LIC Assistant Prelims Mock Test - 7 - Insurance Exams MCQ

The arguments in favour of FDI in defence are familiar. First, public sector companies in defence, Research and Development and allied industries have consistently failed to meet the requirements of the armed forces, especially given the global revolution in military technology. Second, the superior management culture of the private sector will ensure better adherence to budgets and timelines. Third, the country is compelled into repeated imports without any technology transfer (despite contractual obligations) because the military is always urgently in need of the technology. Therefore, the argument goes, encouraging foreign companies to invest in Indian defence and set up industries here will mean that money will be spent within the country, generating jobs and bringing in new know-how, with the possibility of exports.

In my opinion, none of these arguments address the specific and unique needs of the defence sector in India. Whatever else these measures might achieve, they will not help accomplish what must surely be the main goal, namely to build self-reliance in advanced military technology and reduce India’s debilitating dependence on foreign suppliers in the area of national security.

The FDI inflow itself tells a tale. All the liberalised provisions since 2001 have led to a meagre inflow of only $4.8 billion, in an overall FDI inflow of around $334 billion. It may be argued that it is too early to judge, but there are actually good reasons why defence companies do not and will not find FDI in another country attractive, and why there are few such examples across the world.

FDI means a long-term presence in India, and good returns on investment are possible only if repeat orders or contracts for newer models are assured. But, unlike cars or white goods, that will not always happen in military equipment. There may be gaps of many years or even decades between orders. For instance, India bought the Mirage 2000 in the 1980s and has clinched the Rafale deal this year, both from Dassault of France. In France itself, however, Dassault is reasonably assured of continuous business from regular domestic and European orders, as well as from staggered exports. Foreign subsidiaries or substantial FDI will, thus, always put pressure on India for repeat orders. Would dependence on a Lockheed Martin (India) or a Bharat Boeing be really very different from dependence on the U.S. principals?

Yes, more of India’s money will be spent in India rather than in other countries. But the Defence Procurement Policy anyway mandates 30 per cent offsets (50 per cent in high-value contracts). In other words, the supplier must spend 30 per cent of the contracted value within India through local manufacture and services. On the other hand, even if manufacture were by an Indian subsidiary, some specialised technology or components will always need to be imported. As is the case in car manufacture by Korean or Japanese subsidiaries in India, where numerous models that sell in smaller volumes are only assembled in India with imported components. FDI may, therefore, not be so different from offsets in terms of local manufacture, jobs, or money spent

Q. Which of the following companies name is mentioned in the above passage?

The arguments in favour of FDI in defence are familiar. First, public sector companies in defence, Research and Development and allied industries have consistently failed to meet the requirements of the armed forces, especially given the global revolution in military technology. Second, the superior management culture of the private sector will ensure better adherence to budgets and timelines. Third, the country is compelled into repeated imports without any technology transfer (despite contractual obligations) because the military is always urgently in need of the technology. Therefore, the argument goes, encouraging foreign companies to invest in Indian defence and set up industries here will mean that money will be spent within the country, generating jobs and bringing in new know-how, with the possibility of exports.

In my opinion, none of these arguments address the specific and unique needs of the defence sector in India. Whatever else these measures might achieve, they will not help accomplish what must surely be the main goal, namely to build self-reliance in advanced military technology and reduce India’s debilitating dependence on foreign suppliers in the area of national security.

The FDI inflow itself tells a tale. All the liberalised provisions since 2001 have led to a meagre inflow of only $4.8 billion, in an overall FDI inflow of around $334 billion. It may be argued that it is too early to judge, but there are actually good reasons why defence companies do not and will not find FDI in another country attractive, and why there are few such examples across the world.

FDI means a long-term presence in India, and good returns on investment are possible only if repeat orders or contracts for newer models are assured. But, unlike cars or white goods, that will not always happen in military equipment. There may be gaps of many years or even decades between orders. For instance, India bought the Mirage 2000 in the 1980s and has clinched the Rafale deal this year, both from Dassault of France. In France itself, however, Dassault is reasonably assured of continuous business from regular domestic and European orders, as well as from staggered exports. Foreign subsidiaries or substantial FDI will, thus, always put pressure on India for repeat orders. Would dependence on a Lockheed Martin (India) or a Bharat Boeing be really very different from dependence on the U.S. principals?

Yes, more of India’s money will be spent in India rather than in other countries. But the Defence Procurement Policy anyway mandates 30 per cent offsets (50 per cent in high-value contracts). In other words, the supplier must spend 30 per cent of the contracted value within India through local manufacture and services. On the other hand, even if manufacture were by an Indian subsidiary, some specialised technology or components will always need to be imported. As is the case in car manufacture by Korean or Japanese subsidiaries in India, where numerous models that sell in smaller volumes are only assembled in India with imported components. FDI may, therefore, not be so different from offsets in terms of local manufacture, jobs, or money spent

Q. Which of the following can be inferred from the passage?

The arguments in favour of FDI in defence are familiar. First, public sector companies in defence, Research and Development and allied industries have consistently failed to meet the requirements of the armed forces, especially given the global revolution in military technology. Second, the superior management culture of the private sector will ensure better adherence to budgets and timelines. Third, the country is compelled into repeated imports without any technology transfer (despite contractual obligations) because the military is always urgently in need of the technology. Therefore, the argument goes, encouraging foreign companies to invest in Indian defence and set up industries here will mean that money will be spent within the country, generating jobs and bringing in new know-how, with the possibility of exports.

In my opinion, none of these arguments address the specific and unique needs of the defence sector in India. Whatever else these measures might achieve, they will not help accomplish what must surely be the main goal, namely to build self-reliance in advanced military technology and reduce India’s debilitating dependence on foreign suppliers in the area of national security.

The FDI inflow itself tells a tale. All the liberalised provisions since 2001 have led to a meagre inflow of only $4.8 billion, in an overall FDI inflow of around $334 billion. It may be argued that it is too early to judge, but there are actually good reasons why defence companies do not and will not find FDI in another country attractive, and why there are few such examples across the world.

FDI means a long-term presence in India, and good returns on investment are possible only if repeat orders or contracts for newer models are assured. But, unlike cars or white goods, that will not always happen in military equipment. There may be gaps of many years or even decades between orders. For instance, India bought the Mirage 2000 in the 1980s and has clinched the Rafale deal this year, both from Dassault of France. In France itself, however, Dassault is reasonably assured of continuous business from regular domestic and European orders, as well as from staggered exports. Foreign subsidiaries or substantial FDI will, thus, always put pressure on India for repeat orders. Would dependence on a Lockheed Martin (India) or a Bharat Boeing be really very different from dependence on the U.S. principals?

Yes, more of India’s money will be spent in India rather than in other countries. But the Defence Procurement Policy anyway mandates 30 per cent offsets (50 per cent in high-value contracts). In other words, the supplier must spend 30 per cent of the contracted value within India through local manufacture and services. On the other hand, even if manufacture were by an Indian subsidiary, some specialised technology or components will always need to be imported. As is the case in car manufacture by Korean or Japanese subsidiaries in India, where numerous models that sell in smaller volumes are only assembled in India with imported components. FDI may, therefore, not be so different from offsets in terms of local manufacture, jobs, or money spent

Q. Which of the following is the antonym of the word “adherence”?

The arguments in favour of FDI in defence are familiar. First, public sector companies in defence, Research and Development and allied industries have consistently failed to meet the requirements of the armed forces, especially given the global revolution in military technology. Second, the superior management culture of the private sector will ensure better adherence to budgets and timelines. Third, the country is compelled into repeated imports without any technology transfer (despite contractual obligations) because the military is always urgently in need of the technology. Therefore, the argument goes, encouraging foreign companies to invest in Indian defence and set up industries here will mean that money will be spent within the country, generating jobs and bringing in new know-how, with the possibility of exports.

In my opinion, none of these arguments address the specific and unique needs of the defence sector in India. Whatever else these measures might achieve, they will not help accomplish what must surely be the main goal, namely to build self-reliance in advanced military technology and reduce India’s debilitating dependence on foreign suppliers in the area of national security.

The FDI inflow itself tells a tale. All the liberalised provisions since 2001 have led to a meagre inflow of only $4.8 billion, in an overall FDI inflow of around $334 billion. It may be argued that it is too early to judge, but there are actually good reasons why defence companies do not and will not find FDI in another country attractive, and why there are few such examples across the world.

FDI means a long-term presence in India, and good returns on investment are possible only if repeat orders or contracts for newer models are assured. But, unlike cars or white goods, that will not always happen in military equipment. There may be gaps of many years or even decades between orders. For instance, India bought the Mirage 2000 in the 1980s and has clinched the Rafale deal this year, both from Dassault of France. In France itself, however, Dassault is reasonably assured of continuous business from regular domestic and European orders, as well as from staggered exports. Foreign subsidiaries or substantial FDI will, thus, always put pressure on India for repeat orders. Would dependence on a Lockheed Martin (India) or a Bharat Boeing be really very different from dependence on the U.S. principals?

Yes, more of India’s money will be spent in India rather than in other countries. But the Defence Procurement Policy anyway mandates 30 per cent offsets (50 per cent in high-value contracts). In other words, the supplier must spend 30 per cent of the contracted value within India through local manufacture and services. On the other hand, even if manufacture were by an Indian subsidiary, some specialised technology or components will always need to be imported. As is the case in car manufacture by Korean or Japanese subsidiaries in India, where numerous models that sell in smaller volumes are only assembled in India with imported components. FDI may, therefore, not be so different from offsets in terms of local manufacture, jobs, or money spent

Q. Which of the following is the antonym of the word “substantial”?

The arguments in favour of FDI in defence are familiar. First, public sector companies in defence, Research and Development and allied industries have consistently failed to meet the requirements of the armed forces, especially given the global revolution in military technology. Second, the superior management culture of the private sector will ensure better adherence to budgets and timelines. Third, the country is compelled into repeated imports without any technology transfer (despite contractual obligations) because the military is always urgently in need of the technology. Therefore, the argument goes, encouraging foreign companies to invest in Indian defence and set up industries here will mean that money will be spent within the country, generating jobs and bringing in new know-how, with the possibility of exports.

In my opinion, none of these arguments address the specific and unique needs of the defence sector in India. Whatever else these measures might achieve, they will not help accomplish what must surely be the main goal, namely to build self-reliance in advanced military technology and reduce India’s debilitating dependence on foreign suppliers in the area of national security.

The FDI inflow itself tells a tale. All the liberalised provisions since 2001 have led to a meagre inflow of only $4.8 billion, in an overall FDI inflow of around $334 billion. It may be argued that it is too early to judge, but there are actually good reasons why defence companies do not and will not find FDI in another country attractive, and why there are few such examples across the world.

FDI means a long-term presence in India, and good returns on investment are possible only if repeat orders or contracts for newer models are assured. But, unlike cars or white goods, that will not always happen in military equipment. There may be gaps of many years or even decades between orders. For instance, India bought the Mirage 2000 in the 1980s and has clinched the Rafale deal this year, both from Dassault of France. In France itself, however, Dassault is reasonably assured of continuous business from regular domestic and European orders, as well as from staggered exports. Foreign subsidiaries or substantial FDI will, thus, always put pressure on India for repeat orders. Would dependence on a Lockheed Martin (India) or a Bharat Boeing be really very different from dependence on the U.S. principals?

Yes, more of India’s money will be spent in India rather than in other countries. But the Defence Procurement Policy anyway mandates 30 per cent offsets (50 per cent in high-value contracts). In other words, the supplier must spend 30 per cent of the contracted value within India through local manufacture and services. On the other hand, even if manufacture were by an Indian subsidiary, some specialised technology or components will always need to be imported. As is the case in car manufacture by Korean or Japanese subsidiaries in India, where numerous models that sell in smaller volumes are only assembled in India with imported components. FDI may, therefore, not be so different from offsets in terms of local manufacture, jobs, or money spent

Q. Why the author is insisting more on Technology transfer rather than FDI inflow?

The arguments in favour of FDI in defence are familiar. First, public sector companies in defence, Research and Development and allied industries have consistently failed to meet the requirements of the armed forces, especially given the global revolution in military technology. Second, the superior management culture of the private sector will ensure better adherence to budgets and timelines. Third, the country is compelled into repeated imports without any technology transfer (despite contractual obligations) because the military is always urgently in need of the technology. Therefore, the argument goes, encouraging foreign companies to invest in Indian defence and set up industries here will mean that money will be spent within the country, generating jobs and bringing in new know-how, with the possibility of exports.

In my opinion, none of these arguments address the specific and unique needs of the defence sector in India. Whatever else these measures might achieve, they will not help accomplish what must surely be the main goal, namely to build self-reliance in advanced military technology and reduce India’s debilitating dependence on foreign suppliers in the area of national security.

The FDI inflow itself tells a tale. All the liberalised provisions since 2001 have led to a meagre inflow of only $4.8 billion, in an overall FDI inflow of around $334 billion. It may be argued that it is too early to judge, but there are actually good reasons why defence companies do not and will not find FDI in another country attractive, and why there are few such examples across the world.

FDI means a long-term presence in India, and good returns on investment are possible only if repeat orders or contracts for newer models are assured. But, unlike cars or white goods, that will not always happen in military equipment. There may be gaps of many years or even decades between orders. For instance, India bought the Mirage 2000 in the 1980s and has clinched the Rafale deal this year, both from Dassault of France. In France itself, however, Dassault is reasonably assured of continuous business from regular domestic and European orders, as well as from staggered exports. Foreign subsidiaries or substantial FDI will, thus, always put pressure on India for repeat orders. Would dependence on a Lockheed Martin (India) or a Bharat Boeing be really very different from dependence on the U.S. principals?

Yes, more of India’s money will be spent in India rather than in other countries. But the Defence Procurement Policy anyway mandates 30 per cent offsets (50 per cent in high-value contracts). In other words, the supplier must spend 30 per cent of the contracted value within India through local manufacture and services. On the other hand, even if manufacture were by an Indian subsidiary, some specialised technology or components will always need to be imported. As is the case in car manufacture by Korean or Japanese subsidiaries in India, where numerous models that sell in smaller volumes are only assembled in India with imported components. FDI may, therefore, not be so different from offsets in terms of local manufacture, jobs, or money spent

Q. Which of the following is not true according to the passage?

The arguments in favour of FDI in defence are familiar. First, public sector companies in defence, Research and Development and allied industries have consistently failed to meet the requirements of the armed forces, especially given the global revolution in military technology. Second, the superior management culture of the private sector will ensure better adherence to budgets and timelines. Third, the country is compelled into repeated imports without any technology transfer (despite contractual obligations) because the military is always urgently in need of the technology. Therefore, the argument goes, encouraging foreign companies to invest in Indian defence and set up industries here will mean that money will be spent within the country, generating jobs and bringing in new know-how, with the possibility of exports.

In my opinion, none of these arguments address the specific and unique needs of the defence sector in India. Whatever else these measures might achieve, they will not help accomplish what must surely be the main goal, namely to build self-reliance in advanced military technology and reduce India’s debilitating dependence on foreign suppliers in the area of national security.

The FDI inflow itself tells a tale. All the liberalised provisions since 2001 have led to a meagre inflow of only $4.8 billion, in an overall FDI inflow of around $334 billion. It may be argued that it is too early to judge, but there are actually good reasons why defence companies do not and will not find FDI in another country attractive, and why there are few such examples across the world.

FDI means a long-term presence in India, and good returns on investment are possible only if repeat orders or contracts for newer models are assured. But, unlike cars or white goods, that will not always happen in military equipment. There may be gaps of many years or even decades between orders. For instance, India bought the Mirage 2000 in the 1980s and has clinched the Rafale deal this year, both from Dassault of France. In France itself, however, Dassault is reasonably assured of continuous business from regular domestic and European orders, as well as from staggered exports. Foreign subsidiaries or substantial FDI will, thus, always put pressure on India for repeat orders. Would dependence on a Lockheed Martin (India) or a Bharat Boeing be really very different from dependence on the U.S. principals?

Yes, more of India’s money will be spent in India rather than in other countries. But the Defence Procurement Policy anyway mandates 30 per cent offsets (50 per cent in high-value contracts). In other words, the supplier must spend 30 per cent of the contracted value within India through local manufacture and services. On the other hand, even if manufacture were by an Indian subsidiary, some specialised technology or components will always need to be imported. As is the case in car manufacture by Korean or Japanese subsidiaries in India, where numerous models that sell in smaller volumes are only assembled in India with imported components. FDI may, therefore, not be so different from offsets in terms of local manufacture, jobs, or money spent

Q. Which of the following is the synonym of the word “offsets”?

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

The weaker sections of the rural population are mostly from the socially and economically backward and (11) sections of the village community. Because of their (12) and financial difficulty, they are not readily (13) to change their work habits and adopt modern technology. (14) sure about the traditional methods, they are (15) to take to (16) equipment and techniques which require some time to get accustomed for (17) work. 
After holding a number of group meetings with rural people (18) to different vocations and spread over the entire country, we can safely say that persons in the villages are not (19) for training to improve upon their traditional and hereditary (20) of working. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

The weaker sections of the rural population are mostly from the socially and economically backward and (11) sections of the village community. Because of their (12) and financial difficulty, they are not readily (13) to change their work habits and adopt modern technology. (14) sure about the traditional methods, they are (15) to take to (16) equipment and techniques which require some time to get accustomed for (17) work. 
After holding a number of group meetings with rural people (18) to different vocations and spread over the entire country, we can safely say that persons in the villages are not (19) for training to improve upon their traditional and hereditary (20) of working. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

The weaker sections of the rural population are mostly from the socially and economically backward and (11) sections of the village community. Because of their (12) and financial difficulty, they are not readily (13) to change their work habits and adopt modern technology. (14) sure about the traditional methods, they are (15) to take to (16) equipment and techniques which require some time to get accustomed for (17) work. 
After holding a number of group meetings with rural people (18) to different vocations and spread over the entire country, we can safely say that persons in the villages are not (19) for training to improve upon their traditional and hereditary (20) of working. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

The weaker sections of the rural population are mostly from the socially and economically backward and (11) sections of the village community. Because of their (12) and financial difficulty, they are not readily (13) to change their work habits and adopt modern technology. (14) sure about the traditional methods, they are (15) to take to (16) equipment and techniques which require some time to get accustomed for (17) work. 
After holding a number of group meetings with rural people (18) to different vocations and spread over the entire country, we can safely say that persons in the villages are not (19) for training to improve upon their traditional and hereditary (20) of working. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

The weaker sections of the rural population are mostly from the socially and economically backward and (11) sections of the village community. Because of their (12) and financial difficulty, they are not readily (13) to change their work habits and adopt modern technology. (14) sure about the traditional methods, they are (15) to take to (16) equipment and techniques which require some time to get accustomed for (17) work. 
After holding a number of group meetings with rural people (18) to different vocations and spread over the entire country, we can safely say that persons in the villages are not (19) for training to improve upon their traditional and hereditary (20) of working. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

The weaker sections of the rural population are mostly from the socially and economically backward and (11) sections of the village community. Because of their (12) and financial difficulty, they are not readily (13) to change their work habits and adopt modern technology. (14) sure about the traditional methods, they are (15) to take to (16) equipment and techniques which require some time to get accustomed for (17) work. 
After holding a number of group meetings with rural people (18) to different vocations and spread over the entire country, we can safely say that persons in the villages are not (19) for training to improve upon their traditional and hereditary (20) of working. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

The weaker sections of the rural population are mostly from the socially and economically backward and (11) sections of the village community. Because of their (12) and financial difficulty, they are not readily (13) to change their work habits and adopt modern technology. (14) sure about the traditional methods, they are (15) to take to (16) equipment and techniques which require some time to get accustomed for (17) work. 
After holding a number of group meetings with rural people (18) to different vocations and spread over the entire country, we can safely say that persons in the villages are not (19) for training to improve upon their traditional and hereditary (20) of working. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

The weaker sections of the rural population are mostly from the socially and economically backward and (11) sections of the village community. Because of their (12) and financial difficulty, they are not readily (13) to change their work habits and adopt modern technology. (14) sure about the traditional methods, they are (15) to take to (16) equipment and techniques which require some time to get accustomed for (17) work. 
After holding a number of group meetings with rural people (18) to different vocations and spread over the entire country, we can safely say that persons in the villages are not (19) for training to improve upon their traditional and hereditary (20) of working. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

The weaker sections of the rural population are mostly from the socially and economically backward and (11) sections of the village community. Because of their (12) and financial difficulty, they are not readily (13) to change their work habits and adopt modern technology. (14) sure about the traditional methods, they are (15) to take to (16) equipment and techniques which require some time to get accustomed for (17) work. 
After holding a number of group meetings with rural people (18) to different vocations and spread over the entire country, we can safely say that persons in the villages are not (19) for training to improve upon their traditional and hereditary (20) of working. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

The weaker sections of the rural population are mostly from the socially and economically backward and (11) sections of the village community. Because of their (12) and financial difficulty, they are not readily (13) to change their work habits and adopt modern technology. (14) sure about the traditional methods, they are (15) to take to (16) equipment and techniques which require some time to get accustomed for (17) work. 
After holding a number of group meetings with rural people (18) to different vocations and spread over the entire country, we can safely say that persons in the villages are not (19) for training to improve upon their traditional and hereditary (20) of working. 

Find the Error in the following .If No error found select (E) as the answer. 

What to speak (A)/ of proper medical (B)/ treatment (C)/ even first aid was not given (D)/ to him. No error (E)

Find the Error in the following .If No error found select (E) as the answer.

The reason (A)/ why she is (B)/ absent today (C)/ is because (D)/ her husband is ill. No error (E)

Find the Error in the following .If No error found select (E) as the answer.

I never (A)/ remember (B)/ to have met (C)/ this gentleman in (D)/ Baroda. No error (E)

Find the Error in the following .If No error found select (E) as the answer.

Don’t worry (A)/, I shall (B)/ be back (C) in a few minutes (D)/ and join you. No error (E)

Find the Error in the following .If No error found select (E) as the answer.

You are (A) / wrong, I never spoke (B)/to her (C)/ on telephone (D)/ this morning. No error (E)

Find the Error in the following .If No error found select (E) as the answer.

The scenery (A)/ of Kodaikanal (B)/ are not (C)/ doubt very (D)/ beautiful. No error (E)

Find the Error in the following .If No error found select (E) as the answer.

All the gentries (A)/ were invited (B)/ to the (C)/ college annual (D)/day function. No error (E)

Find the Error in the following .If No error found select (E) as the answer.

She has been (A)/ advised to (B)/ live on vegetables (C)/ and fruits. (D)/ No error (E)

Find the Error in the following .If No error found select (E) as the answer.

They have (A)/ purchased many (B) items of furnitures (C)/ for their new (D)/ bungalow. No error (E)

Find the Error in the following .If No error found select (E) as the answer.

Dozen of (A)/ apples were (B)/ distributed among the (C)/ boys by the (D)/ class teacher. No error (E)