Hindu Law - 2 | Civil Law for Judiciary Exams PDF Download

N G Dastane v. S Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534

This case is significant as it established a key concept of cruelty in matrimonial disputes.

Facts

• Sucheta, the respondent, originally from Nagpur, grew up in Delhi and has a B.Sc. degree. She also earned a Master’s in Social Work.
• Before marrying the appellant in May 1956, her father informed his family about her past mental illness due to sunstroke and cerebral malaria.
• The couple lived in different places and had three daughters.
• Over time, there was increasing marital discord, with both parties accusing each other of cruelty.
• In 1961, the appellant tried to have the respondent examined by a psychiatrist, but she refused.
• As their relationship deteriorated, there were malicious letters from family members and accusations of cruelty and desertion.
• The appellant sought judicial separation due to alleged cruelty, but the trial court dismissed the claims regarding the respondent's mental health.
• After the High Court also dismissed his plea, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues Involved

• Were the facts of the case established beyond reasonable doubt?
• Did the act of sexual intercourse amount to cruelty?
• Who bears the burden of proof regarding claims of cruelty?

Observations

• The Supreme Court noted that the lower courts did not properly evaluate the evidence related to the allegations of cruelty.
• It criticized the High Court for deviating from legal principles and stated that it would conduct a thorough examination of the case.
• Evidence indicated a pattern of conduct by the respondent that could be seen as cruelty under Section 10(1)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, but the appellant had condoned this behavior.
• The Court concluded that it was hard to accept the appellant's claims of desertion or cruelty by the respondent since he had previously condoned her actions.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's appeal and ordered him to pay costs.

Sujata Sharma v. Manu Gupta (2016)

This case concerns the position of a daughter as the senior-most member of a Mitakshara Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) and whether she can assume the role of Karta after the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Facts

• Mr. D R Gupta and his sons held a long-term lease on a residence in Delhi, along with movable assets and shares.
• Mr. D R Gupta passed away on October 1, 1971, leaving behind five sons and their families.
• Kishan Mohan Gupta, the eldest son, assumed the role of Karta for the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF).
• Over time, all of Kishan Gupta’s brothers passed away, leaving the son of Kishan Gupta’s younger brother to declare himself the new Karta of the HUF, claiming to be the eldest surviving member.
• The plaintiff, the eldest daughter of Kishan Gupta, disputed this claim, asserting that as the senior-most living member of the family, she was entitled to be the Karta.
• The plaintiff participated in the family settlement by signing it, thus confirming her inclusion as a party to the agreement.
• Her signature on the settlement provided evidence of her entitlement to a share in the family property.

Issue Involved

• Whether the plaintiff, as the eldest born among the co-parceners of the HUF, can be entitled to the position of Karta based solely on her birthright?

Observations

• The plaintiff’s entitlement to the Karta position arose after the demise of the eldest Karta, a fact supported by correspondence with the Land and Building Department.
• She was the eldest co-parcener, making her eligible to assume the role of Karta within the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), as per the prevailing legal framework.
• The argument that female co-parceners could inherit equally but were barred from managing the HUF property lacks validity. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 ensures gender-neutral inheritance rights, allowing women to inherit and manage property equally as men.
• The 2005 Amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, removed the gender-based restriction on female co-parceners managing HUF property, establishing a gender-equal entitlement to become Karta.
• This amendment marks a significant legal reform for women’s empowerment and has been applied in this case, even though the plaintiff’s father passed away before the amendment.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff’s entitlement to her father’s share in the HUF remained valid even after her marriage, in accordance with Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
• As the senior-most co-parcener, the plaintiff was entitled to be the Karta of the Hindu Undivided Family.

Vellikannu v. R. Singaperumal (2005) 6 SCC 622

This case is a significant one concerning the Proviso of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Facts

• The trial court initially ruled that all the properties listed were joint family properties belonging to the late Ramasami Konar and his disqualified son (the first defendant).
• However, due to the first defendant's conviction for murdering his father, he was declared ineligible to claim any of the property.
• Despite this, the court granted the plaintiff a decree for half of the property under the Proviso of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
• The properties in question were self-acquired assets of the late Ramasami Konar.
• The first defendant was the sole son of Ramasami Konar, and the plaintiff was his wife.
• The plaintiff had previously divorced Ramasami Konar and remarried, living separately from him.
• The plaintiff argued that as the sole surviving spouse, she was entitled to inherit all the property left by Ramasami Konar.

Issue Involved

• The key issue was whether the wife of a disqualified heir can claim inheritance of the estate of her deceased father-in-law.

Observation

• The court observed that it could not adjudicate on the rights of the disqualified son, and thus, it was unable to determine the rights of the plaintiff, who inherited through her husband.
• The court considered it crucial to first decide whether the disqualified son could inherit his late father’s property.
• The court concluded that if the son could not inherit, then the wife, who derived her inheritance rights through her husband, could also not claim the deceased father-in-law's property.

Conclusion

• The appeal of the wife was dismissed.

C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar v. C.A. Muruganatha Mudaliar and Ors. AIR 1953 SC 495

• The case involves the determination of whether certain properties are ancestral or self-acquired under Hindu Law.

Facts of the Case

• The appellant (plaintiff), his father (defendant No. 1), and his brother (defendant No. 2) were each entitled to a one-third share of a partitioned property.
• The dispute arose because the appellant and defendant No. 2 were children of the father’s first wife.
• After the first wife's death, the father remarried, leading to family conflicts over property claims.
• The father claimed that the land and house were self-acquired properties inherited through a will, rejecting the idea of any joint family property.
• The Trial Court ruled that properties transferred to defendant No. 1 from his father were ancestral.
• The Madras High Court dismissed the appellant's appeal.

Key Issue

• Whether the properties inherited by defendant No. 1 under his father's will are considered ancestral property for his son.

Supreme Court Observations

• The Supreme Court stated that simply transferring property from a father to a son does not automatically make it ancestral for the son.
• The father has the right to specify whether the property is meant for exclusive ownership or for the family’s benefit.
• If the will or gift specifies conditions, the son's rights depend on those terms.
• The court emphasized that a father under the Mitakshara system has complete authority over his self-acquired property and can dispose of it as he wishes.
• Thus, it is not guaranteed that property given to a son will always be considered ancestral property.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court overturned the High Court decision and allowed the appellant's appeal.

S. Nagalingam v. Sivagami (2001) 7 SCC 487

This landmark judgment reinforced the legal rights of women in cases where their husbands take a second wife without legally ending the first marriage.

Facts of the Case

• September 6, 1970, and they had three children together.
• The respondent experienced domestic violence and moved back to her parents' home.
• In 1984, the respondent discovered that her husband had married another woman, Kasturi, at a marriage hall.
• After this discovery, the respondent filed a criminal complaint against her husband and others, which initially led to their acquittal by the trial court.
• Dissatisfied, the respondent appealed to the High Court of Madras, which referred the case back to the trial court for further evidence against the husband.
• After presenting evidence, the trial court again acquitted the accused, prompting the respondent to appeal again.
• The High Court eventually found the husband guilty of violating Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with bigamy.
• The husband then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues

• Did the husband's second marriage to Kasturi constitute a valid marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?
• Is the Saptapadi (seven steps) ceremony essential for a valid Hindu marriage?
• Did the husband's actions meet the criteria for the offense of bigamy under Section 494 IPC?

Key Observations

• Evidence showed a valid marriage occurred under Section 7-A of the HMA with traditional customs being followed.
• A witness testified that the husband tied the Thirumangalam (a sacred necklace) around the bride's neck and they exchanged garlands, indicating a valid ceremony.
• The marriage followed the customs of both families, and according to Section 7 of HMA, a Hindu marriage can be valid based on the customs of the parties involved.
• The requirement of Saptapadi depends on whether the involved parties consider it necessary; here, the husband did not claim it was essential for their marriage validity.
• Thus, the marriage to Kasturi was valid, proving that the husband committed bigamy as it occurred while he was still married to the respondent.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, confirming that the husband committed the offense of bigamy. The case was sent back to the trial court for sentencing.

Lily Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1650

This case revolves around bigamy and the conversion to another religion for the purpose of solemnizing a second marriage.

Facts

• Sushmita Ghosh filed a petition before the Supreme Court regarding her marriage to Mr. G C Ghosh
• She stated that her husband urged her to consent to a mutual divorce, but since the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 does not permit bigamy, he converted to Islam to marry Ms. Vinita Gupta.
• Mr. Ghosh produced a certificate from the office of the Shahi Qazi, verifying his conversion to Islam.
• Over the years, it became common for Hindu men to convert to Islam to remarry, especially if they were unable to divorce their first wives. However, they would often revert to their original religion afterward to maintain their rights to property, continue their jobs, and carry on other affairs.

Issues Involved

• Whether a non-Muslim converting to Islam for the sole purpose of avoiding the legal consequences of bigamy or entering a second marriage, without a genuine change of belief, would make such a marriage void.
• Whether the Respondent (Mr. Ghosh) would be liable for bigamy under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
• Whether a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) is desirable.

Observation

• The Court observed that a Hindu man who converts to Islam just to remarry without any actual change of belief is not undertaking a genuine religious conversion.
• Changing religion does not automatically dissolve an existing marriage. If the husband converts to Islam while still married, he may be penalized under Section 494 of IPC for bigamy.
• India does not have a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) that governs all marriages. Instead, different personal laws apply based on religious affiliation.
• However, the Court emphasized that any misuse of personal laws for illegal actions, such as marrying again without valid grounds, would be punishable.
• The Court discussed the complexities of implementing a UCC in India, a country with great religious, cultural, and linguistic diversity. The Constitution respects this diversity and aims to promote unity while respecting differences.
• While a Uniform Civil Code is desirable, its immediate enforcement could disrupt national unity, and changes should be made gradually through the legal process.

Conclusion

• The Court ruled in favor of Sushmita Ghosh, making it illegal for someone to convert to Islam just to remarry while still married to their first wife.

Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 1564

This case is significant as it examines how marriage ceremonies under Section 7 of the HMA affect the application of Section 17 of the HMA and Section 494 of the IPC regarding bigamy.

Facts

• Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande married Indubai in 1956 according to religious customs. 
• In 1962, he married Kamlabai while still married to Indubai. 
• He was charged and convicted of bigamy under Section 494 of the IPC. 
• His appeals in lower courts were rejected, leading him to the Supreme Court. 
• Lokhande argued that his second marriage was invalid as it did not follow the necessary religious rituals under Section 7 of the HMA. 
• The State argued that the second marriage was valid under community customs, specifically the "Gandharva" marriage. 
• The State claimed that the validity of the second marriage was not necessary for a conviction under Section 494 IPC. 

Issues

• Was the second marriage of the appellant valid?
• Is the appellant guilty under the charges of Section 494 of IPC?

Observations

• The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove that the second marriage adhered to the required customs under Section 7 of the HMA.
• The court stated that the marriage between Lokhande and Kamlabai did not fulfill the essential requirements for a valid marriage under Hindu Law.
• Thus, the marriage was not considered a "solemnized marriage" under Section 17 of the HMA.
• As a result, Lokhande's second marriage did not lead to consequences under Section 494 of IPC, despite his first wife being alive.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court concluded that Lokhande's conviction under Section 494 of the IPC could not be sustained.
• The charge of bigamy was deemed unsubstantiated, leading to the acceptance of Lokhande's appeal.

Puttrangamma v. M.S. Ranganna, AIR 1968 SC 1018

This case concerns the issue of the separation or partition of Joint Hindu Family property, with a focus on the proper communication of the partition.

Facts

• The Karta of the family was admitted to the hospital and issued a notification for the partition of the Joint Hindu Family property on 8th January 1951.
• After the notification was lodged at the post office, the family’s well-wishers intervened, attempting to reach an agreement.
• The plaintiff instructed the post office to withdraw the notifications, expressing that he did not want the partition of the family property.
• Despite attempts at reconciliation, an agreement could not be reached, and the plaintiff filed the current complaint in January 1951 for division of his share of the joint family property.
• The plaintiff filed a suit (plaint) on 13th January 1951 for the partition of the property.
• The Trial Court ruled that the thumb impression was affixed when the Karta was in a sound mind, validating the plaint.
• The High Court reversed this decision, stating that the plaint was not valid because there was no sufficient communication of the partition to the defendants.

Issues Involved

• Whether Savoy Ranganna died as a divided member of the Joint Hindu family?
• Whether the plaint executed was valid?

Observations

• The Supreme Court highlighted that according to Hindu Law, a member of a Joint Hindu Family can separate from the family and claim their share individually.
• Separation can occur when a person clearly and unmistakably expresses their intention to separate, without the need for unanimous agreement from other family members.
• The Court emphasized that the person wishing to separate must communicate their intention to the other family members.
• Once the separation is communicated and the joint family status is severed, it cannot be reversed.
• In this case, there was sufficient evidence that the plaintiff was in a sound state of mind and not under any pressure when filing for the partition.
• The Court upheld the Trial Court's findings, agreeing that the plaint was valid.

Conclusion

• The Court concluded that the plaint was valid.
• The Supreme Court affirmed that the plaintiff submitted the plaint on 13th January 1951 because he was in a sound mental state and understood the contents of the plaint.

Kakumanu Pedasubhayya v. Kakumanu Akkamma, AIR 1968 SC 1042

This case revolves around the concept that a partition should be in the best interests of the minor, and failure to partition may negatively affect the minor’s interests. The key issue is whether the suit would be abated if the minor dies during the pendency of the suit or if it can continue through the legal representative.

Facts

• A partition suit was filed on behalf of a minor who died during the proceedings.
• The suit was filed by the maternal grandfather of the minor, acting as the next friend.
• The defendants were the minor’s father and his sons from the first wife, who had been selling family land and incurring debts without legal necessity.
• The family’s ancestral properties were sold, and new properties were bought in the name of the adult coparceners.
• The petition was admitted, but the minor passed away during the pendency of the suit.

Issues Involved

• Whether the minor was an undivided member of the family at the time of his death.
• Whether the suit would abate upon the minor’s death.

Observations

• The Supreme Court observed that there is no difference in the rights of a minor and an adult coparcener with respect to coparcenary property, but the court serves as a parens patriae to protect the minor’s rights.
• The Court emphasized that the partition must be in the best interest of the minor, even if the suit is filed by a next friend.
• The Court ruled that the minor would be considered a separate member of the family from the date the partition petition was filed in court.
• In the case of Kawal Nain v. Prabhu Lal (1917), the Bombay High Court held that the division in status occurs when the suit is instituted, even if the suit is later dismissed.
• The Court clarified that the primary difference between a minor and an adult coparcener is the conditionality of the suit being beneficial for the minor.
• The Court concluded that the minor’s severance from the joint family occurred when the petition was filed, and at the time of his death, he was considered a separate member.

Conclusion

• The Court held that the partition suit could continue through the legal representative of the minor.
• It was concluded that the minor was considered a divided member of the family at the time of his death.

Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar (Air 1984 SC 1562)

This case is a significant milestone as it challenged the constitutional validity of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA).
A two-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India (SC) upheld the constitutional validity of the Restitution of Conjugal Rights provision under Section 9 of HMA.

Facts

• The Appellant (wife) was mistreated and forced to leave her marital home by the Respondent (husband), two years after their marriage and the birth of their second daughter.
• The appellant filed for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of HMA before the subordinate judge, and a decree was passed with the mutual consent of both parties.
• After the decree was passed, the appellant claimed that she briefly cohabited with the respondent.
• After one year, the respondent filed for divorce under Section 13 of the HMA before the District Judge, stating that no cohabitation had occurred since the decree under Section 9 was passed.
• The District Judge dismissed the divorce petition, stating that the decree under Section 9 was a consent decree.
• The respondent appealed in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which referred the matter to a Division Bench, including the Chief Justice.
• The Division Bench held that consent decrees in matrimonial matters are not inherently collusive and granted the divorce decree.
• The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues Involved

• Whether Section 9 of HMA violates Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950?
• Whether the respondent was entitled to a divorce decree despite failing to comply with the consent decree for restitution of conjugal rights?

Observations

• The Andhra Pradesh High Court analyzed T. Sareetha v. T. Venkatasubbaiah (1983), which ruled that Section 9 of HMA violated the right to privacy and human dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution.
• In the T. Sareetha case, it was noted that although both husband and wife had the right under Section 9 of HMA, it was more frequently used by men, thus adversely affecting women.
• The Delhi High Court in Harvinder Kaur v. Harminder Singh (1983) disagreed with the Andhra Pradesh HC's view in the T. Sareetha case. The Delhi HC held that Section 9 did not violate Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution.
• The Supreme Court considered both the views and concluded that Section 9 of HMA did not violate Article 21.

Conclusion

• Although the Court did not explicitly discuss the right to privacy, in overruling the T. Sareetha case, it implied that enforcing Section 9 of the HMA did not infringe upon privacy rights.
• The Supreme Court granted the respondent the divorce decree and ordered him to provide maintenance to the wife until she remarries and to the daughter until her marriage.