The Invasion of Nadir Shah and Haryana | HPSC Preparation: All subjects - HPSC (Haryana) PDF Download

Nadir Shah’s Invasion of India

• Nadir Shah, the Persian king, planned to invade India after occupying Afghanistan. The unstable borders and lack of a strong defence policy made India an easy target. He marched through various places, including Jalalabad, Peshawar, and Wazirabad, causing destruction and disorder throughout the region between Lahore and Sarhind. 
• A contemporary writer, Shaikh Ali Hazin, described the situation in the region as being in complete revolution. During the invasion of Nadir Shah, there was widespread looting and pillaging as thousands of robbers took over the roads. The journey was filled with constant fighting and arguments. The Persian army passed through Sarhind and Rajpura and arrived at Ambala on February 7, 1739. 
• They left their heavy baggage and harem under a strong escort and proceeded to Shahbad the next day. On the 10th evening, they captured Thanesar and on the following day, they occupied Sarai Azimabad where the prominent persons of Ambala had sought refuge. From there, they gathered detailed information about the imperial encampment at Karnal. 
• The responsibility of defending India was given to three important figures, namely Itimad-ud-daulah Qamar-ud-din Khan (the Wazir), Nizam-ul-mulk Asaf Jah (the Wakil or Regent), and Samsam-ud-daulah Khan Dauran (the Amir-ud-umara or Bakhshi, who was the head of the military department). Additionally, orders were issued to the Rajputs and Marathas to support in this time of grave danger to the nation. 
• The Rajputs offered excuses and delayed coming to help, while the Marathas did not come at all, despite Baji Rao considering it a glory for the Maratha State to render help to the Emperor of Delhi during such a national crisis. However, surprisingly, Baji Rao I only considered defending the Narmada line to prevent Nadir Shah's southward advance, if it came to that.

Encampment at Karnal

• On January 18, 1739, the imperial army arrived at Panipat, and the Emperor Muhammad Shah and his contingent arrived on the 27th. Upon learning of the fall of Lahore, they decided to set up camp at Karnal, where there was an abundant water supply and open plains that allowed for the movement of large cavalry units. 
• In addition, they were still waiting for the arrival of Saadat Khan, the Governor of Oudh and his army. The decision was made to dig trenches and entrench themselves rather than engage in a straight battle. Muhammad Shah's encampment was situated on the western side of Ali Mardan Khan's canal, with the town of Karnal positioned just to the south. 
• The natural defenses of the area, such as the jungle to the north of Azimabad and the canal to the east, offered protection to the front and right of his army. Sad-ud-din Khan oversaw the construction of a large mud wall, enclosing the encampment for several miles. Guns were positioned along this wall and soldiers were stationed in the trenches to maintain a constant vigil day and night.

Comparison of the Strength of Combatant Forces in the Battle of Karnal and Panipat

• According to various contemporary sources such as Mirza Mahdi, Hanway, Rustam Ali, Ghulam Ali, and Anandram, there is much variation in the figures given regarding the strength of the combatant forces in the Battle of Karnal. 
• However, the most realistic estimate is that the Persian army had about 40,000 horsemen, excluding the vanguard and rear, and three times as many non-combatants, of whom one-third were servants, all mounted and some armed for the purpose of taking part in the plunder and defense of their baggage.
• On the other hand, the total number of Indian fighting forces at Karnal was no more than 75,000 men. However, the number of non-combatants was excessive, which resulted in the Indian army losing its mobility and aggressive power. 
• It was beleaguered and placed in a situation similar to that of Sadashiv Rao Bhau at the Battle of Panipat, 22 years later.

Persian Invasion of India in 1739

• During the Persian invasion of India in 1739, the Persian cavalry carried out surprise attacks on the nearby areas and looted food and other resources, causing the price of grain to skyrocket in the Indian camp. 
• Additionally, an advance force of 6,000 Persian troops led by Haji Khan managed to reach the edge of the enemy's camp along the banks of the canal, gathering crucial information about the position of the imperial army.
• Nadir Shah's strategy was to avoid a direct attack and instead take a wide detour to the east of Karnal, which allowed him to stay close to the Jamuna river for water and also cut off the Mughal communication line with Delhi by capturing Panipat from behind. 
• The goal was to either force Muhammad Shah to leave his camp and fight on a battlefield of Nadir's choosing or to trap him in Karnal while the Persian army marched to Delhi without any resistance.
• The well-executed plan produced the anticipated outcome. The Persian forces marched towards the plain located six miles northeast of Karnal, a little north of Kunjpura, and in clear sight of the Jamuna river. 
• Nadir Shah personally led a reconnaissance mission to determine the location of the enemy's forces and returned unscathed to his own camp. Upon receiving information about Saadat Khan and his troops reaching Panipat, one division of the Persian army was dispatched to intercept them, while another was sent to apply pressure to the eastern flank of the Mughal army.