India - Israel Relations | International Relations for UPSC 2024 (Pre & Mains) PDF Download

 Page 1


India-Israel 
Introduction 
•
The establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1992 was one of India’s most 
signi?cant foreign policy responses to the end of the Cold War 
•
Earlier India followed the policy of recognition-without-normalisation vis-a-vis the Jewish state. 
Normalisation enabled India to signal a departure from its Cold War approach to international politics 
•
For the ?rst four decades of their independence, even as Israel was keen on establishing full diplomatic 
relations, India remained hesitant due to the dominance of political concerns in bilateral relations, which 
could be traced to the early 1920s when the Indian nationalists made a common cause with their Arab 
counterparts in ?ghting imperialism and colonialism.  
?The undercurrents of decolonization, nationalist struggle against the British, and political rivalry 
with the Muslim League resulted in the Indian nationalists adopting an explicitly pro-Arab position 
regarding the Palestinian question since the ?nal days of the First World War. Writing in his Harijan 
weekly in November 1938, Mahatma Gandhi observed: ‘Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same 
sense that England belongs to the English and France to the French 
Indian Stance on the Palestine Issue 
The socio-cultural accommodation of the Jewish people and political opposition to the demand for a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine remained the approach of the Indian nationalists towards the Palestinian question  
•
In 1947 India was elected to the 11 member UN Special Committee on Palestine where India disagreed 
with the majority that advocated partition of Palestine  
?India advocated federal Palestine as the solution to the crisis 
•When UNGA endorsed the partition plan in 1947, India joined Arab and Islamic countries and voted 
against the partition of Palestine 
•
Couple of years later it even opposed Israel’s admission into the UN 
•It was only in 1950 that India reconsidered it position and recognised Israel as a country 
Pre-Normalisation Phase 
•
In March 1952, PM Nehru promised normalisation of relations. But any immediate development was 
hampered by shortage of personnel and budgetary considerations 
•
Both Indian and foreign scholars hold Maulana Azad responsible for the absence of relations with Israel  
?Azad cited Pakistan’s potential diplomatic moves in the Arab world and sentiments of the Indian 
Muslim population as the reasons to defer normalisation  
•
The Suez crisis of 1956 formally ended the prospects of normalisation where Israel collaborated with 
former imperial powers (Britain and France) 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
Page 2


India-Israel 
Introduction 
•
The establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1992 was one of India’s most 
signi?cant foreign policy responses to the end of the Cold War 
•
Earlier India followed the policy of recognition-without-normalisation vis-a-vis the Jewish state. 
Normalisation enabled India to signal a departure from its Cold War approach to international politics 
•
For the ?rst four decades of their independence, even as Israel was keen on establishing full diplomatic 
relations, India remained hesitant due to the dominance of political concerns in bilateral relations, which 
could be traced to the early 1920s when the Indian nationalists made a common cause with their Arab 
counterparts in ?ghting imperialism and colonialism.  
?The undercurrents of decolonization, nationalist struggle against the British, and political rivalry 
with the Muslim League resulted in the Indian nationalists adopting an explicitly pro-Arab position 
regarding the Palestinian question since the ?nal days of the First World War. Writing in his Harijan 
weekly in November 1938, Mahatma Gandhi observed: ‘Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same 
sense that England belongs to the English and France to the French 
Indian Stance on the Palestine Issue 
The socio-cultural accommodation of the Jewish people and political opposition to the demand for a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine remained the approach of the Indian nationalists towards the Palestinian question  
•
In 1947 India was elected to the 11 member UN Special Committee on Palestine where India disagreed 
with the majority that advocated partition of Palestine  
?India advocated federal Palestine as the solution to the crisis 
•When UNGA endorsed the partition plan in 1947, India joined Arab and Islamic countries and voted 
against the partition of Palestine 
•
Couple of years later it even opposed Israel’s admission into the UN 
•It was only in 1950 that India reconsidered it position and recognised Israel as a country 
Pre-Normalisation Phase 
•
In March 1952, PM Nehru promised normalisation of relations. But any immediate development was 
hampered by shortage of personnel and budgetary considerations 
•
Both Indian and foreign scholars hold Maulana Azad responsible for the absence of relations with Israel  
?Azad cited Pakistan’s potential diplomatic moves in the Arab world and sentiments of the Indian 
Muslim population as the reasons to defer normalisation  
•
The Suez crisis of 1956 formally ended the prospects of normalisation where Israel collaborated with 
former imperial powers (Britain and France) 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
•Periodic upsurges of violence in the region and competition with Pakistan resulted in India playing a 
leading role in a number of anti-Israeli resolutions in international forums such as UN and NAM 
?In 1975 India voted for the controversial resolution in UNGA that equated Zionism with racism 
?In 1982, India declared Consul General Yosuf Hassin persona non-grata over a controversial media 
interview, thus ending the limited Israeli diplomatic presence 
•PM Rajiv Gandhi did make some efforts towards normalisation but to little effect. Normalisation only 
became possible when the end of Cold War brought down the ideological barriers 
Phases 
Phase I (Till 1991) 
•Bilateral relations were based on a zero-sum approach whereby India perceived non-relations with 
Israel as the raison d’être for its pro-Arab Middle East policy  
•
India was in the forefront of many anti-Israel resolutions and moves in various international forums 
Phase II (1991-2004) 
Middle East Peace Conference began in Madrid in October 1991. Every major power, including India wanted 
to be involved in the ongoing peace process. Moreover, India could no longer hope to further its interests in 
the Middle East by harping on its non-relations with Israel and pro-Palestinian credentials . It established full 
diplomatic relations and resident missions in T el Aviv and New Delhi marked the second phase. 
India began viewing relations with Israel and the Palestinians as parallel and not exclusive processes. It also 
implied recognition of the fact that it was possible and necessary to maintain formal relations with both of 
the warring parties if India were to be relevant in the Middle East peace process 
Normalisation of relations did not led to any modi?cation of its erstwhile position on some of the core 
issues of the Israeli-Palestinian con?ict like realisation of the political rights of the Palestinians through 
statehood, Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied following in the June 1967 war and opposition to 
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.  
Since 1992, India has exhibited more balance when responding to frequent bouts of violence in Middle 
East. Departing from its erstwhile stand of squarely blaming Israel for all ills and violence in the region, it has 
been more understanding of Israel’s security concerns and accommodative of its interests. Despite 
widespread demands from the Arab and Islamic countries, in August 2001 India refused to endorse the 
resurrection of the ‘Zionism is racism’ debate during the Durban conference against racism. 
Phase III (2004 onwards) 
It coincided with the Congress Party returning to power in 2004. This was an antithesis of the ?rst phase and 
different from second phase. India pursued and strengthened the bilateral relations even when it has serious 
differences with Israel over issues such as the Jerusalem question, settlements, refugees, borders and 
Palestinian statehood. 
The delinking of the bilateral relations from the peace process has served a dual objective. Through its 
opposition to Israel over the peace process, India has managed to maintain its traditional goodwill and 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
Page 3


India-Israel 
Introduction 
•
The establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1992 was one of India’s most 
signi?cant foreign policy responses to the end of the Cold War 
•
Earlier India followed the policy of recognition-without-normalisation vis-a-vis the Jewish state. 
Normalisation enabled India to signal a departure from its Cold War approach to international politics 
•
For the ?rst four decades of their independence, even as Israel was keen on establishing full diplomatic 
relations, India remained hesitant due to the dominance of political concerns in bilateral relations, which 
could be traced to the early 1920s when the Indian nationalists made a common cause with their Arab 
counterparts in ?ghting imperialism and colonialism.  
?The undercurrents of decolonization, nationalist struggle against the British, and political rivalry 
with the Muslim League resulted in the Indian nationalists adopting an explicitly pro-Arab position 
regarding the Palestinian question since the ?nal days of the First World War. Writing in his Harijan 
weekly in November 1938, Mahatma Gandhi observed: ‘Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same 
sense that England belongs to the English and France to the French 
Indian Stance on the Palestine Issue 
The socio-cultural accommodation of the Jewish people and political opposition to the demand for a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine remained the approach of the Indian nationalists towards the Palestinian question  
•
In 1947 India was elected to the 11 member UN Special Committee on Palestine where India disagreed 
with the majority that advocated partition of Palestine  
?India advocated federal Palestine as the solution to the crisis 
•When UNGA endorsed the partition plan in 1947, India joined Arab and Islamic countries and voted 
against the partition of Palestine 
•
Couple of years later it even opposed Israel’s admission into the UN 
•It was only in 1950 that India reconsidered it position and recognised Israel as a country 
Pre-Normalisation Phase 
•
In March 1952, PM Nehru promised normalisation of relations. But any immediate development was 
hampered by shortage of personnel and budgetary considerations 
•
Both Indian and foreign scholars hold Maulana Azad responsible for the absence of relations with Israel  
?Azad cited Pakistan’s potential diplomatic moves in the Arab world and sentiments of the Indian 
Muslim population as the reasons to defer normalisation  
•
The Suez crisis of 1956 formally ended the prospects of normalisation where Israel collaborated with 
former imperial powers (Britain and France) 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
•Periodic upsurges of violence in the region and competition with Pakistan resulted in India playing a 
leading role in a number of anti-Israeli resolutions in international forums such as UN and NAM 
?In 1975 India voted for the controversial resolution in UNGA that equated Zionism with racism 
?In 1982, India declared Consul General Yosuf Hassin persona non-grata over a controversial media 
interview, thus ending the limited Israeli diplomatic presence 
•PM Rajiv Gandhi did make some efforts towards normalisation but to little effect. Normalisation only 
became possible when the end of Cold War brought down the ideological barriers 
Phases 
Phase I (Till 1991) 
•Bilateral relations were based on a zero-sum approach whereby India perceived non-relations with 
Israel as the raison d’être for its pro-Arab Middle East policy  
•
India was in the forefront of many anti-Israel resolutions and moves in various international forums 
Phase II (1991-2004) 
Middle East Peace Conference began in Madrid in October 1991. Every major power, including India wanted 
to be involved in the ongoing peace process. Moreover, India could no longer hope to further its interests in 
the Middle East by harping on its non-relations with Israel and pro-Palestinian credentials . It established full 
diplomatic relations and resident missions in T el Aviv and New Delhi marked the second phase. 
India began viewing relations with Israel and the Palestinians as parallel and not exclusive processes. It also 
implied recognition of the fact that it was possible and necessary to maintain formal relations with both of 
the warring parties if India were to be relevant in the Middle East peace process 
Normalisation of relations did not led to any modi?cation of its erstwhile position on some of the core 
issues of the Israeli-Palestinian con?ict like realisation of the political rights of the Palestinians through 
statehood, Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied following in the June 1967 war and opposition to 
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.  
Since 1992, India has exhibited more balance when responding to frequent bouts of violence in Middle 
East. Departing from its erstwhile stand of squarely blaming Israel for all ills and violence in the region, it has 
been more understanding of Israel’s security concerns and accommodative of its interests. Despite 
widespread demands from the Arab and Islamic countries, in August 2001 India refused to endorse the 
resurrection of the ‘Zionism is racism’ debate during the Durban conference against racism. 
Phase III (2004 onwards) 
It coincided with the Congress Party returning to power in 2004. This was an antithesis of the ?rst phase and 
different from second phase. India pursued and strengthened the bilateral relations even when it has serious 
differences with Israel over issues such as the Jerusalem question, settlements, refugees, borders and 
Palestinian statehood. 
The delinking of the bilateral relations from the peace process has served a dual objective. Through its 
opposition to Israel over the peace process, India has managed to maintain its traditional goodwill and 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
support among the Palestinians and the Arabs at large. This has also enabled the government to retain its 
support among the traditionally pro-Arab and anti-Israeli domestic constituencies. At another level, this 
position or non-dilution of its support for the Palestinians has enabled India to pursue intense political and 
security relations with Israel. New Delhi’s consistent pro-Palestinian voting pattern in the UN was 
accompanied by India launching an Israeli satellite which has military-security implications. This non-parallel 
approach to bilateral relations could be useful in dealing with other countries, especially the US and Iran, with 
whom India has both problems and opportunities. 
Convergence 
There has been a quantum jump in the extent of bilateral economic relations 
•Israel has emerged as India’s major trading partner in the Middle East. The bilateral trade stands at 5.84 
billion (excluding defence) in 2018 with the balance of trade being in India’s favour by more than USD 1.8 
billion 
?Economic ties are dominated by the diamonds trade, namely import of raw diamonds and precious 
stones from Israel and their re-export as ?nished products  
•There are growing number of joint ventures in ?elds such as agriculture, irrigation, science and 
technology, and medicine 
•As part of the diversi?cation of the portfolio, there are growing Israeli interests and involvement in 
infrastructure projects in India 
•
Both countries are working for a Free Trade Agreement to provide impetus to economic relations 
Military-Security Arena 
The military-security establishment has played a signi?cant role in professionalising the ties. The need for 
modernisation, technology upgrading, intelligence gathering and border management are some of the core 
issues dominating the military-security aspects of bilateral relations. At the end of Cold War, India’s defence 
establishment faced a number of problems, primarily due to the sudden disappearance of the USSR. It was 
also a period when there was heightened cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan. Normalisation of 
relations helped meet some of these challenges 
•
Indo-Israeli security related cooperation include: counter-terrorism, border management, upgrading of 
Soviet inventories, surveillance, small arms and ammunition, missile defence and early warning systems 
•
Israel is 3rd largest arms supplier to India and Russia and USA as of 2018, accounting for 11 per cent of 
India’s imports from 2013 to 2017 
•
The 26 November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai were also aimed at Israeli Jewish targets and exposed 
the vulnerability of democratic countries to religious fanaticism and extremism 
•Israel is bene?tting not only from the Indian appetite for defence modernisation but also from its 
advancements in satellites  
?In 2008, India launched an Israeli satellite that could be useful in case of an Israeli military strike 
against Iranian nuclear installations  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
Page 4


India-Israel 
Introduction 
•
The establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1992 was one of India’s most 
signi?cant foreign policy responses to the end of the Cold War 
•
Earlier India followed the policy of recognition-without-normalisation vis-a-vis the Jewish state. 
Normalisation enabled India to signal a departure from its Cold War approach to international politics 
•
For the ?rst four decades of their independence, even as Israel was keen on establishing full diplomatic 
relations, India remained hesitant due to the dominance of political concerns in bilateral relations, which 
could be traced to the early 1920s when the Indian nationalists made a common cause with their Arab 
counterparts in ?ghting imperialism and colonialism.  
?The undercurrents of decolonization, nationalist struggle against the British, and political rivalry 
with the Muslim League resulted in the Indian nationalists adopting an explicitly pro-Arab position 
regarding the Palestinian question since the ?nal days of the First World War. Writing in his Harijan 
weekly in November 1938, Mahatma Gandhi observed: ‘Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same 
sense that England belongs to the English and France to the French 
Indian Stance on the Palestine Issue 
The socio-cultural accommodation of the Jewish people and political opposition to the demand for a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine remained the approach of the Indian nationalists towards the Palestinian question  
•
In 1947 India was elected to the 11 member UN Special Committee on Palestine where India disagreed 
with the majority that advocated partition of Palestine  
?India advocated federal Palestine as the solution to the crisis 
•When UNGA endorsed the partition plan in 1947, India joined Arab and Islamic countries and voted 
against the partition of Palestine 
•
Couple of years later it even opposed Israel’s admission into the UN 
•It was only in 1950 that India reconsidered it position and recognised Israel as a country 
Pre-Normalisation Phase 
•
In March 1952, PM Nehru promised normalisation of relations. But any immediate development was 
hampered by shortage of personnel and budgetary considerations 
•
Both Indian and foreign scholars hold Maulana Azad responsible for the absence of relations with Israel  
?Azad cited Pakistan’s potential diplomatic moves in the Arab world and sentiments of the Indian 
Muslim population as the reasons to defer normalisation  
•
The Suez crisis of 1956 formally ended the prospects of normalisation where Israel collaborated with 
former imperial powers (Britain and France) 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
•Periodic upsurges of violence in the region and competition with Pakistan resulted in India playing a 
leading role in a number of anti-Israeli resolutions in international forums such as UN and NAM 
?In 1975 India voted for the controversial resolution in UNGA that equated Zionism with racism 
?In 1982, India declared Consul General Yosuf Hassin persona non-grata over a controversial media 
interview, thus ending the limited Israeli diplomatic presence 
•PM Rajiv Gandhi did make some efforts towards normalisation but to little effect. Normalisation only 
became possible when the end of Cold War brought down the ideological barriers 
Phases 
Phase I (Till 1991) 
•Bilateral relations were based on a zero-sum approach whereby India perceived non-relations with 
Israel as the raison d’être for its pro-Arab Middle East policy  
•
India was in the forefront of many anti-Israel resolutions and moves in various international forums 
Phase II (1991-2004) 
Middle East Peace Conference began in Madrid in October 1991. Every major power, including India wanted 
to be involved in the ongoing peace process. Moreover, India could no longer hope to further its interests in 
the Middle East by harping on its non-relations with Israel and pro-Palestinian credentials . It established full 
diplomatic relations and resident missions in T el Aviv and New Delhi marked the second phase. 
India began viewing relations with Israel and the Palestinians as parallel and not exclusive processes. It also 
implied recognition of the fact that it was possible and necessary to maintain formal relations with both of 
the warring parties if India were to be relevant in the Middle East peace process 
Normalisation of relations did not led to any modi?cation of its erstwhile position on some of the core 
issues of the Israeli-Palestinian con?ict like realisation of the political rights of the Palestinians through 
statehood, Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied following in the June 1967 war and opposition to 
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.  
Since 1992, India has exhibited more balance when responding to frequent bouts of violence in Middle 
East. Departing from its erstwhile stand of squarely blaming Israel for all ills and violence in the region, it has 
been more understanding of Israel’s security concerns and accommodative of its interests. Despite 
widespread demands from the Arab and Islamic countries, in August 2001 India refused to endorse the 
resurrection of the ‘Zionism is racism’ debate during the Durban conference against racism. 
Phase III (2004 onwards) 
It coincided with the Congress Party returning to power in 2004. This was an antithesis of the ?rst phase and 
different from second phase. India pursued and strengthened the bilateral relations even when it has serious 
differences with Israel over issues such as the Jerusalem question, settlements, refugees, borders and 
Palestinian statehood. 
The delinking of the bilateral relations from the peace process has served a dual objective. Through its 
opposition to Israel over the peace process, India has managed to maintain its traditional goodwill and 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
support among the Palestinians and the Arabs at large. This has also enabled the government to retain its 
support among the traditionally pro-Arab and anti-Israeli domestic constituencies. At another level, this 
position or non-dilution of its support for the Palestinians has enabled India to pursue intense political and 
security relations with Israel. New Delhi’s consistent pro-Palestinian voting pattern in the UN was 
accompanied by India launching an Israeli satellite which has military-security implications. This non-parallel 
approach to bilateral relations could be useful in dealing with other countries, especially the US and Iran, with 
whom India has both problems and opportunities. 
Convergence 
There has been a quantum jump in the extent of bilateral economic relations 
•Israel has emerged as India’s major trading partner in the Middle East. The bilateral trade stands at 5.84 
billion (excluding defence) in 2018 with the balance of trade being in India’s favour by more than USD 1.8 
billion 
?Economic ties are dominated by the diamonds trade, namely import of raw diamonds and precious 
stones from Israel and their re-export as ?nished products  
•There are growing number of joint ventures in ?elds such as agriculture, irrigation, science and 
technology, and medicine 
•As part of the diversi?cation of the portfolio, there are growing Israeli interests and involvement in 
infrastructure projects in India 
•
Both countries are working for a Free Trade Agreement to provide impetus to economic relations 
Military-Security Arena 
The military-security establishment has played a signi?cant role in professionalising the ties. The need for 
modernisation, technology upgrading, intelligence gathering and border management are some of the core 
issues dominating the military-security aspects of bilateral relations. At the end of Cold War, India’s defence 
establishment faced a number of problems, primarily due to the sudden disappearance of the USSR. It was 
also a period when there was heightened cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan. Normalisation of 
relations helped meet some of these challenges 
•
Indo-Israeli security related cooperation include: counter-terrorism, border management, upgrading of 
Soviet inventories, surveillance, small arms and ammunition, missile defence and early warning systems 
•
Israel is 3rd largest arms supplier to India and Russia and USA as of 2018, accounting for 11 per cent of 
India’s imports from 2013 to 2017 
•
The 26 November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai were also aimed at Israeli Jewish targets and exposed 
the vulnerability of democratic countries to religious fanaticism and extremism 
•Israel is bene?tting not only from the Indian appetite for defence modernisation but also from its 
advancements in satellites  
?In 2008, India launched an Israeli satellite that could be useful in case of an Israeli military strike 
against Iranian nuclear installations  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
Across Sectors 
•Extended roles played by ministries and agencies other than the MEA:  
Another area, along with military-security arena, where one could notice growing professionalism is 
agriculture. Different parts of India need and bene?t from Israeli expertise in high-yielding crops, 
farming technology, drip irrigation and other water management techniques. 
Education is the third major area that has gained prominence in recent years.  
•Growing importance of state governments in the bilateral relations: Their preoccupation with 
economic issues and a social welfare agenda and their limited involvement in foreign policy issues has 
enabled many state governments to forge closer economic ties with Israel. In states like Kerala, which 
has a large expatriate presence in the Persian Gulf, the Arab-Israeli con?ict does play a role, especially 
during Lok Sabha and state assembly elections as parties compete for the support of the Muslim 
electorate. This however is not true for other states where the development agenda has forced various 
political parties to seek economic partnerships with Israel. The state governments are primarily 
concerned with immediate tangible issues such as agriculture, horticulture, irrigation, deserti?cation, 
water management, desalination, and infrastructure and seek to bene?t from Israeli experience and 
expertise 
External Factors 
There are at least ?ve external players who have some in?uence on the bilateral relations, namely, US, Egypt, 
Pakistan, Iran and China in that order  
US 
US has been the principle proponent and promoter of bilateral relations. Between 1950 and 1992 there were 
a number of American efforts aimed at rectifying the anomalous situation of recognition-without-relations. 
NSA Brajesh Mishra observed that India, Israel, and the US have some fundamental similarities. They all are 
democracies, sharing a common vision of pluralism, tolerance and equal opportunity. Thus stronger India-Us 
relations and India-Israel relations have a natural logic. Indeed, Israel is one of the very few issues in Middle 
East where post-Cold War American policy has been bene?cial to India, whereas its policies over Iraq and 
Iran have only complicated India’s ability to pursue friendlier ties with the latter two countries  
Iran 
The upward turn in Indo-Iranian relations coincided with a similar trajectory in Indo-Israeli relations. T ehran 
was also looking for friends to end its isolation and was reaching out various countries, including India. Iran, 
although vocal in expressing its disapproval at ?rst, has never raised the issue of Indo-Israel ties while dealing 
with New Delhi. However, the dif?culties facing Indo-Iranian relations are not linked to Israel but are due to 
greater in?uence and interference from the US 
Pakistan  
Pakistan has been the most dominant external factor in shaping India’s Israel policy but its origins can be 
traced to the Khilafat struggle of the 1920s. It began as a tussle between the Congress Party and the Muslim 
League for the support of the Indian Muslims. Indeed, some of the prominent pronouncements of the 
Congress leaders regarding the Palestine issue could be traced to this competition with the League. After 
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Page 5


India-Israel 
Introduction 
•
The establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1992 was one of India’s most 
signi?cant foreign policy responses to the end of the Cold War 
•
Earlier India followed the policy of recognition-without-normalisation vis-a-vis the Jewish state. 
Normalisation enabled India to signal a departure from its Cold War approach to international politics 
•
For the ?rst four decades of their independence, even as Israel was keen on establishing full diplomatic 
relations, India remained hesitant due to the dominance of political concerns in bilateral relations, which 
could be traced to the early 1920s when the Indian nationalists made a common cause with their Arab 
counterparts in ?ghting imperialism and colonialism.  
?The undercurrents of decolonization, nationalist struggle against the British, and political rivalry 
with the Muslim League resulted in the Indian nationalists adopting an explicitly pro-Arab position 
regarding the Palestinian question since the ?nal days of the First World War. Writing in his Harijan 
weekly in November 1938, Mahatma Gandhi observed: ‘Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same 
sense that England belongs to the English and France to the French 
Indian Stance on the Palestine Issue 
The socio-cultural accommodation of the Jewish people and political opposition to the demand for a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine remained the approach of the Indian nationalists towards the Palestinian question  
•
In 1947 India was elected to the 11 member UN Special Committee on Palestine where India disagreed 
with the majority that advocated partition of Palestine  
?India advocated federal Palestine as the solution to the crisis 
•When UNGA endorsed the partition plan in 1947, India joined Arab and Islamic countries and voted 
against the partition of Palestine 
•
Couple of years later it even opposed Israel’s admission into the UN 
•It was only in 1950 that India reconsidered it position and recognised Israel as a country 
Pre-Normalisation Phase 
•
In March 1952, PM Nehru promised normalisation of relations. But any immediate development was 
hampered by shortage of personnel and budgetary considerations 
•
Both Indian and foreign scholars hold Maulana Azad responsible for the absence of relations with Israel  
?Azad cited Pakistan’s potential diplomatic moves in the Arab world and sentiments of the Indian 
Muslim population as the reasons to defer normalisation  
•
The Suez crisis of 1956 formally ended the prospects of normalisation where Israel collaborated with 
former imperial powers (Britain and France) 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
•Periodic upsurges of violence in the region and competition with Pakistan resulted in India playing a 
leading role in a number of anti-Israeli resolutions in international forums such as UN and NAM 
?In 1975 India voted for the controversial resolution in UNGA that equated Zionism with racism 
?In 1982, India declared Consul General Yosuf Hassin persona non-grata over a controversial media 
interview, thus ending the limited Israeli diplomatic presence 
•PM Rajiv Gandhi did make some efforts towards normalisation but to little effect. Normalisation only 
became possible when the end of Cold War brought down the ideological barriers 
Phases 
Phase I (Till 1991) 
•Bilateral relations were based on a zero-sum approach whereby India perceived non-relations with 
Israel as the raison d’être for its pro-Arab Middle East policy  
•
India was in the forefront of many anti-Israel resolutions and moves in various international forums 
Phase II (1991-2004) 
Middle East Peace Conference began in Madrid in October 1991. Every major power, including India wanted 
to be involved in the ongoing peace process. Moreover, India could no longer hope to further its interests in 
the Middle East by harping on its non-relations with Israel and pro-Palestinian credentials . It established full 
diplomatic relations and resident missions in T el Aviv and New Delhi marked the second phase. 
India began viewing relations with Israel and the Palestinians as parallel and not exclusive processes. It also 
implied recognition of the fact that it was possible and necessary to maintain formal relations with both of 
the warring parties if India were to be relevant in the Middle East peace process 
Normalisation of relations did not led to any modi?cation of its erstwhile position on some of the core 
issues of the Israeli-Palestinian con?ict like realisation of the political rights of the Palestinians through 
statehood, Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied following in the June 1967 war and opposition to 
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.  
Since 1992, India has exhibited more balance when responding to frequent bouts of violence in Middle 
East. Departing from its erstwhile stand of squarely blaming Israel for all ills and violence in the region, it has 
been more understanding of Israel’s security concerns and accommodative of its interests. Despite 
widespread demands from the Arab and Islamic countries, in August 2001 India refused to endorse the 
resurrection of the ‘Zionism is racism’ debate during the Durban conference against racism. 
Phase III (2004 onwards) 
It coincided with the Congress Party returning to power in 2004. This was an antithesis of the ?rst phase and 
different from second phase. India pursued and strengthened the bilateral relations even when it has serious 
differences with Israel over issues such as the Jerusalem question, settlements, refugees, borders and 
Palestinian statehood. 
The delinking of the bilateral relations from the peace process has served a dual objective. Through its 
opposition to Israel over the peace process, India has managed to maintain its traditional goodwill and 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
support among the Palestinians and the Arabs at large. This has also enabled the government to retain its 
support among the traditionally pro-Arab and anti-Israeli domestic constituencies. At another level, this 
position or non-dilution of its support for the Palestinians has enabled India to pursue intense political and 
security relations with Israel. New Delhi’s consistent pro-Palestinian voting pattern in the UN was 
accompanied by India launching an Israeli satellite which has military-security implications. This non-parallel 
approach to bilateral relations could be useful in dealing with other countries, especially the US and Iran, with 
whom India has both problems and opportunities. 
Convergence 
There has been a quantum jump in the extent of bilateral economic relations 
•Israel has emerged as India’s major trading partner in the Middle East. The bilateral trade stands at 5.84 
billion (excluding defence) in 2018 with the balance of trade being in India’s favour by more than USD 1.8 
billion 
?Economic ties are dominated by the diamonds trade, namely import of raw diamonds and precious 
stones from Israel and their re-export as ?nished products  
•There are growing number of joint ventures in ?elds such as agriculture, irrigation, science and 
technology, and medicine 
•As part of the diversi?cation of the portfolio, there are growing Israeli interests and involvement in 
infrastructure projects in India 
•
Both countries are working for a Free Trade Agreement to provide impetus to economic relations 
Military-Security Arena 
The military-security establishment has played a signi?cant role in professionalising the ties. The need for 
modernisation, technology upgrading, intelligence gathering and border management are some of the core 
issues dominating the military-security aspects of bilateral relations. At the end of Cold War, India’s defence 
establishment faced a number of problems, primarily due to the sudden disappearance of the USSR. It was 
also a period when there was heightened cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan. Normalisation of 
relations helped meet some of these challenges 
•
Indo-Israeli security related cooperation include: counter-terrorism, border management, upgrading of 
Soviet inventories, surveillance, small arms and ammunition, missile defence and early warning systems 
•
Israel is 3rd largest arms supplier to India and Russia and USA as of 2018, accounting for 11 per cent of 
India’s imports from 2013 to 2017 
•
The 26 November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai were also aimed at Israeli Jewish targets and exposed 
the vulnerability of democratic countries to religious fanaticism and extremism 
•Israel is bene?tting not only from the Indian appetite for defence modernisation but also from its 
advancements in satellites  
?In 2008, India launched an Israeli satellite that could be useful in case of an Israeli military strike 
against Iranian nuclear installations  
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Across Sectors 
•Extended roles played by ministries and agencies other than the MEA:  
Another area, along with military-security arena, where one could notice growing professionalism is 
agriculture. Different parts of India need and bene?t from Israeli expertise in high-yielding crops, 
farming technology, drip irrigation and other water management techniques. 
Education is the third major area that has gained prominence in recent years.  
•Growing importance of state governments in the bilateral relations: Their preoccupation with 
economic issues and a social welfare agenda and their limited involvement in foreign policy issues has 
enabled many state governments to forge closer economic ties with Israel. In states like Kerala, which 
has a large expatriate presence in the Persian Gulf, the Arab-Israeli con?ict does play a role, especially 
during Lok Sabha and state assembly elections as parties compete for the support of the Muslim 
electorate. This however is not true for other states where the development agenda has forced various 
political parties to seek economic partnerships with Israel. The state governments are primarily 
concerned with immediate tangible issues such as agriculture, horticulture, irrigation, deserti?cation, 
water management, desalination, and infrastructure and seek to bene?t from Israeli experience and 
expertise 
External Factors 
There are at least ?ve external players who have some in?uence on the bilateral relations, namely, US, Egypt, 
Pakistan, Iran and China in that order  
US 
US has been the principle proponent and promoter of bilateral relations. Between 1950 and 1992 there were 
a number of American efforts aimed at rectifying the anomalous situation of recognition-without-relations. 
NSA Brajesh Mishra observed that India, Israel, and the US have some fundamental similarities. They all are 
democracies, sharing a common vision of pluralism, tolerance and equal opportunity. Thus stronger India-Us 
relations and India-Israel relations have a natural logic. Indeed, Israel is one of the very few issues in Middle 
East where post-Cold War American policy has been bene?cial to India, whereas its policies over Iraq and 
Iran have only complicated India’s ability to pursue friendlier ties with the latter two countries  
Iran 
The upward turn in Indo-Iranian relations coincided with a similar trajectory in Indo-Israeli relations. T ehran 
was also looking for friends to end its isolation and was reaching out various countries, including India. Iran, 
although vocal in expressing its disapproval at ?rst, has never raised the issue of Indo-Israel ties while dealing 
with New Delhi. However, the dif?culties facing Indo-Iranian relations are not linked to Israel but are due to 
greater in?uence and interference from the US 
Pakistan  
Pakistan has been the most dominant external factor in shaping India’s Israel policy but its origins can be 
traced to the Khilafat struggle of the 1920s. It began as a tussle between the Congress Party and the Muslim 
League for the support of the Indian Muslims. Indeed, some of the prominent pronouncements of the 
Congress leaders regarding the Palestine issue could be traced to this competition with the League. After 
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Partition, this competition transformed into the Indo-Pakistan rivalry that played out prominently in the 
Middle East. Prolonged Indian competition with Pakistan for Arab support has resulted in New Delhi 
adopting a pronouncedly anti-Israeli posture. Limited international leverage, especially after its con?ict with 
China in 1962, and dependence upon foreign economic support led to India seeking to befriend the Arabs 
through the region for energy supplies. The timing of India’s decision to normalise relations with Israel also 
coincided with the diminishing in?uence of the Palestinian factor in inter-Arab relations.  
T o sum up 
Without abandoning its core positions concerning contentious issues such as Palestine statehood, refugees 
or borders, India has managed to forge a strong and nuanced relationship with Israel. The long-term stability, 
sustainability and progress of this relationship depend upon the ability of both countries to ?nd common 
ground for cooperation while agreeing to disagree on the disagreeable.
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