RC Practice Test - 4 - CAT MCQ

Directions: Read the passage and answer the question based on it.

Not for the first time, I watched as one of our PhD students was loaded into an ambulance and taken to hospital. He had collapsed in one of the university research labs about 20 minutes earlier. A few hours later we received word from the hospital that the student was now alert and all tests were normal. Just as I had seen previously, the student had fainted as a result of stress, anxiety and fatigue.

This was not what I had in mind when I accepted a position as a non-academic member of staff. Rather than the relaxed conditions I expected, I found myself in the most stressful environment I had ever experienced.

I initially assumed this was isolated to my university. However with a little online research, I found these toxic conditions were commonplace in universities the world over. Having been part of the university system for some time, I'm now able to see past the imposing architecture and impressive titles.

These figures sit uncomfortably next to the professed ideals of these institutions. Our universities claim to exist to provide our most brilliant minds the freedom to nurture their greatest ideas and inspire the next generation.

To facilitate this, the organisation provides infrastructure and services. With these resources, hundreds of academics are then free to pursue their goals and further their own positions as quasi-entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, these untethered conditions are also very favourable for those with an unhinged sense of entitlement. It strikes me that a rogue professor can often operate on campus with virtual impunity.

Even a well-meaning academic has to juggle many responsibilities. For example, a research professor must teach hundreds of undergraduates, supervise a team of PhD researchers, manage research grants and collaborations and edit publications and dissertations. Very few professors are able to accomplish all this without the overwhelming burden affecting their character and judgement. The resulting stress often manifests as poor judgement and negative behaviour.

Unfortunately, the ones most likely to be on the receiving end of this are the PhD students, postdoctoral researchers and non-academic staff, who are often on short employment contracts. These people are in very tenuous positions and have little if any recourse. This situation creates a dynamic where the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour are often blurred.

There are also many academics who can only muddle through by riding on the coattails of students. Sadly, students are also vulnerable to the theft of data, ideas and materials; not only by their colleagues, but sometimes by their own supervisor. In a university environment, this type of bad behaviour is unfortunately so frequent, it is too often normalised and ignored.

The surprising tolerance of this type of behaviour is likely a result of academia being a product of itself. After all, all academics were once long-suffering PhD students. Hence because of the familiarity, academia often fails to see the gravity of the situation.

But the wider community would be shocked to know this behaviour was so prevalent at the very highest level of education. The community expects so much more from people calling themselves ''doctor'' or ''professor''. The current model of postgraduate research is severely flawed and should be urgently addressed. If we don't, the vicious circle will continue.

Q. What does the author say about the professors' attitude towards non-academic staff?

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.

The psychiatrist, psychoanalyst and 'anti psychiatrist' Thomas Szasz argued that there was no such thing as mental illness. He believed that mental illnesses were 'problems of living': personal conflicts, bad habits and moral faults. Therefore, mental illness was the sufferer's own personal responsibility. As a consequence, Szasz claimed that psychiatry should be abolished as a medical discipline, since it had nothing to treat. If a person's symptoms had a physiological basis, then they were physical disorders of the brain rather than 'mental' ones.

I personally believe that mental illnesses are mental only in that they are psychiatric. Ordinary understandings of the mind, and what is and isn't part of it, have nothing to do with it. Perception is generally considered to be mental, a part of the mind – yet, while medicine considers deafness and blindness to be disorders of perception, it doesn't class them as mental illnesses. Why? The answer is obvious: because psychiatrists generally aren't the best doctors to treat deafness and blindness.

When people talk about 'the mind' and 'the mental' in psychiatry, my first thought is always 'What exactly do they mean?' A 'mental' illness is just an illness that psychiatry is equipped to deal with. That's determined as much by practical considerations about the skills psychiatrists have to offer, as it is by theoretical or philosophical factors. But this pragmatic approach hides itself behind appeals to 'mental illness'. In many contexts, the term mental tends to bring along inappropriate and stigmatizing connotations – showing that the wrong bridges have been built.

Imagine that you suffer from long-term, chronic pain. You go to the latest in a series of doctors: by this point, and especially if you are a member of a marginalized group (a woman or person of color, say), doctors might have dismissed or disbelieved you; they might have assumed you were exaggerating your pain, or perhaps that you were a hypochondriac. After some tests, and some questions, you're eventually told that your chronic pain is a mental illness, and referred to a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist, you are told, will not prescribe drugs or surgery, but will instead prescribe psychotherapy, also known as 'talk therapy', and occasionally, 'mental therapy'.

You might, quite reasonably, think that this doctor disbelieves you too. Perhaps they think that you have a delusion, or that you're lying because of some kind of personality disorder? In mainstream pieces on the topic, being referred to a psychiatrist is seen as tantamount to being disbelieved, dismissed or called a hypochondriac. It's understandable that you might be annoyed for your condition to be branded a 'mental illness'. But what about your doctor – what did they want you to take away from that interaction? It might well be that they absolutely believed that you were in severe, involuntary pain, caused by heightened sensitisation of the peripheral nervous system as a result of 'rewiring'. Pain that results from rewiring of the nervous system is known as 'neoplastic pain', recognised as a highly medically significant category of pain. They don't necessarily think you're lying or delusional. In invoking 'mental illness', what they might have meant is only that it might be best treated by talk therapy, and best managed and understood by a psychiatrist.

Q. Which of the following can be best inferred about Thomas Szasz terming mental illnesses as 'problems of living'?

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.

The psychiatrist, psychoanalyst and 'anti psychiatrist' Thomas Szasz argued that there was no such thing as mental illness. He believed that mental illnesses were 'problems of living': personal conflicts, bad habits and moral faults. Therefore, mental illness was the sufferer's own personal responsibility. As a consequence, Szasz claimed that psychiatry should be abolished as a medical discipline, since it had nothing to treat. If a person's symptoms had a physiological basis, then they were physical disorders of the brain rather than 'mental' ones.

I personally believe that mental illnesses are mental only in that they are psychiatric. Ordinary understandings of the mind, and what is and isn't part of it, have nothing to do with it. Perception is generally considered to be mental, a part of the mind – yet, while medicine considers deafness and blindness to be disorders of perception, it doesn't class them as mental illnesses. Why? The answer is obvious: because psychiatrists generally aren't the best doctors to treat deafness and blindness.

When people talk about 'the mind' and 'the mental' in psychiatry, my first thought is always 'What exactly do they mean?' A 'mental' illness is just an illness that psychiatry is equipped to deal with. That's determined as much by practical considerations about the skills psychiatrists have to offer, as it is by theoretical or philosophical factors. But this pragmatic approach hides itself behind appeals to 'mental illness'. In many contexts, the term mental tends to bring along inappropriate and stigmatizing connotations – showing that the wrong bridges have been built.

Imagine that you suffer from long-term, chronic pain. You go to the latest in a series of doctors: by this point, and especially if you are a member of a marginalized group (a woman or person of color, say), doctors might have dismissed or disbelieved you; they might have assumed you were exaggerating your pain, or perhaps that you were a hypochondriac. After some tests, and some questions, you're eventually told that your chronic pain is a mental illness, and referred to a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist, you are told, will not prescribe drugs or surgery, but will instead prescribe psychotherapy, also known as 'talk therapy', and occasionally, 'mental therapy'.

You might, quite reasonably, think that this doctor disbelieves you too. Perhaps they think that you have a delusion, or that you're lying because of some kind of personality disorder? In mainstream pieces on the topic, being referred to a psychiatrist is seen as tantamount to being disbelieved, dismissed or called a hypochondriac. It's understandable that you might be annoyed for your condition to be branded a 'mental illness'. But what about your doctor – what did they want you to take away from that interaction? It might well be that they absolutely believed that you were in severe, involuntary pain, caused by heightened sensitisation of the peripheral nervous system as a result of 'rewiring'. Pain that results from rewiring of the nervous system is known as 'neoplastic pain', recognised as a highly medically significant category of pain. They don't necessarily think you're lying or delusional. In invoking 'mental illness', what they might have meant is only that it might be best treated by talk therapy, and best managed and understood by a psychiatrist.

Q. In the statement 'mental illnesses are mental only in that they are psychiatric', what is the author trying to imply?

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.

The psychiatrist, psychoanalyst and 'anti psychiatrist' Thomas Szasz argued that there was no such thing as mental illness. He believed that mental illnesses were 'problems of living': personal conflicts, bad habits and moral faults. Therefore, mental illness was the sufferer's own personal responsibility. As a consequence, Szasz claimed that psychiatry should be abolished as a medical discipline, since it had nothing to treat. If a person's symptoms had a physiological basis, then they were physical disorders of the brain rather than 'mental' ones.

I personally believe that mental illnesses are mental only in that they are psychiatric. Ordinary understandings of the mind, and what is and isn't part of it, have nothing to do with it. Perception is generally considered to be mental, a part of the mind – yet, while medicine considers deafness and blindness to be disorders of perception, it doesn't class them as mental illnesses. Why? The answer is obvious: because psychiatrists generally aren't the best doctors to treat deafness and blindness.

When people talk about 'the mind' and 'the mental' in psychiatry, my first thought is always 'What exactly do they mean?' A 'mental' illness is just an illness that psychiatry is equipped to deal with. That's determined as much by practical considerations about the skills psychiatrists have to offer, as it is by theoretical or philosophical factors. But this pragmatic approach hides itself behind appeals to 'mental illness'. In many contexts, the term mental tends to bring along inappropriate and stigmatizing connotations – showing that the wrong bridges have been built.

Imagine that you suffer from long-term, chronic pain. You go to the latest in a series of doctors: by this point, and especially if you are a member of a marginalized group (a woman or person of color, say), doctors might have dismissed or disbelieved you; they might have assumed you were exaggerating your pain, or perhaps that you were a hypochondriac. After some tests, and some questions, you're eventually told that your chronic pain is a mental illness, and referred to a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist, you are told, will not prescribe drugs or surgery, but will instead prescribe psychotherapy, also known as 'talk therapy', and occasionally, 'mental therapy'.

You might, quite reasonably, think that this doctor disbelieves you too. Perhaps they think that you have a delusion, or that you're lying because of some kind of personality disorder? In mainstream pieces on the topic, being referred to a psychiatrist is seen as tantamount to being disbelieved, dismissed or called a hypochondriac. It's understandable that you might be annoyed for your condition to be branded a 'mental illness'. But what about your doctor – what did they want you to take away from that interaction? It might well be that they absolutely believed that you were in severe, involuntary pain, caused by heightened sensitisation of the peripheral nervous system as a result of 'rewiring'. Pain that results from rewiring of the nervous system is known as 'neoplastic pain', recognised as a highly medically significant category of pain. They don't necessarily think you're lying or delusional. In invoking 'mental illness', what they might have meant is only that it might be best treated by talk therapy, and best managed and understood by a psychiatrist.

Q. Which of the following, in context of the passage, would justify terming an illness as 'mental illness'?

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.

The psychiatrist, psychoanalyst and 'anti psychiatrist' Thomas Szasz argued that there was no such thing as mental illness. He believed that mental illnesses were 'problems of living': personal conflicts, bad habits and moral faults. Therefore, mental illness was the sufferer's own personal responsibility. As a consequence, Szasz claimed that psychiatry should be abolished as a medical discipline, since it had nothing to treat. If a person's symptoms had a physiological basis, then they were physical disorders of the brain rather than 'mental' ones.

I personally believe that mental illnesses are mental only in that they are psychiatric. Ordinary understandings of the mind, and what is and isn't part of it, have nothing to do with it. Perception is generally considered to be mental, a part of the mind – yet, while medicine considers deafness and blindness to be disorders of perception, it doesn't class them as mental illnesses. Why? The answer is obvious: because psychiatrists generally aren't the best doctors to treat deafness and blindness.

When people talk about 'the mind' and 'the mental' in psychiatry, my first thought is always 'What exactly do they mean?' A 'mental' illness is just an illness that psychiatry is equipped to deal with. That's determined as much by practical considerations about the skills psychiatrists have to offer, as it is by theoretical or philosophical factors. But this pragmatic approach hides itself behind appeals to 'mental illness'. In many contexts, the term mental tends to bring along inappropriate and stigmatizing connotations – showing that the wrong bridges have been built.

Imagine that you suffer from long-term, chronic pain. You go to the latest in a series of doctors: by this point, and especially if you are a member of a marginalized group (a woman or person of color, say), doctors might have dismissed or disbelieved you; they might have assumed you were exaggerating your pain, or perhaps that you were a hypochondriac. After some tests, and some questions, you're eventually told that your chronic pain is a mental illness, and referred to a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist, you are told, will not prescribe drugs or surgery, but will instead prescribe psychotherapy, also known as 'talk therapy', and occasionally, 'mental therapy'.

You might, quite reasonably, think that this doctor disbelieves you too. Perhaps they think that you have a delusion, or that you're lying because of some kind of personality disorder? In mainstream pieces on the topic, being referred to a psychiatrist is seen as tantamount to being disbelieved, dismissed or called a hypochondriac. It's understandable that you might be annoyed for your condition to be branded a 'mental illness'. But what about your doctor – what did they want you to take away from that interaction? It might well be that they absolutely believed that you were in severe, involuntary pain, caused by heightened sensitisation of the peripheral nervous system as a result of 'rewiring'. Pain that results from rewiring of the nervous system is known as 'neoplastic pain', recognised as a highly medically significant category of pain. They don't necessarily think you're lying or delusional. In invoking 'mental illness', what they might have meant is only that it might be best treated by talk therapy, and best managed and understood by a psychiatrist.

Q. Which of the following statements is the author most likely to disagree with?

Directions: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Gaining knowledge on various issues is a continuous part of human existence. Learning helps us make sense of the world. In Hsun Tzu's 'Encouraging Learning', he gives various metaphors on how education can mould human beings into virtuous creatures. Education also determines the paths many of us follow in life.

A gentleman, according to him, is anyone who seeks education for the betterment of self and uses it to do well. There are different perspectives one may look at in becoming a gentleman and one of them is being a student and studying. The results we get in life are mostly a result of our actions. The harder one works, the more successful they become. According to Tzu, study is of more value than thought. It continually refills your knowledge base giving one insight and purpose day after day. Education gives one a sense of right and wrong, enabling people to live well with each other and shape their lives; it's not difficult to distinguish someone with a good education from someone with none at all or someone who doesn't care for learning. You can tell from their personalities and even their actions.

Knowledge is like food for the mind, body and soul. It builds virtue and character and separates us from every other person in the world. 'Bad company corrupts good morals.' That's an old wise saying that most people would term to be true. Friendship is a part of human existence since no one can survive alone. The gentleman chooses well-bred men for friends and carefully chooses his surroundings. Everyone needs healthy relationships to be able to bond and share ideas and even for health reasons like reduction of stress. Tzu uses the analogy of a bird that builds its nest on reeds but loses it when the wind blows because the reeds aren't strong enough to hold it. Just like the bird, we may build our lives into what we want, with all the right goals and a vision of where we want to be but our friends may destroy it. Psychologically, surrounding yourself with positive energy determines how driven you are and how quickly you get to your goals. More often than not, we surround ourselves with friends and we can only move forward if those friends are the right ones.

According to Tzu, learning basically means achieving oneness. You need to be able to finish what you begin and finish it in the best possible way. In order to deal with issues, we all need a certain strategy or a defined approach towards problem solving. The right strategy gets things done. Experience is the best teacher, but it's wise to make use of the intellect of others and the explanations of scholars; then you will ''become honoured and make your way anywhere in the world''. Negativity inside us attracts negativity from all around us and to act towards people in the wrong way just generally puts a leash on progress and the right ideologies. Every moment in life is an opportunity to learn something new and it's up to you to decide what you learn and whether or not to let that lesson take root to influence your life for the better.

Q. Which of the following statements is true according to the passage?

Directions: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Gaining knowledge on various issues is a continuous part of human existence. Learning helps us make sense of the world. In Hsun Tzu's 'Encouraging Learning', he gives various metaphors on how education can mould human beings into virtuous creatures. Education also determines the paths many of us follow in life.

A gentleman, according to him, is anyone who seeks education for the betterment of self and uses it to do well. There are different perspectives one may look at in becoming a gentleman and one of them is being a student and studying. The results we get in life are mostly a result of our actions. The harder one works, the more successful they become. According to Tzu, study is of more value than thought. It continually refills your knowledge base giving one insight and purpose day after day. Education gives one a sense of right and wrong, enabling people to live well with each other and shape their lives; it's not difficult to distinguish someone with a good education from someone with none at all or someone who doesn't care for learning. You can tell from their personalities and even their actions.

Knowledge is like food for the mind, body and soul. It builds virtue and character and separates us from every other person in the world. 'Bad company corrupts good morals.' That's an old wise saying that most people would term to be true. Friendship is a part of human existence since no one can survive alone. The gentleman chooses well-bred men for friends and carefully chooses his surroundings. Everyone needs healthy relationships to be able to bond and share ideas and even for health reasons like reduction of stress. Tzu uses the analogy of a bird that builds its nest on reeds but loses it when the wind blows because the reeds aren't strong enough to hold it. Just like the bird, we may build our lives into what we want, with all the right goals and a vision of where we want to be but our friends may destroy it. Psychologically, surrounding yourself with positive energy determines how driven you are and how quickly you get to your goals. More often than not, we surround ourselves with friends and we can only move forward if those friends are the right ones.

According to Tzu, learning basically means achieving oneness. You need to be able to finish what you begin and finish it in the best possible way. In order to deal with issues, we all need a certain strategy or a defined approach towards problem solving. The right strategy gets things done. Experience is the best teacher, but it's wise to make use of the intellect of others and the explanations of scholars; then you will ''become honoured and make your way anywhere in the world''. Negativity inside us attracts negativity from all around us and to act towards people in the wrong way just generally puts a leash on progress and the right ideologies. Every moment in life is an opportunity to learn something new and it's up to you to decide what you learn and whether or not to let that lesson take root to influence your life for the better.

Q. Which of the following statements best describes what the author means when he states "Bad company corrupts good morals"?

Directions: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Gaining knowledge on various issues is a continuous part of human existence. Learning helps us make sense of the world. In Hsun Tzu's 'Encouraging Learning', he gives various metaphors on how education can mould human beings into virtuous creatures. Education also determines the paths many of us follow in life.

A gentleman, according to him, is anyone who seeks education for the betterment of self and uses it to do well. There are different perspectives one may look at in becoming a gentleman and one of them is being a student and studying. The results we get in life are mostly a result of our actions. The harder one works, the more successful they become. According to Tzu, study is of more value than thought. It continually refills your knowledge base giving one insight and purpose day after day. Education gives one a sense of right and wrong, enabling people to live well with each other and shape their lives; it's not difficult to distinguish someone with a good education from someone with none at all or someone who doesn't care for learning. You can tell from their personalities and even their actions.

Knowledge is like food for the mind, body and soul. It builds virtue and character and separates us from every other person in the world. 'Bad company corrupts good morals.' That's an old wise saying that most people would term to be true. Friendship is a part of human existence since no one can survive alone. The gentleman chooses well-bred men for friends and carefully chooses his surroundings. Everyone needs healthy relationships to be able to bond and share ideas and even for health reasons like reduction of stress. Tzu uses the analogy of a bird that builds its nest on reeds but loses it when the wind blows because the reeds aren't strong enough to hold it. Just like the bird, we may build our lives into what we want, with all the right goals and a vision of where we want to be but our friends may destroy it. Psychologically, surrounding yourself with positive energy determines how driven you are and how quickly you get to your goals. More often than not, we surround ourselves with friends and we can only move forward if those friends are the right ones.

According to Tzu, learning basically means achieving oneness. You need to be able to finish what you begin and finish it in the best possible way. In order to deal with issues, we all need a certain strategy or a defined approach towards problem solving. The right strategy gets things done. Experience is the best teacher, but it's wise to make use of the intellect of others and the explanations of scholars; then you will ''become honoured and make your way anywhere in the world''. Negativity inside us attracts negativity from all around us and to act towards people in the wrong way just generally puts a leash on progress and the right ideologies. Every moment in life is an opportunity to learn something new and it's up to you to decide what you learn and whether or not to let that lesson take root to influence your life for the better.

Q. Which of the following statements about learning is asserted by the author in the passage?

Directions: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Gaining knowledge on various issues is a continuous part of human existence. Learning helps us make sense of the world. In Hsun Tzu's 'Encouraging Learning', he gives various metaphors on how education can mould human beings into virtuous creatures. Education also determines the paths many of us follow in life.

A gentleman, according to him, is anyone who seeks education for the betterment of self and uses it to do well. There are different perspectives one may look at in becoming a gentleman and one of them is being a student and studying. The results we get in life are mostly a result of our actions. The harder one works, the more successful they become. According to Tzu, study is of more value than thought. It continually refills your knowledge base giving one insight and purpose day after day. Education gives one a sense of right and wrong, enabling people to live well with each other and shape their lives; it's not difficult to distinguish someone with a good education from someone with none at all or someone who doesn't care for learning. You can tell from their personalities and even their actions.

Knowledge is like food for the mind, body and soul. It builds virtue and character and separates us from every other person in the world. 'Bad company corrupts good morals.' That's an old wise saying that most people would term to be true. Friendship is a part of human existence since no one can survive alone. The gentleman chooses well-bred men for friends and carefully chooses his surroundings. Everyone needs healthy relationships to be able to bond and share ideas and even for health reasons like reduction of stress. Tzu uses the analogy of a bird that builds its nest on reeds but loses it when the wind blows because the reeds aren't strong enough to hold it. Just like the bird, we may build our lives into what we want, with all the right goals and a vision of where we want to be but our friends may destroy it. Psychologically, surrounding yourself with positive energy determines how driven you are and how quickly you get to your goals. More often than not, we surround ourselves with friends and we can only move forward if those friends are the right ones.

According to Tzu, learning basically means achieving oneness. You need to be able to finish what you begin and finish it in the best possible way. In order to deal with issues, we all need a certain strategy or a defined approach towards problem solving. The right strategy gets things done. Experience is the best teacher, but it's wise to make use of the intellect of others and the explanations of scholars; then you will ''become honoured and make your way anywhere in the world''. Negativity inside us attracts negativity from all around us and to act towards people in the wrong way just generally puts a leash on progress and the right ideologies. Every moment in life is an opportunity to learn something new and it's up to you to decide what you learn and whether or not to let that lesson take root to influence your life for the better.

Q. Each of the following is emphasised by the author in the passage EXCEPT:

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.

There's a kind of threat to the quality of public reason that tends to go unnoticed. This is the degradation of the core ideas mobilized in exercises of public reason, not least in the utterances of elite actors, such as bureaucrats, lawyers, politicians and representatives of international organizations and NGOs. These ideas – health, human rights, democracy and so on – are central to the way we formulate and address the main political challenges of our time, from the climate crisis to the other issues. One prominent form taken by this degradation of public reason is the phenomenon I call 'conceptual overreach'. This occurs when a particular concept undergoes a process of expansion or inflation in which it absorbs ideas and demands that are foreign to it. In its most extreme manifestation, conceptual overreach morphs into a totalising 'all in one' dogma.

A single concept – say, human rights or the rule of law – is taken to offer a comprehensive political ideology, as opposed to picking out one among many elements upon which our political thinking needs to draw and hold in balance when arriving at justified responses to the problems of our time. Of course, we'll always need some very general concepts to refer to vast domains of value – the ideas of ethics, justice and morality, for example, have traditionally served this function. The problem is when there is a systematic trend for more specific concepts of value to aspire to the same level of generality. But why worry about conceptual overreach? If 'human rights', say, is a phrase that increasingly encompasses more and more things that are genuinely valuable goals, why should we quibble about the label attached to them? Isn't this mere pedantry? Far from it, I believe.

One danger of conceptual overreach is that we lose sight of the distinctive idea conveyed by a given concept through its immersion in a sea of many other quite separate ideas, a significance that goes beyond the baseline fact that all the ideas in question identify something of value. If, for example, human rights are demands that are generally high-priority in nature, such that it's seldom if ever justified to override them, then we lose our grip on that important idea if we start including under the heading of 'human rights' valuable objectives – for example, access to a high-quality internet connection – that don't plausibly enjoy that kind of priority. Another danger is that the extraneous ideas that are subjected to a process of conceptual takeover end up being themselves distorted. So, for example, we start regarding modes of treatment that are beneficial to someone, such as mercy towards a convicted offender, as benefits to which they have a right.

As a result, this conceptual overreach leaves us poorly positioned to identify the distinct values that are at stake in any given decision. It also obscures the agonizing conflicts that exist among these values in particular cases. But these two large intellectual defects also generate serious practical drawbacks when we seek to engage in deliberation with others. Conceptual overreach in its more extreme forms inhibits constructive dialogue, or even just the brokering of honorable compromises, with those whose political orientation differs significantly from ours. This is because it makes it difficult to find any point of common ground or shared understanding with them. Instead, when we try to reach some kind of reasonable accommodation with them based on, say, fairness or human rights, we find ourselves locked in opposing moral-political worldviews at every turn.

Q. In context of the phrase, "to aspire to the same level of generality," in the second paragraph, each of the following statements can be inferred EXCEPT:

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.

There's a kind of threat to the quality of public reason that tends to go unnoticed. This is the degradation of the core ideas mobilized in exercises of public reason, not least in the utterances of elite actors, such as bureaucrats, lawyers, politicians and representatives of international organizations and NGOs. These ideas – health, human rights, democracy and so on – are central to the way we formulate and address the main political challenges of our time, from the climate crisis to the other issues. One prominent form taken by this degradation of public reason is the phenomenon I call 'conceptual overreach'. This occurs when a particular concept undergoes a process of expansion or inflation in which it absorbs ideas and demands that are foreign to it. In its most extreme manifestation, conceptual overreach morphs into a totalising 'all in one' dogma.

A single concept – say, human rights or the rule of law – is taken to offer a comprehensive political ideology, as opposed to picking out one among many elements upon which our political thinking needs to draw and hold in balance when arriving at justified responses to the problems of our time. Of course, we'll always need some very general concepts to refer to vast domains of value – the ideas of ethics, justice and morality, for example, have traditionally served this function. The problem is when there is a systematic trend for more specific concepts of value to aspire to the same level of generality. But why worry about conceptual overreach? If 'human rights', say, is a phrase that increasingly encompasses more and more things that are genuinely valuable goals, why should we quibble about the label attached to them? Isn't this mere pedantry? Far from it, I believe.

One danger of conceptual overreach is that we lose sight of the distinctive idea conveyed by a given concept through its immersion in a sea of many other quite separate ideas, a significance that goes beyond the baseline fact that all the ideas in question identify something of value. If, for example, human rights are demands that are generally high-priority in nature, such that it's seldom if ever justified to override them, then we lose our grip on that important idea if we start including under the heading of 'human rights' valuable objectives – for example, access to a high-quality internet connection – that don't plausibly enjoy that kind of priority. Another danger is that the extraneous ideas that are subjected to a process of conceptual takeover end up being themselves distorted. So, for example, we start regarding modes of treatment that are beneficial to someone, such as mercy towards a convicted offender, as benefits to which they have a right.

As a result, this conceptual overreach leaves us poorly positioned to identify the distinct values that are at stake in any given decision. It also obscures the agonizing conflicts that exist among these values in particular cases. But these two large intellectual defects also generate serious practical drawbacks when we seek to engage in deliberation with others. Conceptual overreach in its more extreme forms inhibits constructive dialogue, or even just the brokering of honorable compromises, with those whose political orientation differs significantly from ours. This is because it makes it difficult to find any point of common ground or shared understanding with them. Instead, when we try to reach some kind of reasonable accommodation with them based on, say, fairness or human rights, we find ourselves locked in opposing moral-political worldviews at every turn.

Q. In the statement "a significance that goes beyond the baseline fact that all the ideas in question identify something of value", what is the author trying to imply?

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.

There's a kind of threat to the quality of public reason that tends to go unnoticed. This is the degradation of the core ideas mobilized in exercises of public reason, not least in the utterances of elite actors, such as bureaucrats, lawyers, politicians and representatives of international organizations and NGOs. These ideas – health, human rights, democracy and so on – are central to the way we formulate and address the main political challenges of our time, from the climate crisis to the other issues. One prominent form taken by this degradation of public reason is the phenomenon I call 'conceptual overreach'. This occurs when a particular concept undergoes a process of expansion or inflation in which it absorbs ideas and demands that are foreign to it. In its most extreme manifestation, conceptual overreach morphs into a totalising 'all in one' dogma.

A single concept – say, human rights or the rule of law – is taken to offer a comprehensive political ideology, as opposed to picking out one among many elements upon which our political thinking needs to draw and hold in balance when arriving at justified responses to the problems of our time. Of course, we'll always need some very general concepts to refer to vast domains of value – the ideas of ethics, justice and morality, for example, have traditionally served this function. The problem is when there is a systematic trend for more specific concepts of value to aspire to the same level of generality. But why worry about conceptual overreach? If 'human rights', say, is a phrase that increasingly encompasses more and more things that are genuinely valuable goals, why should we quibble about the label attached to them? Isn't this mere pedantry? Far from it, I believe.

One danger of conceptual overreach is that we lose sight of the distinctive idea conveyed by a given concept through its immersion in a sea of many other quite separate ideas, a significance that goes beyond the baseline fact that all the ideas in question identify something of value. If, for example, human rights are demands that are generally high-priority in nature, such that it's seldom if ever justified to override them, then we lose our grip on that important idea if we start including under the heading of 'human rights' valuable objectives – for example, access to a high-quality internet connection – that don't plausibly enjoy that kind of priority. Another danger is that the extraneous ideas that are subjected to a process of conceptual takeover end up being themselves distorted. So, for example, we start regarding modes of treatment that are beneficial to someone, such as mercy towards a convicted offender, as benefits to which they have a right.

As a result, this conceptual overreach leaves us poorly positioned to identify the distinct values that are at stake in any given decision. It also obscures the agonizing conflicts that exist among these values in particular cases. But these two large intellectual defects also generate serious practical drawbacks when we seek to engage in deliberation with others. Conceptual overreach in its more extreme forms inhibits constructive dialogue, or even just the brokering of honorable compromises, with those whose political orientation differs significantly from ours. This is because it makes it difficult to find any point of common ground or shared understanding with them. Instead, when we try to reach some kind of reasonable accommodation with them based on, say, fairness or human rights, we find ourselves locked in opposing moral-political worldviews at every turn.

Q. In the phrase ''the extraneous ideas that are subjected to a process of conceptual takeover end up being themselves distorted", which of the following can be best inferred?

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.

There's a kind of threat to the quality of public reason that tends to go unnoticed. This is the degradation of the core ideas mobilized in exercises of public reason, not least in the utterances of elite actors, such as bureaucrats, lawyers, politicians and representatives of international organizations and NGOs. These ideas – health, human rights, democracy and so on – are central to the way we formulate and address the main political challenges of our time, from the climate crisis to the other issues. One prominent form taken by this degradation of public reason is the phenomenon I call 'conceptual overreach'. This occurs when a particular concept undergoes a process of expansion or inflation in which it absorbs ideas and demands that are foreign to it. In its most extreme manifestation, conceptual overreach morphs into a totalising 'all in one' dogma.

A single concept – say, human rights or the rule of law – is taken to offer a comprehensive political ideology, as opposed to picking out one among many elements upon which our political thinking needs to draw and hold in balance when arriving at justified responses to the problems of our time. Of course, we'll always need some very general concepts to refer to vast domains of value – the ideas of ethics, justice and morality, for example, have traditionally served this function. The problem is when there is a systematic trend for more specific concepts of value to aspire to the same level of generality. But why worry about conceptual overreach? If 'human rights', say, is a phrase that increasingly encompasses more and more things that are genuinely valuable goals, why should we quibble about the label attached to them? Isn't this mere pedantry? Far from it, I believe.

One danger of conceptual overreach is that we lose sight of the distinctive idea conveyed by a given concept through its immersion in a sea of many other quite separate ideas, a significance that goes beyond the baseline fact that all the ideas in question identify something of value. If, for example, human rights are demands that are generally high-priority in nature, such that it's seldom if ever justified to override them, then we lose our grip on that important idea if we start including under the heading of 'human rights' valuable objectives – for example, access to a high-quality internet connection – that don't plausibly enjoy that kind of priority. Another danger is that the extraneous ideas that are subjected to a process of conceptual takeover end up being themselves distorted. So, for example, we start regarding modes of treatment that are beneficial to someone, such as mercy towards a convicted offender, as benefits to which they have a right.

As a result, this conceptual overreach leaves us poorly positioned to identify the distinct values that are at stake in any given decision. It also obscures the agonizing conflicts that exist among these values in particular cases. But these two large intellectual defects also generate serious practical drawbacks when we seek to engage in deliberation with others. Conceptual overreach in its more extreme forms inhibits constructive dialogue, or even just the brokering of honorable compromises, with those whose political orientation differs significantly from ours. This is because it makes it difficult to find any point of common ground or shared understanding with them. Instead, when we try to reach some kind of reasonable accommodation with them based on, say, fairness or human rights, we find ourselves locked in opposing moral-political worldviews at every turn.

Q. The author of the passage is most likely to agree with each of the following statements EXCEPT: