 25 Multiple Choice Questions for CAT CAT Verbal Mock Test - 1 (mcq) to study with solutions a complete question bank. The solved questions answers in this CAT Verbal Mock Test - 1 quiz give you a good mix of easy questions and tough questions. CAT students definitely take this CAT Verbal Mock Test - 1 exercise for a better result in the exam. You can find other CAT Verbal Mock Test - 1 extra questions, long questions & short questions for CAT on EduRev as well by searching above.
QUESTION: 1

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Immortality has gone secular. It’s now the subject of serious investment - both intellectual and financial - by philosophers, scientists and the Silicon Valley. But if we treat death as a problem, what are the ethical implications of the highly speculative ‘solutions’ being mooted?

Of course, we don’t currently have the means of achieving human immortality, nor is it clear that we ever will. But two hypothetical options have attracted the most attention: rejuvenation technology, and mind uploading.

Rejuvenation promises to remove and reverse the damage of ageing at the cellular level. Gerontologists argue that growing old is a disease that we can circumvent by having our cells replaced or repaired at regular intervals. Practically speaking, this might mean that every few years, you would visit a rejuvenation clinic. Doctors would not only remove infected, cancerous or otherwise unhealthy cells, but also induce healthy ones to regenerate more effectively and remove accumulated waste products. This deep makeover would ‘turn back the clock’ on your body, leaving you physiologically younger than your actual age. You would, however, remain just as vulnerable to death from acute trauma - that is, from injury and poisoning, whether accidental or not - as you were before.

The other option would be mind uploading, in which your brain is digitally scanned and copied onto a computer. This method presupposes that consciousness is akin to software running on some kind of organic hard-disk - that what makes you ‘you’ is the sum total of the information stored in the brain’s operations, and therefore it should be possible to migrate the self onto a different physical substrate or platform. This remains a highly controversial stance. However, let’s leave aside for now the question of where ‘you’ really reside, and play with the idea that it might be possible to replicate the brain in digital form one day.

Unlike rejuvenation, mind uploading could actually offer something tantalisingly close to true immortality. Just as we currently backup files on external drives and cloud storage, your uploaded mind could be copied innumerable times and backed up in secure locations.

Despite this advantage, mind uploading presents some difficult ethical issues. Some philosophers think there is a possibility that your upload would appear functionally identical to your old self without having any conscious experience of the world.

You’d be more of a zombie than a person, let alone you. Others have argued that since you are reducible to the processes and content of your brain, a functionally identical copy of it - no matter the substrate on which it runs - could not possibly yield anything other than you.

What if the whole process is so qualitatively different from biological existence as to make you utterly terrified or even catatonic? If so, what if you can’t communicate to outsiders or switch yourself off? In this case, your immortality would amount to more of a curse than a blessing. Death might not be so bad after all, but unfortunately it might no longer be an option.

Which option is more ethically fraught? In our view, ‘mere’ rejuvenation would probably be a less problematic choice. Yes, vanquishing death for the entire human species would greatly exacerbate our existing problems of overpopulation and inequality - but the problems would at least be reasonably familiar. We can be pretty certain, for instance, that rejuvenation would widen the gap between the rich and poor, and would eventually force us to make decisive calls about resource use, whether to limit the rate of growth of the population, and so forth. On the other hand, mind uploading would open up a plethora of completely new and unfamiliar ethical quandaries.

Q. The mind-uploading technique depends on the fundamental premise that

Solution: Option A: The summation of a person (the sum total) or the information stored in the brain's operations is what makes ‘you’ you. But mind-uploading doesn't work on this premise for two reasons - it is not software. Software is an analogy to explain the consciousness, an example provided. Secondly, the option circles around itself. Consider the two parts: summation of a person - makes the person who he/she is. This is stating the obvious. Or rather the definition of ‘summation of a person’. Hence, Option A is not the answer.

Option B: The mind-uploading technology is based on the premise that if the brain can be mimicked and stored, it is possible to achieve immortality. But, the technique itself doesn’t rely on the fundamental premise that it is possible someday'. We understand this from the sentence: ‘Of course, we don’t currently have the means of achieving human immortality, nor is it clear that we ever will.' Hence, Option B is not the answer.

Option C: From This method presupposes that consciousness is akin to software running on some kind of organic hard-disk - that what makes you ‘you’ is the sum total of the information stored in the brain's operations and therefore it should be possible to migrate the self onto a different physical substrate or platform’ we can understand that mind-uploading theory depends on looking at consciousness as akin (similar) to software that can be migrated. Hence, Option C is an important premise for mind-uploading. Option C is the answer.

Option D: From ‘that what makes you ‘you’ is the sum total of the information stored in the brain’s operations, and therefore it should be possible to migrate the self onto a different physical substrate or platform’ we can understand that if it were impossible to understand where the real “you’ resides, mind-uploading wouldn't even be considered as a possibility. Hence, Option D is not the answer.

QUESTION: 2

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Immortality has gone secular. It’s now the subject of serious investment - both intellectual and financial - by philosophers, scientists and the Silicon Valley. But if we treat death as a problem, what are the ethical implications of the highly speculative ‘solutions’ being mooted?

Of course, we don’t currently have the means of achieving human immortality, nor is it clear that we ever will. But two hypothetical options have attracted the most attention: rejuvenation technology, and mind uploading.

Rejuvenation promises to remove and reverse the damage of ageing at the cellular level. Gerontologists argue that growing old is a disease that we can circumvent by having our cells replaced or repaired at regular intervals. Practically speaking, this might mean that every few years, you would visit a rejuvenation clinic. Doctors would not only remove infected, cancerous or otherwise unhealthy cells, but also induce healthy ones to regenerate more effectively and remove accumulated waste products. This deep makeover would ‘turn back the clock’ on your body, leaving you physiologically younger than your actual age. You would, however, remain just as vulnerable to death from acute trauma - that is, from injury and poisoning, whether accidental or not - as you were before.

The other option would be mind uploading, in which your brain is digitally scanned and copied onto a computer. This method presupposes that consciousness is akin to software running on some kind of organic hard-disk - that what makes you ‘you’ is the sum total of the information stored in the brain’s operations, and therefore it should be possible to migrate the self onto a different physical substrate or platform. This remains a highly controversial stance. However, let’s leave aside for now the question of where ‘you’ really reside, and play with the idea that it might be possible to replicate the brain in digital form one day.

Unlike rejuvenation, mind uploading could actually offer something tantalisingly close to true immortality. Just as we currently backup files on external drives and cloud storage, your uploaded mind could be copied innumerable times and backed up in secure locations.

Despite this advantage, mind uploading presents some difficult ethical issues. Some philosophers think there is a possibility that your upload would appear functionally identical to your old self without having any conscious experience of the world.

You’d be more of a zombie than a person, let alone you. Others have argued that since you are reducible to the processes and content of your brain, a functionally identical copy of it - no matter the substrate on which it runs - could not possibly yield anything other than you.

What if the whole process is so qualitatively different from biological existence as to make you utterly terrified or even catatonic? If so, what if you can’t communicate to outsiders or switch yourself off? In this case, your immortality would amount to more of a curse than a blessing. Death might not be so bad after all, but unfortunately it might no longer be an option.

Which option is more ethically fraught? In our view, ‘mere’ rejuvenation would probably be a less problematic choice. Yes, vanquishing death for the entire human species would greatly exacerbate our existing problems of overpopulation and inequality - but the problems would at least be reasonably familiar. We can be pretty certain, for instance, that rejuvenation would widen the gap between the rich and poor, and would eventually force us to make decisive calls about resource use, whether to limit the rate of growth of the population, and so forth. On the other hand, mind uploading would open up a plethora of completely new and unfamiliar ethical quandaries.

Q. The rejuvenation method of achieving immortality is based on the understanding that

Solution: The key to the question is understanding why the author thinks rejuvenation is a future possibility - future, and not present.

Option A: If old age is a disease beyond curing, it would negate the rejuvenation technology which claims to be a possible way of curing old age. 'Beyond something’ means not possible using that method. Hence, Option A cannot be a premise for rejuvenation technology.

Option B: This option is the reverse argument. While senility can be avoided by replacing or repairing unhealthy cells according to a hypothesis, we cannot extrapolate it to infer that unhealthy or cancerous cells accelerate the aging process. Hence, Option B is not the answer.

Option C: Consider the sentence: ‘Gerontologists argue that growing old is a disease that we can circumvent by having our cells replaced or repaired at regular intervals'. Option C says we can avoid senility by replacing and repairing unhealthy cells which is the premise of rejuvenation technology. If it is possible to replace or repair the cells, which we cannot be sure of, it is possible to avoid senility. Option C tells you when rejuvenation technology will work (since it is mentioned clearly that it's just a hypothesis). Option C is therefore the answer.

Option D: We are not told whether ‘removal of unhealthy cells is feasible' and the whole technology is still a hypothesis. Hence, Option D is not the answer.

QUESTION: 3

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Immortality has gone secular. It’s now the subject of serious investment - both intellectual and financial - by philosophers, scientists and the Silicon Valley. But if we treat death as a problem, what are the ethical implications of the highly speculative ‘solutions’ being mooted?

Of course, we don’t currently have the means of achieving human immortality, nor is it clear that we ever will. But two hypothetical options have attracted the most attention: rejuvenation technology, and mind uploading.

Rejuvenation promises to remove and reverse the damage of ageing at the cellular level. Gerontologists argue that growing old is a disease that we can circumvent by having our cells replaced or repaired at regular intervals. Practically speaking, this might mean that every few years, you would visit a rejuvenation clinic. Doctors would not only remove infected, cancerous or otherwise unhealthy cells, but also induce healthy ones to regenerate more effectively and remove accumulated waste products. This deep makeover would ‘turn back the clock’ on your body, leaving you physiologically younger than your actual age. You would, however, remain just as vulnerable to death from acute trauma - that is, from injury and poisoning, whether accidental or not - as you were before.

The other option would be mind uploading, in which your brain is digitally scanned and copied onto a computer. This method presupposes that consciousness is akin to software running on some kind of organic hard-disk - that what makes you ‘you’ is the sum total of the information stored in the brain’s operations, and therefore it should be possible to migrate the self onto a different physical substrate or platform. This remains a highly controversial stance. However, let’s leave aside for now the question of where ‘you’ really reside, and play with the idea that it might be possible to replicate the brain in digital form one day.

Unlike rejuvenation, mind uploading could actually offer something tantalisingly close to true immortality. Just as we currently backup files on external drives and cloud storage, your uploaded mind could be copied innumerable times and backed up in secure locations.

Despite this advantage, mind uploading presents some difficult ethical issues. Some philosophers think there is a possibility that your upload would appear functionally identical to your old self without having any conscious experience of the world.

You’d be more of a zombie than a person, let alone you. Others have argued that since you are reducible to the processes and content of your brain, a functionally identical copy of it - no matter the substrate on which it runs - could not possibly yield anything other than you.

What if the whole process is so qualitatively different from biological existence as to make you utterly terrified or even catatonic? If so, what if you can’t communicate to outsiders or switch yourself off? In this case, your immortality would amount to more of a curse than a blessing. Death might not be so bad after all, but unfortunately it might no longer be an option.

Which option is more ethically fraught? In our view, ‘mere’ rejuvenation would probably be a less problematic choice. Yes, vanquishing death for the entire human species would greatly exacerbate our existing problems of overpopulation and inequality - but the problems would at least be reasonably familiar. We can be pretty certain, for instance, that rejuvenation would widen the gap between the rich and poor, and would eventually force us to make decisive calls about resource use, whether to limit the rate of growth of the population, and so forth. On the other hand, mind uploading would open up a plethora of completely new and unfamiliar ethical quandaries.

Q. The author feels that the rejuvenation method is a less problematic choice because

Solution: We are looking for an option that tells us why, even though it is a problem, we can handle it, unlike mind-uploading which comes with unfamiliar ethical quandaries (dilemmas/ difficult choices).

Option A: Consider the sentences: 'In our view, 'mere’ rejuvenation would probably be a less problematic choice. Yes, vanquishing death for the entire human species would greatly exacerbate our existing problems of overpopulation and inequality - but the problems would at least be reasonably familiar. From the underlined portion, we can understand that the author thinks rejuvenation is a less problematic choice, because the problems it leads to are familiar to us. Hence, Option A is the answer.

Option B: While this option seems close, it is a slight misrepresentation of data. Minduploading is not an ethical quandary; neither is rejuvenation technology. Each of them could lead to possible ethical quandaries. Hence, Option B is not the answer.

Option C: This option offers something positive about mind-uploading which further deepens the question - whv then does the author prefer rejuvenation?’ We are looking for an argument to the contrary - 'why is rejuvenation less problematic'. Hence, Option C is not the answer.

Option D: This doesn’t tell us why rejuvenation technology is a less problematic choice. Forcing us to make some strong decisions has been mentioned as a possible solution to one of the problems (resource-crunch) caused by immortality. It doesn't tell us why rejuvenation in particular is not as troublesome as mind-uploading could be. Hence, Option D is not the answer.

QUESTION: 4

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Immortality has gone secular. It’s now the subject of serious investment - both intellectual and financial - by philosophers, scientists and the Silicon Valley. But if we treat death as a problem, what are the ethical implications of the highly speculative ‘solutions’ being mooted?

Of course, we don’t currently have the means of achieving human immortality, nor is it clear that we ever will. But two hypothetical options have attracted the most attention: rejuvenation technology, and mind uploading.

Rejuvenation promises to remove and reverse the damage of ageing at the cellular level. Gerontologists argue that growing old is a disease that we can circumvent by having our cells replaced or repaired at regular intervals. Practically speaking, this might mean that every few years, you would visit a rejuvenation clinic. Doctors would not only remove infected, cancerous or otherwise unhealthy cells, but also induce healthy ones to regenerate more effectively and remove accumulated waste products. This deep makeover would ‘turn back the clock’ on your body, leaving you physiologically younger than your actual age. You would, however, remain just as vulnerable to death from acute trauma - that is, from injury and poisoning, whether accidental or not - as you were before.

The other option would be mind uploading, in which your brain is digitally scanned and copied onto a computer. This method presupposes that consciousness is akin to software running on some kind of organic hard-disk - that what makes you ‘you’ is the sum total of the information stored in the brain’s operations, and therefore it should be possible to migrate the self onto a different physical substrate or platform. This remains a highly controversial stance. However, let’s leave aside for now the question of where ‘you’ really reside, and play with the idea that it might be possible to replicate the brain in digital form one day.

Unlike rejuvenation, mind uploading could actually offer something tantalisingly close to true immortality. Just as we currently backup files on external drives and cloud storage, your uploaded mind could be copied innumerable times and backed up in secure locations.

Despite this advantage, mind uploading presents some difficult ethical issues. Some philosophers think there is a possibility that your upload would appear functionally identical to your old self without having any conscious experience of the world.

You’d be more of a zombie than a person, let alone you. Others have argued that since you are reducible to the processes and content of your brain, a functionally identical copy of it - no matter the substrate on which it runs - could not possibly yield anything other than you.

What if the whole process is so qualitatively different from biological existence as to make you utterly terrified or even catatonic? If so, what if you can’t communicate to outsiders or switch yourself off? In this case, your immortality would amount to more of a curse than a blessing. Death might not be so bad after all, but unfortunately it might no longer be an option.

Which option is more ethically fraught? In our view, ‘mere’ rejuvenation would probably be a less problematic choice. Yes, vanquishing death for the entire human species would greatly exacerbate our existing problems of overpopulation and inequality - but the problems would at least be reasonably familiar. We can be pretty certain, for instance, that rejuvenation would widen the gap between the rich and poor, and would eventually force us to make decisive calls about resource use, whether to limit the rate of growth of the population, and so forth. On the other hand, mind uploading would open up a plethora of completely new and unfamiliar ethical quandaries.

Q. All of the following are ethical issues presented by mind-uploading EXCEPT:

Solution: Option A: From this sentence, What if the whole process is so qualitatively different from biological existence as to make you utterly terrified or even catatonic? we can understand that one of the ethical issues presented by minduploading is a scenario where things don’t go as planned and the person is reduced to a catatonic (comatose) state with complete absence of cognitive skills. Hence, Option A is not the answer.

Option B: From the argument, ‘Some philosophers think there is a possibility that your upload would appear functionally identical to your old self without having any conscious experience of the world’ it can be understood that one of the issues presented by mind-uploading is the possibility that the clone is bereft of conscious experiences. Hence, Option B is not the answer.

Option C: According to the author, if the experience is not good and if one is unable to communicate the same, immortality can actually become a curse. So, one of the ethical issues presented in the argument is the possibility that one may not really like immortality and might fail to get rid of it after that. Immortality may become a curse. Hence, Option C is not the answer.

Option D: From ‘Others have argued that since you are reducible to the processes and content of your brain, a functionally identical copy of it - no matter the substrate on which it runs - could not possibly yield anything other than you’, we can understand that the possibility of an individual being reduced to processes and content has actually been given as an argument to support mind-uploading by proponents. It is not an ethical question against the process. Hence, Option D is the answer.

QUESTION: 5

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Immortality has gone secular. It’s now the subject of serious investment - both intellectual and financial - by philosophers, scientists and the Silicon Valley. But if we treat death as a problem, what are the ethical implications of the highly speculative ‘solutions’ being mooted?

Of course, we don’t currently have the means of achieving human immortality, nor is it clear that we ever will. But two hypothetical options have attracted the most attention: rejuvenation technology, and mind uploading.

Rejuvenation promises to remove and reverse the damage of ageing at the cellular level. Gerontologists argue that growing old is a disease that we can circumvent by having our cells replaced or repaired at regular intervals. Practically speaking, this might mean that every few years, you would visit a rejuvenation clinic. Doctors would not only remove infected, cancerous or otherwise unhealthy cells, but also induce healthy ones to regenerate more effectively and remove accumulated waste products. This deep makeover would ‘turn back the clock’ on your body, leaving you physiologically younger than your actual age. You would, however, remain just as vulnerable to death from acute trauma - that is, from injury and poisoning, whether accidental or not - as you were before.

The other option would be mind uploading, in which your brain is digitally scanned and copied onto a computer. This method presupposes that consciousness is akin to software running on some kind of organic hard-disk - that what makes you ‘you’ is the sum total of the information stored in the brain’s operations, and therefore it should be possible to migrate the self onto a different physical substrate or platform. This remains a highly controversial stance. However, let’s leave aside for now the question of where ‘you’ really reside, and play with the idea that it might be possible to replicate the brain in digital form one day.

Unlike rejuvenation, mind uploading could actually offer something tantalisingly close to true immortality. Just as we currently backup files on external drives and cloud storage, your uploaded mind could be copied innumerable times and backed up in secure locations.

Despite this advantage, mind uploading presents some difficult ethical issues. Some philosophers think there is a possibility that your upload would appear functionally identical to your old self without having any conscious experience of the world.

You’d be more of a zombie than a person, let alone you. Others have argued that since you are reducible to the processes and content of your brain, a functionally identical copy of it - no matter the substrate on which it runs - could not possibly yield anything other than you.

What if the whole process is so qualitatively different from biological existence as to make you utterly terrified or even catatonic? If so, what if you can’t communicate to outsiders or switch yourself off? In this case, your immortality would amount to more of a curse than a blessing. Death might not be so bad after all, but unfortunately it might no longer be an option.

Which option is more ethically fraught? In our view, ‘mere’ rejuvenation would probably be a less problematic choice. Yes, vanquishing death for the entire human species would greatly exacerbate our existing problems of overpopulation and inequality - but the problems would at least be reasonably familiar. We can be pretty certain, for instance, that rejuvenation would widen the gap between the rich and poor, and would eventually force us to make decisive calls about resource use, whether to limit the rate of growth of the population, and so forth. On the other hand, mind uploading would open up a plethora of completely new and unfamiliar ethical quandaries.

Q. Which of the following is not a negative consequence of rejuvenation technology?

I. Those who undergo rejuvenation become vulnerable to injury, poisoning and trauma.

II. Rejuvenation could widen the gap between the rich and the poor.

III. Rejuvenation could increase the population burden.

IV. Rejuvenation is still a hypothesis, and not practically feasible.

Solution: I - Consider the sentence, ‘You would, however, remain just as vulnerable to death from acute trauma - that is, from injury and poisoning, whether accidental or not - as you were before'. This is one of the shortcomings of the rejuvenation technology - why it cannot offer a permanent solution to immortality. It is not a consequence. It is not that people who undergo rejuvenation become vulnerable to injury or poisoning. Hence, I cannot be counted as a negative consequence.

II - From ‘We can be pretty certain, for instance, that rejuvenation would widen the gap between the rich and poor’, we can understand that II is a consequence.

III - From ‘In our view, mere' rejuvenation would probably be a less problematic choice. Yes, vanquishing death for the entire human species would greatly exacerbate our existing problems of overpopulation and inequality', we can understand that a population burst is a consequence (not just of rejuvenation, mind you, but of immortality in general).

IV - This is once again a caveat, a disclaimer that these technologies for achieving immortality are not available to us. This is not a consequence. Hence, IV can be counted out.

Hence, Option b is the answer.

QUESTION: 6

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Immortality has gone secular. It’s now the subject of serious investment - both intellectual and financial - by philosophers, scientists and the Silicon Valley. But if we treat death as a problem, what are the ethical implications of the highly speculative ‘solutions’ being mooted?

Of course, we don’t currently have the means of achieving human immortality, nor is it clear that we ever will. But two hypothetical options have attracted the most attention: rejuvenation technology, and mind uploading.

Rejuvenation promises to remove and reverse the damage of ageing at the cellular level. Gerontologists argue that growing old is a disease that we can circumvent by having our cells replaced or repaired at regular intervals. Practically speaking, this might mean that every few years, you would visit a rejuvenation clinic. Doctors would not only remove infected, cancerous or otherwise unhealthy cells, but also induce healthy ones to regenerate more effectively and remove accumulated waste products. This deep makeover would ‘turn back the clock’ on your body, leaving you physiologically younger than your actual age. You would, however, remain just as vulnerable to death from acute trauma - that is, from injury and poisoning, whether accidental or not - as you were before.

The other option would be mind uploading, in which your brain is digitally scanned and copied onto a computer. This method presupposes that consciousness is akin to software running on some kind of organic hard-disk - that what makes you ‘you’ is the sum total of the information stored in the brain’s operations, and therefore it should be possible to migrate the self onto a different physical substrate or platform. This remains a highly controversial stance. However, let’s leave aside for now the question of where ‘you’ really reside, and play with the idea that it might be possible to replicate the brain in digital form one day.

Unlike rejuvenation, mind uploading could actually offer something tantalisingly close to true immortality. Just as we currently backup files on external drives and cloud storage, your uploaded mind could be copied innumerable times and backed up in secure locations.

Despite this advantage, mind uploading presents some difficult ethical issues. Some philosophers think there is a possibility that your upload would appear functionally identical to your old self without having any conscious experience of the world.

You’d be more of a zombie than a person, let alone you. Others have argued that since you are reducible to the processes and content of your brain, a functionally identical copy of it - no matter the substrate on which it runs - could not possibly yield anything other than you.

What if the whole process is so qualitatively different from biological existence as to make you utterly terrified or even catatonic? If so, what if you can’t communicate to outsiders or switch yourself off? In this case, your immortality would amount to more of a curse than a blessing. Death might not be so bad after all, but unfortunately it might no longer be an option.

Which option is more ethically fraught? In our view, ‘mere’ rejuvenation would probably be a less problematic choice. Yes, vanquishing death for the entire human species would greatly exacerbate our existing problems of overpopulation and inequality - but the problems would at least be reasonably familiar. We can be pretty certain, for instance, that rejuvenation would widen the gap between the rich and poor, and would eventually force us to make decisive calls about resource use, whether to limit the rate of growth of the population, and so forth. On the other hand, mind uploading would open up a plethora of completely new and unfamiliar ethical quandaries.

Q. Which of the following best summarises the nature of the content presented in the sixth para, “Despite this advantage…yield anything other than you”?

Solution: Despite this advantage, mind uploading presents some difficult ethics! issues. [Some philosophers think there is a possibility that your upload would appear functionally identical to your old self without having any conscious experience of the world. You'd be more of a zombie than a person, let alone you], [Others have argued that since you are reducible to the processes and content of your brain, a functionally identical copy of it - no matter the substrate on which it runs - could not possibly yield anything other than you.]

One can notice that the para has three parts. It picks up from the previous para by saying there is an advantage to mind uploading. The next part talks about what some philosophers argue - that one would just be a zombie - against the advantage of mind-uploading. The second part talks about how others defend the advantage of mind-uploading by countering the argument of some philosophers. So, there is a benefit (from previous para), a counter-argument and a counter to the counterargument.

Option A: There is no premise offered in this para. The author starts with a foregone conclusion that mind-uploading has advantages, carried over from a previous para. Hence, Option A is not the answer.

Option B: This option indicates that there are only two parts in the para and not three (the author arguing against a previous conclusion (1) by providing another). Hence, Option B is not the answer.

Option C: While there are two counter arguments, a conclusion hasn’t been established at the end of it. Hence, Option C is not the answer.

Option D: The author presents two sides of an argument (what some philosophers argue and what others argue against it) to discuss the ethical implications of minduploading. The foregone conclusion is that there are advantages to mind-uploading ("Despite this advantage..."). Hence, Option D best represents the nature of the thought flow in the para.

QUESTION: 7

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Do art critics have a point anymore? Can they contribute anything to the development of art? For a long time, I've ducked this question. If you'd asked me any time over the past few years, I'd have replied that criticism does not seriously influence art. It has its own justification, however, as literature. If literature seems a pompous word, let's say entertainment. The appetite to read about art is almost as insatiable as the need to look at it; the critic provides a service that gives a chance to talk, think and tell stories about art and artists. Maybe it doesn't have any impact on art but it does occupy a place in the culture. That's what I would have said, until recently.

But that's a weak defence of criticism. The truth is that critics have been in retreat for a long time. In British art, they faced a cataclysmic loss of standing just before I came on the scene. When I was a student, the art critic whose books I bought was Peter Fuller, founder of the magazine Modern Painters and a savage critic of most trends in contemporary art. I enjoyed the provocative seriousness of his essays. I also loved the writing of Robert Hughes, another critic whose eloquence was - and is - very much at the expense of current art.

Not much newspaper criticism comes near their mark, but what critics did share, in the late 1980s, was a similar scepticism about new fashions, a "seriousness" defined by suspicion. And of course, history played a joke on these critics - even on Fuller and Hughes. While high moral disdain for shallow modern art was pouring from the printing presses, a generation of British artists led by Damien Hirst were getting away with anything they wanted - again and again and again. Words were crushed by images. Critics were reduced to the status of promoters. They had no other role.

Today I think there is an opportunity for critics again - and a need. The sheer volume and range of art that we're fed in a culture obsessed with galleries is so vast and confusing that a critic can get stuck in and make a difference. It really is time to stand up for what is good against what is meretricious. And it really is possible to find examples of excellence as well as stupidity. In other words, this is a great time to be a critic - to try to show people what really matters.

Yes, there's a staggering volume of mediocre art being talked up by fools. But there are real talents and real ideas too. The critic's task is to identify what is good and defend it come hell or high water - and to honestly denounce the bad. Art history can help in this task by enriching your perspective. Writing can give you flexibility in how and when you want to engage.

But engage we must. Engage we will.

Q. The author justifies art criticism in the first para of the passage by saying that art criticism

Solution: The answer can be understood from the following sentences: ‘It has its own justification, however, as literature. If literature seems a pompous word, let's save entertainment. The appetite to read about art is almost as insatiable as the need to look at it; the critic provides a service that gives a chance to talk, think and tell stories about art and artists.’

Option A: The author doesn’t say that art criticism is pompous. The author says, if the word literature’ feels too pompous (or over the board) for art criticism, if we cannot call art criticism as literature, then we could call it ‘entertainment.’ Hence, Option A is not the answer.

Option B: While the statement may be true, it is negative in tone. The author was justifying art criticism by mentioning that even if it doesn’t have a serious influence on art, it has a purpose. Hence, Option B can be eliminated.

Option C: The appetite to read about art is insatiable according to the passage. The author isn’t speaking about insatiable readers (those who love reading a lot, not necessarily only about art). This is misrepresentation of information. Hence, Option C is not the answer.

Option D: From the sentence, ‘the critic provides...gives a chance to talk...about art’, we can understand that art criticism provides a channel (vent/ outlet/ medium) for art discussions. Hence, Option D is the answer.

QUESTION: 8

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Do art critics have a point anymore? Can they contribute anything to the development of art? For a long time, I've ducked this question. If you'd asked me any time over the past few years, I'd have replied that criticism does not seriously influence art. It has its own justification, however, as literature. If literature seems a pompous word, let's say entertainment. The appetite to read about art is almost as insatiable as the need to look at it; the critic provides a service that gives a chance to talk, think and tell stories about art and artists. Maybe it doesn't have any impact on art but it does occupy a place in the culture. That's what I would have said, until recently.

But that's a weak defence of criticism. The truth is that critics have been in retreat for a long time. In British art, they faced a cataclysmic loss of standing just before I came on the scene. When I was a student, the art critic whose books I bought was Peter Fuller, founder of the magazine Modern Painters and a savage critic of most trends in contemporary art. I enjoyed the provocative seriousness of his essays. I also loved the writing of Robert Hughes, another critic whose eloquence was - and is - very much at the expense of current art.

Not much newspaper criticism comes near their mark, but what critics did share, in the late 1980s, was a similar scepticism about new fashions, a "seriousness" defined by suspicion. And of course, history played a joke on these critics - even on Fuller and Hughes. While high moral disdain for shallow modern art was pouring from the printing presses, a generation of British artists led by Damien Hirst were getting away with anything they wanted - again and again and again. Words were crushed by images. Critics were reduced to the status of promoters. They had no other role.

Today I think there is an opportunity for critics again - and a need. The sheer volume and range of art that we're fed in a culture obsessed with galleries is so vast and confusing that a critic can get stuck in and make a difference. It really is time to stand up for what is good against what is meretricious. And it really is possible to find examples of excellence as well as stupidity. In other words, this is a great time to be a critic - to try to show people what really matters.

Yes, there's a staggering volume of mediocre art being talked up by fools. But there are real talents and real ideas too. The critic's task is to identify what is good and defend it come hell or high water - and to honestly denounce the bad. Art history can help in this task by enriching your perspective. Writing can give you flexibility in how and when you want to engage.

But engage we must. Engage we will.

Q. Why does the author think there is an opportunity and need for critics again?

Solution: The para highlights several reasons for the authors to believe that critics are needed again (as underlined): Today I think there is an opportunity for critics again - and a need. The sheer volume and range of art that we're fed in a culture obsessed with galleries is so vast and confusing that a critic can get stuck in and make a difference. It really is time to stand up for what is good against what is meretricious. And it really is possible to find examples of excellence as well as stupidity. In other words, this is a great time to be a critic - to try to show people what really matters.’ Option A: Consider the sentence: Today I think there is an opportunity for critics again - and a need. The sheer volume end range of art that we're fed in a culture obsessed with galleries is so vast and confusing that a critic can get stuck in and make a difference.’ This explains the option. Too much art is produced according to the author. The content is confusing (perplexing) not only in volume but also in range. That’s why there is a need for art criticism to separate out good from bad art. Hence, Option A is the answer.

Option B: The author says it is time to stand up for what is good (meritorious) and stand against what is meretricious (gaudy/cheap). This line is what may lead one to Option B but it should be noted, the question delves on why the author feels there is a need now more than ever. Option B merely talks about the role of an art critic, and it applies at all times and not just now. Hence, Option B is not the answer.

Option C: The author is of the opinion that in a culture obsessed with galleries there is a huge volume and range of art. This cannot lead to the inference that the galleries have diluted the quality of art. The range and volume is confusing. Its quality has not been mentioned in the passage. Hence, Option C is not the answer.

Option D: The author mentions that this is a good time for critics to try and show people what really matters. This cannot be extrapolated to assert that without critics people completely lack the comprehension about art. Further, option D is something that (apart from the phrase 'without the critic’) is more a discussion of the benefit of criticism rather than the opportunity for criticism. Hence. Option D can be eliminated.

QUESTION: 9

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Do art critics have a point anymore? Can they contribute anything to the development of art? For a long time, I've ducked this question. If you'd asked me any time over the past few years, I'd have replied that criticism does not seriously influence art. It has its own justification, however, as literature. If literature seems a pompous word, let's say entertainment. The appetite to read about art is almost as insatiable as the need to look at it; the critic provides a service that gives a chance to talk, think and tell stories about art and artists. Maybe it doesn't have any impact on art but it does occupy a place in the culture. That's what I would have said, until recently.

But that's a weak defence of criticism. The truth is that critics have been in retreat for a long time. In British art, they faced a cataclysmic loss of standing just before I came on the scene. When I was a student, the art critic whose books I bought was Peter Fuller, founder of the magazine Modern Painters and a savage critic of most trends in contemporary art. I enjoyed the provocative seriousness of his essays. I also loved the writing of Robert Hughes, another critic whose eloquence was - and is - very much at the expense of current art.

Not much newspaper criticism comes near their mark, but what critics did share, in the late 1980s, was a similar scepticism about new fashions, a "seriousness" defined by suspicion. And of course, history played a joke on these critics - even on Fuller and Hughes. While high moral disdain for shallow modern art was pouring from the printing presses, a generation of British artists led by Damien Hirst were getting away with anything they wanted - again and again and again. Words were crushed by images. Critics were reduced to the status of promoters. They had no other role.

Today I think there is an opportunity for critics again - and a need. The sheer volume and range of art that we're fed in a culture obsessed with galleries is so vast and confusing that a critic can get stuck in and make a difference. It really is time to stand up for what is good against what is meretricious. And it really is possible to find examples of excellence as well as stupidity. In other words, this is a great time to be a critic - to try to show people what really matters.

Yes, there's a staggering volume of mediocre art being talked up by fools. But there are real talents and real ideas too. The critic's task is to identify what is good and defend it come hell or high water - and to honestly denounce the bad. Art history can help in this task by enriching your perspective. Writing can give you flexibility in how and when you want to engage.

But engage we must. Engage we will.

Q. Which of the following has been dubbed as a weak defence of art criticism by the author in the first sentence of the second para?

Solution: Option A: While the author defends art criticism by saying it doesn’t have a purpose, it is in itself literature (art), the author doesn't mention that art criticism need not contribute to art. The line of reasoning was more akin to: Art criticism doesn't contribute to art. But it is important as literature/entertainment and has a place in culture. Hence, Option A is inaccurate.

Option B: Consider the sentence right before the line that points to a weak defence of criticism. 'Maybe it doesn't have any impact on art but it does occupy a place in the culture. That's what I would have said, until recently.' So, the weak defence the author is referring to is justifying art criticism as part of culture. Hence, Option B is the answer.

Option C: The expression ‘cannot be understated’ means it is already low. In other words, it is the opposite of ‘cannot be emphasized enough1 (used to convey that something is really important). Hence, Option C can be eliminated.

Option D: Art criticism probably has a place in literature, according to the author. But, the author moves on from this idea to talk about culture before making the statement about weak defence. While it can be argued that art as part of literature and art as part of culture are not separate ideas but a single, coherent idea, Option C would still be a better summation than Option D. So, while Option D is not entirely false, you may note how the author makes a concession, saying, ‘fine, if you think saying art criticism is part of literature sounds a little pompous, let's make a concession and call it entertainment.’ So, the author moves away from the idea of equating literature and culture. Hence, Option D is not the answer.

QUESTION: 10

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Do art critics have a point anymore? Can they contribute anything to the development of art? For a long time, I've ducked this question. If you'd asked me any time over the past few years, I'd have replied that criticism does not seriously influence art. It has its own justification, however, as literature. If literature seems a pompous word, let's say entertainment. The appetite to read about art is almost as insatiable as the need to look at it; the critic provides a service that gives a chance to talk, think and tell stories about art and artists. Maybe it doesn't have any impact on art but it does occupy a place in the culture. That's what I would have said, until recently.

But that's a weak defence of criticism. The truth is that critics have been in retreat for a long time. In British art, they faced a cataclysmic loss of standing just before I came on the scene. When I was a student, the art critic whose books I bought was Peter Fuller, founder of the magazine Modern Painters and a savage critic of most trends in contemporary art. I enjoyed the provocative seriousness of his essays. I also loved the writing of Robert Hughes, another critic whose eloquence was - and is - very much at the expense of current art.

Not much newspaper criticism comes near their mark, but what critics did share, in the late 1980s, was a similar scepticism about new fashions, a "seriousness" defined by suspicion. And of course, history played a joke on these critics - even on Fuller and Hughes. While high moral disdain for shallow modern art was pouring from the printing presses, a generation of British artists led by Damien Hirst were getting away with anything they wanted - again and again and again. Words were crushed by images. Critics were reduced to the status of promoters. They had no other role.

Today I think there is an opportunity for critics again - and a need. The sheer volume and range of art that we're fed in a culture obsessed with galleries is so vast and confusing that a critic can get stuck in and make a difference. It really is time to stand up for what is good against what is meretricious. And it really is possible to find examples of excellence as well as stupidity. In other words, this is a great time to be a critic - to try to show people what really matters.

Yes, there's a staggering volume of mediocre art being talked up by fools. But there are real talents and real ideas too. The critic's task is to identify what is good and defend it come hell or high water - and to honestly denounce the bad. Art history can help in this task by enriching your perspective. Writing can give you flexibility in how and when you want to engage.

But engage we must. Engage we will.

Q. The author uses the metaphorical expression ‘words were crushed by images’ to describe how

Solution: While [high moral disdain for shallow modern art was pouring from the printing presses] (positive for art critics), [a generation of British artists led by Damien Hirst were getting away with anything they wanted - again and again and again (negative for art critics]. Words were crushed by images. Critics were reduced to the status of promoters. They had no other role.

The image reference has to be about the art of people like Damien Hirst which got away with shallow modern art.

Option A: The need for critics arising because of a staggering amount of art being produced, has been mentioned in a latter para, and not in this context. Also, the comparison is between art and words and there is nothing about quantity. Hence, Option A is not the answer.

Option B: Words (art criticism) were crushed by images (art, probably shallow modern art). That is the real conflict. The idiom 'couldn't hold its ground' means couldn't resist anymore/ crushed/ defeated. However, the conflict depicted here is art criticism versus shallow modem art criticism. Hence, Option B is not the answer.

Option C: The popularity of [certain artists] (images, specifically created by Hirst and a generation of British artists) superseded (defeated) the popularity of [art criticism] (words). They were able to get away with whatever they wanted despite art critics calling their art shallow. Hence, this option represents the conflict. Option C is the answer.

Option D: This was a consequence of words being crushed by images. After words were crushed by images, art critics were reduced to promoters of art. They couldn't criticise anymore, because the patrons of art criticism disappeared. Hence, Option D was not the purpose of the author to use the metaphor.

QUESTION: 11

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Do art critics have a point anymore? Can they contribute anything to the development of art? For a long time, I've ducked this question. If you'd asked me any time over the past few years, I'd have replied that criticism does not seriously influence art. It has its own justification, however, as literature. If literature seems a pompous word, let's say entertainment. The appetite to read about art is almost as insatiable as the need to look at it; the critic provides a service that gives a chance to talk, think and tell stories about art and artists. Maybe it doesn't have any impact on art but it does occupy a place in the culture. That's what I would have said, until recently.

But that's a weak defence of criticism. The truth is that critics have been in retreat for a long time. In British art, they faced a cataclysmic loss of standing just before I came on the scene. When I was a student, the art critic whose books I bought was Peter Fuller, founder of the magazine Modern Painters and a savage critic of most trends in contemporary art. I enjoyed the provocative seriousness of his essays. I also loved the writing of Robert Hughes, another critic whose eloquence was - and is - very much at the expense of current art.

Not much newspaper criticism comes near their mark, but what critics did share, in the late 1980s, was a similar scepticism about new fashions, a "seriousness" defined by suspicion. And of course, history played a joke on these critics - even on Fuller and Hughes. While high moral disdain for shallow modern art was pouring from the printing presses, a generation of British artists led by Damien Hirst were getting away with anything they wanted - again and again and again. Words were crushed by images. Critics were reduced to the status of promoters. They had no other role.

Today I think there is an opportunity for critics again - and a need. The sheer volume and range of art that we're fed in a culture obsessed with galleries is so vast and confusing that a critic can get stuck in and make a difference. It really is time to stand up for what is good against what is meretricious. And it really is possible to find examples of excellence as well as stupidity. In other words, this is a great time to be a critic - to try to show people what really matters.

Yes, there's a staggering volume of mediocre art being talked up by fools. But there are real talents and real ideas too. The critic's task is to identify what is good and defend it come hell or high water - and to honestly denounce the bad. Art history can help in this task by enriching your perspective. Writing can give you flexibility in how and when you want to engage.

But engage we must. Engage we will.

Q. The joke history played on critics like Fuller and Hughes is that

Solution: And of course, history plaved a joke on these critics - even on Fuller and Hughes. While high moral disdain for shallow modern art was pouring from the printing presses, a generation of British artists led by Damien Hirst were getting away with anything they wanted - again and again and again. Words were crushed by images. Critics were reduced to the status of promoters. They had no other role.

The joke could be explained in two parts: Despite the disdain for shallow art, some artists got away with anything they wanted (you only get away with something that is unacceptable usually, and not with something good). Secondly, art critics, once a powerful voice, lost their role and were now just promoting art (to survive probably). Option A: This is against modern art and therefore, positive about art criticism. We are looking for something that is negative about art criticism. Hence, Option A is not the answer.

Option B: Morality isn't part of this discussion. We are discussing the conflict between words and images, art criticism and shallow modem art. ‘Shallow’ doesn't have a morality-related context either. Hence, Option B is not the answer.

Option C: This option indicates that the art critics once had a role. Now, all they do is promote the same art that critics probably fought against. Their scepticism (their reservations against modern art or new art or contemporary art) didn't have value. Instead, their only role now was promotion (endorsement). Hence, Option C is the answer.

Option D: This option somehow seems to indicate that the popularity of modern art is a consequence of art criticism. That is not true. It is a cause-effect relationship that has not been established in the passage. Art criticism and its importance waned as certain artists got away with whatever art they made. This may not have resulted from the disdain or criticism of the art. Hence, Option D is not the answer.

QUESTION: 12

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Do art critics have a point anymore? Can they contribute anything to the development of art? For a long time, I've ducked this question. If you'd asked me any time over the past few years, I'd have replied that criticism does not seriously influence art. It has its own justification, however, as literature. If literature seems a pompous word, let's say entertainment. The appetite to read about art is almost as insatiable as the need to look at it; the critic provides a service that gives a chance to talk, think and tell stories about art and artists. Maybe it doesn't have any impact on art but it does occupy a place in the culture. That's what I would have said, until recently.

But that's a weak defence of criticism. The truth is that critics have been in retreat for a long time. In British art, they faced a cataclysmic loss of standing just before I came on the scene. When I was a student, the art critic whose books I bought was Peter Fuller, founder of the magazine Modern Painters and a savage critic of most trends in contemporary art. I enjoyed the provocative seriousness of his essays. I also loved the writing of Robert Hughes, another critic whose eloquence was - and is - very much at the expense of current art.

Not much newspaper criticism comes near their mark, but what critics did share, in the late 1980s, was a similar scepticism about new fashions, a "seriousness" defined by suspicion. And of course, history played a joke on these critics - even on Fuller and Hughes. While high moral disdain for shallow modern art was pouring from the printing presses, a generation of British artists led by Damien Hirst were getting away with anything they wanted - again and again and again. Words were crushed by images. Critics were reduced to the status of promoters. They had no other role.

Today I think there is an opportunity for critics again - and a need. The sheer volume and range of art that we're fed in a culture obsessed with galleries is so vast and confusing that a critic can get stuck in and make a difference. It really is time to stand up for what is good against what is meretricious. And it really is possible to find examples of excellence as well as stupidity. In other words, this is a great time to be a critic - to try to show people what really matters.

Yes, there's a staggering volume of mediocre art being talked up by fools. But there are real talents and real ideas too. The critic's task is to identify what is good and defend it come hell or high water - and to honestly denounce the bad. Art history can help in this task by enriching your perspective. Writing can give you flexibility in how and when you want to engage.

But engage we must. Engage we will.

Q. The role of the art critic, according to the author, does not include

Solution: Option A: While there are real talents and ideas, the author urges art critics to defend good art and good talent and criticise bad art and bad talent (if such a thing exists). But, there is no evidence to state that the author thinks the criticism should be personal. It is about defending and criticising good and bad art, not artists. Hence, defending talented artists and criticising mediocre artists is not something the author ascribes to the art critic as his or her duty. Hence, Option A is the answer.

Option B: 'But there are real talents and real ideas too. The critic's task is to identify what is good and defend it come hell or high water - and to honestly denounce the bad.’ From this sentence, we can understand that the author thinks art critics should take a stand on the quality of ideas related to art (artistic). Hence, Option B is not the answer.

Option C: From this sentence, The critic's task is to identify what is good and defend it come hell or high water - and to honestly denounce the bad’ we can clearly say that the author thinks art critics should defend good art and criticise/censure/denounce bad art. Hence, Option C is not the answer.

Option D: Consider the sentences: 'Writing can give you flexibility in how and when you want to engage. But engage we must. Engage we will.’ The author urges art critics to engage (discuss art). Hence, Option D is not the answer.

QUESTION: 13

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Western politics has, it is argued, become more tribal. Tribes are distinguished from other human groups by their relatively clear social boundaries, often defined by kinship and demarcated territory. It’s clear that our political groups are increasingly based on single aspects of common identity with unambiguous boundaries, such as race and educational status.

Equally undeniable, however, is that most commentators vastly misunderstand the nature of tribes. The mistaken view of tribes as primitive, violent, and insular is already having pernicious effects on our response to this new era of politics. If we hope to live productively in this new political era, it helps to understand what tribes actually are - and how, rather than simply being the cause of our political problems, tribalism can also contribute to the solution.

Our colloquial evocation of tribalism mostly reflects outmoded anthropology. Scientists once believed that tribes were defined by their rigid social structures which were coercive; tribes were thought to be able to integrate their individual members only through the stultifying and imposed repetition of social customs.

But, years of empirical studies of actual tribes show that even as they are defined by relatively narrow identities, they are also characterized by porous boundaries. Tribes continually sample one another’s practices and social forms. Speaking about American Indians, James Boon, a Princeton anthropologist, noted that “each tribal population appears almost to toy with patterns that are fundamental to its neighbours.” Tribes also frequently adopt outsiders. Among certain tribes in North Africa, members could voluntarily leave their own tribe and join another.

Reciprocity, too, is a central part of traditional tribal life. Moral or material indebtedness, they know, can serve as the foundation of a strong relationship. It is common amongst the Berbers of North Africa, for example - for leaders to be chosen or ratified by the group’s opponents on the theory that one’s current enemy may later be an ally.

Many tribes - among them the Mae Enga of Papua New Guinea and the Lozi of Central Africa - also share the common practice of marrying members of enemy tribes to reduce the likelihood of internecine warfare. As a result of intermarriage and trading relations, a high proportion of tribes are multilingual.

Nor are tribes inherently authoritarian. Tribes often do not like too much power in too few hands for too long a period of time, and hence, employ a wide variety of practices that redistribute power.

This might sound quite distant from the partisan tribes of our present politics, which seem mostly to be characterized by their pugnaciousness. But the point is that, anthropologically, narrow identity groups such as tribes aren’t defined by exclusionary traits. The existence of narrow group identities doesn’t imply hostility among such groups.

Indeed, there is a reason that tribes historically have not embraced the rigid structural identities and institutions evident in our politics today. Excluding immigrants or cultural outsiders in the name of social solidarity comes at a price. Actual tribes know that social isolation limits their flexibility. But, we can only sustainably avoid paying such costs when we understand that resorting to defensive boundaries, even when we have gone “tribal,” is not our natural default position.

If politicians and ordinary citizens insist on using tribal metaphors to define our present identity politics, we need a more apt metaphor to understand tribes themselves. We could do worse than to think of tribes as amoebas, entities whose very shape adapts to fit changing circumstances.

Q. Which fundamental distinction between tribalism and present politics does the author allude to in the first sentence of the eighth para: ‘This might sound … present politics’?

Solution: Consider the sentences preceding the given statement: ‘Nor are tribes inherently authoritarian. Tribes often do not like too much power in too few hands for too long a period of time, and hence, employ a wide variety of practices that redistribute power.' The fundamental distinction the author alludes to (indirectly remarks, implies) is that tribes are not greedy for power and in fact, have mechanisms to make sure power is redistributed.

Option A: Tribes redistribute power and do not like power being concentrated in a few hands. Hence, it is possible to infer that (please note, it is a possibility, not a concrete fact) tribes don't demonstrate the greed for power evident in political hostilities. Hence, Option A is the answer.

Option B: Tribes are less pugnacious (belligerent, aggressive, ready for a fight) than present politics, as inferred from the passage as understood from the sentence This might sound quite distant from the partisan tribes of our present politics, which seem mostly to be characterized by their pugnaciousness. Hence, Option B can be eliminated.

Option C; Narrow group identities in politics doesn't imply hostility as it does in tribalism - this suggests that in tribalism narrow group identities imply hostility and not so in politics. That is the opposite of what the author intends to convey. This can be understood from the statements: ‘But the point is that, anthropologically, narrow identity groups such as tribes aren’t defined by exclusionary traits. The existence of narrow group identities doesn't imply hostility among such groups' Hence, Option C is not the answer.

Option D: Tribes being fundamentally inclined to centralise power, contradicts the idea expressed by the author. Tribes loved decentralisation of power - employed a wide variety of practices that redistribute power. Hence, Option D is not the answer.

QUESTION: 14

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Western politics has, it is argued, become more tribal. Tribes are distinguished from other human groups by their relatively clear social boundaries, often defined by kinship and demarcated territory. It’s clear that our political groups are increasingly based on single aspects of common identity with unambiguous boundaries, such as race and educational status.

Equally undeniable, however, is that most commentators vastly misunderstand the nature of tribes. The mistaken view of tribes as primitive, violent, and insular is already having pernicious effects on our response to this new era of politics. If we hope to live productively in this new political era, it helps to understand what tribes actually are - and how, rather than simply being the cause of our political problems, tribalism can also contribute to the solution.

Our colloquial evocation of tribalism mostly reflects outmoded anthropology. Scientists once believed that tribes were defined by their rigid social structures which were coercive; tribes were thought to be able to integrate their individual members only through the stultifying and imposed repetition of social customs.

But, years of empirical studies of actual tribes show that even as they are defined by relatively narrow identities, they are also characterized by porous boundaries. Tribes continually sample one another’s practices and social forms. Speaking about American Indians, James Boon, a Princeton anthropologist, noted that “each tribal population appears almost to toy with patterns that are fundamental to its neighbours.” Tribes also frequently adopt outsiders. Among certain tribes in North Africa, members could voluntarily leave their own tribe and join another.

Reciprocity, too, is a central part of traditional tribal life. Moral or material indebtedness, they know, can serve as the foundation of a strong relationship. It is common amongst the Berbers of North Africa, for example - for leaders to be chosen or ratified by the group’s opponents on the theory that one’s current enemy may later be an ally.

Many tribes - among them the Mae Enga of Papua New Guinea and the Lozi of Central Africa - also share the common practice of marrying members of enemy tribes to reduce the likelihood of internecine warfare. As a result of intermarriage and trading relations, a high proportion of tribes are multilingual.

Nor are tribes inherently authoritarian. Tribes often do not like too much power in too few hands for too long a period of time, and hence, employ a wide variety of practices that redistribute power.

This might sound quite distant from the partisan tribes of our present politics, which seem mostly to be characterized by their pugnaciousness. But the point is that, anthropologically, narrow identity groups such as tribes aren’t defined by exclusionary traits. The existence of narrow group identities doesn’t imply hostility among such groups.

Indeed, there is a reason that tribes historically have not embraced the rigid structural identities and institutions evident in our politics today. Excluding immigrants or cultural outsiders in the name of social solidarity comes at a price. Actual tribes know that social isolation limits their flexibility. But, we can only sustainably avoid paying such costs when we understand that resorting to defensive boundaries, even when we have gone “tribal,” is not our natural default position.

If politicians and ordinary citizens insist on using tribal metaphors to define our present identity politics, we need a more apt metaphor to understand tribes themselves. We could do worse than to think of tribes as amoebas, entities whose very shape adapts to fit changing circumstances.

Q. The author has a bone to pick against ‘our colloquial evocation of tribalism’. Which of the following best captures it?

Solution: ‘Bone to pick’ is a grievance/complaint/something that needs to be sorted out. Consider the sentences: ‘If we hope to live productively in this new political era, it helps to understand what tribes actually are — and how. rather than simply being the cause of our political problems, tribalism can also contribute to the solution. Our colloquial evocation of tribalism mostly reflects outmoded anthropology.' So, the author calls colloquial evocation of tribalism incorrect because it is based on anthropology that is outmoded/obsolete/inaccurate - probably hinting at a misunderstanding of tribes.

Option A: ‘Anthropological methods irrelevant with the present political era' seems to suggest that the methods are right, just that they don't match the present situation. The author clearly mentions in the passage that our view of tribes is mistaken (not just irrelevant). Also, outmoded anthropology suggests ‘an obsolete, primitive, probably inaccurate way of looking at tribes’ and doesn’t necessarily mean ‘methods’ existed to study tribes. Hence, Option A is not the answer.

Option B: This option seems to suggest that the habits/customs/practices of tribes now is different from tribes in the past. That is not true according to the passage because the author didn't make that distinction between tribes now and tribes then. Hence, Option B is not the answer.

Option C: Our colloquial evocation of tribalism is laced with misconceptions. Misconception means a mistaken view of something, a misunderstanding. This option represents the author’s criticism of the way tribalism is spoken about in colloquial (contemporary casual language) usage. Hence, Option C is the answer.

Option D: This option is in itself a mistaken view about tribes, which the author seems to correct in the passage. This option therefore, cannot represent the criticism the author has for colloquial evocation of the word ‘tribalism’. Hence, Option D is not the answer.

QUESTION: 15

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Western politics has, it is argued, become more tribal. Tribes are distinguished from other human groups by their relatively clear social boundaries, often defined by kinship and demarcated territory. It’s clear that our political groups are increasingly based on single aspects of common identity with unambiguous boundaries, such as race and educational status.

Equally undeniable, however, is that most commentators vastly misunderstand the nature of tribes. The mistaken view of tribes as primitive, violent, and insular is already having pernicious effects on our response to this new era of politics. If we hope to live productively in this new political era, it helps to understand what tribes actually are - and how, rather than simply being the cause of our political problems, tribalism can also contribute to the solution.

Our colloquial evocation of tribalism mostly reflects outmoded anthropology. Scientists once believed that tribes were defined by their rigid social structures which were coercive; tribes were thought to be able to integrate their individual members only through the stultifying and imposed repetition of social customs.

But, years of empirical studies of actual tribes show that even as they are defined by relatively narrow identities, they are also characterized by porous boundaries. Tribes continually sample one another’s practices and social forms. Speaking about American Indians, James Boon, a Princeton anthropologist, noted that “each tribal population appears almost to toy with patterns that are fundamental to its neighbours.” Tribes also frequently adopt outsiders. Among certain tribes in North Africa, members could voluntarily leave their own tribe and join another.

Reciprocity, too, is a central part of traditional tribal life. Moral or material indebtedness, they know, can serve as the foundation of a strong relationship. It is common amongst the Berbers of North Africa, for example - for leaders to be chosen or ratified by the group’s opponents on the theory that one’s current enemy may later be an ally.

Many tribes - among them the Mae Enga of Papua New Guinea and the Lozi of Central Africa - also share the common practice of marrying members of enemy tribes to reduce the likelihood of internecine warfare. As a result of intermarriage and trading relations, a high proportion of tribes are multilingual.

Nor are tribes inherently authoritarian. Tribes often do not like too much power in too few hands for too long a period of time, and hence, employ a wide variety of practices that redistribute power.

This might sound quite distant from the partisan tribes of our present politics, which seem mostly to be characterized by their pugnaciousness. But the point is that, anthropologically, narrow identity groups such as tribes aren’t defined by exclusionary traits. The existence of narrow group identities doesn’t imply hostility among such groups.

Indeed, there is a reason that tribes historically have not embraced the rigid structural identities and institutions evident in our politics today. Excluding immigrants or cultural outsiders in the name of social solidarity comes at a price. Actual tribes know that social isolation limits their flexibility. But, we can only sustainably avoid paying such costs when we understand that resorting to defensive boundaries, even when we have gone “tribal,” is not our natural default position.

If politicians and ordinary citizens insist on using tribal metaphors to define our present identity politics, we need a more apt metaphor to understand tribes themselves. We could do worse than to think of tribes as amoebas, entities whose very shape adapts to fit changing circumstances.

Q. The attribute about tribalism that the author demonstrates by citing James Boon is

Solution: Consider the sentence: ‘Speaking about American Indians, James Boon, a Princeton anthropologist, noted that “each tribal population appears almost to toy with patterns that are fundamental to its neighbours'". Boon seems to suggest that tribal populations were open to trying out (toy/experiment/try) the patterns and principles of their neighbours.

Option A: According to Boon, tribes were open to toying or indulging or trying out their neighbours' fundamental principles. This option contradicts that idea (strong rejection, the option says). Hence, Option A is not the answer.

Option B: Boycott is a negative word. Option B contradicts the idea mentioned in the statement that tribes were open to learning from each other or adopting each other's ideas. Hence, Option B is not the answer.

Option C: Demonstrating the narrow identity is akin to proving that tribes were very particular and rigid about their customs/rituals and practices. Once again, it is contrary to the opinion of Boon who felt tribes toyed with each other’s principles. Option C is not the answer.

Option D: The tribes were willing to adopt other principles and patterns, according to Boon, as suggested by the practice of toying with other tribes’ patterns. This option is also the only positive option, and hence, can be picked on tone, since Boon's statement was to show that tribes had porous boundaries and that ‘Tribes continually sample one another’s practices and social forms.' Hence, Option D is the answer.

QUESTION: 16

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Western politics has, it is argued, become more tribal. Tribes are distinguished from other human groups by their relatively clear social boundaries, often defined by kinship and demarcated territory. It’s clear that our political groups are increasingly based on single aspects of common identity with unambiguous boundaries, such as race and educational status.

Equally undeniable, however, is that most commentators vastly misunderstand the nature of tribes. The mistaken view of tribes as primitive, violent, and insular is already having pernicious effects on our response to this new era of politics. If we hope to live productively in this new political era, it helps to understand what tribes actually are - and how, rather than simply being the cause of our political problems, tribalism can also contribute to the solution.

Our colloquial evocation of tribalism mostly reflects outmoded anthropology. Scientists once believed that tribes were defined by their rigid social structures which were coercive; tribes were thought to be able to integrate their individual members only through the stultifying and imposed repetition of social customs.

But, years of empirical studies of actual tribes show that even as they are defined by relatively narrow identities, they are also characterized by porous boundaries. Tribes continually sample one another’s practices and social forms. Speaking about American Indians, James Boon, a Princeton anthropologist, noted that “each tribal population appears almost to toy with patterns that are fundamental to its neighbours.” Tribes also frequently adopt outsiders. Among certain tribes in North Africa, members could voluntarily leave their own tribe and join another.

Reciprocity, too, is a central part of traditional tribal life. Moral or material indebtedness, they know, can serve as the foundation of a strong relationship. It is common amongst the Berbers of North Africa, for example - for leaders to be chosen or ratified by the group’s opponents on the theory that one’s current enemy may later be an ally.

Many tribes - among them the Mae Enga of Papua New Guinea and the Lozi of Central Africa - also share the common practice of marrying members of enemy tribes to reduce the likelihood of internecine warfare. As a result of intermarriage and trading relations, a high proportion of tribes are multilingual.

Nor are tribes inherently authoritarian. Tribes often do not like too much power in too few hands for too long a period of time, and hence, employ a wide variety of practices that redistribute power.

This might sound quite distant from the partisan tribes of our present politics, which seem mostly to be characterized by their pugnaciousness. But the point is that, anthropologically, narrow identity groups such as tribes aren’t defined by exclusionary traits. The existence of narrow group identities doesn’t imply hostility among such groups.

Indeed, there is a reason that tribes historically have not embraced the rigid structural identities and institutions evident in our politics today. Excluding immigrants or cultural outsiders in the name of social solidarity comes at a price. Actual tribes know that social isolation limits their flexibility. But, we can only sustainably avoid paying such costs when we understand that resorting to defensive boundaries, even when we have gone “tribal,” is not our natural default position.

If politicians and ordinary citizens insist on using tribal metaphors to define our present identity politics, we need a more apt metaphor to understand tribes themselves. We could do worse than to think of tribes as amoebas, entities whose very shape adapts to fit changing circumstances.

Q. The author mentions the Berbers of North Africa to highlight that

Solution: Consider the sentences: Reciprocity, too, is a central oart of traditional tribal life. Moral or material indebtedness, they know, can serve as the foundation of a strong relationship. It is common amongst the Berbers of North Africa, for example — for leaders to be chosen or ratified by the group’s opponents on the theory that one’s current enemy may later be an ally.’ The author mentions Berbers of North Africa as an example to show how tribal groups often rely on each other for advice (ratification of leaders, a highly sensitive issue), believing today’s enemies could be tomorrow’s allies.

Option A: The Berbers were mentioned not to highlight ‘adopting outsiders’ but to demonstrate collaboration/reciprocity. Berbers didn't adopt any outsiders as per the passage. Hence, Option A can be eliminated.

Option B: No distinction was made by the author between ancient and modem tribes. Right through the passage, tribalism was spoken about as one entity with certain characteristic traits. Hence, Option B can be eliminated.

Option C: The Berbers were a good example of how tribes were open to reciprocating, and were receptive to each other, giving even their enemies importance. Hence, this option can be justified. Option C is the answer.

Option D: Internecine (wars within each other) conflict was mentioned in the passage, but the Berbers were not the example provided for the same. Berbers were mentioned to show how they considered one other’s opinions. Internecine conflict was avoided through marriage and trade within tribes, but that is far-removed from the example of Berbers. Option D is not the answer.

QUESTION: 17

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Western politics has, it is argued, become more tribal. Tribes are distinguished from other human groups by their relatively clear social boundaries, often defined by kinship and demarcated territory. It’s clear that our political groups are increasingly based on single aspects of common identity with unambiguous boundaries, such as race and educational status.

Equally undeniable, however, is that most commentators vastly misunderstand the nature of tribes. The mistaken view of tribes as primitive, violent, and insular is already having pernicious effects on our response to this new era of politics. If we hope to live productively in this new political era, it helps to understand what tribes actually are - and how, rather than simply being the cause of our political problems, tribalism can also contribute to the solution.

Our colloquial evocation of tribalism mostly reflects outmoded anthropology. Scientists once believed that tribes were defined by their rigid social structures which were coercive; tribes were thought to be able to integrate their individual members only through the stultifying and imposed repetition of social customs.

But, years of empirical studies of actual tribes show that even as they are defined by relatively narrow identities, they are also characterized by porous boundaries. Tribes continually sample one another’s practices and social forms. Speaking about American Indians, James Boon, a Princeton anthropologist, noted that “each tribal population appears almost to toy with patterns that are fundamental to its neighbours.” Tribes also frequently adopt outsiders. Among certain tribes in North Africa, members could voluntarily leave their own tribe and join another.

Reciprocity, too, is a central part of traditional tribal life. Moral or material indebtedness, they know, can serve as the foundation of a strong relationship. It is common amongst the Berbers of North Africa, for example - for leaders to be chosen or ratified by the group’s opponents on the theory that one’s current enemy may later be an ally.

Many tribes - among them the Mae Enga of Papua New Guinea and the Lozi of Central Africa - also share the common practice of marrying members of enemy tribes to reduce the likelihood of internecine warfare. As a result of intermarriage and trading relations, a high proportion of tribes are multilingual.

Nor are tribes inherently authoritarian. Tribes often do not like too much power in too few hands for too long a period of time, and hence, employ a wide variety of practices that redistribute power.

This might sound quite distant from the partisan tribes of our present politics, which seem mostly to be characterized by their pugnaciousness. But the point is that, anthropologically, narrow identity groups such as tribes aren’t defined by exclusionary traits. The existence of narrow group identities doesn’t imply hostility among such groups.

Indeed, there is a reason that tribes historically have not embraced the rigid structural identities and institutions evident in our politics today. Excluding immigrants or cultural outsiders in the name of social solidarity comes at a price. Actual tribes know that social isolation limits their flexibility. But, we can only sustainably avoid paying such costs when we understand that resorting to defensive boundaries, even when we have gone “tribal,” is not our natural default position.

If politicians and ordinary citizens insist on using tribal metaphors to define our present identity politics, we need a more apt metaphor to understand tribes themselves. We could do worse than to think of tribes as amoebas, entities whose very shape adapts to fit changing circumstances.

Q. Which of the following best captures the essence of the author’s exhortation in the last para of the passage, ‘We could do worse … circumstances’?

Solution: Consider the sentences: “If politicians and ordinary citizens insist on using tribal metaphors to define our present identity politics, we need a more apt metaphor to understand tribes themselves We could do worse than to think of tribes as amoebas, entities whose very shape adapts to fit changing circumstances.’ From the sentence ‘whose very shape adapts to fit changing circumstances', we can understand that the author mentions amoebas and other such entities in a positive light, for flexibility and porous boundaries have been discussed positively in the passage and tribalism has been defended as something that doesn't subscribe to rigid boundaries as commonly misunderstood. In short, the author suggests there are worse things to do that to think of tribes as shape-shifting amoebas - it is fine to think of tribes as shape-shifting amoebas.

Option A: The term ‘trivial entities' means entities which are insignificant. The passage doesn’t discuss tribes as insignificant entities. Rather it argues against thinking of tribalism as a negative word. Hence, Option A is off the mark.

Option B: The author suggests that we need a good metaphor for tribes if we intend to use tribalism as a metaphor for present-day politics. The author then goes on to say how ‘amoeba’ is a good option (we can do worse than this...so this is not so bad). Hence, Option B captures the essence of the author's exhortation (advice) in the last para well. Option B is the answer.

Option C: Two things are wrong with this option. Tribal metaphors’ distorts the meaning of what the author wanted to say, completely. Tribal metaphors could mean metaphors picked out of the daily life/customs of tribes. The author is talking about using tribe itself as a metaphor for politics. Secondly, the author doesn’t want us to avoid using tribe as a metaphor. The author says, if we want to use tribe as a metaphor we should find a better metaphor for tribe itself — we should understand tribalism better, firstly.

Option D: This particular option casts tribalism in a negative light in strong contrast to the essence of the passage, where tribalism was defended and shown in a positive light. Hence, Option D is easy to eliminate.

QUESTION: 18

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Western politics has, it is argued, become more tribal. Tribes are distinguished from other human groups by their relatively clear social boundaries, often defined by kinship and demarcated territory. It’s clear that our political groups are increasingly based on single aspects of common identity with unambiguous boundaries, such as race and educational status.

Equally undeniable, however, is that most commentators vastly misunderstand the nature of tribes. The mistaken view of tribes as primitive, violent, and insular is already having pernicious effects on our response to this new era of politics. If we hope to live productively in this new political era, it helps to understand what tribes actually are - and how, rather than simply being the cause of our political problems, tribalism can also contribute to the solution.

Our colloquial evocation of tribalism mostly reflects outmoded anthropology. Scientists once believed that tribes were defined by their rigid social structures which were coercive; tribes were thought to be able to integrate their individual members only through the stultifying and imposed repetition of social customs.

But, years of empirical studies of actual tribes show that even as they are defined by relatively narrow identities, they are also characterized by porous boundaries. Tribes continually sample one another’s practices and social forms. Speaking about American Indians, James Boon, a Princeton anthropologist, noted that “each tribal population appears almost to toy with patterns that are fundamental to its neighbours.” Tribes also frequently adopt outsiders. Among certain tribes in North Africa, members could voluntarily leave their own tribe and join another.

Reciprocity, too, is a central part of traditional tribal life. Moral or material indebtedness, they know, can serve as the foundation of a strong relationship. It is common amongst the Berbers of North Africa, for example - for leaders to be chosen or ratified by the group’s opponents on the theory that one’s current enemy may later be an ally.

Many tribes - among them the Mae Enga of Papua New Guinea and the Lozi of Central Africa - also share the common practice of marrying members of enemy tribes to reduce the likelihood of internecine warfare. As a result of intermarriage and trading relations, a high proportion of tribes are multilingual.

Nor are tribes inherently authoritarian. Tribes often do not like too much power in too few hands for too long a period of time, and hence, employ a wide variety of practices that redistribute power.

This might sound quite distant from the partisan tribes of our present politics, which seem mostly to be characterized by their pugnaciousness. But the point is that, anthropologically, narrow identity groups such as tribes aren’t defined by exclusionary traits. The existence of narrow group identities doesn’t imply hostility among such groups.

Indeed, there is a reason that tribes historically have not embraced the rigid structural identities and institutions evident in our politics today. Excluding immigrants or cultural outsiders in the name of social solidarity comes at a price. Actual tribes know that social isolation limits their flexibility. But, we can only sustainably avoid paying such costs when we understand that resorting to defensive boundaries, even when we have gone “tribal,” is not our natural default position.

If politicians and ordinary citizens insist on using tribal metaphors to define our present identity politics, we need a more apt metaphor to understand tribes themselves. We could do worse than to think of tribes as amoebas, entities whose very shape adapts to fit changing circumstances.

Q. What does the author recommend for those who hope to live productively in this new political era?

Solution: Consider the sentences: ‘Equally undeniable, however, is that most commentators vastly misunderstand the nature of tribes. The mistaken view of tribes as primitive, violent, and insular is already having pernicious effects on our response to this new era of politics. If [we hope to live productively in this new political era], it helps to understand - [what tribes actually are] — and [how] rather than simply being the cause of our political problems, [tribalism can also contribute to the solution].’

From the underlined portions we can understand that the author’s recommendation to live productively is to a. understand what tribes are b. understand how tribalism can contribute to the solution.

Option A: This is a restatement of ‘how rather than simply being the cause of our political problems, tribalism can also contribute to the solution. So, the author doesn’t absolve tribalism of all its negative connotations. We can see that the author says there are similarities between our political problems and tribalism. But it is also important to understand that the same ‘tribalism’ can be followed to solve problems as well. Hence, Option A is the answer.

Option B: ‘Pernicious’ means ‘harmful’. The author says that the mistaken view about tribalism has pernicious effects. As a result, the author recommends the mistaken view to be dispelled, not the pernicious effects (since we didn’t discuss what the pernicious effects actually are). Hence, Option B is not the answer.

Option C: The author's suggestion is not for people to understand that tribalism is the cause of political problems. The author's suggestion is for people to understand that while tribalism may be the cause of political problems, tribalism could also offer a solution to political problems. Hence, Option C is not the answer.

Option D: According to the sentence, ‘Equally undeniable, however, is that most commentators vastly misunderstand the nature of tribes’, the commentators have misunderstood tribalism. So, the author’s recommendation is definitely not for us to stop denying what the commentators feel. The author has censured the opinion of the commentators here. Hence, Option D is not the answer.

QUESTION: 19

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of three questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

More than 7,000 years ago, people living in the Middle East discovered that they could ferment grapes to make wine. As with wine, the processing of coffee beans and cacao, used to make chocolate, also requires some fermentation. Cacao originated in the Amazon and was widely cultivated in Central America before Hernán Cortés brought it to the Old World in 1530. From Ethiopia, coffee was disseminated throughout the Middle East by Arab traders during the 6th century and it ultimately arrived in the New World during the 17th century. Over the next three centuries, other trading nations completed coffee’s worldwide dissemination and set it up as a mainstay crop of many of the world’s poorest economies. Cacao was treated in much the same way and is now grown in 33 tropical countries.

Given this history, Aimée Dudley and Justin Fay of the University of Washington wondered if the yeasts associated with cacao and coffee followed these plants from their places of origin just as yeasts had followed wine from the Middle East.

They collected unroasted cacao beans from 13 countries, including Haiti, Colombia, Ghana, Madagascar and Papua New Guinea, and unroasted coffee beans from 14 locations, including Ethiopia, Hawaii, Honduras, Indonesia and Yemen. They then set about studying the yeast found on the beans. As a control, the team also studied the yeasts on grapes from diverse locations.

As they report in Current Biology, although all vineyard-yeast strains are extremely similar genetically, there is tremendous diversity among the yeast strains associated with cacao and coffee. Further, all cacao beans collected from Venezuela carried closely related strains of yeast that were distinct from those found on Nigerian and Ecuadorian beans. The same was true for the yeasts found on coffee. The use of starter yeast culture is very rare in the processing of cacao and coffee, where growers tend to rely upon the species of yeast found locally.

This greater diversity of cacao and coffee yeasts means there is the potential to create new flavours by using a strain from one location in another. No one knows what the resulting coffee and chocolate might taste like, but if Dr Dudley and her colleagues are correct in their hunch, there will be many new flavours for coffee lovers and chocoholics to savour.

Q. Which of the following, if true, would strengthen the researchers’ finding that “all vineyard-yeast strains are extremely similar genetically”?

Solution: All vineyard-yeast strains are extremely similar genetically.

Option A: If oak barrels exported from an established winemaking region serve as reservoirs of yeasts native to the original location (in an area of new cultivation), then the yeasts will get introduced in the new location. This will re-inforce the view that all vineyard-yeast strains are extremely similar genetically. Choice A is correct.

Option B: The use of starter yeast culture is very rare in the processing of cacao and coffee, where growers tend to rely upon the species of yeast found locally. If winemakers have used starter cultures of yeast from places that have traditionally produced wines, then it will strengthen the author's assertion that “all vineyard-yeast strains are extremely similar genetically". Choice B is correct.

Option C: The advantages mentioned in choice C will make yeasts native to the original location superior and if they are favoured in new vineyards of the world, then all vineyard-yeast strains will be extremely similar genetically. Choice C is also correct.

QUESTION: 20

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of three questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

More than 7,000 years ago, people living in the Middle East discovered that they could ferment grapes to make wine. As with wine, the processing of coffee beans and cacao, used to make chocolate, also requires some fermentation. Cacao originated in the Amazon and was widely cultivated in Central America before Hernán Cortés brought it to the Old World in 1530. From Ethiopia, coffee was disseminated throughout the Middle East by Arab traders during the 6th century and it ultimately arrived in the New World during the 17th century. Over the next three centuries, other trading nations completed coffee’s worldwide dissemination and set it up as a mainstay crop of many of the world’s poorest economies. Cacao was treated in much the same way and is now grown in 33 tropical countries.

Given this history, Aimée Dudley and Justin Fay of the University of Washington wondered if the yeasts associated with cacao and coffee followed these plants from their places of origin just as yeasts had followed wine from the Middle East.

They collected unroasted cacao beans from 13 countries, including Haiti, Colombia, Ghana, Madagascar and Papua New Guinea, and unroasted coffee beans from 14 locations, including Ethiopia, Hawaii, Honduras, Indonesia and Yemen. They then set about studying the yeast found on the beans. As a control, the team also studied the yeasts on grapes from diverse locations.

As they report in Current Biology, although all vineyard-yeast strains are extremely similar genetically, there is tremendous diversity among the yeast strains associated with cacao and coffee. Further, all cacao beans collected from Venezuela carried closely related strains of yeast that were distinct from those found on Nigerian and Ecuadorian beans. The same was true for the yeasts found on coffee. The use of starter yeast culture is very rare in the processing of cacao and coffee, where growers tend to rely upon the species of yeast found locally.

This greater diversity of cacao and coffee yeasts means there is the potential to create new flavours by using a strain from one location in another. No one knows what the resulting coffee and chocolate might taste like, but if Dr Dudley and her colleagues are correct in their hunch, there will be many new flavours for coffee lovers and chocoholics to savour.

Q. Which of the following best summarises the content of the passage?

Solution: Option A: The research findings do not point to the fact that coffee and cacao yeasts are genetically inferior than those found on grapes. Choice A is a distortion of facts. Option B: All vineyard-yeast strains are extremely similar genetically but there is tremendous diversity among the yeast strains associated with cacao and coffee. This greater diversity of cacao and coffee veasts means there is the potential to create new flavours by using a strain from one location in another. So the genetic diversity of yeasts could produce novel flavours in coffee and chocolate, not in wine. Choice B is incorrect.

Option C: There is tremendous diversity among the yeast strains associated with cacao and coffee. Also refer to the last para of the passage. Choice C is the correct summary of the passage.

Option D: Coffee and cacao yeasts are far more genetically diverse than wine strains. Choice D is incorrect. The second part of choice D is out of scope.

QUESTION: 21

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of three questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

More than 7,000 years ago, people living in the Middle East discovered that they could ferment grapes to make wine. As with wine, the processing of coffee beans and cacao, used to make chocolate, also requires some fermentation. Cacao originated in the Amazon and was widely cultivated in Central America before Hernán Cortés brought it to the Old World in 1530. From Ethiopia, coffee was disseminated throughout the Middle East by Arab traders during the 6th century and it ultimately arrived in the New World during the 17th century. Over the next three centuries, other trading nations completed coffee’s worldwide dissemination and set it up as a mainstay crop of many of the world’s poorest economies. Cacao was treated in much the same way and is now grown in 33 tropical countries.

Given this history, Aimée Dudley and Justin Fay of the University of Washington wondered if the yeasts associated with cacao and coffee followed these plants from their places of origin just as yeasts had followed wine from the Middle East.

They collected unroasted cacao beans from 13 countries, including Haiti, Colombia, Ghana, Madagascar and Papua New Guinea, and unroasted coffee beans from 14 locations, including Ethiopia, Hawaii, Honduras, Indonesia and Yemen. They then set about studying the yeast found on the beans. As a control, the team also studied the yeasts on grapes from diverse locations.

As they report in Current Biology, although all vineyard-yeast strains are extremely similar genetically, there is tremendous diversity among the yeast strains associated with cacao and coffee. Further, all cacao beans collected from Venezuela carried closely related strains of yeast that were distinct from those found on Nigerian and Ecuadorian beans. The same was true for the yeasts found on coffee. The use of starter yeast culture is very rare in the processing of cacao and coffee, where growers tend to rely upon the species of yeast found locally.

This greater diversity of cacao and coffee yeasts means there is the potential to create new flavours by using a strain from one location in another. No one knows what the resulting coffee and chocolate might taste like, but if Dr Dudley and her colleagues are correct in their hunch, there will be many new flavours for coffee lovers and chocoholics to savour.

Q. Which of the following cannot be understood from the passage?

Solution: Option A: They collected unroasted cacao beans from 13 countries, including Haiti, Colombia, Ghana, Madagascar and Papua New Guinea, and unroasted coffee beans from 14 locations, including Ethiopia, Hawaii, Honduras, Indonesia and Yemen. This greater diversity of cacao and coffee yeasts means there is the potential to create new flavours by using a strain from one location in another. Choice A is true and is not the answer.

Option B: There is tremendous diversity among the yeast strains associated with cacao and coffee. Further, all cacao beans collected from Venezuela carried closely related strains of yeast that were distinct from those found on Nigerian and Ecuadorian beans. The same was taie for the yeasts found on coffee. But the second part of choice B cannot be deduced from the passage. Choice B is out of scope and is the answer.

Option C: More than 7,000 years ago, people living in the Middle East discovered that they could ferment grapes to make wine. Aimee Dudley and Justin Fay of the University of Washington wondered if the yeasts associated with cacao and coffee followed these plants from their places of origin just as yeasts had followed wine from the Middle East. All vineyard-yeast strains are extremely similar genetically. Hence choice C is correct and is not the answer.

Option D: Further, all cacao beans collected from Venezuela earned closely related strains of yeast that were distinct from those found on Nigerian and Ecuadorian beans. The same was true for the yeasts found on coffee. We can say that choice D can also be understood to be true and is not the answer.

QUESTION: 22

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of three questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Biotechnology proponents have argued repeatedly that GM seeds are crucial to feed the world, using the same flawed reasoning that was advanced for decades by the proponents of the Green Revolution. Conventional food production, they maintain, will not keep pace with the growing world population. Monsanto's ads proclaimed in 1998: “Worrying about starving future generations won't feed them. Food biotechnology will.” As agroecologists Miguel Altieri and Peter Rosset point out, this argument is based on two erroneous assumptions. The first is that world hunger is caused by a global shortage of food; the second is that genetic engineering is the only way to increase food production.

In their classic study, World Hunger: Twelve Myths, development specialists Frances Moore Lappé and her colleagues at the Institute for Food and Development Policy gave a detailed account of world food production that surprised many readers.

They showed that abundance, not scarcity, best describes the food supply in today's world. During the past three decades, increases in global food production have outstripped world population growth by 16 per cent. During that time, mountains of surplus grain have pushed prices strongly downward on world markets. Increases in food supplies have kept ahead of population growth in every region except Africa during the past fifty years. A 1997 study found that in the developing world, 78 percent of all malnourished children under five live in countries with food surpluses. Many of these countries, in which hunger is rampant, export more agricultural goods than they import.

The root causes of hunger around the world are unrelated to food production. They are poverty, inequality and lack of access to food and land. People go hungry because the means to produce and distribute food are controlled by the rich and powerful: world hunger is not a technological but a political problem. Miguel Altieri points out that we cannot ignore the social and political realities. ‘If the root causes are not addressed,’ he retorts, ‘hunger will persist no matter what technologies are used.’

Q. Which of the following best represents the flaws in the argument that food biotechnology will feed the starving future generations?

Solution: The answer to this question can be found in the lines: “Worrying about starving future generations won't feed them. Food biotechnology will.” As agraeco/og/sfs Miguel Altieri and Peter Rosset point out. This argument is based on two erroneous assumptions. The first is that world hunger is caused bv a global shortage of food: the second is that genetic engineering is the only v/av to increase food production.

Option A: Only genetic engineering can address food shortage (since it is the only way to increase food production) - that checks the second assumption. Please note that the passage doesn’t say genetic engineering will completely resolve the issue (it will feed the starving, but to what extent?). Food shortage is the real cause of world hunger (the second part of the option) addresses the first assumption. Hence, Option A is the answer.

Option B: Food shortage should be avoided through genetic engineering to sidestep world hunger- as the underlined portions suggest, the option treats world hunger as a future problem. That is not true. World hunger is already a problem. Hence, Option B is not the answer.

Option C: The partfood production exceeds food shortage’ makes a fallacious comparison between production quantity and shortage quantity. The amount of food produced should be compared with the food consumption to get an idea of the amount of food shortage. Should genetic engineering target to produce food only as much as the shortage amount? Hence, Option C is not the answer.

Option D: This option short-changes the two assumptions by saying genetic engineering balms/reduces the problem of (alleviate) world hunger. It hasn’t been indicated that the other false assumption is that world hunger itself is caused by food shortage. Hence, Option D is not the answer.

QUESTION: 23

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of three questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Biotechnology proponents have argued repeatedly that GM seeds are crucial to feed the world, using the same flawed reasoning that was advanced for decades by the proponents of the Green Revolution. Conventional food production, they maintain, will not keep pace with the growing world population. Monsanto's ads proclaimed in 1998: “Worrying about starving future generations won't feed them. Food biotechnology will.” As agroecologists Miguel Altieri and Peter Rosset point out, this argument is based on two erroneous assumptions. The first is that world hunger is caused by a global shortage of food; the second is that genetic engineering is the only way to increase food production.

In their classic study, World Hunger: Twelve Myths, development specialists Frances Moore Lappé and her colleagues at the Institute for Food and Development Policy gave a detailed account of world food production that surprised many readers.

They showed that abundance, not scarcity, best describes the food supply in today's world. During the past three decades, increases in global food production have outstripped world population growth by 16 per cent. During that time, mountains of surplus grain have pushed prices strongly downward on world markets. Increases in food supplies have kept ahead of population growth in every region except Africa during the past fifty years. A 1997 study found that in the developing world, 78 percent of all malnourished children under five live in countries with food surpluses. Many of these countries, in which hunger is rampant, export more agricultural goods than they import.

The root causes of hunger around the world are unrelated to food production. They are poverty, inequality and lack of access to food and land. People go hungry because the means to produce and distribute food are controlled by the rich and powerful: world hunger is not a technological but a political problem. Miguel Altieri points out that we cannot ignore the social and political realities. ‘If the root causes are not addressed,’ he retorts, ‘hunger will persist no matter what technologies are used.’

Q. The argument that world hunger is caused by food shortage is weakened by which of the following?

Solution: All but one option above has been misrepresented in some form or the other.

Option A: During the past three decades, increases in global food production have outstripped world population growth by 16 per cent. According to the given line, the comparison is between increase in food production and increase in population. The option compares the absolute numbers - food production versus world population. Hence, Option A is not the answer.

Option B: Increases in food supplies have kept ahead of population growth in every reofon except Africa during the past fifty years. This cannot be extrapolated to all regions. Hence, Option B is very easy to eliminate.

Option C: Many of these countries, in which hunger is rampant, export more agricultural goods than they import. So, this can be equated to 'most countries susceptible to hunger having more exports than imports. This confirms that food shortage is not the reason for hunger. If there were food shortage, then exports wouldn't exceed imports. Option C is the answer.

Option D; A 1997 study found that in the developing world. 78 percent of all malnourished children under five live in countries with food surpluses. So, we are only looking at malnourished children under five, in the developing world, not in the entire world as the option suggests. Hence, Option D can be eliminated easily.

QUESTION: 24

DIRECTIONS for questions: The passage given below is accompanied by a set of three questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Biotechnology proponents have argued repeatedly that GM seeds are crucial to feed the world, using the same flawed reasoning that was advanced for decades by the proponents of the Green Revolution. Conventional food production, they maintain, will not keep pace with the growing world population. Monsanto's ads proclaimed in 1998: “Worrying about starving future generations won't feed them. Food biotechnology will.” As agroecologists Miguel Altieri and Peter Rosset point out, this argument is based on two erroneous assumptions. The first is that world hunger is caused by a global shortage of food; the second is that genetic engineering is the only way to increase food production.

In their classic study, World Hunger: Twelve Myths, development specialists Frances Moore Lappé and her colleagues at the Institute for Food and Development Policy gave a detailed account of world food production that surprised many readers.

They showed that abundance, not scarcity, best describes the food supply in today's world. During the past three decades, increases in global food production have outstripped world population growth by 16 per cent. During that time, mountains of surplus grain have pushed prices strongly downward on world markets. Increases in food supplies have kept ahead of population growth in every region except Africa during the past fifty years. A 1997 study found that in the developing world, 78 percent of all malnourished children under five live in countries with food surpluses. Many of these countries, in which hunger is rampant, export more agricultural goods than they import.

The root causes of hunger around the world are unrelated to food production. They are poverty, inequality and lack of access to food and land. People go hungry because the means to produce and distribute food are controlled by the rich and powerful: world hunger is not a technological but a political problem. Miguel Altieri points out that we cannot ignore the social and political realities. ‘If the root causes are not addressed,’ he retorts, ‘hunger will persist no matter what technologies are used.’

Q. Which of the following has not been suggested by the author in the third para of the passage?

Solution: The root causes of hunger around the world are unrelated to food production. They are poverty, inequality and lack of access to food and land. People go hungry because the means to produce and distribute food are controlled by the rich and powerful: world hunger is not a technical but a political problem. Miguel Altieri points out that we cannot ignore the social and political realities. ‘If the root causes are not addressed,' he retorts, ‘hunger will persist no matter what technologies are used.’

Option A: People go hungry because the means to produce and distribute food are controlled bv the rich and powerful. From this, we can understand that the rich control the means and that results in people going hungry - a voluntary decision on the part of the rich and powerful. So, it can be inferred that the author suggests the rich and powerful aren't keen to solve the hunger problem. Option A is therefore, not the answer.

Option B: That technology cannot solve the hunger problem doesn't necessarily mean it cannot mitigate the hunger problem. The author only suggests 'hunger will persist'. Whether technology is absolutely useless or whether it can reduce world hunger at least to some extent is not a discussion that was taken up in the last para of the passage. Hence, Option B is the answer.

Option C: The author says that the means to produce and distribute food are controlled by the rich and powerful. So, the author seems to suggest that the resources are accessible only to these people, reasoning that this is the reason there will always be world hunger. Hence, Option C is not the answer.

Option D: Consider the sentences: The root causes of hunger around the world are unrelated to food production. They are poverty, inequality and lack of access to food and land. From this we can understand that the author suggests inequality is a root cause of the hunger problem. Hence, Option D is not the answer.

QUESTION: 25

DIRECTIONS for questions: The sentences given in each of the following questions, when properly sequenced, form a coherent paragraph. Each sentence is labelled with a number. Decide on the proper order for the five sentences and key in the sequence of five numbers as your answer, in the input box given below the question.

1. It was not like pistons and wheels and gears all moving at once, massive and coordinated.

2. General illumination of that target he hit seems to be left for me.

3. Phaedrus did not try to use his brilliance for general illumination but he sought one specific distant target and aimed for it and hit it, and that was all.

4. Phaedrus was systematic as an individual, but to say that he thought and acted like a machine would be to misunderstand the nature of his thought.

5. The image of a laser beam comes to mind instead; a single pencil of light of such terrific energy in such concentration that it can be shot at the moon and its reflection seen back on earth.

Solution:  

Sentence 1: “It was not like" in sentence 1 is a description which needs a precedent.

Sentence 2: Sentence 2 brings in a reference to “me" in relation to what he (Phaedrus) did.

Sentence 3: Sentence 3 speaks about Phaedrus using his brilliance for general illumination and hitting a distant target.

Sentence 4: Sentence 4 looks like a general opening sentence. It has a reference to Phaedrus. It clarifies a point of view about Phaedrus.

Sentence 5: The presence of the contrast word 'instead' in sentence 5 indicates that sentence 5 corrects a point of view that has been mentioned earlier.

So, sentence 4 is a general sentence that can begin the paragraph. The remaining sentences need a precedent and more substantiation. Though sentence 3 can also be a general opening sentence, on a closer examination, we can understand that its contents can only be placed later in sequence after the general idea “to say that he thought and acted like a machine would be to misunderstand the nature of his thought" in sentence 4. So sentence 4 is the first or opening sentence of the para.

Sentences 4 and 1 form a logical block, “to say that he thought and acted like a machine would be to misunderstand the nature of his thought" in sentence 4 links with “it was not like pistons and wheels and gears all moving at once" in sentence 1. So sentence 1 follows sentence 4.

Sentences 1 and 5 fonn another logical block, “not like pistons and wheels and gears all moving at once" in sentence 1 is contrasted by “The image of a laser beam comes to mind instead” in sentence 5. So 5 follows 1.

Sentence 3 continues the train of thought. “Phaedrus did not try to use his brilliance for general illumination” in sentence 3 is another description of Phaedrus in addition to “but to say that he thought and acted like a machine would be to misunderstand the nature of his thought" mentioned in sentence 4. “sought one specific distant target and aimed for it and hit it, and that was all” in sentence 3 links with “laser beam can be shot at the moon and its reflection seen back on earth” in sentence 5. Sentence 3 follows sentence 5.

Sentences 3 and 2 form a logical block. “Phaedrus did not try to use his brilliance for general illumination” in sentence 3 links with “General illumination of that target he hit" in sentence 2. So, sentence 2 concludes the para. Hence 41532.

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