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Directions :Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is aperceptiblechange in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the mostformidablechallenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of itsinnovative‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire forreconciliationwith Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pakrapprochementcould have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one.The third major driver is the mainstreamingof radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.Q. What is the synonym of the word “innovative”?a)Castigationb)Unconventionalc)Chicaneryd)Cogente)None of the aboveCorrect answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? for Bank Exams 2024 is part of Bank Exams preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the Bank Exams exam syllabus. Information about Directions :Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is aperceptiblechange in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the mostformidablechallenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of itsinnovative‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire forreconciliationwith Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pakrapprochementcould have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one.The third major driver is the mainstreamingof radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.Q. What is the synonym of the word “innovative”?a)Castigationb)Unconventionalc)Chicaneryd)Cogente)None of the aboveCorrect answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for Bank Exams 2024 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for Directions :Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is aperceptiblechange in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the mostformidablechallenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of itsinnovative‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire forreconciliationwith Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pakrapprochementcould have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one.The third major driver is the mainstreamingof radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.Q. What is the synonym of the word “innovative”?a)Castigationb)Unconventionalc)Chicaneryd)Cogente)None of the aboveCorrect answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?.

Solutions for Directions :Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is aperceptiblechange in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the mostformidablechallenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of itsinnovative‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire forreconciliationwith Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pakrapprochementcould have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one.The third major driver is the mainstreamingof radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.Q. What is the synonym of the word “innovative”?a)Castigationb)Unconventionalc)Chicaneryd)Cogente)None of the aboveCorrect answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for Bank Exams. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for Bank Exams Exam by signing up for free.

Here you can find the meaning of Directions :Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is aperceptiblechange in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the mostformidablechallenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of itsinnovative‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire forreconciliationwith Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pakrapprochementcould have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one.The third major driver is the mainstreamingof radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.Q. What is the synonym of the word “innovative”?a)Castigationb)Unconventionalc)Chicaneryd)Cogente)None of the aboveCorrect answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of Directions :Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is aperceptiblechange in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the mostformidablechallenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of itsinnovative‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire forreconciliationwith Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pakrapprochementcould have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one.The third major driver is the mainstreamingof radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.Q. What is the synonym of the word “innovative”?a)Castigationb)Unconventionalc)Chicaneryd)Cogente)None of the aboveCorrect answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for Directions :Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is aperceptiblechange in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the mostformidablechallenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of itsinnovative‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire forreconciliationwith Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pakrapprochementcould have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one.The third major driver is the mainstreamingof radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.Q. What is the synonym of the word “innovative”?a)Castigationb)Unconventionalc)Chicaneryd)Cogente)None of the aboveCorrect answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of Directions :Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is aperceptiblechange in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the mostformidablechallenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of itsinnovative‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire forreconciliationwith Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pakrapprochementcould have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one.The third major driver is the mainstreamingof radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.Q. What is the synonym of the word “innovative”?a)Castigationb)Unconventionalc)Chicaneryd)Cogente)None of the aboveCorrect answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice Directions :Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is aperceptiblechange in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the mostformidablechallenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. On the one hand, China is enhancing its influence in the region with the unveiling of itsinnovative‘New Silk Road’ strategy and by offering economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan, while on the other Beijing is also increasingly engaged in regional “conflict management” initiatives by mediating between Kabul and the Taliban, and organising trilateral strategic engagements with Afghanistan and Pakistan. In November 2014, for instance, representatives of the Taliban from its Doha-based office met in Beijing for talks. In February this year, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Liu Jianchao, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry, and the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Hekmat Karzai, met in Kabul for the inaugural round of a new trilateral strategic dialogue. New Delhi has been disappointingly quiet in the face of these strategically significant developments, unable and unwilling to contribute towards stabilising the region.The second significant component is the newfound warmth between Kabul and Islamabad. Abandoning the trend of public spats, they are now on a path of cooperation and friendship, or so it seems. Immediately after assuming office, Mr. Ghani signalled a desire forreconciliationwith Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In his September 2014 “five-circle” foreign policy speech, not only did he place Pakistan in the first circle of countries that are most important to Afghanistan (with India in the fourth circle), but also took the unprecedented step of visiting the Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, a gesture signifying the deep policy changes under way in Kabul. Pakistan has also been making efforts to strengthen its relationship with Afghanistan; its Army and the intelligence chiefs have already visited Kabul to discuss joint counter-terrorism measures and to enhance the fight against terror. More importantly, given Chinese concerns about terrorism and its increasing influence on its borderlands, the Af-Pak rapprochement will most likely be superintended by China. While this in itself need not concern New Delhi, Islamabad is deeply suspicious of any cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Therefore, the worry in New Delhi that the Af-Pakrapprochementcould have zero-sum implications for India is indeed a legitimate one.The third major driver is the mainstreamingof radical Islamist terrorism in the form of the rise of the IS and the resurgence of the Taliban. While the West Asian region is currently the hotbed of Islamist terrorism, the Southern Asian region would not only be a potential target of such forces but also a fertile breeding ground. There are already reports of growing support for the IS in the region and its focus there. The IS has reportedly made some inroads into Pakistan and some Pakistan-based terror outfits have offered their allegiance to the organisation. While there may not be any ideological unity among them, the IS has the dangerous potential of providing a “wave of the future call” to the disparate terror outfits in the region. The IS has also been making recruitments from India; the speech by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in July last year specifically referred to the “atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir”. For India in particular, the potential resurgence of the Taliban and the rise of the IS have dangerous implications. The belief, in this context, that by merely strengthening its borders, India would be able to survive the scourge of terrorism is a mistaken one.Q. What is the synonym of the word “innovative”?a)Castigationb)Unconventionalc)Chicaneryd)Cogente)None of the aboveCorrect answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice Bank Exams tests.