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Who has been elected as the new chairman of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC)?
  • a)
    Ajay Singh
  • b)
    Rajiv Kumar
  • c)
    Jishnu Baruah
  • d)
    Umesh Awasthi
  • e)
    None of the above
Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?
Most Upvoted Answer
Who has been elected as the new chairman of the Central Electricity R...
Appointment of the new Chairman of Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC)
The new chairman of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) is Rajiv Kumar. He has been elected to lead the regulatory body, which plays a crucial role in regulating the power sector in India.

Background of Rajiv Kumar
Rajiv Kumar brings with him a wealth of experience in the energy sector. He has previously served in various capacities in the power sector, including as a member of the Joint Electricity Regulatory Commission for the states of Manipur and Mizoram.

Significance of the appointment
- As the chairman of CERC, Rajiv Kumar will be responsible for overseeing the regulatory framework for the power sector in India.
- His leadership will be crucial in ensuring a fair and transparent environment for electricity generation, transmission, and distribution in the country.
- Rajiv Kumar's appointment comes at a critical time when the power sector is undergoing significant reforms to meet the growing energy needs of the country.

Conclusion
The appointment of Rajiv Kumar as the new chairman of CERC is a significant development in the power sector in India. His experience and expertise will be instrumental in shaping the regulatory framework for the sector and driving its growth in the coming years.
Community Answer
Who has been elected as the new chairman of the Central Electricity R...
Jishnu Barua has become the new chairman of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC). Baruah was the Chief Secretary of Assam from October 2020 to August 2022. Earlier, he was the Additional Chief Secretary of Assam looking after various departments of the state from August 2017 to October 2020. The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission has been established by the Government of India under the provisions of the Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, of 1998.
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Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.Amartya Sen wrote about the Indian tradition of scepticism and heterodoxy of opinion that led to high levels of intellectual argument. The power sector in India is a victim of this tradition at its worst. Instead of forcefully communicating, supporting and honestly and firmly implementing policies, people just debate them. It is argued that central undertakings produce power at lower tariffs and must therefore, build most of the required extra capacities. This is a delusion. They no longer have access to low-cost government funds.Uncertainty about payment remains a reason for the hesitation of private investment. They had to sell only to SEBs (State Electricity Boards). SEB balance sheets are cleaner after the "securitisation" of the Rs. 40,000 crore or so owed by SEBs to central government undertakings, now shown as debt instruments. But, state governments have not implemented agreed plans to ensure repayment when due. The current annual losses of around Rs. 28,000 crore make repayment highly uncertain. The central undertakings that are their main suppliers have payment security because the government will come to their help. Private enterprises do not have such assurance and are concerned about payment security, that must be resolved.By the late 1990s, improving the SEB finances was recognised as fundamental to power reform. Unbundling SEBs, working under corporate discipline and even privatisation and not vertically integrated state enterprises, are necessary for efficient and financially viable electricity enterprises. Since the government will not distance itself from managing them, privatising is an option. The Delhi model has worked. But, it receives no public support.The Electricity Act 2003, the APRDP (Accelerated Power Reform and Development Programm e) with its incentives and penalties, and the creation of independent regulatory commissions, were the means to bring about reforms to improve financial viability of power sector. Implementation has been half-hearted and results disappointing. The concurrent nature of electricity in the Constitution impedes power sector improvement. States are more responsive to populist pressures than the central government, and less inclined to take drastic action against electricity thieves.Captive power would add significantly to capacity. However, captive generation, three years after the Act enabled it, has added little to capacity because rules for open access were delayed. Redefined captive generation avoids state vetoes on purchase or sale of electricity except to state electricity enterprises. Mandating open access on state-owned wires to power regardless of ownership and customer would encourage electricity trading. The Act recognised electricity trading as a separate activity. A surcharge on transmission charges will pay for cross-subsidies. These were to be eliminated in time. Rules for open access and quantum of surcharge by each state commission (under broad principles defined by the central commission) have yet to be announced by some. The few who have announced the surcharge have kept it so high that no trading can take place.Q. The author thinks it is appropriate to

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.Amartya Sen wrote about the Indian tradition of scepticism and heterodoxy of opinion that led to high levels of intellectual argument. The power sector in India is a victim of this tradition at its worst. Instead of forcefully communicating, supporting and honestly and firmly implementing policies, people just debate them. It is argued that central undertakings produce power at lower tariffs and must therefore, build most of the required extra capacities. This is a delusion. They no longer have access to low-cost government funds.Uncertainty about payment remains a reason for the hesitation of private investment. They had to sell only to SEBs (State Electricity Boards). SEB balance sheets are cleaner after the "securitisation" of the Rs. 40,000 crore or so owed by SEBs to central government undertakings, now shown as debt instruments. But, state governments have not implemented agreed plans to ensure repayment when due. The current annual losses of around Rs. 28,000 crore make repayment highly uncertain. The central undertakings that are their main suppliers have payment security because the government will come to their help. Private enterprises do not have such assurance and are concerned about payment security, that must be resolved.By the late 1990s, improving the SEB finances was recognised as fundamental to power reform. Unbundling SEBs, working under corporate discipline and even privatisation and not vertically integrated state enterprises, are necessary for efficient and financially viable electricity enterprises. Since the government will not distance itself from managing them, privatising is an option. The Delhi model has worked. But, it receives no public support.The Electricity Act 2003, the APRDP (Accelerated Power Reform and Development Programm e) with its incentives and penalties, and the creation of independent regulatory commissions, were the means to bring about reforms to improve financial viability of power sector. Implementation has been half-hearted and results disappointing. The concurrent nature of electricity in the Constitution impedes power sector improvement. States are more responsive to populist pressures than the central government, and less inclined to take drastic action against electricity thieves.Captive power would add significantly to capacity. However, captive generation, three years after the Act enabled it, has added little to capacity because rules for open access were delayed. Redefined captive generation avoids state vetoes on purchase or sale of electricity except to state electricity enterprises. Mandating open access on state-owned wires to power regardless of ownership and customer would encourage electricity trading. The Act recognised electricity trading as a separate activity. A surcharge on transmission charges will pay for cross-subsidies. These were to be eliminated in time. Rules for open access and quantum of surcharge by each state commission (under broad principles defined by the central commission) have yet to be announced by some. The few who have announced the surcharge have kept it so high that no trading can take place.Q. What is mentioned about the role of the state governments in terms of private investment?

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.Amartya Sen wrote about the Indian tradition of scepticism and heterodoxy of opinion that led to high levels of intellectual argument. The power sector in India is a victim of this tradition at its worst. Instead of forcefully communicating, supporting and honestly and firmly implementing policies, people just debate them. It is argued that central undertakings produce power at lower tariffs and must therefore, build most of the required extra capacities. This is a delusion. They no longer have access to low-cost government funds.Uncertainty about payment remains a reason for the hesitation of private investment. They had to sell only to SEBs (State Electricity Boards). SEB balance sheets are cleaner after the "securitisation" of the Rs. 40,000 crore or so owed by SEBs to central government undertakings, now shown as debt instruments. But, state governments have not implemented agreed plans to ensure repayment when due. The current annual losses of around Rs. 28,000 crore make repayment highly uncertain. The central undertakings that are their main suppliers have payment security because the government will come to their help. Private enterprises do not have such assurance and are concerned about payment security, that must be resolved.By the late 1990s, improving the SEB finances was recognised as fundamental to power reform. Unbundling SEBs, working under corporate discipline and even privatisation and not vertically integrated state enterprises, are necessary for efficient and financially viable electricity enterprises. Since the government will not distance itself from managing them, privatising is an option. The Delhi model has worked. But, it receives no public support.The Electricity Act 2003, the APRDP (Accelerated Power Reform and Development Programm e) with its incentives and penalties, and the creation of independent regulatory commissions, were the means to bring about reforms to improve financial viability of power sector. Implementation has been half-hearted and results disappointing. The concurrent nature of electricity in the Constitution impedes power sector improvement. States are more responsive to populist pressures than the central government, and less inclined to take drastic action against electricity thieves.Captive power would add significantly to capacity. However, captive generation, three years after the Act enabled it, has added little to capacity because rules for open access were delayed. Redefined captive generation avoids state vetoes on purchase or sale of electricity except to state electricity enterprises. Mandating open access on state-owned wires to power regardless of ownership and customer would encourage electricity trading. The Act recognised electricity trading as a separate activity. A surcharge on transmission charges will pay for cross-subsidies. These were to be eliminated in time. Rules for open access and quantum of surcharge by each state commission (under broad principles defined by the central commission) have yet to be announced by some. The few who have announced the surcharge have kept it so high that no trading can take place.Q. Why are the central undertakings not capable of generating power at low cost?

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.Amartya Sen wrote about the Indian tradition of scepticism and heterodoxy of opinion that led to high levels of intellectual argument. The power sector in India is a victim of this tradition at its worst. Instead of forcefully communicating, supporting and honestly and firmly implementing policies, people just debate them. It is argued that central undertakings produce power at lower tariffs and must therefore, build most of the required extra capacities. This is a delusion. They no longer have access to low-cost government funds.Uncertainty about payment remains a reason for the hesitation of private investment. They had to sell only to SEBs (State Electricity Boards). SEB balance sheets are cleaner after the "securitisation" of the Rs. 40,000 crore or so owed by SEBs to central government undertakings, now shown as debt instruments. But, state governments have not implemented agreed plans to ensure repayment when due. The current annual losses of around Rs. 28,000 crore make repayment highly uncertain. The central undertakings that are their main suppliers have payment security because the government will come to their help. Private enterprises do not have such assurance and are concerned about payment security, that must be resolved.By the late 1990s, improving the SEB finances was recognised as fundamental to power reform. Unbundling SEBs, working under corporate discipline and even privatisation and not vertically integrated state enterprises, are necessary for efficient and financially viable electricity enterprises. Since the government will not distance itself from managing them, privatising is an option. The Delhi model has worked. But, it receives no public support.The Electricity Act 2003, the APRDP (Accelerated Power Reform and Development Programm e) with its incentives and penalties, and the creation of independent regulatory commissions, were the means to bring about reforms to improve financial viability of power sector. Implementation has been half-hearted and results disappointing. The concurrent nature of electricity in the Constitution impedes power sector improvement. States are more responsive to populist pressures than the central government, and less inclined to take drastic action against electricity thieves.Captive power would add significantly to capacity. However, captive generation, three years after the Act enabled it, has added little to capacity because rules for open access were delayed. Redefined captive generation avoids state vetoes on purchase or sale of electricity except to state electricity enterprises. Mandating open access on state-owned wires to power regardless of ownership and customer would encourage electricity trading. The Act recognised electricity trading as a separate activity. A surcharge on transmission charges will pay for cross-subsidies. These were to be eliminated in time. Rules for open access and quantum of surcharge by each state commission (under broad principles defined by the central commission) have yet to be announced by some. The few who have announced the surcharge have kept it so high that no trading can take place.Q. What serious drawback of the states is pointed out by the author of the passage?

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.Amartya Sen wrote about the Indian tradition of scepticism and heterodoxy of opinion that led to high levels of intellectual argument. The power sector in India is a victim of this tradition at its worst. Instead of forcefully communicating, supporting and honestly and firmly implementing policies, people just debate them. It is argued that central undertakings produce power at lower tariffs and must therefore, build most of the required extra capacities. This is a delusion. They no longer have access to low-cost government funds.Uncertainty about payment remains a reason for the hesitation of private investment. They had to sell only to SEBs (State Electricity Boards). SEB balance sheets are cleaner after the "securitisation" of the Rs. 40,000 crore or so owed by SEBs to central government undertakings, now shown as debt instruments. But, state governments have not implemented agreed plans to ensure repayment when due. The current annual losses of around Rs. 28,000 crore make repayment highly uncertain. The central undertakings that are their main suppliers have payment security because the government will come to their help. Private enterprises do not have such assurance and are concerned about payment security, that must be resolved.By the late 1990s, improving the SEB finances was recognised as fundamental to power reform. Unbundling SEBs, working under corporate discipline and even privatisation and not vertically integrated state enterprises, are necessary for efficient and financially viable electricity enterprises. Since the government will not distance itself from managing them, privatising is an option. The Delhi model has worked. But, it receives no public support.The Electricity Act 2003, the APRDP (Accelerated Power Reform and Development Programm e) with its incentives and penalties, and the creation of independent regulatory commissions, were the means to bring about reforms to improve financial viability of power sector. Implementation has been half-hearted and results disappointing. The concurrent nature of electricity in the Constitution impedes power sector improvement. States are more responsive to populist pressures than the central government, and less inclined to take drastic action against electricity thieves.Captive power would add significantly to capacity. However, captive generation, three years after the Act enabled it, has added little to capacity because rules for open access were delayed. Redefined captive generation avoids state vetoes on purchase or sale of electricity except to state electricity enterprises. Mandating open access on state-owned wires to power regardless of ownership and customer would encourage electricity trading. The Act recognised electricity trading as a separate activity. A surcharge on transmission charges will pay for cross-subsidies. These were to be eliminated in time. Rules for open access and quantum of surcharge by each state commission (under broad principles defined by the central commission) have yet to be announced by some. The few who have announced the surcharge have kept it so high that no trading can take place.Q. Which of the following is the reason for apathy of private investors in the power sector?

Who has been elected as the new chairman of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC)?a)Ajay Singhb)Rajiv Kumarc)Jishnu Baruahd)Umesh Awasthie)None of the aboveCorrect answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?
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Who has been elected as the new chairman of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC)?a)Ajay Singhb)Rajiv Kumarc)Jishnu Baruahd)Umesh Awasthie)None of the aboveCorrect answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? for Banking Exams 2025 is part of Banking Exams preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the Banking Exams exam syllabus. Information about Who has been elected as the new chairman of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC)?a)Ajay Singhb)Rajiv Kumarc)Jishnu Baruahd)Umesh Awasthie)None of the aboveCorrect answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for Banking Exams 2025 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for Who has been elected as the new chairman of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC)?a)Ajay Singhb)Rajiv Kumarc)Jishnu Baruahd)Umesh Awasthie)None of the aboveCorrect answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?.
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