Chapter 7 Dryers - Chapter Notes, Chemical Engineering, Semester Chemical Engineering Notes | EduRev

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Chemical Engineering : Chapter 7 Dryers - Chapter Notes, Chemical Engineering, Semester Chemical Engineering Notes | EduRev

 Page 1


7
DRYERS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents potential failure mechanisms for dryers and drying sys-
tems, and suggests design alternatives for reducing the risks associated with
such failures. The types of equipment covered in this chapter include:
• Spray dryers
• Tray dryers
• Fluid bed dryers
• Conveying (flash, mechanical, and pneumatic) dryers
• Rotary dryers
This chapter presents only those failure modes that are unique to
dryers. Some of the generic failure scenarios pertaining to vessels and heat
transfer equipment may also be applicable to dryers. Consequently, this chap-
ter should be used in conjunction with Chapter 3, Vessels and Chapter 6, Heat
Transfer Equipment. Also, since drying equipment is often associated with
solid-fluid separators and solids handling and processing equipment, refer to
Chapters 9 and 10 for additional information. Unless specifically noted, the
failure scenarios apply to more than one class of dryers.
7.2 PAST INCIDENTS
This section presents three case histories involving fires and explosions (defla-
grations) to reinforce the need for safe design and operating practices for
dryers and drying systems.
Page 2


7
DRYERS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents potential failure mechanisms for dryers and drying sys-
tems, and suggests design alternatives for reducing the risks associated with
such failures. The types of equipment covered in this chapter include:
• Spray dryers
• Tray dryers
• Fluid bed dryers
• Conveying (flash, mechanical, and pneumatic) dryers
• Rotary dryers
This chapter presents only those failure modes that are unique to
dryers. Some of the generic failure scenarios pertaining to vessels and heat
transfer equipment may also be applicable to dryers. Consequently, this chap-
ter should be used in conjunction with Chapter 3, Vessels and Chapter 6, Heat
Transfer Equipment. Also, since drying equipment is often associated with
solid-fluid separators and solids handling and processing equipment, refer to
Chapters 9 and 10 for additional information. Unless specifically noted, the
failure scenarios apply to more than one class of dryers.
7.2 PAST INCIDENTS
This section presents three case histories involving fires and explosions (defla-
grations) to reinforce the need for safe design and operating practices for
dryers and drying systems.
7.2. / Drying of Compound Fertilizers
A fire and explosion occurred in a dryer handling a blended fertilizer that con-
tained single and triple super-phosphates and a mixture of nitrogen-
phosphorous-potassium-fertilizers. The blend was prone to self-sustained
decompositions, and began decomposing while passing through the dryer.
When the temperature of the blend rose to about 13O
0
C, the operator inter-
vened and shut down the dryer. Subsequently, a rapid exothermic reaction
occurred within the dryer which resulted in a fire and explosion. One person
was killed and 18 were injured (Drogaris 1993). See item 1 in Table 7 for
potential design solutions.
Ed. Note: A prior study of exotherm potential might have led to safer operating
limits.
7.2.2 Fires in Cellulose Acetate Dryer
A continuous belt dryer used to dry cellulose acetate powder had experienced
repeated small internal fires over a two-year period. After performing a basket
(self-heating) test to determine if exothermic behavior was present under vari-
ous solids depths, investigators discovered that an exotherm was initiated at
223
0
C under process conditions. Because the dryer was heated with 100 psig
steam (saturation temperature of 172
0
C) it was initially thought that this exo-
thermic behavior was not the cause of the fires. Further examination revealed
that the 100 psig steam at this particular location was superheated to 235
0
C,
well above the exotherm initiation temperature. After a steam desuperheater
was installed immediately upstream of the dryer, the fire problem disappeared.
See item 19 in Table 7 for potential design solutions.
7.2.3 Pharmaceutical Powder Dryer Fire and Explosion
An operator had tested dryer samples on a number of occasions. After the last
sampling, he closed the manhole cover, put the dryer under vacuum, and started
rotation of the dryer. A few minutes later an explosion and flash fire occurred,
which self-extinguished. No one was injured. Investigations revealed that after
the last sampling, the dryer manhole cover had not been securely fastened. This
allowed the vacuum within the dryer to draw air into the rotating dryer and
create a flammable mixture. The ignition source was probably an electrostatic
discharge (the Teflon coating on the internal lining of the dryer could have built
up a charge). No nitrogen inciting had been used (Drogaris 1993).
After this incident, the following precautions were instituted to prevent
similar incidents from occurring in the future:
Page 3


7
DRYERS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents potential failure mechanisms for dryers and drying sys-
tems, and suggests design alternatives for reducing the risks associated with
such failures. The types of equipment covered in this chapter include:
• Spray dryers
• Tray dryers
• Fluid bed dryers
• Conveying (flash, mechanical, and pneumatic) dryers
• Rotary dryers
This chapter presents only those failure modes that are unique to
dryers. Some of the generic failure scenarios pertaining to vessels and heat
transfer equipment may also be applicable to dryers. Consequently, this chap-
ter should be used in conjunction with Chapter 3, Vessels and Chapter 6, Heat
Transfer Equipment. Also, since drying equipment is often associated with
solid-fluid separators and solids handling and processing equipment, refer to
Chapters 9 and 10 for additional information. Unless specifically noted, the
failure scenarios apply to more than one class of dryers.
7.2 PAST INCIDENTS
This section presents three case histories involving fires and explosions (defla-
grations) to reinforce the need for safe design and operating practices for
dryers and drying systems.
7.2. / Drying of Compound Fertilizers
A fire and explosion occurred in a dryer handling a blended fertilizer that con-
tained single and triple super-phosphates and a mixture of nitrogen-
phosphorous-potassium-fertilizers. The blend was prone to self-sustained
decompositions, and began decomposing while passing through the dryer.
When the temperature of the blend rose to about 13O
0
C, the operator inter-
vened and shut down the dryer. Subsequently, a rapid exothermic reaction
occurred within the dryer which resulted in a fire and explosion. One person
was killed and 18 were injured (Drogaris 1993). See item 1 in Table 7 for
potential design solutions.
Ed. Note: A prior study of exotherm potential might have led to safer operating
limits.
7.2.2 Fires in Cellulose Acetate Dryer
A continuous belt dryer used to dry cellulose acetate powder had experienced
repeated small internal fires over a two-year period. After performing a basket
(self-heating) test to determine if exothermic behavior was present under vari-
ous solids depths, investigators discovered that an exotherm was initiated at
223
0
C under process conditions. Because the dryer was heated with 100 psig
steam (saturation temperature of 172
0
C) it was initially thought that this exo-
thermic behavior was not the cause of the fires. Further examination revealed
that the 100 psig steam at this particular location was superheated to 235
0
C,
well above the exotherm initiation temperature. After a steam desuperheater
was installed immediately upstream of the dryer, the fire problem disappeared.
See item 19 in Table 7 for potential design solutions.
7.2.3 Pharmaceutical Powder Dryer Fire and Explosion
An operator had tested dryer samples on a number of occasions. After the last
sampling, he closed the manhole cover, put the dryer under vacuum, and started
rotation of the dryer. A few minutes later an explosion and flash fire occurred,
which self-extinguished. No one was injured. Investigations revealed that after
the last sampling, the dryer manhole cover had not been securely fastened. This
allowed the vacuum within the dryer to draw air into the rotating dryer and
create a flammable mixture. The ignition source was probably an electrostatic
discharge (the Teflon coating on the internal lining of the dryer could have built
up a charge). No nitrogen inciting had been used (Drogaris 1993).
After this incident, the following precautions were instituted to prevent
similar incidents from occurring in the future:
• Nitrogen purging is carried out before charging or sampling of the
dryer.
• If the absolute pressure rises to about 4 psia, the rotation stops, an alarm
sounds, and a nitrogen purge starts automatically.
7.3 FAILURE SCENARIOS AND DESIGN SOLUTIONS
Table 7 presents information on equipment failure scenarios and associated
design solutions specific to dryers. The table heading definitions are provided
in Chapter 3, section 3.3.
7.4 DISCUSSION
7.4. / Use of Potential Design Solutions Table
To arrive at the optimal design solution for a given application, use Table 7 in
conjunction with the design basis selection methodology presented in Chapter
2. Use of the design solutions presented in the table should be combined with
sound engineering judgment and consideration of all relevant factors.
7.4.2 Special Considerations
Table 7 contains numerous design solutions derived from a variety of sources
and actual situations. This section contains additional information on selected
design solutions. The information is organized and cross-referenced by the
Operational Deviation Number in the table.
Buildup and Auto ignition of Deposits in Dryers/Ductworks (I)
Some dryers and drying systems (including ductwork and associated equip-
ment such as cyclones, dust collectors, etc.) are prone to accumulation of
deposits on dryer walls and ductwork. Solids often accumulate on spray
devices at the top of dryers where the highest dryer temperature is often expe-
rienced. Frequent cleaning and monitoring may be required to ensure that
these deposits do not overheat and autoignite. Tests should be conducted to
evaluate the hazards of dust deposit ignitability. The characteristics of materi-
als deposited on walls or other surfaces may change over time when the mate-
rials are exposed to high temperatures or other process conditions.
Page 4


7
DRYERS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents potential failure mechanisms for dryers and drying sys-
tems, and suggests design alternatives for reducing the risks associated with
such failures. The types of equipment covered in this chapter include:
• Spray dryers
• Tray dryers
• Fluid bed dryers
• Conveying (flash, mechanical, and pneumatic) dryers
• Rotary dryers
This chapter presents only those failure modes that are unique to
dryers. Some of the generic failure scenarios pertaining to vessels and heat
transfer equipment may also be applicable to dryers. Consequently, this chap-
ter should be used in conjunction with Chapter 3, Vessels and Chapter 6, Heat
Transfer Equipment. Also, since drying equipment is often associated with
solid-fluid separators and solids handling and processing equipment, refer to
Chapters 9 and 10 for additional information. Unless specifically noted, the
failure scenarios apply to more than one class of dryers.
7.2 PAST INCIDENTS
This section presents three case histories involving fires and explosions (defla-
grations) to reinforce the need for safe design and operating practices for
dryers and drying systems.
7.2. / Drying of Compound Fertilizers
A fire and explosion occurred in a dryer handling a blended fertilizer that con-
tained single and triple super-phosphates and a mixture of nitrogen-
phosphorous-potassium-fertilizers. The blend was prone to self-sustained
decompositions, and began decomposing while passing through the dryer.
When the temperature of the blend rose to about 13O
0
C, the operator inter-
vened and shut down the dryer. Subsequently, a rapid exothermic reaction
occurred within the dryer which resulted in a fire and explosion. One person
was killed and 18 were injured (Drogaris 1993). See item 1 in Table 7 for
potential design solutions.
Ed. Note: A prior study of exotherm potential might have led to safer operating
limits.
7.2.2 Fires in Cellulose Acetate Dryer
A continuous belt dryer used to dry cellulose acetate powder had experienced
repeated small internal fires over a two-year period. After performing a basket
(self-heating) test to determine if exothermic behavior was present under vari-
ous solids depths, investigators discovered that an exotherm was initiated at
223
0
C under process conditions. Because the dryer was heated with 100 psig
steam (saturation temperature of 172
0
C) it was initially thought that this exo-
thermic behavior was not the cause of the fires. Further examination revealed
that the 100 psig steam at this particular location was superheated to 235
0
C,
well above the exotherm initiation temperature. After a steam desuperheater
was installed immediately upstream of the dryer, the fire problem disappeared.
See item 19 in Table 7 for potential design solutions.
7.2.3 Pharmaceutical Powder Dryer Fire and Explosion
An operator had tested dryer samples on a number of occasions. After the last
sampling, he closed the manhole cover, put the dryer under vacuum, and started
rotation of the dryer. A few minutes later an explosion and flash fire occurred,
which self-extinguished. No one was injured. Investigations revealed that after
the last sampling, the dryer manhole cover had not been securely fastened. This
allowed the vacuum within the dryer to draw air into the rotating dryer and
create a flammable mixture. The ignition source was probably an electrostatic
discharge (the Teflon coating on the internal lining of the dryer could have built
up a charge). No nitrogen inciting had been used (Drogaris 1993).
After this incident, the following precautions were instituted to prevent
similar incidents from occurring in the future:
• Nitrogen purging is carried out before charging or sampling of the
dryer.
• If the absolute pressure rises to about 4 psia, the rotation stops, an alarm
sounds, and a nitrogen purge starts automatically.
7.3 FAILURE SCENARIOS AND DESIGN SOLUTIONS
Table 7 presents information on equipment failure scenarios and associated
design solutions specific to dryers. The table heading definitions are provided
in Chapter 3, section 3.3.
7.4 DISCUSSION
7.4. / Use of Potential Design Solutions Table
To arrive at the optimal design solution for a given application, use Table 7 in
conjunction with the design basis selection methodology presented in Chapter
2. Use of the design solutions presented in the table should be combined with
sound engineering judgment and consideration of all relevant factors.
7.4.2 Special Considerations
Table 7 contains numerous design solutions derived from a variety of sources
and actual situations. This section contains additional information on selected
design solutions. The information is organized and cross-referenced by the
Operational Deviation Number in the table.
Buildup and Auto ignition of Deposits in Dryers/Ductworks (I)
Some dryers and drying systems (including ductwork and associated equip-
ment such as cyclones, dust collectors, etc.) are prone to accumulation of
deposits on dryer walls and ductwork. Solids often accumulate on spray
devices at the top of dryers where the highest dryer temperature is often expe-
rienced. Frequent cleaning and monitoring may be required to ensure that
these deposits do not overheat and autoignite. Tests should be conducted to
evaluate the hazards of dust deposit ignitability. The characteristics of materi-
als deposited on walls or other surfaces may change over time when the mate-
rials are exposed to high temperatures or other process conditions.
Electrostatic Hazards (3, 14, 15)
Electrostatic sparks are a common cause of dust and flammable vapor deflagra-
tions. Dryers and drying systems that can generate electrostatic charges must
be properly bonded and grounded to drain off these charges and minimize the
possibility of deflagrations. Inerting is often needed to prevent the occurrence
of a deflagration.
Hybrid Mixtures (I I)
Many drying operations involve the evaporation of a flammable solvent from a
combustible powder. This combination of a flammable vapor and combusti-
ble powder fines (dust) is called a hybrid mixture. Hybrid mixtures represent a
greater explosion hazard than that presented by the combustible dust alone.
This increased hazard is characterized by the following:
1. The hybrid mixture may explode more severely than a dust-air mixture
alone, i.e., the maximum pressure and maximum rate of pressure rise
may be greater, even if the vapor concentration is below its lower
explosive limit (LEL).
2. The minimum ignition energy of hybrid mixtures is usually lower than
that of the dust-air mixture alone.
3. The minimum explosible concentration (MEC) of a dust is reduced by
the presence of a flammable vapor even if the latter is below its LEL.
Measurable effects are observed as low as 20% of the vapor LEL.
Decomposition of Process Materials (19, 20, 22)
Many powders are thermally sensitive and may decompose at high tempera-
ture, resulting in an overpressure or fire. Some dried materials, such as sodium
hydrosulfite, may also exothermically decompose when exposed to water. It is
very important to determine if organic powders are thermally unstable and, if
so, that they be tested for thermal stability to establish a safe operating tem-
perature for the drying operation. The potential for decomposition will
depend on the characteristics of the solid, including depth, composition, tem-
perature, duration of exposure, and dryness.
7.5 REFERENCES
Drogaris, G. 1993. Major Accident Reporting System: Lessons Learned from Accidents Notified.
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.
Suggested Additional Reading
Abbot, J. 1990. Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Dryers—A User Guide. 2d ed. London: The
Institution of Chemical Engineers.
Page 5


7
DRYERS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents potential failure mechanisms for dryers and drying sys-
tems, and suggests design alternatives for reducing the risks associated with
such failures. The types of equipment covered in this chapter include:
• Spray dryers
• Tray dryers
• Fluid bed dryers
• Conveying (flash, mechanical, and pneumatic) dryers
• Rotary dryers
This chapter presents only those failure modes that are unique to
dryers. Some of the generic failure scenarios pertaining to vessels and heat
transfer equipment may also be applicable to dryers. Consequently, this chap-
ter should be used in conjunction with Chapter 3, Vessels and Chapter 6, Heat
Transfer Equipment. Also, since drying equipment is often associated with
solid-fluid separators and solids handling and processing equipment, refer to
Chapters 9 and 10 for additional information. Unless specifically noted, the
failure scenarios apply to more than one class of dryers.
7.2 PAST INCIDENTS
This section presents three case histories involving fires and explosions (defla-
grations) to reinforce the need for safe design and operating practices for
dryers and drying systems.
7.2. / Drying of Compound Fertilizers
A fire and explosion occurred in a dryer handling a blended fertilizer that con-
tained single and triple super-phosphates and a mixture of nitrogen-
phosphorous-potassium-fertilizers. The blend was prone to self-sustained
decompositions, and began decomposing while passing through the dryer.
When the temperature of the blend rose to about 13O
0
C, the operator inter-
vened and shut down the dryer. Subsequently, a rapid exothermic reaction
occurred within the dryer which resulted in a fire and explosion. One person
was killed and 18 were injured (Drogaris 1993). See item 1 in Table 7 for
potential design solutions.
Ed. Note: A prior study of exotherm potential might have led to safer operating
limits.
7.2.2 Fires in Cellulose Acetate Dryer
A continuous belt dryer used to dry cellulose acetate powder had experienced
repeated small internal fires over a two-year period. After performing a basket
(self-heating) test to determine if exothermic behavior was present under vari-
ous solids depths, investigators discovered that an exotherm was initiated at
223
0
C under process conditions. Because the dryer was heated with 100 psig
steam (saturation temperature of 172
0
C) it was initially thought that this exo-
thermic behavior was not the cause of the fires. Further examination revealed
that the 100 psig steam at this particular location was superheated to 235
0
C,
well above the exotherm initiation temperature. After a steam desuperheater
was installed immediately upstream of the dryer, the fire problem disappeared.
See item 19 in Table 7 for potential design solutions.
7.2.3 Pharmaceutical Powder Dryer Fire and Explosion
An operator had tested dryer samples on a number of occasions. After the last
sampling, he closed the manhole cover, put the dryer under vacuum, and started
rotation of the dryer. A few minutes later an explosion and flash fire occurred,
which self-extinguished. No one was injured. Investigations revealed that after
the last sampling, the dryer manhole cover had not been securely fastened. This
allowed the vacuum within the dryer to draw air into the rotating dryer and
create a flammable mixture. The ignition source was probably an electrostatic
discharge (the Teflon coating on the internal lining of the dryer could have built
up a charge). No nitrogen inciting had been used (Drogaris 1993).
After this incident, the following precautions were instituted to prevent
similar incidents from occurring in the future:
• Nitrogen purging is carried out before charging or sampling of the
dryer.
• If the absolute pressure rises to about 4 psia, the rotation stops, an alarm
sounds, and a nitrogen purge starts automatically.
7.3 FAILURE SCENARIOS AND DESIGN SOLUTIONS
Table 7 presents information on equipment failure scenarios and associated
design solutions specific to dryers. The table heading definitions are provided
in Chapter 3, section 3.3.
7.4 DISCUSSION
7.4. / Use of Potential Design Solutions Table
To arrive at the optimal design solution for a given application, use Table 7 in
conjunction with the design basis selection methodology presented in Chapter
2. Use of the design solutions presented in the table should be combined with
sound engineering judgment and consideration of all relevant factors.
7.4.2 Special Considerations
Table 7 contains numerous design solutions derived from a variety of sources
and actual situations. This section contains additional information on selected
design solutions. The information is organized and cross-referenced by the
Operational Deviation Number in the table.
Buildup and Auto ignition of Deposits in Dryers/Ductworks (I)
Some dryers and drying systems (including ductwork and associated equip-
ment such as cyclones, dust collectors, etc.) are prone to accumulation of
deposits on dryer walls and ductwork. Solids often accumulate on spray
devices at the top of dryers where the highest dryer temperature is often expe-
rienced. Frequent cleaning and monitoring may be required to ensure that
these deposits do not overheat and autoignite. Tests should be conducted to
evaluate the hazards of dust deposit ignitability. The characteristics of materi-
als deposited on walls or other surfaces may change over time when the mate-
rials are exposed to high temperatures or other process conditions.
Electrostatic Hazards (3, 14, 15)
Electrostatic sparks are a common cause of dust and flammable vapor deflagra-
tions. Dryers and drying systems that can generate electrostatic charges must
be properly bonded and grounded to drain off these charges and minimize the
possibility of deflagrations. Inerting is often needed to prevent the occurrence
of a deflagration.
Hybrid Mixtures (I I)
Many drying operations involve the evaporation of a flammable solvent from a
combustible powder. This combination of a flammable vapor and combusti-
ble powder fines (dust) is called a hybrid mixture. Hybrid mixtures represent a
greater explosion hazard than that presented by the combustible dust alone.
This increased hazard is characterized by the following:
1. The hybrid mixture may explode more severely than a dust-air mixture
alone, i.e., the maximum pressure and maximum rate of pressure rise
may be greater, even if the vapor concentration is below its lower
explosive limit (LEL).
2. The minimum ignition energy of hybrid mixtures is usually lower than
that of the dust-air mixture alone.
3. The minimum explosible concentration (MEC) of a dust is reduced by
the presence of a flammable vapor even if the latter is below its LEL.
Measurable effects are observed as low as 20% of the vapor LEL.
Decomposition of Process Materials (19, 20, 22)
Many powders are thermally sensitive and may decompose at high tempera-
ture, resulting in an overpressure or fire. Some dried materials, such as sodium
hydrosulfite, may also exothermically decompose when exposed to water. It is
very important to determine if organic powders are thermally unstable and, if
so, that they be tested for thermal stability to establish a safe operating tem-
perature for the drying operation. The potential for decomposition will
depend on the characteristics of the solid, including depth, composition, tem-
perature, duration of exposure, and dryness.
7.5 REFERENCES
Drogaris, G. 1993. Major Accident Reporting System: Lessons Learned from Accidents Notified.
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.
Suggested Additional Reading
Abbot, J. 1990. Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Dryers—A User Guide. 2d ed. London: The
Institution of Chemical Engineers.
Bartknecht, W. 1989. Dust Explosions: Course, Prevention, Protection. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Chatrathi, K. 1991. How to Safely Handle Explosible Dust—Part I Powder and Bulk Engineering.
January 1991: 22-28.
Chatrathi, K. 1991. How to Safely Handle Explosible Dust—Part II. Powder and Bulk Engineer-
ing. February 1991: 12-18.
Ebadat, V. 1994. Testing to Assess Your Powder's Fire and Explosion Hazards. Powder and Bulk
Engineering. January 1994: 19-26.
Garcia, H., and Guarici, D. 1995. How to Protect Your Drying Process from Explosions. Powder
and Bulk Engineering. April 1995: 53-64.
Gibson, N., Harper, D. J. and Rogers, R. L. 1985. Evaluation of the Fire and Explosion Risk in
Drying Powders. Plant/Operations Progress. 4: 181-189.
Narayan, S. B., and Majumdar, A. A. 1987. Fire and Explosion Hazards in Drying Plants, Ch. 28
in Handbook of Industrial Drying. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.
Palmer, K. N. 1973. Dust Explosions and Fires. London: Chapman and Hall Ltd.
Palmer, K. N. 1990. Dust Explosions: Initiations, Characteristics, and Protection. Chemical Engi-
neering Progress. March 1990: 24-32
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