Directions: Read the passage and answer the questions that follow.
The path of India-China relations is strewn with the ghosts of summits past. No doubt, summits are good, nobody has a quarrel with them, the media at least loves them. The relationship has often benefited from such meetings. A note of hope was therefore sounded when Prime Minister Narendra Modi flew into the Chinese city of Wuhan to meet with President Xi Jinping for an “informal” summit last week. The aim, as announced, was to build strategic communication and provide a long-term perspective for what is a complex and adversarial bilateral relationship.
For the duration of a day and a half, the leaders of the world’s two most populous countries held talks. The optics were reassuring and optimism about the outcome of these conversations was implied. Only a year ago, on the high Himalayan plateau of Doklam on the borders of Bhutan, India and China, overlooking the vital Siliguri Corridor connecting ‘mainland’ India to the Northeastern States, Indian and Chinese troops engaged in a tense stand-off lasting 73 days. The visit of the Dalai Lama, exiled in India for nearly six decades, to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh engendered deep Chinese resentment. The voluble Indian opposition to China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), especially the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) being developed in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, was also a source of serious friction. China’s growing inroads in the form of high-profile projects and support for anti-Indian political interests in India’s South Asian neighbourhood fuelled Indian distrust. Hawkish and hypernationalist voices in both countries raised tensions further, and the spectre of armed conflict on a shared but disputed frontier lurked in the shadows.
The Wuhan summit signalled that the two countries are working on restoring a much-needed equilibrium in a deeply disturbed relationship. The outcome statement from the Indian foreign office speaks about Mr. Modi and Mr. Xi having forged a common understanding in Wuhan on the future direction of India-China relations “built upon mutual respect for each other’s developmental aspirations and prudent management of differences with mutual sensitivity”. The distilled essence is: let us give each other space and let us rationalise our opposition to each other and our differences in a grown-up way. The takeaway buzzword from Wuhan appears to be “strategic communication” by both leaderships in order to provide a more cogent sense of purpose and direction that helps heal the relationship. The intention is to prevent incidents in border regions of the Doklam variety, it is presumed. The situation bears watching. There are many pockets along the 3,500 km border between the two countries where the Line of Actual Control is disputed. Efforts to establish a clearly delineated Line of Actual Control have not succeeded, mainly due to Chinese reluctance.
The summit has apparently not yielded any significant reduction of differences on the CPEC. The Indian government can ill-afford to give the impression of any concession on this question to China given the Pakistan factor — a perennial trigger for public hysteria. The announcement that China and India will jointly work on a project in war-torn Afghanistan is a first and unlikely to give Pakistan comfort, although China will no doubt provide undercover assurances to the former that its interests will not be harmed.
A sober prognosis for the future of India-China relations is warranted despite the euphoria of Mr. Modi’s visit to Wuhan. The potential for tension on the Himalayan piedmont is aggravated by the clash of Chinese and Indian ambition in the maritime environment of the Indo-Pacific. The growing alignment of interest among three democracies — India, the U.S. and Japan — is a source for Chinese insecurity, just as China-Pakistan strategic cooperation and China’s inroads in South Asia make India uneasy. Twenty-first century Asia is not a pacific place. It is multi-polar and multi-aligned and a testing ground for the security architectures of the future.
I. Recurring
II. Intermittent
III. Enduring
IV. Ceasing
I. Forecast
II. Projection
III. Calculation
IV. Prediction
I. Creep
II. Susceptible
III. Yawn
IV. Skulk
I. The Doklam issue saw the militaries of both India and China engage in a military stand-off lasting 73 days.
II. The Wuhan Summit has led to a much needed thaw in the relationship although not a lot was achieved in terms of the CPEC.
III. Asia in the Twenty-first century is uni-polar with the increasing rise of China.
I. The strategic cooperation between China and Pakistan.
II. The growing alignment between India, US and Japan.
III. The growing economic and military clout of India in South Asia.
I. The summit at Wuhan coincided with news that India will build 96 more border outposts along the frontier with China.
II. Transgressions from both sides have been occurring regularly since 1962.
III. The two leaders have “issued strategic guidance” to their militaries to strengthen communication.
I. Both the sides’ militaries have been trained to be unyielding when it comes to territory.
II. The efforts have failed mainly due to the Chinese being less than enthusiastic about the issue.
III. The efforts failed due to the lack of strategic communication and a lack of direction in the overall relationship.
I. Better relations between the triad- India, China and Pakistan.
II. India yielding on the CPEC issue.
III. An agreement between the two to work out the border issues via mutual understanding.
I. India’s increasing engagement with Afghanistan
II. China’s increasing inroads in South Asia.
III. The visit of the Dalai Lama to places in India considered sensitive by China.
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