One of the most important issues in biomedical ethics is the controversy surrounding abortion. This controversy has a long history and is still heavily discussed among researchers and the public- both in terms of morality and in terms of legality. There are three main views: first, the extreme conservative view- held by the Catholic Church; second, the extreme liberal view- held by Singer; and third, moderate views which lie between both extremes. Some opponents- anti-abortionists, pro-life activists- holding the extreme view, argue that human personhood begins from the unicellular zygote and thus- according to the religious stance- one should not have an abortion by virtue of the imago dei of the human being. To have an abortion would be, by definition, homicide. The extreme liberal view is held by proponents. They claim that human personhood begins immediately after birth or a bit later. Thus, they consider the relevant date is at birth or a short time later- say, one month. The proponents of the moderate views argue that there is a morally relevant break in the biological process of development- from the unicellular zygote to birth- which determines the justifiability and non-justifiability of having an abortion.
According to them, there is a gradual process from being a fetus to being an infant where the fetus is not a human being but a human offspring with a different moral status. The advantage of the extreme conservative view is the fact that it defines human personhood from the beginning of life -the unicellular zygote; there is no slippery slope. The advantage of the extreme liberal view is that its main claim is supported by a common philosophical usage of the notion “personhood” and thus seems more sound than the extreme conservative view because the offspring is far more developed; as the unicellular zygote. This view also faces severe problems; for example, it is not at all clear where the morally relevant difference is between the fetus five minutes before birth and a just born offspring. Some moderate views have commonsense plausibility especially when it is argued that there are significant differences between the developmental stages. The fact that they also claim for a break in the biological process, which is morally relevant, seems to be a relapse into old and unjustified habits. As Gillespie stresses in his article “Abortion and Human Rights” there is no morally relevant break in the biological process of development. But, in fact, there are differences, which make a comparative basis possible without having to solve the problem of drawing a line.
The standard argument is the following practical syllogism: 1. The killing of human beings is prohibited. 2. A fetus is a human being. 3. The killing of fetuses is prohibited. Hence, abortion is not allowed since homicide is prohibited. However, there are possible situations where the first premise could be questioned by noting, for example that killing in self-defense is not prohibited. The second premise could also be questioned since it is not at all clear whether fetuses are human beings in the sense of being persons, although they are of course human beings in the sense of being members of the species of homo sapiens. Consecutively, one would deny that fetuses are persons but admit that a young two year old child may be a person. Although, in the end, it may be difficult to claim that every human being is a person. For example, people with severe mental handicaps or disorders seem not to have personhood. That is, if personhood is defined with regard to specific criteria like the capacity to reason, or to have consciousness, self-consciousness, or rationality, some people might be excluded. But, in fact, this does not mean that people with severe mental handicaps who lack personhood can be killed. Even when rights are tied to the notion of personhood, it is clearly prohibited to kill disabled people. Norbert Hoerster, a well-known German philosopher, claims that fetuses with severe handicaps can be- like all other fetuses- aborted, as born human beings with severe handicaps have to be protected and respected like all other human beings, too.
However, it seems appropriate to modify the standard argument and to use a more sophisticated version. Replace the notion “human being” with “human life form.” The new practical syllogism is: I. The killing of human life forms is prohibited. 2. A fetus is a human life form. 3.The killing of fetuses is prohibited. The objection against the first premise of the standard argument still holds for the new more sophisticated version. But, the second modified premise is much stronger than the previous one because one has to determine what a human life form really is. The fetus may be a human life form but it hardly seems to be a person and thus has no corresponding basic right to live. However, this kind of talk seems to go astray because the criteria for personhood may be suitable for just-borns but not appropriate for fetuses, embryos, or unicellular zygotes, like some biological, psychological, rational, social, or legal criteria may indicate.
Which of the following questions is the most fundamental with the (extreme) conservative view on abortion?
One of the most important issues in biomedical ethics is the controversy surrounding abortion. This controversy has a long history and is still heavily discussed among researchers and the public- both in terms of morality and in terms of legality. There are three main views: first, the extreme conservative view- held by the Catholic Church; second, the extreme liberal view- held by Singer; and third, moderate views which lie between both extremes. Some opponents- anti-abortionists, pro-life activists- holding the extreme view, argue that human personhood begins from the unicellular zygote and thus- according to the religious stance- one should not have an abortion by virtue of the imago dei of the human being. To have an abortion would be, by definition, homicide. The extreme liberal view is held by proponents. They claim that human personhood begins immediately after birth or a bit later. Thus, they consider the relevant date is at birth or a short time later- say, one month. The proponents of the moderate views argue that there is a morally relevant break in the biological process of development- from the unicellular zygote to birth- which determines the justifiability and non-justifiability of having an abortion.
According to them, there is a gradual process from being a fetus to being an infant where the fetus is not a human being but a human offspring with a different moral status. The advantage of the extreme conservative view is the fact that it defines human personhood from the beginning of life -the unicellular zygote; there is no slippery slope. The advantage of the extreme liberal view is that its main claim is supported by a common philosophical usage of the notion “personhood” and thus seems more sound than the extreme conservative view because the offspring is far more developed; as the unicellular zygote. This view also faces severe problems; for example, it is not at all clear where the morally relevant difference is between the fetus five minutes before birth and a just born offspring. Some moderate views have commonsense plausibility especially when it is argued that there are significant differences between the developmental stages. The fact that they also claim for a break in the biological process, which is morally relevant, seems to be a relapse into old and unjustified habits. As Gillespie stresses in his article “Abortion and Human Rights” there is no morally relevant break in the biological process of development. But, in fact, there are differences, which make a comparative basis possible without having to solve the problem of drawing a line.
The standard argument is the following practical syllogism: 1. The killing of human beings is prohibited. 2. A fetus is a human being. 3. The killing of fetuses is prohibited. Hence, abortion is not allowed since homicide is prohibited. However, there are possible situations where the first premise could be questioned by noting, for example that killing in self-defense is not prohibited. The second premise could also be questioned since it is not at all clear whether fetuses are human beings in the sense of being persons, although they are of course human beings in the sense of being members of the species of homo sapiens. Consecutively, one would deny that fetuses are persons but admit that a young two year old child may be a person. Although, in the end, it may be difficult to claim that every human being is a person. For example, people with severe mental handicaps or disorders seem not to have personhood. That is, if personhood is defined with regard to specific criteria like the capacity to reason, or to have consciousness, self-consciousness, or rationality, some people might be excluded. But, in fact, this does not mean that people with severe mental handicaps who lack personhood can be killed. Even when rights are tied to the notion of personhood, it is clearly prohibited to kill disabled people. Norbert Hoerster, a well-known German philosopher, claims that fetuses with severe handicaps can be- like all other fetuses- aborted, as born human beings with severe handicaps have to be protected and respected like all other human beings, too.
However, it seems appropriate to modify the standard argument and to use a more sophisticated version. Replace the notion “human being” with “human life form.” The new practical syllogism is: I. The killing of human life forms is prohibited. 2. A fetus is a human life form. 3.The killing of fetuses is prohibited. The objection against the first premise of the standard argument still holds for the new more sophisticated version. But, the second modified premise is much stronger than the previous one because one has to determine what a human life form really is. The fetus may be a human life form but it hardly seems to be a person and thus has no corresponding basic right to live. However, this kind of talk seems to go astray because the criteria for personhood may be suitable for just-borns but not appropriate for fetuses, embryos, or unicellular zygotes, like some biological, psychological, rational, social, or legal criteria may indicate.
It can be inferred from the passage that those who hold the extreme liberal view on abortion are likely to admit that: