Rivals and Neighbours | Goa State PSC (GPSC) Preparation - GPSC (Goa) PDF Download

 Page 1


A
FTER A FIRST century of nearly undisputed mastery over the western
Indian ocean, and after a suf?ciently long spell of prosperity, misfor-
tunes began falling thick and fast upon the Portuguese Empire. In 1580
Portugal lost its independence and the crowns of Spain and Portugal were
united in the person of Philip II of Spain, who assumed the title of Philip
I of Portugal. True, Portuguese administration and trade were left in the
hands of Portuguese nationals, but the royal authority in Spain showed little
concern for the growing dif?culties of the Portuguese in the East. Portugal
had no foreign policy of its own and the enemies of Spain were turned into
enemies of Portugal. Despite promises to the contrary, Spain also used
?nancial resources and man-power from Portugal in order to quell Dutch
insurgency against Spanish rule.
1
In 1640 the Portuguese regained their independent rule, but it was too late to
repair the damage to the national and imperial economy. The century-old
fabric of the Portuguese eastern empire had been torn apart and appro-
priated by its North-European rivals. There was also the factor of moral
degeneration at work and we have the following comment about it from
a contemporary Jesuit who was very familiar with the prevailing situation:
“From the oldest to the youngest, rare are the persons who perform their
duty. Of zeal for the service of the crown there is little. Portuguese exploits
are scarce. Graft in administration has ?ourished, the martial spirit has
faded; valour is non-existent and cowardice is rampant. All these are rea-
sons encouraging our enemies.”
2
These reverses had emboldened native
rules of the neighbourhood to ?out the trade restrictions of the Portuguese
and to exploit the competitive market inaugurated by the arrival of the
North-Europeans.
3
What follows is a short review of a long-drawn con?ict which deprived
the Portuguese of their stronghold over the Asiatic trade. This review is
Page 2


A
FTER A FIRST century of nearly undisputed mastery over the western
Indian ocean, and after a suf?ciently long spell of prosperity, misfor-
tunes began falling thick and fast upon the Portuguese Empire. In 1580
Portugal lost its independence and the crowns of Spain and Portugal were
united in the person of Philip II of Spain, who assumed the title of Philip
I of Portugal. True, Portuguese administration and trade were left in the
hands of Portuguese nationals, but the royal authority in Spain showed little
concern for the growing dif?culties of the Portuguese in the East. Portugal
had no foreign policy of its own and the enemies of Spain were turned into
enemies of Portugal. Despite promises to the contrary, Spain also used
?nancial resources and man-power from Portugal in order to quell Dutch
insurgency against Spanish rule.
1
In 1640 the Portuguese regained their independent rule, but it was too late to
repair the damage to the national and imperial economy. The century-old
fabric of the Portuguese eastern empire had been torn apart and appro-
priated by its North-European rivals. There was also the factor of moral
degeneration at work and we have the following comment about it from
a contemporary Jesuit who was very familiar with the prevailing situation:
“From the oldest to the youngest, rare are the persons who perform their
duty. Of zeal for the service of the crown there is little. Portuguese exploits
are scarce. Graft in administration has ?ourished, the martial spirit has
faded; valour is non-existent and cowardice is rampant. All these are rea-
sons encouraging our enemies.”
2
These reverses had emboldened native
rules of the neighbourhood to ?out the trade restrictions of the Portuguese
and to exploit the competitive market inaugurated by the arrival of the
North-Europeans.
3
What follows is a short review of a long-drawn con?ict which deprived
the Portuguese of their stronghold over the Asiatic trade. This review is
indispensable as an introduction to the present study because the place
of importance to which Goa had risen depended entirely on its being the
strategic base of the Portuguese seaborne trade in the East. Hence, it would
be unrealistic to study economic change at Goa merely within the con?nes
of its geographical boundary.
The Portuguese and their North-European rivals
Neither the English nor the Dutch had been happy with their dependence
upon the Lisbon market for the supplies of eastern spices. It was a humil-
iating experience to the masters of the carrying trade of the Baltic and of
the rest of the western Europe.
4
The merchant-adventurers of both these
countries had, from long back planned and carried successful raids upon
the home-bound wealth-laden vessels of the Iberian empires. Rich prizes
had whetted their appetites and tempted them to probe further into the
weakness of their empires. Following the union of the crowns of Spain and
Portugal, the latter as the weaker partner drew upon itself the fury of the
North-Europeans, who fought for spices under the cloak of nationalism and
the banner of Reformation.
The Portuguese and the English Rivals: The English restricted their use of
force to the minimum and succeeded in wresting concessions from the Por-
tuguese through diplomatic tact. The Anglo-Portuguese relations in India
re?ected very much the pattern of the Anglo-Portuguese relations in Eu-
rope. More than once in moments of national crises Portugal had turned to
England for help against enemies threatening her independence. However,
England had exploited all such occasions by offering its alliance to further
its business interests in the trade-world of Portugal.
5
At the dawn of the
seventeenth century, the involvement of the English in the Asiatic trade com-
pelled the Portuguese to buy their neutrality with concessions. This enabled
a concentration of Portuguese forces against the Dutch aggressiveness.
In the ominous situation created by the Dutch, the Portuguese could not
prevent the English from exploiting their weakness and from strengthening
their foothold in the Surat trade. However, the Portuguese did use whatever
little force they could and tried diplomatic intrigue at the Mughal court to
discourage English trade ambitions. It was only after Captain Thomas Best
had successfully resisted Portuguese attacks off the coast of Surat in 1612,
and after Captain Nicholas Downton had made short work of a Portuguese
?eet commanded personally by the Viceroy of Goa in 1615, that the Mughal
ruler of?cially sanctioned the trade activities of the English in his lands and
accepted an English ambassador at his court.
6
The Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), pitting European countries against each
other largely on the basis of religious differences, was also responsible for
Page 3


A
FTER A FIRST century of nearly undisputed mastery over the western
Indian ocean, and after a suf?ciently long spell of prosperity, misfor-
tunes began falling thick and fast upon the Portuguese Empire. In 1580
Portugal lost its independence and the crowns of Spain and Portugal were
united in the person of Philip II of Spain, who assumed the title of Philip
I of Portugal. True, Portuguese administration and trade were left in the
hands of Portuguese nationals, but the royal authority in Spain showed little
concern for the growing dif?culties of the Portuguese in the East. Portugal
had no foreign policy of its own and the enemies of Spain were turned into
enemies of Portugal. Despite promises to the contrary, Spain also used
?nancial resources and man-power from Portugal in order to quell Dutch
insurgency against Spanish rule.
1
In 1640 the Portuguese regained their independent rule, but it was too late to
repair the damage to the national and imperial economy. The century-old
fabric of the Portuguese eastern empire had been torn apart and appro-
priated by its North-European rivals. There was also the factor of moral
degeneration at work and we have the following comment about it from
a contemporary Jesuit who was very familiar with the prevailing situation:
“From the oldest to the youngest, rare are the persons who perform their
duty. Of zeal for the service of the crown there is little. Portuguese exploits
are scarce. Graft in administration has ?ourished, the martial spirit has
faded; valour is non-existent and cowardice is rampant. All these are rea-
sons encouraging our enemies.”
2
These reverses had emboldened native
rules of the neighbourhood to ?out the trade restrictions of the Portuguese
and to exploit the competitive market inaugurated by the arrival of the
North-Europeans.
3
What follows is a short review of a long-drawn con?ict which deprived
the Portuguese of their stronghold over the Asiatic trade. This review is
indispensable as an introduction to the present study because the place
of importance to which Goa had risen depended entirely on its being the
strategic base of the Portuguese seaborne trade in the East. Hence, it would
be unrealistic to study economic change at Goa merely within the con?nes
of its geographical boundary.
The Portuguese and their North-European rivals
Neither the English nor the Dutch had been happy with their dependence
upon the Lisbon market for the supplies of eastern spices. It was a humil-
iating experience to the masters of the carrying trade of the Baltic and of
the rest of the western Europe.
4
The merchant-adventurers of both these
countries had, from long back planned and carried successful raids upon
the home-bound wealth-laden vessels of the Iberian empires. Rich prizes
had whetted their appetites and tempted them to probe further into the
weakness of their empires. Following the union of the crowns of Spain and
Portugal, the latter as the weaker partner drew upon itself the fury of the
North-Europeans, who fought for spices under the cloak of nationalism and
the banner of Reformation.
The Portuguese and the English Rivals: The English restricted their use of
force to the minimum and succeeded in wresting concessions from the Por-
tuguese through diplomatic tact. The Anglo-Portuguese relations in India
re?ected very much the pattern of the Anglo-Portuguese relations in Eu-
rope. More than once in moments of national crises Portugal had turned to
England for help against enemies threatening her independence. However,
England had exploited all such occasions by offering its alliance to further
its business interests in the trade-world of Portugal.
5
At the dawn of the
seventeenth century, the involvement of the English in the Asiatic trade com-
pelled the Portuguese to buy their neutrality with concessions. This enabled
a concentration of Portuguese forces against the Dutch aggressiveness.
In the ominous situation created by the Dutch, the Portuguese could not
prevent the English from exploiting their weakness and from strengthening
their foothold in the Surat trade. However, the Portuguese did use whatever
little force they could and tried diplomatic intrigue at the Mughal court to
discourage English trade ambitions. It was only after Captain Thomas Best
had successfully resisted Portuguese attacks off the coast of Surat in 1612,
and after Captain Nicholas Downton had made short work of a Portuguese
?eet commanded personally by the Viceroy of Goa in 1615, that the Mughal
ruler of?cially sanctioned the trade activities of the English in his lands and
accepted an English ambassador at his court.
6
The Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), pitting European countries against each
other largely on the basis of religious differences, was also responsible for
the English and the Dutch co-religionists joining hands in conquering the
East Indies trade.
7
They fought by proxy upholding the grievances of the na-
tive princes against the Portuguese. Thus the English assisted the Persians
to drive the Portuguese out of Hurmuz in 1622, thereby depriving the Por-
tuguese of an important strategic outpost as well as trading base. The Dutch
did the same in the Indonesian archipelago and in Ceylon. Fortunately for
the Portuguese, the English fell out with the Dutch over the control of the
Spice Islands. Coen of the Dutch East India Company had not reconciled
himself to the stipulations of the Dutch agreement with the English in 1619
and was of the opinion that Dutch supremacy in the Spice Islands would not
be achieved if conquests were to be undertaken jointly with the English.
8
Deteriorating relations culminated with the massacre of some Englishmen
at Amboina in 1623. This incident marked a de?nite end to negotiations for
cooperation in Asia. This factor, plus the lack of interest shown by the early
Stuarts in offering protection to the Company merchants seemingly caused
the shifting of the English East India Company’s interest to the west coast of
India and to the Persian Gulf. It also brought about a change in the staple of
the English trade from spices to textiles.
9
As a result of a Portuguese initiative and of the willing response of the
English, Anglo-Portuguese relations entered a new phase with the signing
of the Goa Accord on January 20, 1635, which marked the cessation of
hostilities and inaugurated a phase of mutual assistance.
10
While the long-
term effect of the truce was restricted to a benevolent neutrality of the
English in favour of the Portuguese, there were immediate bene?ts derived
by the two signatories. The Portuguese freighted English vessels to supply
provisions to the besieged garrison of Malacca and to fetch copper and
ordnance from Macau to Goa through the straits of Singapore where the
Dutch were lying in wait for the Portuguese ships.
11
In the meantime the
English were increasing their pro?ts on the carrying trade, and even a few
coasters were built for them in the Portuguese shipyards of Bassein and
Daman.
12
Anglo-Portuguese relations turned tense for a while when the
Accord was being violated by some English interlopers who had come to
draw the bene?ts of the truce. They belonged to the so-called Courteen’s
Association. It took the Portuguese some time to be convinced that the
Accord violators were not in league with the English East India Company
based at Surat.
13
Throughout the rest of the seventeenth century the Portuguese and the
English were kept together by their common hostilities towards the Dutch.
While the English fought three wars with the Dutch in Europe, the Por-
tuguese and the Dutch continued locked in their grim duel for the Asi-
atic trade. The exhaustion of the Portuguese and their inability to contain
the Dutch forced them into a marriage treaty with England in 1661. The
treaty included a secret clause whereby the King of England committed
himself to bring about cessation of hostilities between the Portuguese and
Page 4


A
FTER A FIRST century of nearly undisputed mastery over the western
Indian ocean, and after a suf?ciently long spell of prosperity, misfor-
tunes began falling thick and fast upon the Portuguese Empire. In 1580
Portugal lost its independence and the crowns of Spain and Portugal were
united in the person of Philip II of Spain, who assumed the title of Philip
I of Portugal. True, Portuguese administration and trade were left in the
hands of Portuguese nationals, but the royal authority in Spain showed little
concern for the growing dif?culties of the Portuguese in the East. Portugal
had no foreign policy of its own and the enemies of Spain were turned into
enemies of Portugal. Despite promises to the contrary, Spain also used
?nancial resources and man-power from Portugal in order to quell Dutch
insurgency against Spanish rule.
1
In 1640 the Portuguese regained their independent rule, but it was too late to
repair the damage to the national and imperial economy. The century-old
fabric of the Portuguese eastern empire had been torn apart and appro-
priated by its North-European rivals. There was also the factor of moral
degeneration at work and we have the following comment about it from
a contemporary Jesuit who was very familiar with the prevailing situation:
“From the oldest to the youngest, rare are the persons who perform their
duty. Of zeal for the service of the crown there is little. Portuguese exploits
are scarce. Graft in administration has ?ourished, the martial spirit has
faded; valour is non-existent and cowardice is rampant. All these are rea-
sons encouraging our enemies.”
2
These reverses had emboldened native
rules of the neighbourhood to ?out the trade restrictions of the Portuguese
and to exploit the competitive market inaugurated by the arrival of the
North-Europeans.
3
What follows is a short review of a long-drawn con?ict which deprived
the Portuguese of their stronghold over the Asiatic trade. This review is
indispensable as an introduction to the present study because the place
of importance to which Goa had risen depended entirely on its being the
strategic base of the Portuguese seaborne trade in the East. Hence, it would
be unrealistic to study economic change at Goa merely within the con?nes
of its geographical boundary.
The Portuguese and their North-European rivals
Neither the English nor the Dutch had been happy with their dependence
upon the Lisbon market for the supplies of eastern spices. It was a humil-
iating experience to the masters of the carrying trade of the Baltic and of
the rest of the western Europe.
4
The merchant-adventurers of both these
countries had, from long back planned and carried successful raids upon
the home-bound wealth-laden vessels of the Iberian empires. Rich prizes
had whetted their appetites and tempted them to probe further into the
weakness of their empires. Following the union of the crowns of Spain and
Portugal, the latter as the weaker partner drew upon itself the fury of the
North-Europeans, who fought for spices under the cloak of nationalism and
the banner of Reformation.
The Portuguese and the English Rivals: The English restricted their use of
force to the minimum and succeeded in wresting concessions from the Por-
tuguese through diplomatic tact. The Anglo-Portuguese relations in India
re?ected very much the pattern of the Anglo-Portuguese relations in Eu-
rope. More than once in moments of national crises Portugal had turned to
England for help against enemies threatening her independence. However,
England had exploited all such occasions by offering its alliance to further
its business interests in the trade-world of Portugal.
5
At the dawn of the
seventeenth century, the involvement of the English in the Asiatic trade com-
pelled the Portuguese to buy their neutrality with concessions. This enabled
a concentration of Portuguese forces against the Dutch aggressiveness.
In the ominous situation created by the Dutch, the Portuguese could not
prevent the English from exploiting their weakness and from strengthening
their foothold in the Surat trade. However, the Portuguese did use whatever
little force they could and tried diplomatic intrigue at the Mughal court to
discourage English trade ambitions. It was only after Captain Thomas Best
had successfully resisted Portuguese attacks off the coast of Surat in 1612,
and after Captain Nicholas Downton had made short work of a Portuguese
?eet commanded personally by the Viceroy of Goa in 1615, that the Mughal
ruler of?cially sanctioned the trade activities of the English in his lands and
accepted an English ambassador at his court.
6
The Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), pitting European countries against each
other largely on the basis of religious differences, was also responsible for
the English and the Dutch co-religionists joining hands in conquering the
East Indies trade.
7
They fought by proxy upholding the grievances of the na-
tive princes against the Portuguese. Thus the English assisted the Persians
to drive the Portuguese out of Hurmuz in 1622, thereby depriving the Por-
tuguese of an important strategic outpost as well as trading base. The Dutch
did the same in the Indonesian archipelago and in Ceylon. Fortunately for
the Portuguese, the English fell out with the Dutch over the control of the
Spice Islands. Coen of the Dutch East India Company had not reconciled
himself to the stipulations of the Dutch agreement with the English in 1619
and was of the opinion that Dutch supremacy in the Spice Islands would not
be achieved if conquests were to be undertaken jointly with the English.
8
Deteriorating relations culminated with the massacre of some Englishmen
at Amboina in 1623. This incident marked a de?nite end to negotiations for
cooperation in Asia. This factor, plus the lack of interest shown by the early
Stuarts in offering protection to the Company merchants seemingly caused
the shifting of the English East India Company’s interest to the west coast of
India and to the Persian Gulf. It also brought about a change in the staple of
the English trade from spices to textiles.
9
As a result of a Portuguese initiative and of the willing response of the
English, Anglo-Portuguese relations entered a new phase with the signing
of the Goa Accord on January 20, 1635, which marked the cessation of
hostilities and inaugurated a phase of mutual assistance.
10
While the long-
term effect of the truce was restricted to a benevolent neutrality of the
English in favour of the Portuguese, there were immediate bene?ts derived
by the two signatories. The Portuguese freighted English vessels to supply
provisions to the besieged garrison of Malacca and to fetch copper and
ordnance from Macau to Goa through the straits of Singapore where the
Dutch were lying in wait for the Portuguese ships.
11
In the meantime the
English were increasing their pro?ts on the carrying trade, and even a few
coasters were built for them in the Portuguese shipyards of Bassein and
Daman.
12
Anglo-Portuguese relations turned tense for a while when the
Accord was being violated by some English interlopers who had come to
draw the bene?ts of the truce. They belonged to the so-called Courteen’s
Association. It took the Portuguese some time to be convinced that the
Accord violators were not in league with the English East India Company
based at Surat.
13
Throughout the rest of the seventeenth century the Portuguese and the
English were kept together by their common hostilities towards the Dutch.
While the English fought three wars with the Dutch in Europe, the Por-
tuguese and the Dutch continued locked in their grim duel for the Asi-
atic trade. The exhaustion of the Portuguese and their inability to contain
the Dutch forced them into a marriage treaty with England in 1661. The
treaty included a secret clause whereby the King of England committed
himself to bring about cessation of hostilities between the Portuguese and
the Dutch, or to ?ght in favour of the Portuguese in case the Dutch refused
to negotiate.
14
In return for this secret promise English merchants were
granted the same privileges of trade at Goa, Cochin and Diu as were enjoyed
by Portuguese subjects, but no more than four English families would be
allowed to reside at one time at any of those places. The marriage treaty
also contained another clause by which the Portuguese crown ceded the
port region of Bombay to the English crown as dowry of the Portuguese
princess.
15
The cession of Bombay, which was carried out by the Portuguese authorities
in India with great reluctance after a delay of four years, proved to be a severe
blow to Portuguese trade interests. The English crown transferred the island
to the English East India Company in 1668 for an insigni?cant annual rental
of ten pounds sterling and the Company proceeded to transform it into an
important trading base in India.
16
Bombay began attracting many native
businessmen who until then had invested their capital in Portuguese trade.
Many native traders and artisans found in Bombay a safe refuge against the
intimidations of the Goa Inquisition or against the Portuguese legislation
regarding the orphan-children of the non-Christian families residing in
Portuguese-controlled territories.
17
Correspondence between the English and the Portuguese in India during
the remainder of the seventeenth century was charged with accusations
and counter-accusations. Throughout that period the Portuguese tried to
obstruct the growth of English trade at Bombay by levying heavy transit
duties on goods taken from Bassein, Karanja and Thana, and by prohibiting
the transport of timber and food provisions to the island of Bombay.
18
The
English responded to this harassment by supplying arms and ammunition
to the Arabs of Muscat, who had been harrassying Portuguese trade and
threatening the Portuguese East African trade centre of Mombasa.
19
English
rivalry in India deprived the Portuguese of much of their cloth and indigo
supplies from Gujarat.
20
Englishmen had also entered the calico market of
Sind as an useful subsidiary to their main establishment at Surat, and they
had created a new and pro?table branch of the silk trade, thereby winning
for themselves an important position in the trade with the Persian Gulf.
21
After the acquisition of Bombay the English also challenged the Portuguese
trade in tobacco, which was supplied from Brazil via Lisbon and had become
the best pro?t-making item of the Asiatic trade of Portugal in the last quarter
of the seventeenth century. At least a part of tobacco which the English sold
at Bombay was purchased at Lisbon itself.
22
The Portuguese and the Dutch Rivals: when the Dutch came to the East
Indies, their considerable ?nancial resources and long commercial experi-
ence gave them an edge over even the English, and hence, much more over
the Portuguese. Besides, their superior naval organisation and far less or-
ganisational hurdles made the Dutch challenge to the “Lords of commerce
and navigation” a tremendously overawing experience. The Dutch system-
Page 5


A
FTER A FIRST century of nearly undisputed mastery over the western
Indian ocean, and after a suf?ciently long spell of prosperity, misfor-
tunes began falling thick and fast upon the Portuguese Empire. In 1580
Portugal lost its independence and the crowns of Spain and Portugal were
united in the person of Philip II of Spain, who assumed the title of Philip
I of Portugal. True, Portuguese administration and trade were left in the
hands of Portuguese nationals, but the royal authority in Spain showed little
concern for the growing dif?culties of the Portuguese in the East. Portugal
had no foreign policy of its own and the enemies of Spain were turned into
enemies of Portugal. Despite promises to the contrary, Spain also used
?nancial resources and man-power from Portugal in order to quell Dutch
insurgency against Spanish rule.
1
In 1640 the Portuguese regained their independent rule, but it was too late to
repair the damage to the national and imperial economy. The century-old
fabric of the Portuguese eastern empire had been torn apart and appro-
priated by its North-European rivals. There was also the factor of moral
degeneration at work and we have the following comment about it from
a contemporary Jesuit who was very familiar with the prevailing situation:
“From the oldest to the youngest, rare are the persons who perform their
duty. Of zeal for the service of the crown there is little. Portuguese exploits
are scarce. Graft in administration has ?ourished, the martial spirit has
faded; valour is non-existent and cowardice is rampant. All these are rea-
sons encouraging our enemies.”
2
These reverses had emboldened native
rules of the neighbourhood to ?out the trade restrictions of the Portuguese
and to exploit the competitive market inaugurated by the arrival of the
North-Europeans.
3
What follows is a short review of a long-drawn con?ict which deprived
the Portuguese of their stronghold over the Asiatic trade. This review is
indispensable as an introduction to the present study because the place
of importance to which Goa had risen depended entirely on its being the
strategic base of the Portuguese seaborne trade in the East. Hence, it would
be unrealistic to study economic change at Goa merely within the con?nes
of its geographical boundary.
The Portuguese and their North-European rivals
Neither the English nor the Dutch had been happy with their dependence
upon the Lisbon market for the supplies of eastern spices. It was a humil-
iating experience to the masters of the carrying trade of the Baltic and of
the rest of the western Europe.
4
The merchant-adventurers of both these
countries had, from long back planned and carried successful raids upon
the home-bound wealth-laden vessels of the Iberian empires. Rich prizes
had whetted their appetites and tempted them to probe further into the
weakness of their empires. Following the union of the crowns of Spain and
Portugal, the latter as the weaker partner drew upon itself the fury of the
North-Europeans, who fought for spices under the cloak of nationalism and
the banner of Reformation.
The Portuguese and the English Rivals: The English restricted their use of
force to the minimum and succeeded in wresting concessions from the Por-
tuguese through diplomatic tact. The Anglo-Portuguese relations in India
re?ected very much the pattern of the Anglo-Portuguese relations in Eu-
rope. More than once in moments of national crises Portugal had turned to
England for help against enemies threatening her independence. However,
England had exploited all such occasions by offering its alliance to further
its business interests in the trade-world of Portugal.
5
At the dawn of the
seventeenth century, the involvement of the English in the Asiatic trade com-
pelled the Portuguese to buy their neutrality with concessions. This enabled
a concentration of Portuguese forces against the Dutch aggressiveness.
In the ominous situation created by the Dutch, the Portuguese could not
prevent the English from exploiting their weakness and from strengthening
their foothold in the Surat trade. However, the Portuguese did use whatever
little force they could and tried diplomatic intrigue at the Mughal court to
discourage English trade ambitions. It was only after Captain Thomas Best
had successfully resisted Portuguese attacks off the coast of Surat in 1612,
and after Captain Nicholas Downton had made short work of a Portuguese
?eet commanded personally by the Viceroy of Goa in 1615, that the Mughal
ruler of?cially sanctioned the trade activities of the English in his lands and
accepted an English ambassador at his court.
6
The Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), pitting European countries against each
other largely on the basis of religious differences, was also responsible for
the English and the Dutch co-religionists joining hands in conquering the
East Indies trade.
7
They fought by proxy upholding the grievances of the na-
tive princes against the Portuguese. Thus the English assisted the Persians
to drive the Portuguese out of Hurmuz in 1622, thereby depriving the Por-
tuguese of an important strategic outpost as well as trading base. The Dutch
did the same in the Indonesian archipelago and in Ceylon. Fortunately for
the Portuguese, the English fell out with the Dutch over the control of the
Spice Islands. Coen of the Dutch East India Company had not reconciled
himself to the stipulations of the Dutch agreement with the English in 1619
and was of the opinion that Dutch supremacy in the Spice Islands would not
be achieved if conquests were to be undertaken jointly with the English.
8
Deteriorating relations culminated with the massacre of some Englishmen
at Amboina in 1623. This incident marked a de?nite end to negotiations for
cooperation in Asia. This factor, plus the lack of interest shown by the early
Stuarts in offering protection to the Company merchants seemingly caused
the shifting of the English East India Company’s interest to the west coast of
India and to the Persian Gulf. It also brought about a change in the staple of
the English trade from spices to textiles.
9
As a result of a Portuguese initiative and of the willing response of the
English, Anglo-Portuguese relations entered a new phase with the signing
of the Goa Accord on January 20, 1635, which marked the cessation of
hostilities and inaugurated a phase of mutual assistance.
10
While the long-
term effect of the truce was restricted to a benevolent neutrality of the
English in favour of the Portuguese, there were immediate bene?ts derived
by the two signatories. The Portuguese freighted English vessels to supply
provisions to the besieged garrison of Malacca and to fetch copper and
ordnance from Macau to Goa through the straits of Singapore where the
Dutch were lying in wait for the Portuguese ships.
11
In the meantime the
English were increasing their pro?ts on the carrying trade, and even a few
coasters were built for them in the Portuguese shipyards of Bassein and
Daman.
12
Anglo-Portuguese relations turned tense for a while when the
Accord was being violated by some English interlopers who had come to
draw the bene?ts of the truce. They belonged to the so-called Courteen’s
Association. It took the Portuguese some time to be convinced that the
Accord violators were not in league with the English East India Company
based at Surat.
13
Throughout the rest of the seventeenth century the Portuguese and the
English were kept together by their common hostilities towards the Dutch.
While the English fought three wars with the Dutch in Europe, the Por-
tuguese and the Dutch continued locked in their grim duel for the Asi-
atic trade. The exhaustion of the Portuguese and their inability to contain
the Dutch forced them into a marriage treaty with England in 1661. The
treaty included a secret clause whereby the King of England committed
himself to bring about cessation of hostilities between the Portuguese and
the Dutch, or to ?ght in favour of the Portuguese in case the Dutch refused
to negotiate.
14
In return for this secret promise English merchants were
granted the same privileges of trade at Goa, Cochin and Diu as were enjoyed
by Portuguese subjects, but no more than four English families would be
allowed to reside at one time at any of those places. The marriage treaty
also contained another clause by which the Portuguese crown ceded the
port region of Bombay to the English crown as dowry of the Portuguese
princess.
15
The cession of Bombay, which was carried out by the Portuguese authorities
in India with great reluctance after a delay of four years, proved to be a severe
blow to Portuguese trade interests. The English crown transferred the island
to the English East India Company in 1668 for an insigni?cant annual rental
of ten pounds sterling and the Company proceeded to transform it into an
important trading base in India.
16
Bombay began attracting many native
businessmen who until then had invested their capital in Portuguese trade.
Many native traders and artisans found in Bombay a safe refuge against the
intimidations of the Goa Inquisition or against the Portuguese legislation
regarding the orphan-children of the non-Christian families residing in
Portuguese-controlled territories.
17
Correspondence between the English and the Portuguese in India during
the remainder of the seventeenth century was charged with accusations
and counter-accusations. Throughout that period the Portuguese tried to
obstruct the growth of English trade at Bombay by levying heavy transit
duties on goods taken from Bassein, Karanja and Thana, and by prohibiting
the transport of timber and food provisions to the island of Bombay.
18
The
English responded to this harassment by supplying arms and ammunition
to the Arabs of Muscat, who had been harrassying Portuguese trade and
threatening the Portuguese East African trade centre of Mombasa.
19
English
rivalry in India deprived the Portuguese of much of their cloth and indigo
supplies from Gujarat.
20
Englishmen had also entered the calico market of
Sind as an useful subsidiary to their main establishment at Surat, and they
had created a new and pro?table branch of the silk trade, thereby winning
for themselves an important position in the trade with the Persian Gulf.
21
After the acquisition of Bombay the English also challenged the Portuguese
trade in tobacco, which was supplied from Brazil via Lisbon and had become
the best pro?t-making item of the Asiatic trade of Portugal in the last quarter
of the seventeenth century. At least a part of tobacco which the English sold
at Bombay was purchased at Lisbon itself.
22
The Portuguese and the Dutch Rivals: when the Dutch came to the East
Indies, their considerable ?nancial resources and long commercial experi-
ence gave them an edge over even the English, and hence, much more over
the Portuguese. Besides, their superior naval organisation and far less or-
ganisational hurdles made the Dutch challenge to the “Lords of commerce
and navigation” a tremendously overawing experience. The Dutch system-
atically harried the Portuguese interport trade of Asia from the Persian Gulf
to Japan, and reduced many of the long chain of Portuguese settlements
picking them off one by one.
23
The Dutch had begun their operations in the Indonesian archipelago, which
Linschoten’s Itinerario had indicated as the least controlled region by the
Portuguese, and as such offering no possibility of a serious clash with them.
It was only after the Dutch had tested the strength of the Portuguese in Asia
that they ventured to broaden their area of confrontation.
24
The overbearing
attitude of the Portuguese fort captains and their extortions from the native
merchants of the Spice Islands had won easy allies for the Dutch. With
their support and active collaboration the Dutch restricted the Portuguese
in?uence to Malacca, which lost its important rapidly and fell into Dutch
hands in 1641. A little earlier the Dutch had already wrested from the
Portuguese their rich monopoly of the Japanese trade, and the straits of
Singapore were no longer safe for Portuguese shipping with Dutch gun-
boats lying in wait for Portuguese vessels, particularly those engaged in
trade with Macau and Manila.
25
The Dutch had stepped up their aggression
in Indian Ocean after the Portuguese had come to an agreement with the
English in 1635 in the form of the Goa Accord. Along with a campaign of
diplomatic intrigues at the Mughal court, the Dutch initiated a practice of
blockading the Goa port every year at the time of the arrival and departure
of the ships of the Carreira da India.
26
These regular blockades disrupted
Portuguese Goa-based seaborne trade quite effectively, so much so that
between 1641-1644 not a single carrack could leave Goa for Portugal.
27
The
loading and unloading operations of the Carreira ships were then shifted to
the northern ports of Chaul, Bassein and Bombay, though this meant a lot of
extra expenditure in the transport of goods and buillion from the northern
ports to Goa and vice-versa.
28
When the Portuguese regained their independence in 1640, the Dutch hailed
the Portuguese revolt as a blow to Spain, but they showed no eagerness
to relieve their pressure upon the Portuguese colonies in the East Indies.
The Dutch did accept a ten-year truce in favour of the Portuguese, but its
rati?cation was delayed in order to gain time to effect the capture of Malacca.
The blockading of Goa port continued and the tempo of attacks on Ceylon
was intensi?ed. The Dutch did not want the truce to snatch from their hands
what they considered to be a sure catch. In the meantime the Portuguese
were trying frantically to convince the Dutch that they were bound morally
to honour the terms of the truce.
29
Before the said truce had come to an end in 1652, the Portuguese had
received a boost in the form of a successful campaign against the Dutch in
Brazil.
30
The Portuguese had also succeeded in winning over the ruler of
Macassar in the Spice Islands to resist the Dutch claims and to keep them
distracted there.
31
Portugal had also initiated negotiations with England
in order to ensure English support once the hostilities with the Dutch were