Spectrum Summary: Independence with Partition

Attlee's Statement of February 20, 1947

On 20 February 1947 Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister, announced in the House of Commons that the British government intended to withdraw from the Indian subcontinent. The announcement accepted that Britain could no longer continue to govern India and that a date for withdrawal would have to be fixed. The statement signalled an end to British responsibility for India's constitutional future and set in motion steps that led to independence and partition.

Clement Attlee

Main Points of Attlee's Statement

• The government fixed a deadline of 30 June 1948 for the transfer of power even if Indian political parties had not by then agreed on a constitution.
• If the Constituent Assembly was not fully representative-for example, if Muslim-majority provinces did not join-the British would relinquish power either to some form of central authority or to the existing provincial governments.
• The British powers and obligations in respect of the princely states would cease with the transfer of power; these would not be transferred to any single successor government in British India.
• Lord Mountbatten was to replace Lord Wavell as Viceroy. The statement contained clear hints of partition and a possible balkanisation of the subcontinent and was, in essence, a reversion of earlier offers such as the Cripps proposals.

Why the Government Fixed a Withdrawal Date

• It was hoped that a fixed date would put pressure on Indian political parties to arrive at an agreement on the constitution and transfer of power.
• The government sought to avert a growing constitutional and administrative crisis in India by setting a timetable.
• The British wished to demonstrate sincerity about leaving and to limit indefinite responsibility for a volatile situation.
• The assessment of the deteriorating situation, reflected in Wavell's and Attlee's communications, made a departure timetable unavoidable.

Congress Stand

• The prospect of transfer of power to more than one centre was acceptable to the Indian National Congress because it allowed the existing Constituent Assembly to proceed with framing a constitution for the areas it represented and offered a practical escape from the political deadlock.

Independence and Partition

Between February and June 1947 the political situation was fluid. Leaders continued to explore options for a united India as well as the possibility of partition. Important intervening developments included the Cabinet Mission proposals, continuing communal tensions, and the appointment of Lord Mountbatten as Viceroy with a mandate to find a practical solution.

Political Positions before June 1947

• On 10 March 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru declared that the Cabinet Mission plan was the best solution if implemented; he added that the only practical alternative might be the partition of sensitive provinces such as Punjab and Bengal.
• In April 1947 the Congress president, J. B. Kripalani, communicated formally with the Viceroy about Congress's position and concessions it might accept to ensure a smooth transfer of power.

Mountbatten as Viceroy

• Lord Mountbatten replaced Lord Wavell as Viceroy. He was given wide discretionary authority to explore options for the transfer of power and to act quickly where necessary.
• Mountbatten's style was more decisive and fast-moving; he was expected to report back to London on options for unity or division and advise on the form of the transfer of power.

Louis Mountbatten

Mountbatten Plan (3 June 1947)

• The plan provided that in the provinces of Punjab and Bengal the existing legislative assemblies were to meet in two separate groups (Hindu and Muslim members) to vote on whether the province should be partitioned. If a simple majority of either group voted for partition, partition would be carried out.
• If partition occurred, two dominions and two constituent assemblies would be created for the respective parts.
• Other provinces such as Sindh were allowed to decide their own course.
• Referendums were to be held in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Sylhet district of Bengal to determine their future associations.
• The plan conceded several Congress demands in return for acceptance of partition: princely states would not be independent but would accede to one dominion or the other; Bengal would not be independent; Hyderabad would not accede to Pakistan; freedom was to come on 15 August 1947; and a boundary commission would be set up to demarcate the new borders where partition occurred.

Why Congress Accepted Dominion Status

• Acceptance of dominion status was judged to be the quickest means to secure a peaceful and prompt transfer of power.
• Assuming authority under dominion arrangements allowed Congress leaders to exercise control needed to contain communal disturbances and manage government functions during the transition.
• Dominion status provided continuity in administration by preserving the existing bureaucracy and the army, which was essential for maintaining order.

The Rationale for an Early Date (August 15, 1947)

• The Mountbatten Plan was implemented without delay. The legislative assemblies of Bengal and Punjab voted in favour of partition according to the procedures set out in the plan.
• Consequently, East Bengal and West Punjab became parts of Pakistan while West Bengal and East Punjab remained with the Indian Union.

Indian Independence Act, 1947

• The British Parliament enacted the Indian Independence Act, 1947, which gave statutory effect to the Mountbatten proposals and provided for the creation of two independent Dominions of India and Pakistan with effect from 15 August 1947.
• Under the Act, Pakistan's independence was celebrated on 14 August 1947 and India's on 15 August 1947.
• The Act provided the legal framework for partition, the division of territories and assets, and the end of British paramountcy over princely states.
• Muhammad Ali Jinnah became the first Governor-General of Pakistan. India requested Lord Mountbatten to continue for a short period as Governor-General of India to ensure administrative continuity.

Problems of Early Withdrawal

• The rapid pace of events under Mountbatten produced administrative anomalies and inadequate time to resolve complex boundary and population-transfer problems.
• There were no fully functioning transitional institutional structures through which partition problems could be managed comprehensively.
• Mountbatten had hoped to serve as Governor-General of both Dominions for a transitional period as a linking authority, but Jinnah insisted on having the position in Pakistan for himself.
• There was a delay and lack of transparency with the boundary demarcation process: although the boundary award under the Radcliffe commission was reported to have been prepared earlier, its publication was held back until after the transfer date so that the British could minimise direct responsibility for ensuing disturbances.
• The hurried transfer failed to prevent communal violence in places such as Punjab, leading to large-scale loss of life and refugee flows.

Integration of Princely States

• In July 1947, Vallabhbhai Patel assumed charge of the States Department and led the effort to integrate over 560 princely states into the Indian Union using a combination of incentives and persuasive pressure.
• Phase I: By 15 August 1947, most princely states had signed Instruments of Accession to India; the principal exceptions were Kashmir, Hyderabad, and Junagarh.
• Phase II: This involved the more difficult work of political integration-merging smaller states with neighbouring provinces, creating administrative units, and resolving questions of rulers' privileges, jagirs and administrative reorganisation.

Inevitability of Partition

Why Congress Accepted Partition

• Congress leaders increasingly viewed partition as inevitable because of their long-term inability to integrate large sections of the Muslim population into the national movement and to allay Muslim League demands for a separate homeland.
• Immediate transfer of power was seen as the only practical way to forestall the spread of Direct Action and communal violence; the virtual collapse of cooperative working between the parties made partition appear unavoidable.
• The Mountbatten scheme explicitly ruled out independence for princely states, which, if granted, might have led to balkanisation of the subcontinent; thus partition of British provinces appeared the lesser danger.
• Congress acceptance of partition was the culmination of successive concessions made to the League's demand for a separate Muslim state and reflected the political realities of the time.
• When the Congress Working Committee accepted the terms implicit in the 3 June Plan, including compulsory grouping and the possibility of partition of Punjab and Bengal, it marked practical acceptance of a divided subcontinent.
• Although Congress asserted the sovereignty of its Constituent Assembly, in practice it accepted the grouping and partition because it could not prevent widespread communal riots and lawlessness.

Gandhi's Helplessness

• Mahatma Gandhi felt unable to prevent partition because communal polarisation had spread deeply among the people; he accepted partition reluctantly because public opinion and communal violence made unity unworkable in practice.