India - Sri Lanka Relations | International Relations for UPSC 2024 (Pre & Mains) PDF Download

 Page 1


 
India-Sri Lanka 
Introduction 
All aspects of Sri Lankan life—demography, religion, language, and culture—bear the indelible imprint of 
Indian in?uence. Despite many ups and downs, India-Sri Lanka relations have never been so bad as to reach a 
level of confrontation. Invariably, before relations reached a critical tripping point one or the other side 
pulled back.  
Jawaharlal Nehru was conscious of the twin facets of India-Sri Lanka relations — he frequently highlighted 
the necessity to promote understanding on the basis of trust and cooperation 
India’s Sri Lanka policy was governed by two considerations:  
1. geo-strategic concerns and the desire to insulate Sri Lanka from external forces which might have a  
destabilising effect on the South Asian strategic environment 
2. geographical proximity and ethnic af?nities should not lead to resurgence of secessionist demands in 
T amil Nadu.  
Thus while proclaiming India’s commitment to the unity of Sri Lanka, New Delhi also helped T amils to wrest 
concessions from unwilling Sinhalese dominated government. The cumulative effect was the pursuance of a 
two-pronged strategy—mediatory and militant supportive—which turned out to be contradictory and which 
created suspicions both among T amils and the Sri Lankan government. 
In 1971, when Ceylon was faced with the revolt led by the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), the government 
asked for external assistance to defend the country. Indian defence forces helped to defend the Colombo 
harbour and Katunayke airport. But, during the East Pakistan crisis, Government of Sri Lanka provided 
refuelling facilities for Pakistani air force planes on their way to East Pakistan to carry out savage reprisals 
against Bangladeshi nationalists.  
In recent times, the induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), on the invitation of President 
Jayawardene under the provisions of India-Sri Lanka Accord, enabled Sri Lankan army to devote itself 
completely to countering the JVP threat. What is instructive for India is the fact that the military 
marginalization of the Liberation Tigers of T amil Eelam (LTTE), accomplished at heavy cost of men and 
materials, did not earn for India the corresponding gratitude of the Sinhalese. On the contrary, it gave a ?llip 
to Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism and provided justi?cation for the argument that Sri Lanka would soon 
become the client state of its northern neighbour. 
Cooperation 
Trade & Economics 
Sri Lanka is one of the major recipients of development credit given by the GoI, with a total commitment of 
around US$ 2.63 billion, including US$ 458 million as grants 
India also continues to assist a large number of smaller development projects in areas like education, health 
transport connectivity, small and medium enterprise development and training in many parts of the country 
through its grant funding  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
!
Page 2


 
India-Sri Lanka 
Introduction 
All aspects of Sri Lankan life—demography, religion, language, and culture—bear the indelible imprint of 
Indian in?uence. Despite many ups and downs, India-Sri Lanka relations have never been so bad as to reach a 
level of confrontation. Invariably, before relations reached a critical tripping point one or the other side 
pulled back.  
Jawaharlal Nehru was conscious of the twin facets of India-Sri Lanka relations — he frequently highlighted 
the necessity to promote understanding on the basis of trust and cooperation 
India’s Sri Lanka policy was governed by two considerations:  
1. geo-strategic concerns and the desire to insulate Sri Lanka from external forces which might have a  
destabilising effect on the South Asian strategic environment 
2. geographical proximity and ethnic af?nities should not lead to resurgence of secessionist demands in 
T amil Nadu.  
Thus while proclaiming India’s commitment to the unity of Sri Lanka, New Delhi also helped T amils to wrest 
concessions from unwilling Sinhalese dominated government. The cumulative effect was the pursuance of a 
two-pronged strategy—mediatory and militant supportive—which turned out to be contradictory and which 
created suspicions both among T amils and the Sri Lankan government. 
In 1971, when Ceylon was faced with the revolt led by the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), the government 
asked for external assistance to defend the country. Indian defence forces helped to defend the Colombo 
harbour and Katunayke airport. But, during the East Pakistan crisis, Government of Sri Lanka provided 
refuelling facilities for Pakistani air force planes on their way to East Pakistan to carry out savage reprisals 
against Bangladeshi nationalists.  
In recent times, the induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), on the invitation of President 
Jayawardene under the provisions of India-Sri Lanka Accord, enabled Sri Lankan army to devote itself 
completely to countering the JVP threat. What is instructive for India is the fact that the military 
marginalization of the Liberation Tigers of T amil Eelam (LTTE), accomplished at heavy cost of men and 
materials, did not earn for India the corresponding gratitude of the Sinhalese. On the contrary, it gave a ?llip 
to Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism and provided justi?cation for the argument that Sri Lanka would soon 
become the client state of its northern neighbour. 
Cooperation 
Trade & Economics 
Sri Lanka is one of the major recipients of development credit given by the GoI, with a total commitment of 
around US$ 2.63 billion, including US$ 458 million as grants 
India also continues to assist a large number of smaller development projects in areas like education, health 
transport connectivity, small and medium enterprise development and training in many parts of the country 
through its grant funding  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
! 
Sri Lanka is one of India’s largest trading partners in SAARC. India in turn is Sri Lanka’s largest trade partner 
globally. Trade between the two countries grew particularly rapidly after the entry into force of the India-Sri 
Lanka Free Trade Agreement in March 2000. Exports from India to Sri Lanka in 2016 were US$ 3.83 billion, 
while exports from Sri Lanka to India were US$ 551 million 
T ourism also forms an important link between India and Sri Lanka. In 2016, of the two million total tourist 
arrivals to Sri Lanka, 357,000 were from India constituting 14% of the total number of tourist arrival to Sri 
Lanka 
Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) is keen on enhancing connectivity with Indian ports using ferry services to 
facilitate easier trade and tourism 
•
SLPA chairman also stressed that a ferry service connecting Kankesanthurai port (KKS) in Jaffna with 
Karaikal near Puducherry, and similarly between Colombo and Tuticorin in south India has a huge scope 
a huge potential to increase trade activity and tourism 
Sri Lanka’s deteriorating balance of payments and external debt problems are very pertinent. 10% of Sri 
Lanka’s foreign loans are from China, close to 40% of its external debt is from the international markets. 
Defence & Security 
Defence cooperation with Sri Lanka encompasses a wide array of activities, including supply of military 
equipment, training, joint exercises, high level bilateral visits, bilateral goodwill visits by naval and Coast 
Guard ships, sports exchanges and study tours 
Training is the strongest and most enduring pillar of bilateral defence cooperation with Sri Lanka. India is the 
largest provider of foreign training assistance to Sri Lankan Armed Forces, Similarly, since the end of the 
armed con?ict in 2009, Sri Lanka has also been offering training vacancies to Indian Armed Forces 
Several bilateral military exercises are held between both countries on an annual basis, for e.g. Army exercise 
Mitra-Shakti and naval exercise SLINEX. Sri Lankan Navy is also a regular participant in the multilateral 
MILAN naval exercise conducted by India. 
Differences 
Given prevalent suspicions about India’s intentions and objectives the Sinhalese leaders are assiduously 
cultivating China and Pakistan to checkmate India’s in?uence 
Asymmetrical Relations 
The asymmetrical nature of relations made Sinhalese leaders apprehensive of India’s intentions and 
capabilities. It is the tragedy of South Asian history that instead of striving for close cooperation with its 
northern neighbour, the Sinhalese leaders frequently sought external assistance to counter the Indian threat. 
•
According to Sir John Kotelawala, the former Prime Minister, ‘the day Ceylon dispenses with Englishmen 
completely, the island would go under India’ . He regarded membership of the Commonwealth ‘as the ?rst 
insurance against any possibility of aggression from nearer home 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
!
Page 3


 
India-Sri Lanka 
Introduction 
All aspects of Sri Lankan life—demography, religion, language, and culture—bear the indelible imprint of 
Indian in?uence. Despite many ups and downs, India-Sri Lanka relations have never been so bad as to reach a 
level of confrontation. Invariably, before relations reached a critical tripping point one or the other side 
pulled back.  
Jawaharlal Nehru was conscious of the twin facets of India-Sri Lanka relations — he frequently highlighted 
the necessity to promote understanding on the basis of trust and cooperation 
India’s Sri Lanka policy was governed by two considerations:  
1. geo-strategic concerns and the desire to insulate Sri Lanka from external forces which might have a  
destabilising effect on the South Asian strategic environment 
2. geographical proximity and ethnic af?nities should not lead to resurgence of secessionist demands in 
T amil Nadu.  
Thus while proclaiming India’s commitment to the unity of Sri Lanka, New Delhi also helped T amils to wrest 
concessions from unwilling Sinhalese dominated government. The cumulative effect was the pursuance of a 
two-pronged strategy—mediatory and militant supportive—which turned out to be contradictory and which 
created suspicions both among T amils and the Sri Lankan government. 
In 1971, when Ceylon was faced with the revolt led by the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), the government 
asked for external assistance to defend the country. Indian defence forces helped to defend the Colombo 
harbour and Katunayke airport. But, during the East Pakistan crisis, Government of Sri Lanka provided 
refuelling facilities for Pakistani air force planes on their way to East Pakistan to carry out savage reprisals 
against Bangladeshi nationalists.  
In recent times, the induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), on the invitation of President 
Jayawardene under the provisions of India-Sri Lanka Accord, enabled Sri Lankan army to devote itself 
completely to countering the JVP threat. What is instructive for India is the fact that the military 
marginalization of the Liberation Tigers of T amil Eelam (LTTE), accomplished at heavy cost of men and 
materials, did not earn for India the corresponding gratitude of the Sinhalese. On the contrary, it gave a ?llip 
to Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism and provided justi?cation for the argument that Sri Lanka would soon 
become the client state of its northern neighbour. 
Cooperation 
Trade & Economics 
Sri Lanka is one of the major recipients of development credit given by the GoI, with a total commitment of 
around US$ 2.63 billion, including US$ 458 million as grants 
India also continues to assist a large number of smaller development projects in areas like education, health 
transport connectivity, small and medium enterprise development and training in many parts of the country 
through its grant funding  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
! 
Sri Lanka is one of India’s largest trading partners in SAARC. India in turn is Sri Lanka’s largest trade partner 
globally. Trade between the two countries grew particularly rapidly after the entry into force of the India-Sri 
Lanka Free Trade Agreement in March 2000. Exports from India to Sri Lanka in 2016 were US$ 3.83 billion, 
while exports from Sri Lanka to India were US$ 551 million 
T ourism also forms an important link between India and Sri Lanka. In 2016, of the two million total tourist 
arrivals to Sri Lanka, 357,000 were from India constituting 14% of the total number of tourist arrival to Sri 
Lanka 
Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) is keen on enhancing connectivity with Indian ports using ferry services to 
facilitate easier trade and tourism 
•
SLPA chairman also stressed that a ferry service connecting Kankesanthurai port (KKS) in Jaffna with 
Karaikal near Puducherry, and similarly between Colombo and Tuticorin in south India has a huge scope 
a huge potential to increase trade activity and tourism 
Sri Lanka’s deteriorating balance of payments and external debt problems are very pertinent. 10% of Sri 
Lanka’s foreign loans are from China, close to 40% of its external debt is from the international markets. 
Defence & Security 
Defence cooperation with Sri Lanka encompasses a wide array of activities, including supply of military 
equipment, training, joint exercises, high level bilateral visits, bilateral goodwill visits by naval and Coast 
Guard ships, sports exchanges and study tours 
Training is the strongest and most enduring pillar of bilateral defence cooperation with Sri Lanka. India is the 
largest provider of foreign training assistance to Sri Lankan Armed Forces, Similarly, since the end of the 
armed con?ict in 2009, Sri Lanka has also been offering training vacancies to Indian Armed Forces 
Several bilateral military exercises are held between both countries on an annual basis, for e.g. Army exercise 
Mitra-Shakti and naval exercise SLINEX. Sri Lankan Navy is also a regular participant in the multilateral 
MILAN naval exercise conducted by India. 
Differences 
Given prevalent suspicions about India’s intentions and objectives the Sinhalese leaders are assiduously 
cultivating China and Pakistan to checkmate India’s in?uence 
Asymmetrical Relations 
The asymmetrical nature of relations made Sinhalese leaders apprehensive of India’s intentions and 
capabilities. It is the tragedy of South Asian history that instead of striving for close cooperation with its 
northern neighbour, the Sinhalese leaders frequently sought external assistance to counter the Indian threat. 
•
According to Sir John Kotelawala, the former Prime Minister, ‘the day Ceylon dispenses with Englishmen 
completely, the island would go under India’ . He regarded membership of the Commonwealth ‘as the ?rst 
insurance against any possibility of aggression from nearer home 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
! 
Status of PIO in Sri Lanka 
The Indian T amils, as they were called, were the descendants of those Indian labourers who were taken to the 
island under the protective umbrella of the British to provide labour for the opening of tea plantations, 
development of Colombo port, and construction of the network of roads which linked the country. Initially 
being ‘birds of passage’ , they gradually began to put down roots and became permanent settlers in the island. 
As long as British ruled, Indian T amils had the same legal status as the Sinhalese, but the later Sri Lankan 
government did not ascribe to the same values and wanted to absorb only a small fraction of the Indian 
population. 
Maritime Boundary & Fishermen Issue 
The Palk Bay region, in which the island of Kachchatheevu is located, has in recent years become a bone of 
contention among T amil Nadu ?shermen, the Sri Lankan navy, and Sri Lankan T amil ?shermen. The rich 
?shing grounds on the Sri Lankan side have become an area of con?ict.  
The Indian ?shermen are being intimidated and harassed; their catch dumped into the sea; and during years 
of ethnic con?ict, suspecting them to be T amil Tigers the Sri Lankan navy used to shoot and kill them.  
The root cause of tension is con?ict of interests. On one side are the governments in Colombo and New Delhi 
which concluded the maritime boundary agreements of 1974 and 1976; on the other side are Indian 
?shermen who will not give up their ?shing rights which they have enjoyed for several centuries.  
Adding to the complexity are Sri Lankan T amil ?shermen, who ?nd their livelihood threatened by 
indiscriminate use of bottom trawlers by Indian ?shermen.  
The island was part of the Zamindari of the Raja of Ramnad and when Zamindari was abolished after 
independence it became a part of Madras Presidency. In order to avoid strains in bilateral relations, New 
Delhi chose to ignore territorial claims and viewed the island as a disputed territory; what is more, in the 
process of delimitation, the principle of median line was not strictly adhered to so that the island could fall on 
the Sri Lankan side. More saddening, while Article 5 of the 1974 agreement protected the traditional ?shing 
rights of Indian ?shermen to ?sh in and around Kachchatheevu, these rights were also given away by the 
1976 Agreement. Suggestions made by the governments in T amil Nadu that the island should be got back on 
the basis of ‘lease in perpetuity’ and licensed Indian ?shermen should be allowed to ?sh in Sri Lankan waters 
up to ?ve nautical miles, with reciprocal rights to Sri Lankan ?shermen to ?sh in the Indian Exclusive 
Economic Zone, have not made much headway because New Delhi does not want to reopen the boundary 
dispute. 
Given the proximity of the territorial waters of both countries, especially in the Palk Straits and the Gulf of 
Mannar, incidents of straying of ?shermen are common. Both countries have agreed on certain practical 
arrangements to deal with the issue of bona ?de ?shermen of either side crossing the International Maritime 
Boundary Line. Through these arrangements, it has been possible to deal with the issue of detention of 
?shermen in a humane manner. India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) on 
Fisheries between the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare of India and Ministry of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Resources Development of Sri Lanka as the mechanism to help ?nd a permanent solution to the 
?shermen issue. 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
!
Page 4


 
India-Sri Lanka 
Introduction 
All aspects of Sri Lankan life—demography, religion, language, and culture—bear the indelible imprint of 
Indian in?uence. Despite many ups and downs, India-Sri Lanka relations have never been so bad as to reach a 
level of confrontation. Invariably, before relations reached a critical tripping point one or the other side 
pulled back.  
Jawaharlal Nehru was conscious of the twin facets of India-Sri Lanka relations — he frequently highlighted 
the necessity to promote understanding on the basis of trust and cooperation 
India’s Sri Lanka policy was governed by two considerations:  
1. geo-strategic concerns and the desire to insulate Sri Lanka from external forces which might have a  
destabilising effect on the South Asian strategic environment 
2. geographical proximity and ethnic af?nities should not lead to resurgence of secessionist demands in 
T amil Nadu.  
Thus while proclaiming India’s commitment to the unity of Sri Lanka, New Delhi also helped T amils to wrest 
concessions from unwilling Sinhalese dominated government. The cumulative effect was the pursuance of a 
two-pronged strategy—mediatory and militant supportive—which turned out to be contradictory and which 
created suspicions both among T amils and the Sri Lankan government. 
In 1971, when Ceylon was faced with the revolt led by the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), the government 
asked for external assistance to defend the country. Indian defence forces helped to defend the Colombo 
harbour and Katunayke airport. But, during the East Pakistan crisis, Government of Sri Lanka provided 
refuelling facilities for Pakistani air force planes on their way to East Pakistan to carry out savage reprisals 
against Bangladeshi nationalists.  
In recent times, the induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), on the invitation of President 
Jayawardene under the provisions of India-Sri Lanka Accord, enabled Sri Lankan army to devote itself 
completely to countering the JVP threat. What is instructive for India is the fact that the military 
marginalization of the Liberation Tigers of T amil Eelam (LTTE), accomplished at heavy cost of men and 
materials, did not earn for India the corresponding gratitude of the Sinhalese. On the contrary, it gave a ?llip 
to Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism and provided justi?cation for the argument that Sri Lanka would soon 
become the client state of its northern neighbour. 
Cooperation 
Trade & Economics 
Sri Lanka is one of the major recipients of development credit given by the GoI, with a total commitment of 
around US$ 2.63 billion, including US$ 458 million as grants 
India also continues to assist a large number of smaller development projects in areas like education, health 
transport connectivity, small and medium enterprise development and training in many parts of the country 
through its grant funding  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
! 
Sri Lanka is one of India’s largest trading partners in SAARC. India in turn is Sri Lanka’s largest trade partner 
globally. Trade between the two countries grew particularly rapidly after the entry into force of the India-Sri 
Lanka Free Trade Agreement in March 2000. Exports from India to Sri Lanka in 2016 were US$ 3.83 billion, 
while exports from Sri Lanka to India were US$ 551 million 
T ourism also forms an important link between India and Sri Lanka. In 2016, of the two million total tourist 
arrivals to Sri Lanka, 357,000 were from India constituting 14% of the total number of tourist arrival to Sri 
Lanka 
Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) is keen on enhancing connectivity with Indian ports using ferry services to 
facilitate easier trade and tourism 
•
SLPA chairman also stressed that a ferry service connecting Kankesanthurai port (KKS) in Jaffna with 
Karaikal near Puducherry, and similarly between Colombo and Tuticorin in south India has a huge scope 
a huge potential to increase trade activity and tourism 
Sri Lanka’s deteriorating balance of payments and external debt problems are very pertinent. 10% of Sri 
Lanka’s foreign loans are from China, close to 40% of its external debt is from the international markets. 
Defence & Security 
Defence cooperation with Sri Lanka encompasses a wide array of activities, including supply of military 
equipment, training, joint exercises, high level bilateral visits, bilateral goodwill visits by naval and Coast 
Guard ships, sports exchanges and study tours 
Training is the strongest and most enduring pillar of bilateral defence cooperation with Sri Lanka. India is the 
largest provider of foreign training assistance to Sri Lankan Armed Forces, Similarly, since the end of the 
armed con?ict in 2009, Sri Lanka has also been offering training vacancies to Indian Armed Forces 
Several bilateral military exercises are held between both countries on an annual basis, for e.g. Army exercise 
Mitra-Shakti and naval exercise SLINEX. Sri Lankan Navy is also a regular participant in the multilateral 
MILAN naval exercise conducted by India. 
Differences 
Given prevalent suspicions about India’s intentions and objectives the Sinhalese leaders are assiduously 
cultivating China and Pakistan to checkmate India’s in?uence 
Asymmetrical Relations 
The asymmetrical nature of relations made Sinhalese leaders apprehensive of India’s intentions and 
capabilities. It is the tragedy of South Asian history that instead of striving for close cooperation with its 
northern neighbour, the Sinhalese leaders frequently sought external assistance to counter the Indian threat. 
•
According to Sir John Kotelawala, the former Prime Minister, ‘the day Ceylon dispenses with Englishmen 
completely, the island would go under India’ . He regarded membership of the Commonwealth ‘as the ?rst 
insurance against any possibility of aggression from nearer home 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
! 
Status of PIO in Sri Lanka 
The Indian T amils, as they were called, were the descendants of those Indian labourers who were taken to the 
island under the protective umbrella of the British to provide labour for the opening of tea plantations, 
development of Colombo port, and construction of the network of roads which linked the country. Initially 
being ‘birds of passage’ , they gradually began to put down roots and became permanent settlers in the island. 
As long as British ruled, Indian T amils had the same legal status as the Sinhalese, but the later Sri Lankan 
government did not ascribe to the same values and wanted to absorb only a small fraction of the Indian 
population. 
Maritime Boundary & Fishermen Issue 
The Palk Bay region, in which the island of Kachchatheevu is located, has in recent years become a bone of 
contention among T amil Nadu ?shermen, the Sri Lankan navy, and Sri Lankan T amil ?shermen. The rich 
?shing grounds on the Sri Lankan side have become an area of con?ict.  
The Indian ?shermen are being intimidated and harassed; their catch dumped into the sea; and during years 
of ethnic con?ict, suspecting them to be T amil Tigers the Sri Lankan navy used to shoot and kill them.  
The root cause of tension is con?ict of interests. On one side are the governments in Colombo and New Delhi 
which concluded the maritime boundary agreements of 1974 and 1976; on the other side are Indian 
?shermen who will not give up their ?shing rights which they have enjoyed for several centuries.  
Adding to the complexity are Sri Lankan T amil ?shermen, who ?nd their livelihood threatened by 
indiscriminate use of bottom trawlers by Indian ?shermen.  
The island was part of the Zamindari of the Raja of Ramnad and when Zamindari was abolished after 
independence it became a part of Madras Presidency. In order to avoid strains in bilateral relations, New 
Delhi chose to ignore territorial claims and viewed the island as a disputed territory; what is more, in the 
process of delimitation, the principle of median line was not strictly adhered to so that the island could fall on 
the Sri Lankan side. More saddening, while Article 5 of the 1974 agreement protected the traditional ?shing 
rights of Indian ?shermen to ?sh in and around Kachchatheevu, these rights were also given away by the 
1976 Agreement. Suggestions made by the governments in T amil Nadu that the island should be got back on 
the basis of ‘lease in perpetuity’ and licensed Indian ?shermen should be allowed to ?sh in Sri Lankan waters 
up to ?ve nautical miles, with reciprocal rights to Sri Lankan ?shermen to ?sh in the Indian Exclusive 
Economic Zone, have not made much headway because New Delhi does not want to reopen the boundary 
dispute. 
Given the proximity of the territorial waters of both countries, especially in the Palk Straits and the Gulf of 
Mannar, incidents of straying of ?shermen are common. Both countries have agreed on certain practical 
arrangements to deal with the issue of bona ?de ?shermen of either side crossing the International Maritime 
Boundary Line. Through these arrangements, it has been possible to deal with the issue of detention of 
?shermen in a humane manner. India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) on 
Fisheries between the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare of India and Ministry of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Resources Development of Sri Lanka as the mechanism to help ?nd a permanent solution to the 
?shermen issue. 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
! 
Ethnic con?icts in Sri Lanka 
India’s policy towards ethnic con?ict has taken a zig-zag course, confounding both supporters and critics. 
One signi?cant factor for the sorry state of affairs had been lack of coordination among various agencies 
involved in implementation. During the Nehru era, the distinction between Sri Lankan T amils and Indian 
T amils was clearly maintained. But as the gulf between Colombo and T amils began to widen in the 1970s a 
shift of opinion took place on both sides of the Palk Strait. The widespread sympathy for the T amils in T amil 
Nadu and the sanctuary and support that T amil militants received in the state were interpreted in Colombo 
as an Indian attempt to destabilize the state. In that situation New Delhi began to give up its policy of 
aloofness; the Indian diplomats in Colombo advised the UNP and the T amil United Liberation Front (TULF) to 
work together for the common good. 
The Indo-Lankan accord of 1987 led to the 13th amendment to Sri Lankan constitution, recognising T amil as 
an of?cial language and devolving power to the provinces — two longstanding demands of the T amil minority.  
Political Crisis in Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka was plunged into a crisis in 2018, when President Maithripala Sirisena sacked PM Ranil 
Wickremesinghe and swore in ex-president Mahinda Rajapaksa to replace him, breaking up a fragile 
coalition. But the Speaker recognised Wickremesinghe as the prime minister and questioned the move of the 
President to suspend Parliament. 
Unlike India, Sri Lanka has a semi-presidential system in which the President plays the most dominant 
political force in the country. PM functions as deputy to President 
India, EU and US have all urged Sirisena to abide by the constitution 
Sri Lanka had grown closer to China under Rajapaksha’s rule with Beijing pumping in more than US$ 15 
billion into huge infrastructure projects between 2005 and 2014. Alarm bells also went off in 2014, when a 
Chinese submarine docked in Colombo. However, some of that had been reversed under the current political 
establishment as Chinese debt pinched the country’s economy and they looked towards India, which obliged.  
Rajapaksa’s ouster raised hopes for democracy and an improvement in human rights in Sri Lanka. For many 
years in the US and India, it was also sen as an opportunity to counter Chinese in?uence in New Delhi’s 
backyard, with the new Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government coming to power pledging to revisit and revise 
some of the deals Rajapaksha had signed with China 
Struggling to service its debts, in 2017 Sri Lanka moved to lease the Chinese-funded port in the south — to 
Chinese state-owned ?rms. 
Way Forward 
If the full potential of bilateral cooperation is to be realized, it is necessary that the two countries should look 
at Palk Bay not as a contested territory, but as a common heritage. Historically the shallow waters of the Palk 
Bay have not acted as a barrier, but as a bridge, which facilitated the movement of people, ideas, and goods.  
The cultural ef?orescence in Sri Lanka was the cumulative result of cross-cultural interaction. During recent 
years, in order to surmount the problems of ?shermen, it has been advocated that Palk Bay should be 
regarded as a legacy in common to both countries.  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
!
Page 5


 
India-Sri Lanka 
Introduction 
All aspects of Sri Lankan life—demography, religion, language, and culture—bear the indelible imprint of 
Indian in?uence. Despite many ups and downs, India-Sri Lanka relations have never been so bad as to reach a 
level of confrontation. Invariably, before relations reached a critical tripping point one or the other side 
pulled back.  
Jawaharlal Nehru was conscious of the twin facets of India-Sri Lanka relations — he frequently highlighted 
the necessity to promote understanding on the basis of trust and cooperation 
India’s Sri Lanka policy was governed by two considerations:  
1. geo-strategic concerns and the desire to insulate Sri Lanka from external forces which might have a  
destabilising effect on the South Asian strategic environment 
2. geographical proximity and ethnic af?nities should not lead to resurgence of secessionist demands in 
T amil Nadu.  
Thus while proclaiming India’s commitment to the unity of Sri Lanka, New Delhi also helped T amils to wrest 
concessions from unwilling Sinhalese dominated government. The cumulative effect was the pursuance of a 
two-pronged strategy—mediatory and militant supportive—which turned out to be contradictory and which 
created suspicions both among T amils and the Sri Lankan government. 
In 1971, when Ceylon was faced with the revolt led by the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), the government 
asked for external assistance to defend the country. Indian defence forces helped to defend the Colombo 
harbour and Katunayke airport. But, during the East Pakistan crisis, Government of Sri Lanka provided 
refuelling facilities for Pakistani air force planes on their way to East Pakistan to carry out savage reprisals 
against Bangladeshi nationalists.  
In recent times, the induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), on the invitation of President 
Jayawardene under the provisions of India-Sri Lanka Accord, enabled Sri Lankan army to devote itself 
completely to countering the JVP threat. What is instructive for India is the fact that the military 
marginalization of the Liberation Tigers of T amil Eelam (LTTE), accomplished at heavy cost of men and 
materials, did not earn for India the corresponding gratitude of the Sinhalese. On the contrary, it gave a ?llip 
to Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism and provided justi?cation for the argument that Sri Lanka would soon 
become the client state of its northern neighbour. 
Cooperation 
Trade & Economics 
Sri Lanka is one of the major recipients of development credit given by the GoI, with a total commitment of 
around US$ 2.63 billion, including US$ 458 million as grants 
India also continues to assist a large number of smaller development projects in areas like education, health 
transport connectivity, small and medium enterprise development and training in many parts of the country 
through its grant funding  
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Sri Lanka is one of India’s largest trading partners in SAARC. India in turn is Sri Lanka’s largest trade partner 
globally. Trade between the two countries grew particularly rapidly after the entry into force of the India-Sri 
Lanka Free Trade Agreement in March 2000. Exports from India to Sri Lanka in 2016 were US$ 3.83 billion, 
while exports from Sri Lanka to India were US$ 551 million 
T ourism also forms an important link between India and Sri Lanka. In 2016, of the two million total tourist 
arrivals to Sri Lanka, 357,000 were from India constituting 14% of the total number of tourist arrival to Sri 
Lanka 
Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) is keen on enhancing connectivity with Indian ports using ferry services to 
facilitate easier trade and tourism 
•
SLPA chairman also stressed that a ferry service connecting Kankesanthurai port (KKS) in Jaffna with 
Karaikal near Puducherry, and similarly between Colombo and Tuticorin in south India has a huge scope 
a huge potential to increase trade activity and tourism 
Sri Lanka’s deteriorating balance of payments and external debt problems are very pertinent. 10% of Sri 
Lanka’s foreign loans are from China, close to 40% of its external debt is from the international markets. 
Defence & Security 
Defence cooperation with Sri Lanka encompasses a wide array of activities, including supply of military 
equipment, training, joint exercises, high level bilateral visits, bilateral goodwill visits by naval and Coast 
Guard ships, sports exchanges and study tours 
Training is the strongest and most enduring pillar of bilateral defence cooperation with Sri Lanka. India is the 
largest provider of foreign training assistance to Sri Lankan Armed Forces, Similarly, since the end of the 
armed con?ict in 2009, Sri Lanka has also been offering training vacancies to Indian Armed Forces 
Several bilateral military exercises are held between both countries on an annual basis, for e.g. Army exercise 
Mitra-Shakti and naval exercise SLINEX. Sri Lankan Navy is also a regular participant in the multilateral 
MILAN naval exercise conducted by India. 
Differences 
Given prevalent suspicions about India’s intentions and objectives the Sinhalese leaders are assiduously 
cultivating China and Pakistan to checkmate India’s in?uence 
Asymmetrical Relations 
The asymmetrical nature of relations made Sinhalese leaders apprehensive of India’s intentions and 
capabilities. It is the tragedy of South Asian history that instead of striving for close cooperation with its 
northern neighbour, the Sinhalese leaders frequently sought external assistance to counter the Indian threat. 
•
According to Sir John Kotelawala, the former Prime Minister, ‘the day Ceylon dispenses with Englishmen 
completely, the island would go under India’ . He regarded membership of the Commonwealth ‘as the ?rst 
insurance against any possibility of aggression from nearer home 
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Status of PIO in Sri Lanka 
The Indian T amils, as they were called, were the descendants of those Indian labourers who were taken to the 
island under the protective umbrella of the British to provide labour for the opening of tea plantations, 
development of Colombo port, and construction of the network of roads which linked the country. Initially 
being ‘birds of passage’ , they gradually began to put down roots and became permanent settlers in the island. 
As long as British ruled, Indian T amils had the same legal status as the Sinhalese, but the later Sri Lankan 
government did not ascribe to the same values and wanted to absorb only a small fraction of the Indian 
population. 
Maritime Boundary & Fishermen Issue 
The Palk Bay region, in which the island of Kachchatheevu is located, has in recent years become a bone of 
contention among T amil Nadu ?shermen, the Sri Lankan navy, and Sri Lankan T amil ?shermen. The rich 
?shing grounds on the Sri Lankan side have become an area of con?ict.  
The Indian ?shermen are being intimidated and harassed; their catch dumped into the sea; and during years 
of ethnic con?ict, suspecting them to be T amil Tigers the Sri Lankan navy used to shoot and kill them.  
The root cause of tension is con?ict of interests. On one side are the governments in Colombo and New Delhi 
which concluded the maritime boundary agreements of 1974 and 1976; on the other side are Indian 
?shermen who will not give up their ?shing rights which they have enjoyed for several centuries.  
Adding to the complexity are Sri Lankan T amil ?shermen, who ?nd their livelihood threatened by 
indiscriminate use of bottom trawlers by Indian ?shermen.  
The island was part of the Zamindari of the Raja of Ramnad and when Zamindari was abolished after 
independence it became a part of Madras Presidency. In order to avoid strains in bilateral relations, New 
Delhi chose to ignore territorial claims and viewed the island as a disputed territory; what is more, in the 
process of delimitation, the principle of median line was not strictly adhered to so that the island could fall on 
the Sri Lankan side. More saddening, while Article 5 of the 1974 agreement protected the traditional ?shing 
rights of Indian ?shermen to ?sh in and around Kachchatheevu, these rights were also given away by the 
1976 Agreement. Suggestions made by the governments in T amil Nadu that the island should be got back on 
the basis of ‘lease in perpetuity’ and licensed Indian ?shermen should be allowed to ?sh in Sri Lankan waters 
up to ?ve nautical miles, with reciprocal rights to Sri Lankan ?shermen to ?sh in the Indian Exclusive 
Economic Zone, have not made much headway because New Delhi does not want to reopen the boundary 
dispute. 
Given the proximity of the territorial waters of both countries, especially in the Palk Straits and the Gulf of 
Mannar, incidents of straying of ?shermen are common. Both countries have agreed on certain practical 
arrangements to deal with the issue of bona ?de ?shermen of either side crossing the International Maritime 
Boundary Line. Through these arrangements, it has been possible to deal with the issue of detention of 
?shermen in a humane manner. India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) on 
Fisheries between the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare of India and Ministry of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Resources Development of Sri Lanka as the mechanism to help ?nd a permanent solution to the 
?shermen issue. 
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Ethnic con?icts in Sri Lanka 
India’s policy towards ethnic con?ict has taken a zig-zag course, confounding both supporters and critics. 
One signi?cant factor for the sorry state of affairs had been lack of coordination among various agencies 
involved in implementation. During the Nehru era, the distinction between Sri Lankan T amils and Indian 
T amils was clearly maintained. But as the gulf between Colombo and T amils began to widen in the 1970s a 
shift of opinion took place on both sides of the Palk Strait. The widespread sympathy for the T amils in T amil 
Nadu and the sanctuary and support that T amil militants received in the state were interpreted in Colombo 
as an Indian attempt to destabilize the state. In that situation New Delhi began to give up its policy of 
aloofness; the Indian diplomats in Colombo advised the UNP and the T amil United Liberation Front (TULF) to 
work together for the common good. 
The Indo-Lankan accord of 1987 led to the 13th amendment to Sri Lankan constitution, recognising T amil as 
an of?cial language and devolving power to the provinces — two longstanding demands of the T amil minority.  
Political Crisis in Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka was plunged into a crisis in 2018, when President Maithripala Sirisena sacked PM Ranil 
Wickremesinghe and swore in ex-president Mahinda Rajapaksa to replace him, breaking up a fragile 
coalition. But the Speaker recognised Wickremesinghe as the prime minister and questioned the move of the 
President to suspend Parliament. 
Unlike India, Sri Lanka has a semi-presidential system in which the President plays the most dominant 
political force in the country. PM functions as deputy to President 
India, EU and US have all urged Sirisena to abide by the constitution 
Sri Lanka had grown closer to China under Rajapaksha’s rule with Beijing pumping in more than US$ 15 
billion into huge infrastructure projects between 2005 and 2014. Alarm bells also went off in 2014, when a 
Chinese submarine docked in Colombo. However, some of that had been reversed under the current political 
establishment as Chinese debt pinched the country’s economy and they looked towards India, which obliged.  
Rajapaksa’s ouster raised hopes for democracy and an improvement in human rights in Sri Lanka. For many 
years in the US and India, it was also sen as an opportunity to counter Chinese in?uence in New Delhi’s 
backyard, with the new Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government coming to power pledging to revisit and revise 
some of the deals Rajapaksha had signed with China 
Struggling to service its debts, in 2017 Sri Lanka moved to lease the Chinese-funded port in the south — to 
Chinese state-owned ?rms. 
Way Forward 
If the full potential of bilateral cooperation is to be realized, it is necessary that the two countries should look 
at Palk Bay not as a contested territory, but as a common heritage. Historically the shallow waters of the Palk 
Bay have not acted as a barrier, but as a bridge, which facilitated the movement of people, ideas, and goods.  
The cultural ef?orescence in Sri Lanka was the cumulative result of cross-cultural interaction. During recent 
years, in order to surmount the problems of ?shermen, it has been advocated that Palk Bay should be 
regarded as a legacy in common to both countries.  
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India must project the vision that the seas which unite India and Sri Lanka are our common inheritance and 
the harnessing of marine resources jointly will only lead to a win-win situation. In order to accomplish this 
task, we must recognize that in addition to the governments of India and Sri Lanka, there are other important 
stakeholders: the government of T amil Nadu and the government of the Northern Province in Sri Lanka and, 
above all, the ?shermen of the two countries. A dialogue among ?shermen is the need of the hour; it will lead 
to a solution from below and will have greater chances of success, rather than a solution imposed from above 
by New Delhi and Colombo.  
A Palk Bay Authority should be constituted, consisting of representatives of both countries, including 
?sheries experts, marine ecologists, and ?shermen’s representatives. The Palk Bay Authority can determine 
the ideal sustainable catch per year, the ?shing equipment to be used, the number of days Indian and Sri 
Lankan ?shermen can ?sh, and how the sea can be enriched.  
What is more, the Governments in Chennai and New Delhi should take the initiative to start joint ventures 
among Sri Lankan and Indian T amil ?shermen so that they can undertake deep sea ?shing in multi-day boats. 
The focus of cooperative development and sharing of know-how should be enrichment of marine resources 
and bringing about qualitative improvement in the lives of ?shermen and their families
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