Hindu Law - 1 | Civil Law for Judiciary Exams PDF Download

Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2004)

• This case is significant in Hindu Law as it discusses the concept of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
• It was decided by a three-judge bench: Justice BN Agrawal, Justice AK Mathur, and Justice Dalveer Bhandari.

Facts

• Naveen Kohli and Neelu Kohli got married on November 20, 1975, and have three sons.
• Naveen built three factories and a bungalow for the family.
• Naveen claimed Neelu was bad-tempered, often quarreled with him and his parents, and had transferred business assets to herself.
• He accused her of infidelity and claimed she filed false police reports against him.
• Neelu also filed complaints against Naveen, alleging he was immoral and had affairs.
• Naveen's petition for divorce was based on cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA).

Findings of the Courts

• The Trial Court found Neelu's actions constituted harassment and noted the couple could not live together, leading to the decision to dissolve the marriage.
• The High Court later overturned this decision, allowing the appeal from Neelu.

Issues 

• What constitutes cruelty under HMA?
• Can the marriage be dissolved due to irretrievable breakdown?

Observations

• Cruelty can be physical or mental and is challenging to prove, especially mental cruelty.
• The Court referred to a previous ruling (NG Dastane v. S Dastane) stating that cruelty must cause a reasonable fear of harm.
• The Court acknowledged that a marriage could break down irreparably, but this is not explicitly a ground for divorce under current HMA.
• Long-term separation can imply a broken marriage, and it is essential to consider the emotional aspects of such a situation.
• The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with the High Court's decision and granted the divorce.

Conclusion

• This case established the importance of recognizing irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a valid reason for divorce.
• The Court emphasized that laws focused solely on fault are insufficient for dealing with broken marriages.

Ganduri Koteshwaramma and another v. Chakiri Yanadi and another AIR 2012 SC 169

The core issue before the Court was whether a preliminary decree for partition and possession of suit properties, passed prior to the enforcement of the amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as revised by the Amendment Act, 2005), could be altered before the final decree, especially when daughters were parties to the suit. This raised significant questions regarding the coparcenary rights of daughters under the amended law.

Facts of the Case

• The case involved siblings (appellants and respondents), daughters, and sons of Chakiri Venkata Swamy.
  The first respondent (plaintiff) filed a suit for partition in the Senior Civil Judge’s Court at Ongole, including his father Chakiri Venkata Swamy (1st defendant), his brother Chakiri Anji Babu (2nd defendant), and his two sisters (the appellants, 3rd and 4th defendants).
• The plaintiff claimed:
  • 1/3rd share in the coparcenary properties listed under schedules ‘A’, ‘C’, and ‘D’.
  • 1/5th share in property ‘B’, belonging to his mother.
• On March 19, 1999, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to:
  • 1/3rd of schedules ‘A’, ‘C’, and ‘D’.
  • 1/4th of the 1/3rd share left by the deceased 1st defendant.
  • 1/5th share in property ‘B’.
• The preliminary decree was amended on 27th September 2003, and proceedings for the final decree were initiated. Before the final decree could be passed, the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 came into force, significantly impacting the daughters' (appellants') rights.
• The appellants sought a reallocation of shares under the amended Act, demanding 1/4th share each in the coparcenary properties (schedules ‘A’, ‘C’, and ‘D’). The trial court allowed the application, but the High Court later overturned this decision.

Issue Involved

• Whether the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, granting daughters coparcenary rights, applied to the appellants despite the prior preliminary decree?

Observations

• The Court allowed the appeal, confirming that the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, granted equal rights to daughters in coparcenary property, making them coparceners by birth, similar to sons, with the same rights and liabilities.
• The Act applied to all daughters, except where partition had been finalized before 20th December 2004.
• In this case, the preliminary decree passed in 1999 and amended in 2003 did not amount to a final partition by metes and bounds. As the final decree had not been passed, the appellants were entitled to the benefits of the amended Act.
• The High Court erred in interpreting Order XX Rule 18 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), incorrectly concluding that the preliminary decree was immutable. The Court clarified that a preliminary decree could be amended or modified in light of changed circumstances, including legislative amendments.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s decision and restored the trial court’s order, granting the appellants 1/4th share each in the coparcenary properties under schedules ‘A’, ‘C’, and ‘D’.
• The Court underscored that in a partition suit, the rights of all parties must be conclusively settled, with the 2005 Amendment Act applied to achieve social justice for women, as envisioned by the legislature.

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo v. Charulata Sahu 2023 INSC 319

In this case, the Supreme Court invalidated the settlement deed because it was not signed by all the parties involved.

Facts

• Mr. Prasanta Kumar Sahoo had three children: Ms. Charulata (daughter), Ms. Santilal (daughter), and Mr. Prafulla (son).
• Ms. Charulatafiled a suit for the partition of her father’s ancestral property before the Trial Court.
• The Trial Courtordered:
  • 1/6th share of the ancestral property and 1/3rd share of the self-acquired property of Mr. Sahoo, along with mesne profits, in favor of both daughters.
  • 4/6th share of the ancestral property and 1/3rd share of the self-acquired property of Mr. Sahoo, along with mesne profits, in favor of the son.
• The son (petitioner) appealed to the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court, asserting that all of Mr. Sahoo's property was ancestral.
• During the appeal, the plaintiff and Ms. Santilal reached a settlement, where Ms. Santilal relinquished her entire share in the joint property in favor of the plaintiff in exchange for ₹50,000.
• The settlement deed was not signed by the defendant (Ms. Charulata).
• The defendant filed a parallel appeal, questioning the validity of the settlement deed.
• The plaintiff filed a compromise petition, and the High Court validated the settlement deed.
• The plaintiff then filed a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court, raising the same issue: that all of Mr. Sahoo’s properties were ancestral.
• The High Court dismissed the appeal, invalidating the settlement deed.
• Aggrieved, the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues Involved

• Whether the substituted Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies to cases where the male coparcener had already passed away prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act of 2005.
• Whether all parties in a joint property must sign a deed, even if only two parties are involved in the transfer or settlement of rights.

Observations

• The Supreme Court referred to the case of Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma and Ors (2020), where it was held that if an amendment to the law occurs during the pendency of an appeal or between the passing of the preliminary decree and the final decree, the amended provisions can be considered when making the final decree.
• The Supreme Court observed that under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, any compromise or settlement must be in writing and signed by all the parties.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court varied the final decree based on the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act.
• The Court emphasized that under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, a settlement deed that is not signed by all co-owners in a joint property is invalid.

Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan 2023 INSC 468

• The Supreme Court exercised its discretionary power to dissolve marriages deemed "dead" due to prolonged statutory requirements.
• The case highlights the application of Article 142 of the Constitution of India (COI) for granting justice.

Facts

• Both parties sought divorce under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1995 (HMA).
• The couple had been living separately for over six years and pursued various legal avenues for divorce.
• Initial cases were filed under the Domestic Violence Act and Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
• The trial court failed to address marital grievances, leading the couple to approach the High Court, which also failed to resolve the matter.
• Ultimately, the case was taken to the Supreme Court.

Issue Involved

• Can the Supreme Court deviate from statutory law using Article 142 of COI to resolve cases of irretrievable marital breakdown?

Observations

• The Supreme Court observed that the marriage was a "dead marriage" with no possibility of rehabilitation.
• It emphasized that Article 142 allows it to exercise discretionary power to grant justice, provided it is used with care and diligence.
• Irretrievable breakdown of marriage was upheld as a valid ground for divorce when reconciliation is impossible.

Factors Considered by the Court

• Cohabitation period after marriage.
• Last instance of cohabitation between the parties.
• Nature of allegations made against each other and their families.
• Impact of previous legal proceedings on the relationship.
• Attempts made for dispute settlement, including court interventions and mediation efforts.
• Length of separation, with six years or more being significant.
• The Supreme Court also stated that the Fault theory could be overlooked in such cases to ensure justice.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court concluded that it holds the authority to waive statutory requirements under Article 142 to deliver complete justice.
• It also clarified that a mutual divorce could be granted when both parties reach a settlement and when the marriage shows no scope for reconciliation.

Muhammad Husain Khan v. Babu Kishva Nandan Sahai AIR 1937 PC 233

This case revolves around the principle that property inherited from maternal ancestors does not constitute ancestral property and should be treated as distinct property owned by the transferee.

Facts

• Om Ganesh Prasad, the proprietor of the disputed village, passed away on 10th May 1914, having inherited the property from his maternal grandfather.
• Before his death, Ganesh executed a second will in Allahabad, dedicating the property to religious and charitable purposes and appointing seven executors and trustees for its execution.
• A caveat was filed by Bindeshri in the High Court opposing the probate, leading the executors and trustees to allow Bindeshri to take proprietary possession of his father’s property.
• The property was held jointly with his son, Bindeshri Prasad, who later sold the property through auction on 25th January 1925.
• Bindeshri’s son filed a suit in the Allahabad High Court, claiming the sale was invalid, but he passed away during the pendency of the case.
• His wife, Giri Bala, filed an application to substitute her name in the suit, asserting:
• Her father-in-law's will designated her late husband as the heir.
• After her husband's death, the property should be transferred to her.
• She held full interest in the estate and sought to nullify the village sale.
• The court permitted amendments to the suit, which the defendants opposed by filing an appeal in the Bombay High Court.
• The plaintiff contended that the property was ancestral property and could not be disposed of.

Issue Involved

• Whether property inherited from a maternal grandparent qualifies as ancestral property and whether such property can be jointly held by the inheritor and subsequent heirs.

Observations

• The Bombay High Court referred to the Mitakshara School to interpret the term ancestral property.
• Ancestral property includes property inherited from a father, paternal grandfather, or paternal great-grandfather.
• Property inherited from maternal ancestors is separate property and does not fall under ancestral property.
• Thus, property inherited from a maternal source is distinct from ancestral property as defined in Hindu law.

Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) 2 SCC 228

The landmark judgment in Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India redefined guardianship under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. This pivotal case recognized a mother's right to be the natural guardian of her child, challenging the traditional interpretation that favored the father.

• The Supreme Court emphasized the child's best interests and principles of equality.
• It stressed aligning legal provisions with evolving societal norms.
• This decision reshaped parental rights and responsibilities in India.

Facts

• Githa Hariharan, the petitioner, married Dr. Mohan Ram in 1982 and had a son, Rishab Bailey.
• A divorce case in the Delhi District Court involved Dr. Mohan claiming custody of Rishab despite his apparent lack of interest in the child.
• Ms. Hariharan sought maintenance for herself and Rishab.
• In 1984, she applied to the RBI for 9% relief bondsin Rishab's name, designating herself as the natural guardian.
• The RBI rejected the application, requiring the father's signature or a guardianship certificate issued by a competent authority.
• Ms. Hariharan filed a writ petition, challenging Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act for prioritizing the father's guardianship rights.
• She argued that the provision violated Articles 14 and 15 of the Indian Constitution.
• Dr. Mohan, in a counter-affidavit, asserted his exclusive rights as the natural guardian.
• Under Article 32, Ms. Hariharan sought the invalidation of Section 6(a) and Section 19(b) of the Guardian and Wards Act, claiming they were discriminatory.

Issue Involved

• Whether Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and Section 19(b) of the Guardianship Act violated the right to equality under Articles 14 and 15 of the Indian Constitution.

Observation

• The Supreme Court interpreted Section 6(a) in light of gender equality enshrined in the Constitution.
• The Court ruled that the term “after”in Section 6(a) must be broadly interpreted to include situations where the father is:
  • Absent
  • Indifferent or
  • Neglectful of the child’s welfare.
• Emphasizing the child’s welfare, the Court held that a mother could act as the natural guardian in such cases.
• The Court:
• Directed the RBI to develop appropriate procedures reflecting its findings.
• Instructed the District Court to prioritize the child's welfare when deciding custody matters.

Conclusion

• The Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India case revolutionized the interpretation of Section 6(a), highlighting that natural guardianship should depend on a parent's capability and genuine interest in the child’s welfare, rather than gender.
• This ruling reaffirmed the principle of equality in the Indian Constitution.
• It stressed the shared responsibility of both parents in nurturing and safeguarding their children.

Sunil Kumar v. Ram Prakash (1988) 2 SCC 77

The case revolves around a suit for injunction aimed at restraining the Karta of a Joint Hindu Family (JHF) from alienating property.

Facts

• Ram Prakash, the Karta (manager) of a JHF, executed an agreement in 1978 to sell joint family property.
• His sons (the appellants) sought to be impleaded in the specific performance suit filed by the buyer, Jai Bhagwan, but were not allowed.
• The sons filed a suit for permanent injunctionagainst their father, claiming:
  • The property was joint family property.
  • The sale was not for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate.
• The trial court ruled in favor of the sons, granting the injunction, but the High Court reversed this, reasoning that:
  • A coparcener cannot seek an injunction to stop the Karta from managing joint family property.
  • The sons appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues Involved

• Can a coparcener (son) file a suit for permanent injunction to prevent the Karta (father) from alienating joint family property?
• Was the High Court correct in holding that the coparcener could only challenge the alienation after its completion?

Observations

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment with the following key points:

• A blanket injunction against the Karta cannot be granted as it would hinder the management of joint family affairs.
• A coparcener's right is limited to claiming a share in the property free from unnecessary encumbrances, not interfering with the Karta’s management.
• Under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1930, injunctions are not permitted where alternative legal remedies (e.g., challenging the alienation after completion) are available.
• Granting such injunctions would impede the Karta’s ability to manage property for legal necessities or estate benefit, especially given the delays in litigation.

Conclusion

• A permanent injunction suit by a coparcener to prevent the Karta from alienating joint family property is not maintainable.
• The coparcener can instead challenge the alienation after it occurs.

Commissioner of Wealth-Tax v. Chander Sen AIR 1986 SC 1753

This case is a significant one under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Facts of the Case

• Rangi Lal and his son Chander Sen formed a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), which owned immovable property and a business.
• On 10th October 1961, a partial partition occurred between Rangi Lal and Chander Sen, dividing the business into a partnership.
• Rangi Lal passed away on 17th July 1965, leaving behind a credit balance of Rs. 1,85,043 in the partnership's books.
• For the assessment year 1966-67, Chander Sen, now part of a new HUF with his sons, did not include the Rs. 1,85,043 in his net wealth, claiming it as his individual property.
• The Wealth-tax officer included the Rs. 1,85,043 in the net wealth of Chander Sen's HUF.
• For assessment year 1967-68, interest of Rs. 23,330 was credited to Rangi Lal’s account. Chander Sen claimed this as a deduction, stating it was his individual income, but the Income-tax officer disallowed this.
• On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted Chander Sen’s claims for both wealth-tax and income-tax assessments.
• The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeals.
• In the wealth-tax references, the High Court held that under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, the amounts did not constitute assets of Chander Sen’s HUF.
• Similarly, in the income-tax reference, the High Court ruled that the interest was allowable as a deduction.
• The revenue then approached the Supreme Court.

Issues Involved

• Whether the sum of Rs. 1,85,043 and Rs. 1,82,742 (after interest) was an asset of Chander Sen’s HUF or his individual property?
• Whether the interest of Rs. 23,330 was allowable as a deduction in calculating the business profits of Chander Sen’s HUF?

Observation

• The Supreme Court observed that, under Hindu law, when a son is born, he automatically becomes part of the coparcenary and gains a share in the father's property. However, this situation might be altered by Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
• Section 8 specifies the heirs for certain properties, with Class I heirs including the son but not the grandson, unless the son predeceased the father.
• The Supreme Court stated that when a son inherits property as an heir under Class I of the Schedule, he cannot be considered as the Karta of his own undivided family in such cases.
• The Court emphasized that accepting the Gujarat High Court’s view would grant a right to the grandson (who should be excluded under Section 8), which contradicts the purpose of Section 8.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court disagreed with the Gujarat High Court’s view.

Swaraj Garg v. K.M. Garg, AIR 1978 Del. 296

Smt. Dipo v. Wassan Singh & Others AIR 1983 SC 846

• This case is significant in understanding ancestral property rights under Hindu law.

Facts of the Case

• The appellant, Smt. Dipo, claimed to be the closest heir of her deceased brother, Bua Singh.
• The defendants, who were the sons of Ganda Singh, argued that Smt. Dipo was not the rightful heir and claimed preferential rights based on ancestral property customs.
• The Subordinate Judge in Amritsar ruled that some of Bua Singh's properties were ancestral while others were not.
• The judge decided that Smt. Dipo was excluded from the ancestral property but could claim the non-ancestral property.
• Dissatisfied with this ruling, Smt. Dipo appealed to the District Judge, but her appeal was dismissed for procedural reasons.
• A subsequent appeal to the High Court was rejected because it was filed too late.
• Eventually, Smt. Dipo took her case to the Supreme Court for further review.

Legal Issue

• The main question was whether Smt. Dipo had any rights to Bua Singh's ancestral property.

Supreme Court's Decision

• The Supreme Court overturned the decisions made by the lower courts.
• It ruled in favor of Smt. Dipo, confirming her rights to the property that was deemed ancestral.
• The court found that the defendants did not have any rights to the ancestral property, establishing Smt. Dipo as the rightful heir.
• A decree was issued for Smt. Dipo to receive all properties in question, reversing the lower court’s judgments.
• Additionally, the court ordered that the defendants pay the legal costs incurred by Smt. Dipo, including fees for the various stages of her legal battles.

Conclusion

• The ruling clarified property rights and assigned costs accordingly, affirming Smt. Dipo's legal entitlements.