Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) | Administrative Law - CLAT PG PDF Download

Central Vigilance Commission

A serious problem affecting the Indian Polity is that of corruption in the administration this is the decision-making process by the administration and gives rise to all kinds of vices. Incorruptibility is an essential requirement of public confidence in the administration of government departments.

Establishment of the CVC

• The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) was recommended by the Santhanam Committee, appointed in 1962 to address administrative corruption.
• The committee proposed the CVC as the apex authority over existing anti-corruption bodies, including the Directorate of Vigilance and the Central Police Organisation.
• In February 1964, the Government of India accepted these recommendations, establishing the CVC on a non-statutory basis.

Purpose of the CVC

• The CVC was tasked with two primary objectives:Preventing corruption and maintaining integrity among government servants.
• Ensuring just and fair exercise of administrative powers by various authorities.

Structure and Independence

• The CVC operates independently, similar to the Union Public Service Commission(UPSC).
• The Central Vigilance Commissioner(CVC) is appointed by the President of India for a term of 6 years or until the age of 65, whichever comes first.
• The CVC can only be removed or suspended by the President, following an inquiry by the Supreme Court.
• The CVC coordinates vigilance activities and oversees vigilance officers under its jurisdiction.

Scope of the Commission

• The CVC focuses on corruption cases and maladministration issues.
• Initially, maladministration was excluded to maintain the commission's effectiveness in handling corruption cases.

Functions and Powers

• The CVC exercises control and supervision over vigilance and anti-corruption efforts across various ministries, departments, and public sector undertakings.
• The commission has the authority to conduct inquiries into transactions involving public servants suspected of misconduct or corruption.
• The Central Bureau of Investigation(CBI) assists the CVC in its operations, but the CVC has expressed concerns over the CBI's involvement in non-vigilance work.

Advisory Role

• The CVC advises the Home Ministry on disciplinary actions against public servants based on prima facie evidence of corruption or misconduct.

Complaint Handling

• Complaints received by the CVC are referred to the CBI or the relevant ministry/department for investigation.
• The CVC may drop complaints at the initial stage if they are vague or unverifiable.
• In 1976, out of 665 complaints, 492 were dropped, and the remaining were forwarded for investigation.

Technical Examination

• The Chief Technical Examination Organisation, linked to the CVC, conducts technical examinations of public works during contractor bill checks.

Advisory Actions

• The CVC advises on actions to be taken based on investigation reports by the CBI or ministries, including disciplinary actions and prosecutions.
• It can require oral inquiries in departmental proceedings to be entrusted to one of the Commissioners for Departmental Enquiries.

Enquiry Oversight

• The CVC oversees inquiries conducted by Commissioners for Departmental Enquiries and ensures their expeditious completion.
• The commission advises disciplinary authorities on actions based on inquiry reports.

Vigilance Reports

• Chief Vigilance Commissioners are required to submit a resume of vigilance work in their organisations to the CVC for assessment.

Procedural Changes

• The CVC suggests changes in procedures and practices that may allow for corruption or misconduct.
• It reviews administrative procedures related to maintaining integrity in administration.

Miscellaneous Functions

• The CVC conducts orientation courses for vigilance officers, reviews vigilance arrangements in various organisations, and advises on interpretations of laws and procedures governing departmental proceedings.

Independence Challenges

• Over time, the independence of the CVC has been challenged, with the term of its chairman reduced from 6 years to 3 years, and the vacancy period in the role increasing.
• The CVC has faced instances where the government did not accept its recommendations for major penalties against officials.

Judicial Oversight

• The Supreme Court has restructured the CVC's role, separating it from direct executive control and placing it as an umbrella agency coordinating various investigating arms, including the CBI.

Statutory Status

• The CVC was made a statutory body, with its head selected by a high-powered panel consisting of the Prime Minister, Home Minister, and Leader of the Opposition.

Government Actions

• In response to the Supreme Court's views, the government issued an ordinance to give effect to the court's recommendations, though the implementation faced criticism for bureaucratic delays.

Objections to the Ordinance

• Restricting CVC Membership: Limiting the membership of the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) to bureaucrats was seen as problematic.
• Prior Permission Requirement: The ordinance mandated prior permission from the competent authority before initiating investigations against government officers above the rank of joint secretary, as well as high-ranking officials of nationalized banks and public sector undertakings. This was viewed as a hindrance to effective investigation.
• Ex-Officio Membership: Making the secretary personnel an ex-officio member of the CVC faced objections.
• Rule-Making Authority: Concerns were raised about Article 21 of the ordinance, which authorized the commission to make rules in consultation with the government.

These objections were highlighted during the Supreme Court's scrutiny of the ordinance's validity.

Amendments to the Ordinance

In response to the Supreme Court's concerns, the government amended the ordinance on 27th October 1988, leading to the issuance of the Central Vigilance Commission Amendment Ordinance. The key changes included:

• Expanded Membership: The CVC was reconstituted as a four-member body with membership open to individuals beyond bureaucrats.
• Removal of Prior Permission Requirement: The single directive requiring prior permission for investigations was deleted.
• Statutory Status for Secretary Personnel: The membership of secretary personnel, Government of India, was given statutory status.

While it is too early to evaluate the functioning of the reconstituted statutory CVC, it is acknowledged that no commission can completely eradicate deep-rooted corruption. The CVC can only act as a facilitator in the absence of a strong political will.

Union of India v. Alok Kumar (2010 SCC)
The Supreme Court ruled that the advice of the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) is not binding unless required by specific rules. The CVC's role is to assist the disciplinary authority in following the correct procedure. If there are no specific rules mandating the consultation with the CVC, taking action without their advice does not invalidate the disciplinary action against the officer.

Disciplinary Proceedings and Prosecution of Public Servants

• Disciplinary proceedings against government servants are conducted under the Services Rules framed by the Government under Article 309 of the Constitution. Additionally, public servants can be prosecuted for bribery and corruption in criminal courts. 
• The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, later replaced by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, includes provisions to expedite such trials. It is in the public interest to eradicate corruption, but it is equally important to ensure that honest public servants can perform their duties without facing false, frivolous, or malicious accusations.

Sanction for Prosecution

In the case of Mohammad Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court highlighted two key aspects regarding the sanction for prosecution:

• Invalidity of Unsanctioned Cases: Any case initiated without proper sanction is void ab initio, and the prosecution must demonstrate that valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority.
• Criteria for Granting Sanction: The sanctioning authority must be convinced that a case for sanction exists without constituting an offense. The authority must be aware of the facts constituting the offense and must apply its mind while granting sanction. The grant of sanction is not a mere formality; it is a crucial act that protects government servants from baseless prosecution.

All facts constituting the offense must be presented to the sanctioning authority, which should then arrive at its satisfaction. However, an accused facing prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 or 1988 cannot claim immunity due to lack of sanction if they cease to be a public servant by the time the court takes cognizance of the offense. The situation is different when Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applies.

Protection under Section 197: In the case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, it was established that protection under Section 197 is only applicable when the actions of the public servant are reasonably connected to the performance of their official duties.

Section 6 of the PCA

• In State of Maharashtra v. R. S. Nayak, the Supreme Court ruled that a complaint against a chief minister alleging offenses under Sections 161 and 185 of the Penal Code and Section 5 of the PCA was not maintainable without the necessary government sanction under Section 6 of the PCA. The court emphasized that the sanction must be granted by the Governor at his discretion, not on the advice of the Ministers. This ensures the interest of democratic governance and the functioning of the government.
• When prosecuting a Chief Minister, the Governor must act independently while deciding whether to grant sanction under Section 6 of the PCA. This approach serves the cause of justice.
• In another case related to the same facts as above, the Supreme Court addressed whether a private complaint against a public servant for cognizable offenses is maintainable. The court affirmed that, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, the locus standi of a complainant is not a concept in criminal jurisprudence. The right to initiate proceedings is for the larger good of society, and penal statutes aim to punish offenders in the interest of society.

PCA and Appointment of Special Judges

• Under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA), state governments have the authority to appoint special judges to try specific offenses against public servants. These special judges hold exclusive jurisdiction over such cases and follow the procedure outlined in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C) for trial of warrant cases. The rationale behind appointing special judges is to expedite trials related to corruption, as it was deemed necessary to separate corruption cases from the regular criminal cases handled by Magistrates.
• A special judge has the same status as a sessions judge and operates under one of the original criminal jurisdictions, subject to the control of the High Court. Special judges can take cognizance of specified offenses based on complaints, police reports, or other information about the commission of the offense.

Antulay's Case: Historical Context

• Antulay's case holds significance as the first formal criminal trial initiated through a private complaint against a public figure for corruption-related charges during their term in office. Historically, there have been instances where state ministers faced similar charges, but these cases were often addressed on an ad hoc basis without a consistent approach. Some ministers resigned following unfavorable court remarks, while others were subject to administrative inquiries or formal Commission of Enquiry under the Commission of Enquiry Act.
• Even when inquiries suggested prima facie evidence against a minister, criminal prosecution was rarely pursued. The challenges stemmed from the political controversy surrounding such inquiries, as they were conducted either by the central government or the state government after the previous government had vacated office.
• Antulay's case is of significant public interest as it marks the first prosecution of an ex-Chief Minister based on a private complaint. However, it is not a model for future cases. Initiating such prosecutions requires immense effort, resources, and determination, which not many individuals can muster. Relying solely on the government to address corruption and abuse of power is inadequate, as political considerations often influence the process.

In addition to government actions, a strong and independent ombudsman system with constitutional backing is essential to combat corruption and misuse of power effectively. However, even such institutions may struggle to deliver results without robust political support. Addressing corruption and misuse of power by high-ranking officials is crucial as it distorts policy-making and decision-making processes, necessitating a strong mechanism to tackle these issues.