SBI Clerk Prelims Mock Test - 2 - Bank Exams MCQ

Directions : Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.

The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is a perceptible change in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the most formidable challenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.

The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of its innovative ‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.

The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire for reconciliation with Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pak rapprochement could have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one. The third major driver is the mainstreaming of radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.

Q. Which of the following is true according to the passage?

Directions : Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.

The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is a perceptible change in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the most formidable challenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.

The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of its innovative ‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.

The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire for reconciliation with Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pak rapprochement could have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one. The third major driver is the mainstreaming of radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.

Q. What does the author mean by the phrase “The third major driver is the mainstreaming”?

Directions : Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.

The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is a perceptible change in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the most formidable challenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.

The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of its innovative ‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.

The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire for reconciliation with Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pak rapprochement could have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one. The third major driver is the mainstreaming of radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.

Q. What is the synonym of the word “innovative”?

Directions : Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.

The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is a perceptible change in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the most formidable challenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.

The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of its innovative ‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.

The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire for reconciliation with Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pak rapprochement could have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one. The third major driver is the mainstreaming of radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.

Q. Which of the following is the synonym of the word “rapprochement”?

Directions : Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.

The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is a perceptible change in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the most formidable challenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.

The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of its innovative ‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.

The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire for reconciliation with Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pak rapprochement could have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one. The third major driver is the mainstreaming of radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.

Q. Which of the following is not the synonym of the word “reconciliation”?

Directions : Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.

The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is a perceptible change in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the most formidable challenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.

The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of its innovative ‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.

The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire for reconciliation with Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pak rapprochement could have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one. The third major driver is the mainstreaming of radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.

Q. Which of the following is not the synonym of the word “perceptible”?

Directions : Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.

The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is a perceptible change in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the most formidable challenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.

The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of its innovative ‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.

The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire for reconciliation with Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pak rapprochement could have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one. The third major driver is the mainstreaming of radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.

Q. Which of the following is not the synonym of the word “formidable”?

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

In our system, a vast gap (11) the life children lead at school and what they experience outside. The space where they are (12) to learn about life is so far removed from (3) that we might as well ask (14) to buy space-suits for their little ones, instead of school uniforms. (15) they read, listen to and copy from the blackboard is so meticulously deodorized and (16) that it carries no resonance of experienced reality and (17) in life. The school day becomes a (18) of didactic songs and memorised information. Special (19) are marked by elaborate acts of sycophancy and preaching. School authorities (20) stop talking about values, but ignore the cynicism felt by the young over the high levels of chicanery and verbosity they find in adult talk. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

In our system, a vast gap (11) the life children lead at school and what they experience outside. The space where they are (12) to learn about life is so far removed from (3) that we might as well ask (14) to buy space-suits for their little ones, instead of school uniforms. (15) they read, listen to and copy from the blackboard is so meticulously deodorized and (16) that it carries no resonance of experienced reality and (17) in life. The school day becomes a (18) of didactic songs and memorised information. Special (19) are marked by elaborate acts of sycophancy and preaching. School authorities (20) stop talking about values, but ignore the cynicism felt by the young over the high levels of chicanery and verbosity they find in adult talk. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

In our system, a vast gap (11) the life children lead at school and what they experience outside. The space where they are (12) to learn about life is so far removed from (3) that we might as well ask (14) to buy space-suits for their little ones, instead of school uniforms. (15) they read, listen to and copy from the blackboard is so meticulously deodorized and (16) that it carries no resonance of experienced reality and (17) in life. The school day becomes a (18) of didactic songs and memorised information. Special (19) are marked by elaborate acts of sycophancy and preaching. School authorities (20) stop talking about values, but ignore the cynicism felt by the young over the high levels of chicanery and verbosity they find in adult talk. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

In our system, a vast gap (11) the life children lead at school and what they experience outside. The space where they are (12) to learn about life is so far removed from (3) that we might as well ask (14) to buy space-suits for their little ones, instead of school uniforms. (15) they read, listen to and copy from the blackboard is so meticulously deodorized and (16) that it carries no resonance of experienced reality and (17) in life. The school day becomes a (18) of didactic songs and memorised information. Special (19) are marked by elaborate acts of sycophancy and preaching. School authorities (20) stop talking about values, but ignore the cynicism felt by the young over the high levels of chicanery and verbosity they find in adult talk. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

In our system, a vast gap (11) the life children lead at school and what they experience outside. The space where they are (12) to learn about life is so far removed from (3) that we might as well ask (14) to buy space-suits for their little ones, instead of school uniforms. (15) they read, listen to and copy from the blackboard is so meticulously deodorized and (16) that it carries no resonance of experienced reality and (17) in life. The school day becomes a (18) of didactic songs and memorised information. Special (19) are marked by elaborate acts of sycophancy and preaching. School authorities (20) stop talking about values, but ignore the cynicism felt by the young over the high levels of chicanery and verbosity they find in adult talk. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

In our system, a vast gap (11) the life children lead at school and what they experience outside. The space where they are (12) to learn about life is so far removed from (3) that we might as well ask (14) to buy space-suits for their little ones, instead of school uniforms. (15) they read, listen to and copy from the blackboard is so meticulously deodorized and (16) that it carries no resonance of experienced reality and (17) in life. The school day becomes a (18) of didactic songs and memorised information. Special (19) are marked by elaborate acts of sycophancy and preaching. School authorities (20) stop talking about values, but ignore the cynicism felt by the young over the high levels of chicanery and verbosity they find in adult talk. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

In our system, a vast gap (11) the life children lead at school and what they experience outside. The space where they are (12) to learn about life is so far removed from (3) that we might as well ask (14) to buy space-suits for their little ones, instead of school uniforms. (15) they read, listen to and copy from the blackboard is so meticulously deodorized and (16) that it carries no resonance of experienced reality and (17) in life. The school day becomes a (18) of didactic songs and memorised information. Special (19) are marked by elaborate acts of sycophancy and preaching. School authorities (20) stop talking about values, but ignore the cynicism felt by the young over the high levels of chicanery and verbosity they find in adult talk. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

In our system, a vast gap (11) the life children lead at school and what they experience outside. The space where they are (12) to learn about life is so far removed from (3) that we might as well ask (14) to buy space-suits for their little ones, instead of school uniforms. (15) they read, listen to and copy from the blackboard is so meticulously deodorized and (16) that it carries no resonance of experienced reality and (17) in life. The school day becomes a (18) of didactic songs and memorised information. Special (19) are marked by elaborate acts of sycophancy and preaching. School authorities (20) stop talking about values, but ignore the cynicism felt by the young over the high levels of chicanery and verbosity they find in adult talk. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

In our system, a vast gap (11) the life children lead at school and what they experience outside. The space where they are (12) to learn about life is so far removed from (3) that we might as well ask (14) to buy space-suits for their little ones, instead of school uniforms. (15) they read, listen to and copy from the blackboard is so meticulously deodorized and (16) that it carries no resonance of experienced reality and (17) in life. The school day becomes a (18) of didactic songs and memorised information. Special (19) are marked by elaborate acts of sycophancy and preaching. School authorities (20) stop talking about values, but ignore the cynicism felt by the young over the high levels of chicanery and verbosity they find in adult talk. 

Directions: In the following passage, some of the words have been left out, each of which is indicated by a number. Find the suitable word from the options given against each number and fill up the blanks with appropriate words to make the paragraph meaningful.

In our system, a vast gap (11) the life children lead at school and what they experience outside. The space where they are (12) to learn about life is so far removed from (3) that we might as well ask (14) to buy space-suits for their little ones, instead of school uniforms. (15) they read, listen to and copy from the blackboard is so meticulously deodorized and (16) that it carries no resonance of experienced reality and (17) in life. The school day becomes a (18) of didactic songs and memorised information. Special (19) are marked by elaborate acts of sycophancy and preaching. School authorities (20) stop talking about values, but ignore the cynicism felt by the young over the high levels of chicanery and verbosity they find in adult talk. 

Directions : Rearrange the following seven sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F) and (G) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them.

(A) Equally, if you show disloyalty to your company or colleagues, your manners will be seen as unacceptable.

(B) Much of this book is concerned with this golden rule.

(C) The other half is good manners invoke taking positive action to make the other person feel good about your relationship with him. 

(D) They indicate to the person you are dealing with whether you can be relied on to act correctly and fairly when he does business with you.

(E) Avoiding these negatives is only half the story.

(F) Manners are the patterns of behaviour.

(G) If he thinks that you are boorish, selfish or undisciplined your relationship is unlikely to be proper.

Q. Which of the following will be the SEVENTH sentence? 

Directions : Rearrange the following seven sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F) and (G) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them.

(A) Equally, if you show disloyalty to your company or colleagues, your manners will be seen as unacceptable.

(B) Much of this book is concerned with this golden rule.

(C) The other half is good manners invoke taking positive action to make the other person feel good about your relationship with him. 

(D) They indicate to the person you are dealing with whether you can be relied on to act correctly and fairly when he does business with you.

(E) Avoiding these negatives is only half the story.

(F) Manners are the patterns of behaviour.

(G) If he thinks that you are boorish, selfish or undisciplined your relationship is unlikely to be proper.

Q. Which of the following will be the FIRST sentence?

Directions : Rearrange the following seven sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F) and (G) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them.

(A) Equally, if you show disloyalty to your company or colleagues, your manners will be seen as unacceptable.

(B) Much of this book is concerned with this golden rule.

(C) The other half is good manners invoke taking positive action to make the other person feel good about your relationship with him. 

(D) They indicate to the person you are dealing with whether you can be relied on to act correctly and fairly when he does business with you.

(E) Avoiding these negatives is only half the story.

(F) Manners are the patterns of behaviour.

(G) If he thinks that you are boorish, selfish or undisciplined your relationship is unlikely to be proper.

Q. Which of the following will be the THIRD sentence? '

Directions : Rearrange the following seven sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F) and (G) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them.

(A) Equally, if you show disloyalty to your company or colleagues, your manners will be seen as unacceptable.

(B) Much of this book is concerned with this golden rule.

(C) The other half is good manners invoke taking positive action to make the other person feel good about your relationship with him. 

(D) They indicate to the person you are dealing with whether you can be relied on to act correctly and fairly when he does business with you.

(E) Avoiding these negatives is only half the story.

(F) Manners are the patterns of behaviour.

(G) If he thinks that you are boorish, selfish or undisciplined your relationship is unlikely to be proper.

Q. Which of the following will be the FIFTH sentence?

Directions : Rearrange the following seven sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F) and (G) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them.

(A) Equally, if you show disloyalty to your company or colleagues, your manners will be seen as unacceptable.

(B) Much of this book is concerned with this golden rule.

(C) The other half is good manners invoke taking positive action to make the other person feel good about your relationship with him. 

(D) They indicate to the person you are dealing with whether you can be relied on to act correctly and fairly when he does business with you.

(E) Avoiding these negatives is only half the story.

(F) Manners are the patterns of behaviour.

(G) If he thinks that you are boorish, selfish or undisciplined your relationship is unlikely to be proper.

Q. Which of the following will be the SIXTH sentence?

Directions : Read each sentence to find our whether there is any grammatical or idiomatic error in it the error,if any, will be in one part of the sentence. Ignore the error of punctuation, if any.

While undergoing a 1) / strenuous workout, 2) / he suffered a massive heart attack 3) / but luckily survival. 4) / No error 5)

Directions : Read each sentence to find our whether there is any grammatical or idiomatic error in it the error,if any, will be in one part of the sentence. Ignore the error of punctuation, if any.

He thinks that 1) / once he paid money 2) / he is relieved of 3)/ all his responsibilities. 4)/ No error 5)

Directions : Read each sentence to find our whether there is any grammatical or idiomatic error in it the error,if any, will be in one part of the sentence. Ignore the error of punctuation, if any.

Taking care of yourself 1) / cannot be 2)/ and should not be considered 3) / as a selfish thing. 4) / No error 5)

Directions : Read each sentence to find our whether there is any grammatical or idiomatic error in it the error,if any, will be in one part of the sentence. Ignore the error of punctuation, if any.

People express their expectations 1) / that their leaders should not 2)/ resorting to 3)/ corrupt practices and nepotism. 4) / No error 5)

Directions : Read each sentence to find our whether there is any grammatical or idiomatic error in it the error,if any, will be in one part of the sentence. Ignore the error of punctuation, if any.

We as the editors of 1) / a popular magazine would like to 2) / know what are other topics most 3)/ on people’s minds. 4) / No error 5)