Banking Exams

Absa Singh asked   •  6 hours ago

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.
Lok Sabha Speaker Sumitra Mahajan found herself in the eye of the storm last week after she delivered two almost identical rulings on consecutive days expunging jibes targeting Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
A heated debate followed, with an enraged Opposition unitedly questioning her on Thursday on whatever was “unparliamentary” in Aam Aadmi Party MP Bhagwant Mann’s remark that ending farmers’ suicides and the agrarian crisis would require more than a ‘Mann Ki Baat’, in a reference to Mr. Modi’s monthly radio broadcast. In the end, Ms. Mahajan was forced to retreat, saying she did not object to criticism of the Prime Minister — she just wished to emphasise that every issue should not be “politicised”. She agreed to examine the records, saying that if the context permitted such a comment, she would restore it. That has since been done, and Mr. Mann’s words are now part of the parliamentary record. Earlier she acknowledged that she had repeatedly told MPs it was wrong to refer to the Prime Minister in every discussion. On Wednesday, a remark by Congress MP K.C. Venugopal on Mr. Modi during a discussion on attacks on minorities had invited expunction by Ms. Mahajan.
In the 11 months since the Modi government came to power, the growing tension between Ms. Mahajan and the Opposition has been palpable, with many MPs expressing their dismay — if informally — at what they describe as the “partisan” attitude of the Chair. There have been occasions when Ms. Mahajan has directed the switching off of microphones mid-speech; her invocation of “Om Shanti” after obituary references has invited comment. But on Thursday it all exploded in the House in the full glare of the television cameras. In a parliamentary democracy the Speaker’s role is well-defined: once elected, she is expected to detach herself from government activity to run the House impartially. The Rules characterise the Speaker as “the true guardian of the traditions of parliamentary democracy”, stressing that her decisions are “final and binding and ordinarily cannot be questioned, challenged or criticised”. While giving “adequate opportunities to all sections of the House to ventilate their views”, she must “preserve the dignity of the House”. Mr. Modi is neither the first Prime Minister — nor will he be the last — to face Opposition fire in Parliament. Since Independence every Prime Minister has faced criticism. This was true also of Nehru, who enjoyed an absolute majority and enormous publicesteem. Dr. Manmohan Singh, who was regularly pilloried in Parliament, would, like all his predecessors, defend himself. Mr. Modi, who has positioned himself as a strong leader, does not need the protection of the Chair. As for the Speaker, she must not just be just, she must be seen to do justice
Q. What is the antonym of the word “Dismay”?
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The captain of a cricket team of 11 players is 25 years old and the wicket-keeper is 4 years older. If the age of these two players are replaced by that of another two players, the average of the cricket team drops by 2 years. Find the average age of these two players.
  • a)
    15 years
  • b)
    16 years
  • c)
    17 years
  • d)
    16.5 years
  • e)
    17.5 years
Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?

AMAN Manuja answered  •  13 hours ago
Age of the captain is 25, hence age of the wicket keeper is 29 and sum of their ages is 54 years.
On replacing these players with two new, then average comes down by 2 years, hence sum of the ages of the new players is 22 = (2 × 11) years less than 54 years. Thus, sum of the ages of the new players = 54 – 22 = 32 years and required average will be 16 years

G Shiva asked   •  11 hours ago

Directions : Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.
The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is a perceptible change in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the most formidable challenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.
The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of its innovative ‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.
The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire for reconciliation with Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pak rapprochement could have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one. The third major driver is the mainstreaming of radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.
Q. Choose an appropriate title for the passage.
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