Sample Test: Legal Reasoning - CLAT MCQ

Parliament has made into law the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Bill, 2019, which had been framed for the welfare of transgender persons. The community had organised protests across the country, urging changes to the Bill, claiming that in the form in which the Central government had conceived it, it showed a poor understanding of gender and sexual identity. Activists had problems right from the beginning, starting with the name. 'T ransgender' was restrictive, they argued, and it showed a lack of understanding of the complexities in people who do not conform to the gender binary, male/ female. Charging that the Bill had serious flaws, because of this basic lack of comprehension about gender, some activists also wrote an alternative wish Bill, outlining their demands.
Activists chastised the Union government for failing to live up to the opportunity to ensure that fundamental rights are guaranteed to all people regardless of their sex characteristics or gender identity. Rejecting 'Transgender' as the nomenclature, they suggested instead that the title should be a comprehensive "Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics (Protection of Rights) Bill", and in definition, sought to introduce the distinction between transgenders and intersex persons upfront. Members of the community perceive transgender as different from intersex, and were insistent that the distinction be made in the Bill.
While the community is miffed that the Bill has become an Act without any effort to make valid or relevant changes to its original composition, it worries about how implementation will address the pressing needs of the community. It only hopes that the National Council for Transgender Persons will allow for a more favourable implementation of the law, and thus provide more elbow room for genuine representations of the community that the Bill itself failed to accommodate.

A legal principle says that Penal laws should be provided a strict interpretation. Bala, a trangender, while returning from office encountered some goons. Goons subjected her to sexual assault, including molestation and rape.
Bala immediately reports the said incident to a nearest Police Station. Officer Incharge of the station refused to register the information as the crime of rape can only be committed against a woman. Bala files the writ. Based upon the principle of strict interpretation and author's argument which of the following represents the best recourse:

Parliament has made into law the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Bill, 2019, which had been framed for the welfare of transgender persons. The community had organised protests across the country, urging changes to the Bill, claiming that in the form in which the Central government had conceived it, it showed a poor understanding of gender and sexual identity. Activists had problems right from the beginning, starting with the name. 'T ransgender' was restrictive, they argued, and it showed a lack of understanding of the complexities in people who do not conform to the gender binary, male/ female. Charging that the Bill had serious flaws, because of this basic lack of comprehension about gender, some activists also wrote an alternative wish Bill, outlining their demands.
Activists chastised the Union government for failing to live up to the opportunity to ensure that fundamental rights are guaranteed to all people regardless of their sex characteristics or gender identity. Rejecting 'Transgender' as the nomenclature, they suggested instead that the title should be a comprehensive "Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics (Protection of Rights) Bill", and in definition, sought to introduce the distinction between transgenders and intersex persons upfront. Members of the community perceive transgender as different from intersex, and were insistent that the distinction be made in the Bill.
While the community is miffed that the Bill has become an Act without any effort to make valid or relevant changes to its original composition, it worries about how implementation will address the pressing needs of the community. It only hopes that the National Council for Transgender Persons will allow for a more favourable implementation of the law, and thus provide more elbow room for genuine representations of the community that the Bill itself failed to accommodate.

Recently, there is a boom of Sex reassignment surgery (SRS). Intersex and transgender people are subjected to SRS during their infancy and childhood, to alter their bodies, particularly the sexual organs, to make them conform to gendered physical norms, including through repeated surgeries, hormonal interventions and other measures. Based on the author's reasoning should the consent of the Parents to conduct SRS over their children be considered as the consent of the child:

The weakness of the political process provides a propitious ground for judicial activism. In many instances the executive has almost invited the judiciary in; in many states, governments routinely seek judicial dispensation to give them political cover for unpopular decisions they might have to make. Judicial activism can mean many things: scrutiny of legislation to determine constitutionality, the creation of law, and the exercise of policy prerogatives normally reserved for the executive. But whatever its form, judicial activism raises two questions. Is it legitimate? Is it effective? The democrat in all of us is rightly suspicious of a few old (mostly) men assuming such broad powers over our destiny without much accountability. We may ruminate that we can throw the politicians out once in a while, but judges are shielded from accountability. On the other hand, our impatience with a debilitating political process whose usual results are inaction makes us thankful for an assertive judiciary. At least the judiciary can protect our rights, clean our air, call politicians to account and so forth. And it must be an unenviable task for judges to steer a middle course between usurping too much power on the one hand, and doing too little to sustain fundamental values on the other. But the prickly question remains: what justifies judicial activism? One possible answer is that judicial activism is justified to the extent that it helps preserve democratic institutions and values. After all, transient majorities in Parliament can barter away our democratic rights; representative institutions are too often burdened with the imperatives of money, power or inertia, that to call their decisions democratic and in the public interest is often something of a joke. If judges use their power to restore integrity to the democratic process, to make our rights, including social and economic ones more meaningful, if they advance the public interest, an assertive judiciary can be an instrument of democracy. This is the most plausible defence of an assertive judiciary.

Which of the following is the plausible inference, in support of Judicial Activism, can be attributed to the author of the above passage?

The weakness of the political process provides a propitious ground for judicial activism. In many instances the executive has almost invited the judiciary in; in many states, governments routinely seek judicial dispensation to give them political cover for unpopular decisions they might have to make. Judicial activism can mean many things: scrutiny of legislation to determine constitutionality, the creation of law, and the exercise of policy prerogatives normally reserved for the executive. But whatever its form, judicial activism raises two questions. Is it legitimate? Is it effective? The democrat in all of us is rightly suspicious of a few old (mostly) men assuming such broad powers over our destiny without much accountability. We may ruminate that we can throw the politicians out once in a while, but judges are shielded from accountability. On the other hand, our impatience with a debilitating political process whose usual results are inaction makes us thankful for an assertive judiciary. At least the judiciary can protect our rights, clean our air, call politicians to account and so forth. And it must be an unenviable task for judges to steer a middle course between usurping too much power on the one hand, and doing too little to sustain fundamental values on the other. But the prickly question remains: what justifies judicial activism? One possible answer is that judicial activism is justified to the extent that it helps preserve democratic institutions and values. After all, transient majorities in Parliament can barter away our democratic rights; representative institutions are too often burdened with the imperatives of money, power or inertia, that to call their decisions democratic and in the public interest is often something of a joke. If judges use their power to restore integrity to the democratic process, to make our rights, including social and economic ones more meaningful, if they advance the public interest, an assertive judiciary can be an instrument of democracy. This is the most plausible defence of an assertive judiciary.

With reference to the passage, the author is concerned about the Judicial Activism because:
1. The age and gender of the members of the judiciary may affect their judicial decisions.
2. The accountability of the judiciary, even when judicial activism is not legitimate, is limited.
3. Author believes that policymaking is not within the remit and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
4. Every decisions taken in the Parliament are against the public interest.
Which of the following assumptions is/are valid?

The weakness of the political process provides a propitious ground for judicial activism. In many instances the executive has almost invited the judiciary in; in many states, governments routinely seek judicial dispensation to give them political cover for unpopular decisions they might have to make. Judicial activism can mean many things: scrutiny of legislation to determine constitutionality, the creation of law, and the exercise of policy prerogatives normally reserved for the executive. But whatever its form, judicial activism raises two questions. Is it legitimate? Is it effective? The democrat in all of us is rightly suspicious of a few old (mostly) men assuming such broad powers over our destiny without much accountability. We may ruminate that we can throw the politicians out once in a while, but judges are shielded from accountability. On the other hand, our impatience with a debilitating political process whose usual results are inaction makes us thankful for an assertive judiciary. At least the judiciary can protect our rights, clean our air, call politicians to account and so forth. And it must be an unenviable task for judges to steer a middle course between usurping too much power on the one hand, and doing too little to sustain fundamental values on the other. But the prickly question remains: what justifies judicial activism? One possible answer is that judicial activism is justified to the extent that it helps preserve democratic institutions and values. After all, transient majorities in Parliament can barter away our democratic rights; representative institutions are too often burdened with the imperatives of money, power or inertia, that to call their decisions democratic and in the public interest is often something of a joke. If judges use their power to restore integrity to the democratic process, to make our rights, including social and economic ones more meaningful, if they advance the public interest, an assertive judiciary can be an instrument of democracy. This is the most plausible defence of an assertive judiciary.

Which one of the following is the essential message implied by this passage?

The weakness of the political process provides a propitious ground for judicial activism. In many instances the executive has almost invited the judiciary in; in many states, governments routinely seek judicial dispensation to give them political cover for unpopular decisions they might have to make. Judicial activism can mean many things: scrutiny of legislation to determine constitutionality, the creation of law, and the exercise of policy prerogatives normally reserved for the executive. But whatever its form, judicial activism raises two questions. Is it legitimate? Is it effective? The democrat in all of us is rightly suspicious of a few old (mostly) men assuming such broad powers over our destiny without much accountability. We may ruminate that we can throw the politicians out once in a while, but judges are shielded from accountability. On the other hand, our impatience with a debilitating political process whose usual results are inaction makes us thankful for an assertive judiciary. At least the judiciary can protect our rights, clean our air, call politicians to account and so forth. And it must be an unenviable task for judges to steer a middle course between usurping too much power on the one hand, and doing too little to sustain fundamental values on the other. But the prickly question remains: what justifies judicial activism? One possible answer is that judicial activism is justified to the extent that it helps preserve democratic institutions and values. After all, transient majorities in Parliament can barter away our democratic rights; representative institutions are too often burdened with the imperatives of money, power or inertia, that to call their decisions democratic and in the public interest is often something of a joke. If judges use their power to restore integrity to the democratic process, to make our rights, including social and economic ones more meaningful, if they advance the public interest, an assertive judiciary can be an instrument of democracy. This is the most plausible defence of an assertive judiciary.

Public Interest Litigation (PILs) was conceived and created as a judicial tool by the courts in this country for helping the poor, weaker and oppressed sections of society, truth is that PILs are being entertained by many courts as a routine and the dockets of most of the superior courts are flooded with PILs, most of which are frivolous or for which the judiciary has no remedy. If this is true, then, based on the author's reasoning in the passage above:

The weakness of the political process provides a propitious ground for judicial activism. In many instances the executive has almost invited the judiciary in; in many states, governments routinely seek judicial dispensation to give them political cover for unpopular decisions they might have to make. Judicial activism can mean many things: scrutiny of legislation to determine constitutionality, the creation of law, and the exercise of policy prerogatives normally reserved for the executive. But whatever its form, judicial activism raises two questions. Is it legitimate? Is it effective? The democrat in all of us is rightly suspicious of a few old (mostly) men assuming such broad powers over our destiny without much accountability. We may ruminate that we can throw the politicians out once in a while, but judges are shielded from accountability. On the other hand, our impatience with a debilitating political process whose usual results are inaction makes us thankful for an assertive judiciary. At least the judiciary can protect our rights, clean our air, call politicians to account and so forth. And it must be an unenviable task for judges to steer a middle course between usurping too much power on the one hand, and doing too little to sustain fundamental values on the other. But the prickly question remains: what justifies judicial activism? One possible answer is that judicial activism is justified to the extent that it helps preserve democratic institutions and values. After all, transient majorities in Parliament can barter away our democratic rights; representative institutions are too often burdened with the imperatives of money, power or inertia, that to call their decisions democratic and in the public interest is often something of a joke. If judges use their power to restore integrity to the democratic process, to make our rights, including social and economic ones more meaningful, if they advance the public interest, an assertive judiciary can be an instrument of democracy. This is the most plausible defence of an assertive judiciary.

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is a judicial innovation. Recently, Apex Court recently remarked that "The problems facing the people of India have to be solved by the people themselves by using their creativity and by scientific thinking and not by using judicial crutches like PIL". Based on the Author's reasoning and considering the apex court statement regarding PIL, will the author become concerned?

The weakness of the political process provides a propitious ground for judicial activism. In many instances the executive has almost invited the judiciary in; in many states, governments routinely seek judicial dispensation to give them political cover for unpopular decisions they might have to make. Judicial activism can mean many things: scrutiny of legislation to determine constitutionality, the creation of law, and the exercise of policy prerogatives normally reserved for the executive. But whatever its form, judicial activism raises two questions. Is it legitimate? Is it effective? The democrat in all of us is rightly suspicious of a few old (mostly) men assuming such broad powers over our destiny without much accountability. We may ruminate that we can throw the politicians out once in a while, but judges are shielded from accountability. On the other hand, our impatience with a debilitating political process whose usual results are inaction makes us thankful for an assertive judiciary. At least the judiciary can protect our rights, clean our air, call politicians to account and so forth. And it must be an unenviable task for judges to steer a middle course between usurping too much power on the one hand, and doing too little to sustain fundamental values on the other. But the prickly question remains: what justifies judicial activism? One possible answer is that judicial activism is justified to the extent that it helps preserve democratic institutions and values. After all, transient majorities in Parliament can barter away our democratic rights; representative institutions are too often burdened with the imperatives of money, power or inertia, that to call their decisions democratic and in the public interest is often something of a joke. If judges use their power to restore integrity to the democratic process, to make our rights, including social and economic ones more meaningful, if they advance the public interest, an assertive judiciary can be an instrument of democracy. This is the most plausible defence of an assertive judiciary.

Recently various matters came to light such as grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees, criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing gallows, persons are sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years and detenus expecting their release from the detention orders. However these matters has witness Government's apathy. If this is true, then, based on the author's reasoning in the passage above: