India's Nuclear Doctrine | UPSC Mains: Internal Security & Disaster Management PDF Download

Historical Background of India’s Nuclear Programme

• India's nuclear programme can trace its origins to June 1945 when Dr Homi Jehangir Bhabha founded the nuclear research centre, the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research.
• India built its first research reactor (Apsara, which was also Asia’s first nuclear research reactor) in 1956 and its first plutonium reprocessing plant by 1964.
• India's military defeat to China in October 1962, provided the Government of India impetus for developing nuclear weapons as a means of deterring potential aggression.

Also, China conducted its first nuclear test in October, 1964.

About Pokhran-I Nuclear Test

• Physicist Raja Ramanna expanded and supervised scientific research on nuclear weapons and was the first directing officer of a small team of scientists that supervised and carried out the test.
• The test was codenamed 'Smiling Buddha' (conducted on Buddha Purnima) and conducted on May 18, 1974.
• The bomb was detonated on the army base Pokhran Test Range in Jaisalmer, Rajasthan.
• It was the first confirmed nuclear test by a nation that was not a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

 Subsequent Nuclear Tests

• After the 1974 tests, India conducted five tests - three on May 11 and two on May 13, 1998.
• The tests codenamed 'Operation Shakti'/ Pokhran-II were carried out again at the Pokhran test range.
• Following Pokhran-II, the Indian leadership exploited the political utility of its action, which once again attracted international criticism and sanctions, also created political space for, and gave strategic autonomy to India’s decision-making.
• For example, the Indo-US nuclear deal (2008) paved the way for the strategic partnership that now involves high-end technology cooperation from defence to artificial intelligence.

 India’s Nuclear Doctrine

• A nuclear doctrine states how a nuclear weapon state would employ its nuclear weapons both during peace and war. India released its Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) in August 1999.
• In January 2003, India released its official nuclear doctrine which can be summarized as follows –
  1. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;
  2. A posture of "No First Use" - nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;
  3. Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
  4. Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.
  5. Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states;
     • However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons;
     • A continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations, and continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests.
     • Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

Challenges to India’s Nuclear Doctrine

Slow implementation

• India’s nuclear triad is still a work in progress, which is a three-sided military-force structure consisting of land-launched nuclear missiles, nuclear-missile-armed submarines, and strategic aircraft with nuclear bombs and missiles.
• India’s sea component of the triad is facing difficulties.
• The commissioning of the INS Arighat - the 2nd nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine being built by India, has ostensibly been delayed.

Need to Upgrade the Doctrine 

• India’s existing doctrinal principles of ‘credible minimum deterrence (CMD),’ ‘No First Use (NFU),’ and massive retaliation are inadequate to deter its adversaries – China and Pakistan.
• China’s quest for enlarging its nuclear arsenals and delivery systems nullifies India’s commitment to maintain the CMD.
• The persisting Chinese provocations to alter the status quo in the Line of Actual Control (LAC) put a question mark on the original intentions and relevance of the NFU.