Muslim Law - 1 | Civil Law for Judiciary Exams PDF Download

This landmark judgment addressed the entitlement of a Muslim woman to receive maintenance after the iddat period. The case was decided by a 2-judge bench, comprising Justice Dipak Misra and Justice Vikramajit Sen.

Facts

• The Appellant (Shamim Bano) and Respondent (Ashraf Khan) married on 17th November 1993.
• The Appellant filed a case under Section 498A of IPC and Section 34 of IPC against her husband and his family. However, the accused were acquitted.
• The Appellant then applied for maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC.
• While the application for maintenance was pending, a divorce occurred between the parties.
• Subsequently, the Appellant filed an application under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, seeking the mahr, return of gifts and ornaments, and maintenance during the iddat period. The court ordered:
  • Rs. 11,786 as mahr,
  • Return of goods and ornaments,
  • Rs. 1,750 as maintenance during iddat.
• The application for maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC was dismissed.
• An appeal was filed, but the revisional court concurred with the Magistrate's decision.
• The High Court declined to interfere with the lower court's orders.

Issues Involved

• Whether filing an application under Section 3 of the Act after divorce for mahr and the return of gifts affects the entitlement to maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC?
• Whether consent under Section 5 of the Act is essential to maintain an application under Section 125 of CrPC?

Observations

The Court examined prior case law and developments:

• Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985): This case established that a Muslim wife is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC. The Court ruled that Section 127does not absolve the husband from his maintenance obligation.
  • This led to the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.
• Danial Latifi v. Union of India (2001): The Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Act and clarified that the intention was to ensure a divorced womanreceives sufficient livelihood post-divorce.
  • The Court also interpreted Section 2 and Section 3 of the Act to emphasize the need for providing for the woman's needs after divorce.
• Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P. (2002): This case confirmed that when both parties agree, Section 125 of CrPC can be invoked as per Section 5 of the Act. It was held that the parameters for granting maintenance under both provisions are the same.

The Court then reviewed the case:

• The High Court had ruled that since the Appellant had already filed for maintenance under Section 3 of the Act, her application under Section 125 of CrPC was only valid before the divorce.
• However, the Supreme Court questioned this stance, noting that the divorce occurred after the application under Section 125 had been filed. The Court observed that the maintenance provided under Section 3 was limited to the iddat period, and no provision was made for maintenance post-iddat.
• The Court stated that denying the Appellant relief would be a travesty of justice.
• It concluded that even if the Appellant filed an application under Section 3 of the Act, the parameters of Section 125 of CrPC would still apply.
• The Court emphasized that filing an application under Section 3 of the Act does not mean the wife has exercised her option and thus remains entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC.
• Additionally, the Court noted that the husband never raised the issue of consent under Section 5 of the Act.

Conclusion

• The Court ruled that filing an application under Section 3 of the Act does not preclude a Muslim wife from seeking maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC. The Court upheld the wife's entitlement to maintenance beyond the iddat period, emphasizing that Section 125 still applies even after a wife has filed under the Act.

Danial Latifi v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740

This case discusses the maintenance obligations of a husband under Muslim Law after divorce, which are typically limited to the iddat period, but do not absolve the husband of his responsibilities towards the wife beyond that period.
Iddat Period:

• If the woman is menstruating, it lasts for three menstrual cycles.
• If the woman is pregnant, it lasts until delivery, regardless of whether it is more or less than three months.
• If the woman is not menstruating, it lasts for three lunar months.

The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is challenged in terms of its constitutional validity. Section 3 of this Act mandates the provision of maintenance to a divorced Muslim woman, as per the following condition in Section 3(a):

• The Magistrate may order the husband to provide maintenance if it is proven that he has failed to provide a reasonable provision during the iddat period, despite having sufficient means.

Facts

• The husband appealed against a decision by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which ordered him to pay Rs. 179 per month to his divorced wife, an increase from the original amount of Rs. 25 per month set by the Magistrate.
• They had been married for 43 years before the wife, who was ill and elderly, was evicted from her husband's house.
• The husband had already paid a deferred mahr (dower) of Rs. 3000 and additional payments for arrears of maintenance and the iddat period. He sought to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the payments due under Muslim law had already been made.
• Mohd. Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985) had established that if the divorced wife cannot maintain herself after the iddat period, she is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC, as it does not conflict with Muslim personal law.

Issues Involved

• Constitutionality: Was the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 constitutionally valid?
• Discrimination: Was the Act inconsistent with Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian Constitution?

Contentions of the Petitioner

• The petitioner argued that Section 125 of the CrPC was designed to protect divorced wives' rights to maintenance, ensuring their life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
• It was also contended that the Act discriminated against divorced Muslim women, violating Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.

Contentions of the Union of India

• The Union of India argued that maintenance in the context of personal law is determined by the facts of each case.
• Section 3 of the Act clearly specifies that the maintenance obligation is limited to the iddat period and does not extend for life. Therefore, there is no conflict between the Act and the Constitution.
• The government emphasized that the Act is grounded in the personal law of the Muslim community and does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.

Contentions of the Muslim Personal Law Board

• The Muslim Personal Law Board argued that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 was enacted to undo the verdict in Shah Bano's case.
• They stated that the purpose of the Act was to avoid vagrancy for divorced Muslim women, emphasizing the broader social support system within the Muslim community for such women.

Observations

• The Court compared Section 125 of the CrPC and the Muslim law provisions, concluding that the intent of Section 125 was to prevent vagrancy by ensuring that individuals who could support others were legally obliged to do so.
• The Court reaffirmed the rationale behind Shah Bano's case, stating that the objective of Section 125 CrPC is to prevent destitution and to ensure the maintenance of divorced Muslim women.
• The Act applies only to Muslim women divorced under Muslim personal law, not to those divorced under other legal frameworks like the Indian Divorce Act, 1969 or the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
• The husband's liability for maintenance under Section 3(1)(a) extends beyond the iddat period if the wife is unable to maintain herself, and the Magistrate can direct the State Wakf Board to provide maintenance if the husband's relatives are unable to do so.
• The Court concluded that the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 did not violate Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian Constitution.

Conclusion

• The Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, ruling that it did not infringe upon the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Abdul Kadir v. Salima (1886) ILR 8 ALL 149

The non-payment of dower does not prevent the husband from filing for restitution of conjugal rights or from seeking judicial remedy.

Facts

• The appellant and respondent were married and lived together for three months.
• After this period, the respondent went to her father's house and was not allowed to return by her father.
• Despite several attempts by the appellant to speak with the respondent's father, the issue remained unresolved.
• Consequently, the appellant filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against both the respondent and her father.
• The respondent filed for divorce, citing cruelty and non-payment of dower.
• The court dismissed the first two contentions of the respondent.
• However, the court focused on the issue of non-payment of dower.
• The appellant paid the dower amount before the court, and the court issued a conditional judgment for restitution of conjugal rights, contingent upon the payment of the dower.
• Both parties appealed the decision, with the Appellate Court dismissing the appellant’s appeal on the grounds that the dower had not been paid before filing for restitution of conjugal rights.
• The matter regarding the maintainability of the claim for dower was referred to the Allahabad High Court.

Issues Involved

• Can a petition for restitution of conjugal rights be filed without paying the amount of dower?
• Does the non-payment of dower make the husband ineligible to seek judicial remedy?

Observations

• The Allahabad High Court observed that Muslim marriage is a legal contract, not merely a sacrament.
• The judgment relied on Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shums-oon-nissa Begum (1867), which outlined the roles and responsibilities of spouses in a marriage.
• The court held that the wife can refuse to live with her husband and deny sexual intercourse as long as the prompt dower remains unpaid.
• If sexual intercourse has taken place with free consent, the court may issue a conditional decree for restitution of conjugal rights, contingent upon prompt payment of the dower.
• The defense of non-payment of dower could modify the decree, making its enforcement conditional on the payment of the dower.
• The suit for restitution of conjugal rights was transformed into a suit for reciprocal rights of cohabitation.

Conclusion

• The Allahabad High Court concluded that non-payment of dower does not prevent the husband from filing for restitution of conjugal rights or seeking a judicial remedy.

Shaikh Taslim Shaikh Hakim v. State of Maharashtra

Syeda Nazira Khatoon (d) By Lr V. Syed Zahiruddin Ahmed Baghdadi & Ors. 2019

• This case involves the concepts of wakf (a charitable endowment) and mutawalli (a manager of the wakf).
• The case clarifies that a mutawalli cannot transfer their position to someone else unless they have been given explicit permission to do so by the founder of the wakf.

Facts of the Case

• Abdur Rahim created a wakf on February 7, 1913, for certain properties linked to Syed Obaidullah Baghdadi Shah.
• The wakf deed specified that the office of the mutawalli would pass to the “putro poutradi krome” (descendants) of the original mutawalli.
• Syed Gyasuddin Ahmed Baghdadi became the first mutawalli after the original mutawalli's death.
• When Gyasuddin died in 1977, his son Syed Badruddin Ahmed was appointed as the mutawalli.
• After Badruddin's death in 1992, his wife Nazira Khatoon applied to be the mutawalli based on a trust deed he had created.
• The Commissioner of Wakfs appointed Nazira as the mutawalli in 1995, but this was contested by a relative.

Legal Issues

• Can a mutawalli transfer their position to someone else through a trust deed, even when a wakf deed outlines a specific line of succession?
• Do female descendants of the last mutawalli qualify for the position of mutawalli under the term “putro poutradi krome” in the wakf deed?

Supreme Court Observations

• The Supreme Court explained that when a wakf is created, all rights to the property go to God, and the mutawalli only manages the property.
• A mutawalli cannot transfer their role unless the wakf deed allows it.
• The court referenced Mulla’s Principles of Mohammedan Law stating that a mutawalli's office is not transferable without the founder's express permission.
• The wakf deed did not provide for the mutawalli to appoint someone else via a trust deed.
• The succession must follow the founder's intentions, which cannot be altered by other documents.
• Nazira Khatoon, being the wife of the last mutawalli, was not a direct descendant and therefore was not entitled to the position.
• The term “putro poutradi krome” was interpreted to include only male descendants (sons and grandsons), excluding female descendants.
• Consequently, Nazira Khatoon and her daughters could not claim the mutawalliship.
• The court ruled that the relative, being a male descendant, was entitled to the position of mutawalli.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court confirmed that a mutawalli acts in a managerial role and cannot transfer their position unless authorized by the wakf deed.
• The court concluded that the term “putro poutradi krome” refers only to male descendants and does not include females.

Rahmat Ullah and Ors. v. Maqsood Ahmad and Ors (1949)

• This case, Rahmat Ullah And Ors. v. Maqsood Ahmad And Ors, deals with the issue of whether an illegitimate child can be considered a brother of a legitimate child from the same mother and what that means for inheritance rights under Muslim law.

Facts of the Case

• The plaintiffs, Maqsood Ahmad and his two sisters, filed a lawsuit to reclaim a house owned by their uncle, Mohammad Yaqub.
• The defendants were Rahmatullah and his three sons.
• Rahmatullah claimed he was a brother to Mohammad Yaqub, asserting he was the son of the same parents, and therefore entitled to inherit the property.
• Rahmatullah's sons argued that they owned the property based on a will supposedly made by Mohammad Yaqub.
• The trial court concluded that Rahmatullah was not the legitimate son of his claimed father but rather an illegitimate son of his mother, Mt. Qadri. The court also ruled that the will presented by Rahmatullah's sons was valid, leading to the dismissal of the suit.
• The appellate court upheld the trial court's findings, confirming Rahmatullah's illegitimacy and the invalidity of the will.
• Consequently, the case was brought before the Allahabad High Court.

Legal Issues

• The central question was whether Rahmatullah, as an illegitimate son, could be seen as the uterine brother of Mohammad Yaqub and thus inherit his property under Muslim law.
• Additionally, the court needed to determine if an illegitimate child could inherit from the legitimate child of their mother through a subsequent marriage.

Observations

• The court noted that an illegitimate child lacks formal parentage and cannot claim a father for lineage purposes. Hence, Rahmatullah could not be regarded as the uterine brother of Mohammad Yaqub.
• According to Hanafi Law of Inheritance, illegitimate children can inherit from their mother and her relatives; however, they cannot inherit from a legitimate child born after the mother’s marriage.
• Since Mohammad Yaqub was a legitimate child, he was part of his father's family, making him not a relation to Rahmatullah for inheritance purposes.

Conclusion

• The Allahabad High Court ruled that Rahmatullah had no right to inherit Mohammad Yaqub's property through his mother. Thus, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 2017 SC 4609

The Supreme Court delivered a landmark ruling, declaring that triple talaq (also known as talaq-e-biddat or instant talaq) is unconstitutional and arbitrarily discriminatory. The majority of the court held that this practice is not protected under the exception to Article 25 of the Constitution.

Facts

• The marriage (nikah) between Shayara Bano (the petitioner) and Rizwan Ahmad (her husband) took place on 11th April 2001 as per Shariat law.
• The couple has two children, a son and a daughter.
• On 10th October 2015, Rizwan Ahmad divorced his wife by using triple talaq (saying "talaq" three times in front of two witnesses).
• The petitioner filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court in February 2016 challenging the constitutional validity of triple talaq.
• The petitioner argued that the practice violated fundamental rights and was not protected under Articles 25(1), 26(b), and 29 of the Constitution.

Issues Involved

• Whether triple talaq violates fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution?
• Whether the practice of triple talaq is protected under Articles 25(1), 26(b), and 29 of the Constitution?
• Whether triple talaq is an essential religious practice in Islam?
• Whether the practice is invalid under the Muslim Personal (Shariat) Application Act, 1937?

Observations

• On 22nd August 2017, the Supreme Court delivered its final judgment.
• The ruling was issued by a 5-judge bench consisting of Chief Justice Jagadish Singh Khehar, Justice Abdul Nazeer, Justice Rohinton Nariman, Justice U.U. Lalit, and Justice Kurian Joseph.
• The Court declared triple talaq unconstitutional by a 3:2 majority.
• Justices Rohinton Nariman, U.U. Lalit, and Kurian Joseph formed the majority opinion.
• The majority concluded:
• Triple talaq is not protected under the exception in Article 25.
• The practice was found arbitrary and against the basic principles of Shariat and the Quran.
• The practice is not an essential religious practice and therefore cannot be defended under fundamental rights.
• Justice Kurian Joseph's concurring opinion: “What is bad in the Quran cannot be good in Shariat, and what is bad in theology is bad in law.”
• The court emphasized that triple talaq is manifestly arbitrary since a man could break the marital tie capriciously and whimsically without any effort to reconcile, making it a violation of Article 14 (Right to Equality).
• The Muslim Personal (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 was declared void to the extent it recognizes and enforces triple talaq, as it falls under the category of 'laws in force' under Article 13(1) of the Constitution.
• The Supreme Court directed the government to consider enacting legislation to regulate the practice of divorce in the Muslim community.

Minority View

• Chief Justice J.S. Khehar and Justice Abdul Nazeer dissented.
• They argued that while triple talaq was undesirable, it was within the authority of Parliament to frame a law to govern the practice, and not the courts’ responsibility to strike it down.

Conclusion

• The judgment focused on safeguarding women's rights and the preservation of marriage.
• The court found that instant divorce through triple talaq cannot be treated as legally valid under any law.
• The ruling was a significant step toward promoting gender equality and ensuring religious identity within the framework of constitutional values.

Imambandi v. Sheikh Haji Mutsaddi

This case is a significant one concerning the property rights of minors under Muslim law.

Facts

• Ismail Ali Khan passed away in 1906, leaving behind three widows (defendants 1, 5, and Enayet-uz-Zohra) and several children.
• The plaintiffs purchased Zohra's share and the shares of her two minor children (defendants 9 and 10) through a deed of sale in 1906.
• The names of the other widows (defendants 1-7) were recorded in the revenue records as owners of Ismail's property, after asserting that Zohra was not his legally wedded wife.
• The plaintiffs filed a suit to seek a declaration that Zohra was legally married to Ismail and to establish their title/possession of the shares they purchased from her.

Issues Involved

• Whether Zohra was the legally wedded wife of Ismail Ali Khan, and whether defendants 9 and 10 were his legitimate children?
• Whether Zohra, as a mother, could legally sell her minor children’s shares to the plaintiffs under Muslim law?

Observations

• The Privy Council reviewed the principles of Mahomedan law governing a guardian's authority over a minor's immovable property.
• Under the Hanafi school, there is a clear distinction:
  • For movable property, even an unauthorized de facto guardian can sell if there is necessity.
  • For immovable property, only legally appointed guardians, like an executor, have the authority to sell.
• The doctrine of 'fazuli' sales, which allows ratification of sales by an owner with full legal capacity, does not apply to minors' property.
• Fatawa Alamgiri states that a mother, assuming she is an executrix, cannot sell her minor children’s property, and such a sale is suspended until the minor ratifies it.
• In this case, the Privy Council ruled that Zohra, as a de facto guardian, did not have the legal right to sell her minor children’s shares to the plaintiffs, making the sale invalid. A transferee under these circumstances does not acquire an enforceable title against the minor.

Conclusion

• The Privy Council upheld the declaration that Zohra was the legal wife of Ismail and the plaintiffs’ title to her share.
• However, it set aside the decree awarding possession of the minor children's shares to the plaintiffs, as their purchase was invalid.

Gohar Begam v. Suggi Alias Nazma Begam

The case focused on the legal entitlement to custody under Mohammedan law for an illegitimate child, challenging the High Court's decision regarding the application of Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).

Facts

• The appellant, an unmarried Sunni Muslim woman, had an illegitimate female child named Anjum.
• She applied to the Bombay High Court under Section 491 of the CrPC for custody of her child, but the application was denied.
• The respondent, Kaniz Begum, had raised the appellant when she was young.
• Since 1951, the appellant had been living with Trivedi, with whom she had three children, including Anjum. Trivedi acknowledged his paternity and agreed to raise Anjum as his own.
• The respondent took Anjum to Pakistan temporarily, but later refused to return her to the appellant when she came back.
• The High Court dismissed the appellant’s application, citing controversial facts regarding paternity and living arrangements.

Issues Involved

• Whether the respondent had made the appellant live with different persons?
• Whether the respondent had prevented the appellant from having access to the child?

Observation

• The Supreme Court found the High Court's decision erroneous.
• It ruled that under Mohammedan law, the appellant had the right to custody of Anjum as her illegitimate child, irrespective of paternity.
• Trivedi’s acknowledgment of paternity further supported the appellant’s right to custody.
• The Court also noted that the appellant’s profession as a singing girl, shared with the respondent, did not affect her custody rights.
• The High Court’s consideration of controversial facts was deemed irrelevant to the legal entitlement to custody.
• The Court emphasized that the welfare of the child favored placing her with the appellant, who was willing and capable of caring for Anjum.
• It rejected the High Court's assertion that the child's interests were better served with the respondent, particularly since Trivedi had acknowledged paternity and was willing to support Anjum.
• The Court clarified that the appellant had the right to seek custody under Section 491 of the CrPC, without needing to resort to the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.
• The High Court’s failure to provide reasoning for its decision undermined the exercise of judicial discretion.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the respondents (except the State of Bombay) to transfer custody of Anjum to the appellant.
• It instructed the Registrar of the High Court to oversee the custody transfer and return the child's passport to the appellant's advocate.
• An injunction against removing Anjum from Greater Bombay remained in place until custody was transferred to the appellant.