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Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.
The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called anti-takeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares' value.
But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing "hard to get" may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, anti-takeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive  in the press.
Q. Which of the following, if true, would most seriously weaken the author's conclusion about the benefits of management resistance to takeovers?
  • a)
    A third category of mergers, comprising firms that underwent several unsuccessful bids before being acquired, shows a rate of return to shareholders somewhere between the rates for the other two categories.
  • b)
    When acquisitions are studied over a two-year period, companies that resisted takeover attempts show  the same return to shareholders as companies that did not resist.
  • c)
    The 56 per cent return to shareholders earned when companies are acquired after an unsuccessful takeover bid, is an average that includes companies whose stock declined in value as well as companies whose stock gained in value.
  • d)
    Of the companies whose managements resisted acquisition attempts, about fifty per cent experienced an increase in stock prices and fifty per cent suffered a decrease in stock prices.
  • e)
    Companies that unsuccessfully resisted turnover suffer setbacks later due to the reduced sale ability of their stock.
Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?
Most Upvoted Answer
Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its c...


Explanation:


Key Points:
- The author argues that management resistance to takeovers can be beneficial for shareholders, as it can lead to higher returns when the company is eventually acquired.
- The author points out that studies have shown an average return of 56% for shareholders when companies are acquired after an unsuccessful takeover bid.
- The author also mentions that playing "hard to get" may result in the initial suitor increasing the bid or other competing bids being submitted, ultimately benefiting shareholders.
- The author cautions that excessive resistance solely to eliminate a specific bidder can harm shareholders.


Analysis:
- Option B states that when acquisitions are studied over a two-year period, companies that resisted takeover attempts show the same return to shareholders as companies that did not resist. This statement directly contradicts the author's argument that management resistance can lead to higher returns for shareholders.
- If it is true that companies that resisted takeovers show the same return as those that did not resist, it weakens the author's conclusion that resistance can be beneficial for shareholders.
- This information challenges the idea that management resistance is always beneficial and raises doubts about the overall effectiveness of anti-takeover tactics in maximizing shareholder value.
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Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called anti-takeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares value.But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing "hard to get" may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, anti-takeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.Q.According to the passage, under which of the following conditions do firms, on the average, yield the greatest return to their shareholders?

The second issue I want to address is one that comes up frequently - that Indian banks should aim to become global Most people who put forward this view have not thought through the costs and benefits analytically; they only see this as an aspiration consistent with Indias growing international profile. In its 1998 report, the Narasimham (II) Committee envisaged a three tier structure for the Indian banking sector: 3 or 4 large banks having an international presence on the top, 8-10 mid-sized banks, with a network of branches throughout the country and engaged in universal banking, in the middle, and local banks and regional rural banks operating in smaller regions forming the bottom layer. However, the Indian banking system has not consolidated in the manner envisioned by the Narasimham Committee. The current structure is that India has 81 scheduled commercial banks of which 26 are public sector banks. 21 are private sector banks and 34 are foreign banks. Even a quick review would reveal that there is no segmentation in the banking structure along the lines of Narasimham II.A natural sequel to this issue of the envisaged structure of the Indian banking system is the Reserve Banks position on bank consolidation. Our view on bank consolidation is that the process should be market-driven, based on profitability considerations and brought about through a process of mergers & amalgamations (M&As). The initiative for this has to come from the boards of the banks concerned which have to make a decision based on a judgment of the synergies involved in the business models and the compatibility of the business cultures. The Reserve Banks role in the reorganisation of the banking system will normally be only that of a facilitator.It should-be noted though that bank consolidation through mergers is not always a totally benign option. On the positive side are a higher exposure threshold, international acceptance and recognition, improved risk management and improvement in financials due to economies of scale and scope. This can be achieved both through organic and inorganic growth. On the negative side, experience shows that consolidation would rail if there are no synergies in the business models and there is no compatibility in the business cultures and technology platforms of the merging banks.Having given that broad brush position on bank consolidation, let me address two specific questions: (i) can Indian banks aspire to global size?; and CO should Indian banks aspire to global size?On the first question, as per the current global league tables based on the size of assets, our largest bank, the State Bank of India (SBI), together with its subsidiaries, comes in at No.74 followed by ICICI Bank at No. 145 and Bank of Baroda at 188. It is, therefore, unlikely that any of our banks will jump into the top ten of the global league even after reasonable consolidation.Then comes the next question of whether Indian banks should become global. Opinion on this is divided. Those who argue that, we must go global contend that the issue is not so much the size of our banks in global rankings but of Indian banks having a strong enough global presence. The main argument is that the increasing global size and influence of Indian corporates warrant a corresponding increase in the global footprint of Indian banks. The opposing view is that Indian banks should look inwards rather than outwards, focus their efforts on financial deepening at home rather than aspiring to global size.It is possible to fake a middle path and argue that looking outwards towards increased global presence and looking inwards towards deeper financial penetration are not mutually exclusive; it should be possible to aim for both. With the onset of the global financial crisis, there has definitely been « pause to the rapid expansion overseas of our banks. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the risks involved, it will be opportune for some of our larger banks to be looking out for opportunities for consolidation both organically and inorganically. They should look out more actively in regions which hold out a promise of attractive acquisitions.The surmise, therefore, is that Indian banks should increase their global footprint opportunistically even if they do not get to the top of the league table.Q. Identify thewrongstatement from the following

Directions: Read the following passage and answer the given question:Corporate governance suffers in companies where the allegiance of independent directors is to the officers of the company rather than to its shareholders. To make the shareholder-board relationship more effective, we need better shareholder surveillance. Shareholders must actively step up as owners, and engage directors on corporate issues. Independent directors in general, and chairmen of all companies in particular, must participate more actively in annual general meetings by owning up to their board decisions and answering shareholder queries.The abuse of corporate power results from incentives within firms that encourage a culture of corruption. For example, former employees within a now-demised corporation described a 'yes man' culture in which only those employees who did everything to please their bosses prospered. 'Corporate culture is what determines how people behave when they are not being watched,' remarked a former managing partner of a consultancy firm. Unethical companies have typified corporate cultures that voiced their commitment to one value system while their processes and incentives reflected an entirely different value system in practice. The responsibility to change this lies with the top management.Clearly, good governance requires a mindset within the corporation which integrates the corporate code of ethics into the day-to-day activities of its managers and workers. As the sociologists opine, companies must move from the 'reactive and compliance mode' of corporate ethics to the 'integrity mode', where the functions of the entire organisation are completely aligned with its value system. To achieve this, we must address the system of incentives that exists within corporations.Corporations must integrate their value systems into their recruitment programmes. They must mandate compliance with their values as a key requirement from each potential employee. They must ensure that every employee owns responsibility for accountability and ethics in every transaction. Corporations must also publicly recognise internal role models for ethical behaviour. They must reinforce exemplary ethical conduct among employees through reward and recognition programmes. Ethical standards and best practices must be applied fairly and uniformly across all levels of the organisation. Any non-compliance must be swiftly dealt with and publicised. Additionally, there should be strong whistle-blower mechanisms within the corporation for exposing unethical or illegal activities.The need of the hour is for all voices in a corporation to unanimously extol the values of decency, honesty and transparency. In other words, every employee has to appreciate that the future of the corporation is safe only if he/she does the right thing in every transaction. Corporates have to create systems, structures and incentives to promote transparency, since transparency brings accountability. In an ideal organisation every employee remembers and follows the adage, 'when in doubt, disclose'.None of this can happen unless corporate leaders believe in the values of the company, and walk the talk. Corporate leaders are powerful role models. Every employee watches them carefully and imitates them. For example, many corporations talk about cutting costs as a way to improve profitability. Such cost consciousness has to come from the top. If leaders want employees to spend carefully, they have to show the way.Why does the author suggest that shareholders step up as owners?

Directions: Read the following passage and answer the given question:Corporate governance suffers in companies where the allegiance of independent directors is to the officers of the company rather than to its shareholders. To make the shareholder-board relationship more effective, we need better shareholder surveillance. Shareholders must actively step up as owners, and engage directors on corporate issues. Independent directors in general, and chairmen of all companies in particular, must participate more actively in annual general meetings by owning up to their board decisions and answering shareholder queries.The abuse of corporate power results from incentives within firms that encourage a culture of corruption. For example, former employees within a now-demised corporation described a 'yes man' culture in which only those employees who did everything to please their bosses prospered. 'Corporate culture is what determines how people behave when they are not being watched,' remarked a former managing partner of a consultancy firm. Unethical companies have typified corporate cultures that voiced their commitment to one value system while their processes and incentives reflected an entirely different value system in practice. The responsibility to change this lies with the top management.Clearly, good governance requires a mindset within the corporation which integrates the corporate code of ethics into the day-to-day activities of its managers and workers. As the sociologists opine, companies must move from the 'reactive and compliance mode' of corporate ethics to the 'integrity mode', where the functions of the entire organisation are completely aligned with its value system. To achieve this, we must address the system of incentives that exists within corporations.Corporations must integrate their value systems into their recruitment programmes. They must mandate compliance with their values as a key requirement from each potential employee. They must ensure that every employee owns responsibility for accountability and ethics in every transaction. Corporations must also publicly recognise internal role models for ethical behaviour. They must reinforce exemplary ethical conduct among employees through reward and recognition programmes. Ethical standards and best practices must be applied fairly and uniformly across all levels of the organisation. Any non-compliance must be swiftly dealt with and publicised. Additionally, there should be strong whistle-blower mechanisms within the corporation for exposing unethical or illegal activities.The need of the hour is for all voices in a corporation to unanimously extol the values of decency, honesty and transparency. In other words, every employee has to appreciate that the future of the corporation is safe only if he/she does the right thing in every transaction. Corporates have to create systems, structures and incentives to promote transparency, since transparency brings accountability. In an ideal organisation every employee remembers and follows the adage, 'when in doubt, disclose'.None of this can happen unless corporate leaders believe in the values of the company, and walk the talk. Corporate leaders are powerful role models. Every employee watches them carefully and imitates them. For example, many corporations talk about cutting costs as a way to improve profitability. Such cost consciousness has to come from the top. If leaders want employees to spend carefully, they have to show the way.Which of the following is possibly the most appropriate title for the passage?

Directions: Read the following passage and answer the given question:Corporate governance suffers in companies where the allegiance of independent directors is to the officers of the company rather than to its shareholders. To make the shareholder-board relationship more effective, we need better shareholder surveillance. Shareholders must actively step up as owners, and engage directors on corporate issues. Independent directors in general, and chairmen of all companies in particular, must participate more actively in annual general meetings by owning up to their board decisions and answering shareholder queries.The abuse of corporate power results from incentives within firms that encourage a culture of corruption. For example, former employees within a now-demised corporation described a 'yes man' culture in which only those employees who did everything to please their bosses prospered. 'Corporate culture is what determines how people behave when they are not being watched,' remarked a former managing partner of a consultancy firm. Unethical companies have typified corporate cultures that voiced their commitment to one value system while their processes and incentives reflected an entirely different value system in practice. The responsibility to change this lies with the top management.Clearly, good governance requires a mindset within the corporation which integrates the corporate code of ethics into the day-to-day activities of its managers and workers. As the sociologists opine, companies must move from the 'reactive and compliance mode' of corporate ethics to the 'integrity mode', where the functions of the entire organisation are completely aligned with its value system. To achieve this, we must address the system of incentives that exists within corporations.Corporations must integrate their value systems into their recruitment programmes. They must mandate compliance with their values as a key requirement from each potential employee. They must ensure that every employee owns responsibility for accountability and ethics in every transaction. Corporations must also publicly recognise internal role models for ethical behaviour. They must reinforce exemplary ethical conduct among employees through reward and recognition programmes. Ethical standards and best practices must be applied fairly and uniformly across all levels of the organisation. Any non-compliance must be swiftly dealt with and publicised. Additionally, there should be strong whistle-blower mechanisms within the corporation for exposing unethical or illegal activities.The need of the hour is for all voices in a corporation to unanimously extol the values of decency, honesty and transparency. In other words, every employee has to appreciate that the future of the corporation is safe only if he/she does the right thing in every transaction. Corporates have to create systems, structures and incentives to promote transparency, since transparency brings accountability. In an ideal organisation every employee remembers and follows the adage, 'when in doubt, disclose'.None of this can happen unless corporate leaders believe in the values of the company, and walk the talk. Corporate leaders are powerful role models. Every employee watches them carefully and imitates them. For example, many corporations talk about cutting costs as a way to improve profitability. Such cost consciousness has to come from the top. If leaders want employees to spend carefully, they have to show the way.Which of the following can be said about the current state of corporate ethics?

Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called anti-takeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares value.But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing "hard to get" may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, anti-takeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.Q.Which of the following, if true, would most seriously weaken the authors conclusion about the benefits of management resistance to takeovers?a)A third category of mergers, comprising firms that underwent several unsuccessful bids before being acquired, shows a rate of return to shareholders somewhere between the rates for the other two categories.b)When acquisitions are studied over a two-year period, companies that resisted takeover attempts show the same return to shareholders as companies that did not resist.c)The 56 per cent return to shareholders earned when companies are acquired after an unsuccessful takeover bid, is an average that includes companies whose stock declined in value as well as companies whose stock gained in value.d)Of the companies whose managements resisted acquisition attempts, about fifty per cent experienced an increase in stock prices and fifty per cent suffered a decrease in stock prices.e)Companies thatunsuccessfullyresisted turnover suffer setbacks later due to the reduced sale ability of their stock.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?
Question Description
Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called anti-takeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares value.But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing "hard to get" may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, anti-takeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.Q.Which of the following, if true, would most seriously weaken the authors conclusion about the benefits of management resistance to takeovers?a)A third category of mergers, comprising firms that underwent several unsuccessful bids before being acquired, shows a rate of return to shareholders somewhere between the rates for the other two categories.b)When acquisitions are studied over a two-year period, companies that resisted takeover attempts show the same return to shareholders as companies that did not resist.c)The 56 per cent return to shareholders earned when companies are acquired after an unsuccessful takeover bid, is an average that includes companies whose stock declined in value as well as companies whose stock gained in value.d)Of the companies whose managements resisted acquisition attempts, about fifty per cent experienced an increase in stock prices and fifty per cent suffered a decrease in stock prices.e)Companies thatunsuccessfullyresisted turnover suffer setbacks later due to the reduced sale ability of their stock.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? for CAT 2024 is part of CAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CAT exam syllabus. Information about Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called anti-takeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares value.But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing "hard to get" may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, anti-takeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.Q.Which of the following, if true, would most seriously weaken the authors conclusion about the benefits of management resistance to takeovers?a)A third category of mergers, comprising firms that underwent several unsuccessful bids before being acquired, shows a rate of return to shareholders somewhere between the rates for the other two categories.b)When acquisitions are studied over a two-year period, companies that resisted takeover attempts show the same return to shareholders as companies that did not resist.c)The 56 per cent return to shareholders earned when companies are acquired after an unsuccessful takeover bid, is an average that includes companies whose stock declined in value as well as companies whose stock gained in value.d)Of the companies whose managements resisted acquisition attempts, about fifty per cent experienced an increase in stock prices and fifty per cent suffered a decrease in stock prices.e)Companies thatunsuccessfullyresisted turnover suffer setbacks later due to the reduced sale ability of their stock.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CAT 2024 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called anti-takeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares value.But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing "hard to get" may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, anti-takeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.Q.Which of the following, if true, would most seriously weaken the authors conclusion about the benefits of management resistance to takeovers?a)A third category of mergers, comprising firms that underwent several unsuccessful bids before being acquired, shows a rate of return to shareholders somewhere between the rates for the other two categories.b)When acquisitions are studied over a two-year period, companies that resisted takeover attempts show the same return to shareholders as companies that did not resist.c)The 56 per cent return to shareholders earned when companies are acquired after an unsuccessful takeover bid, is an average that includes companies whose stock declined in value as well as companies whose stock gained in value.d)Of the companies whose managements resisted acquisition attempts, about fifty per cent experienced an increase in stock prices and fifty per cent suffered a decrease in stock prices.e)Companies thatunsuccessfullyresisted turnover suffer setbacks later due to the reduced sale ability of their stock.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?.
Solutions for Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called anti-takeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares value.But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing "hard to get" may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, anti-takeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.Q.Which of the following, if true, would most seriously weaken the authors conclusion about the benefits of management resistance to takeovers?a)A third category of mergers, comprising firms that underwent several unsuccessful bids before being acquired, shows a rate of return to shareholders somewhere between the rates for the other two categories.b)When acquisitions are studied over a two-year period, companies that resisted takeover attempts show the same return to shareholders as companies that did not resist.c)The 56 per cent return to shareholders earned when companies are acquired after an unsuccessful takeover bid, is an average that includes companies whose stock declined in value as well as companies whose stock gained in value.d)Of the companies whose managements resisted acquisition attempts, about fifty per cent experienced an increase in stock prices and fifty per cent suffered a decrease in stock prices.e)Companies thatunsuccessfullyresisted turnover suffer setbacks later due to the reduced sale ability of their stock.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CAT Exam by signing up for free.
Here you can find the meaning of Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called anti-takeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares value.But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing "hard to get" may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, anti-takeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.Q.Which of the following, if true, would most seriously weaken the authors conclusion about the benefits of management resistance to takeovers?a)A third category of mergers, comprising firms that underwent several unsuccessful bids before being acquired, shows a rate of return to shareholders somewhere between the rates for the other two categories.b)When acquisitions are studied over a two-year period, companies that resisted takeover attempts show the same return to shareholders as companies that did not resist.c)The 56 per cent return to shareholders earned when companies are acquired after an unsuccessful takeover bid, is an average that includes companies whose stock declined in value as well as companies whose stock gained in value.d)Of the companies whose managements resisted acquisition attempts, about fifty per cent experienced an increase in stock prices and fifty per cent suffered a decrease in stock prices.e)Companies thatunsuccessfullyresisted turnover suffer setbacks later due to the reduced sale ability of their stock.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called anti-takeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares value.But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing "hard to get" may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, anti-takeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.Q.Which of the following, if true, would most seriously weaken the authors conclusion about the benefits of management resistance to takeovers?a)A third category of mergers, comprising firms that underwent several unsuccessful bids before being acquired, shows a rate of return to shareholders somewhere between the rates for the other two categories.b)When acquisitions are studied over a two-year period, companies that resisted takeover attempts show the same return to shareholders as companies that did not resist.c)The 56 per cent return to shareholders earned when companies are acquired after an unsuccessful takeover bid, is an average that includes companies whose stock declined in value as well as companies whose stock gained in value.d)Of the companies whose managements resisted acquisition attempts, about fifty per cent experienced an increase in stock prices and fifty per cent suffered a decrease in stock prices.e)Companies thatunsuccessfullyresisted turnover suffer setbacks later due to the reduced sale ability of their stock.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called anti-takeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares value.But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing "hard to get" may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, anti-takeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.Q.Which of the following, if true, would most seriously weaken the authors conclusion about the benefits of management resistance to takeovers?a)A third category of mergers, comprising firms that underwent several unsuccessful bids before being acquired, shows a rate of return to shareholders somewhere between the rates for the other two categories.b)When acquisitions are studied over a two-year period, companies that resisted takeover attempts show the same return to shareholders as companies that did not resist.c)The 56 per cent return to shareholders earned when companies are acquired after an unsuccessful takeover bid, is an average that includes companies whose stock declined in value as well as companies whose stock gained in value.d)Of the companies whose managements resisted acquisition attempts, about fifty per cent experienced an increase in stock prices and fifty per cent suffered a decrease in stock prices.e)Companies thatunsuccessfullyresisted turnover suffer setbacks later due to the reduced sale ability of their stock.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called anti-takeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares value.But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing "hard to get" may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, anti-takeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.Q.Which of the following, if true, would most seriously weaken the authors conclusion about the benefits of management resistance to takeovers?a)A third category of mergers, comprising firms that underwent several unsuccessful bids before being acquired, shows a rate of return to shareholders somewhere between the rates for the other two categories.b)When acquisitions are studied over a two-year period, companies that resisted takeover attempts show the same return to shareholders as companies that did not resist.c)The 56 per cent return to shareholders earned when companies are acquired after an unsuccessful takeover bid, is an average that includes companies whose stock declined in value as well as companies whose stock gained in value.d)Of the companies whose managements resisted acquisition attempts, about fifty per cent experienced an increase in stock prices and fifty per cent suffered a decrease in stock prices.e)Companies thatunsuccessfullyresisted turnover suffer setbacks later due to the reduced sale ability of their stock.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called anti-takeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares value.But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing "hard to get" may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, anti-takeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.Q.Which of the following, if true, would most seriously weaken the authors conclusion about the benefits of management resistance to takeovers?a)A third category of mergers, comprising firms that underwent several unsuccessful bids before being acquired, shows a rate of return to shareholders somewhere between the rates for the other two categories.b)When acquisitions are studied over a two-year period, companies that resisted takeover attempts show the same return to shareholders as companies that did not resist.c)The 56 per cent return to shareholders earned when companies are acquired after an unsuccessful takeover bid, is an average that includes companies whose stock declined in value as well as companies whose stock gained in value.d)Of the companies whose managements resisted acquisition attempts, about fifty per cent experienced an increase in stock prices and fifty per cent suffered a decrease in stock prices.e)Companies thatunsuccessfullyresisted turnover suffer setbacks later due to the reduced sale ability of their stock.Correct answer is option 'B'. 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