Muslim Law - 2 | Civil Law for Judiciary Exams PDF Download

Ahmedabad Women’s Action Group v. Union of India, AIR 1997, 3 SCC 573

This case involves multiple Writ Petitions filed as Public Interest Litigation (PIL), challenging various aspects of personal laws related to different religious communities in India.
These petitions contested specific provisions in Hindu, Muslim, and other personal laws, alleging violations of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India, 1950.

Facts

• Several writ petitions questioned provisions in Muslim Personal Law and Hindu Law, alleging violations of fundamental rights like equality and non-discrimination.
• Grievances raised included issues like polygamy, unilateral divorce, discriminatory inheritance laws, and testamentary disposition.
• Past court decisions were cited during proceedings, urging consideration of a Uniform Civil Code.
• Despite the petitions, the court declined to entertain them, citing legislative prerogative and the gradual nature of legal reform.
• An appeal was filed challenging the court’s decision to dismiss the writ petitions.
• The appellants argued that the court erred by not addressing the constitutional validity of the contested provisions and that the judiciary’s duty to uphold fundamental rights should not be overlooked.
• The appellants requested a review of the court's decision, stating that the issues raised were of significant public interest and required judicial intervention.

Issues Involved

• Whether aspects of Muslim Personal Law, such as polygamy and unilateral Talaq, violate Articles 14 (right to equality) and 15 (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth) of the Constitution?
• Whether provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 violate Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution?
• Whether sections of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 and Indian Succession Act, 1925 are unconstitutional and violate constitutional provisions?
• Whether the court should intervene in matters of personal laws, considering the separation of powers and legislative competence in these matters?

Observation

• The court declined to entertain the writ petitions, stating that the issues raised were primarily matters of state policy and legislative discretion, falling outside the judiciary’s purview.
• The court referred to previous decisions where similar challenges to personal laws had been dismissed, emphasizing that such matters were more appropriate for legislative action than judicial intervention.
• The court also acknowledged the complexity and sensitivity of personal laws, deeply tied to religious beliefs and societal customs.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, noting that issues like the validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 were already being addressed by a Constitution Bench, suggesting that the matter was progressing through the appropriate legal channels.

Mussa Miya walad Mahammed Shaffi v. Kadar Bax, AIR 1928 PC 108

The case before the Bombay High Court concerns the validity of a gift under Mahomedan law.

Facts

• Musa Miya walad Mahamad Shaffi and Isa Miya alias Mahamad Ismailkhan walad Mahainad Shaffi, both minors, were defendants No. 18 and 19 in a suit filed on 6th January 1919 by Kadar Bax Sir Lancelot Khaj Bax, now deceased.
• The suit sought a three-eighth share of properties left by Abdul Rasul, under Sunni Mahomedan law, with the plaintiff being one of Abdul Rasul's heirs.
• Abdul Rasul's widow and daughter claimed that he had orally gifted his properties to his grandsons (defendants 18 and 19), supported by letters and oral declarations.
• The trial court ruled that although there was no valid gift, the letters constituted a will, awarding the plaintiff one-fourth share and the defendants three-fourths.
• Both the defendants and plaintiff appealed to the Bombay High Court.

Issues Involved

• Whether the alleged gift, announced by Abdul Rasul in 1910 without actual transfer of possession, was valid under Mahomedan law?
• Whether the circumstances surrounding the alleged gift, including Abdul Rasul's relationship with the grandsons and management of the properties, constituted a complete gift?
• Whether the findings of the trial court and High Court regarding the absence of transfer of possession and control by Abdul Rasul are acceptable?

Observation

• The Bombay High Court concluded that the property could not be considered a valid gift under Mahomedan law.
• Abdul Rasul's intention to make a gift was acknowledged, but the court found that there was no actual transfer of possession.
• The court discussed whether Abdul Rasul's announcement of the gift to his friends constituted a complete gift according to Mahomedan law.
• The court concluded that the facts did not fulfill the requirements for a valid gift. Specifically, Abdul Rasul did not relinquish control over the property nor deliver possession to his grandsons.
• A precedentrelated to gifts to infant sons under Mahomedan law was also discussed but was not applicable in this case.
• The precedent applied only when the father was deceased and no guardian had been appointed.
• Since the father was alive and living with his family, the precedent did not support the appellants' case.

Conclusion

• The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the alleged gift by Abdul Rasul to his grandsons was not complete under Mahomedan law.
• The court granted the plaintiff a three-eighth share of the properties left by Abdul Rasul and stated that no costs should be awarded, as there was no appearance for the respondents.

Yousuf Rawther v. Sowramma, AIR 1971 Ker. 261

Ms. Ghulam Kubra Bibi v. Mohd. Shafi Mohd. Din, AIR 1940 Pesh. 2

The case involved the restitution of conjugal rights under Muslim Law.

Facts

• Mohammad Shafi filed a lawsuit against his wife, Mt. Ghulam Kubra, seeking the restitution of conjugal rights.
• Additionally, he sought an injunction against her parents, preventing them from interfering with his marital relationship.
• Mt. Ghulam Kubra's defense was that she was never married to Mohammad Shafi.
• The question of the woman's age at the time of the supposed marriage became central to the case.

Both parties presented evidence, including:

• A Mullah testified that he conducted the nikah at the grandfather's request but denied anyone inquired about the bride’s consent.
• Mistri Abdul Karim provided vague testimony, mentioning two unnamed witnesses.
• Mohammad Ramzan and Mohammad Din claimed to have witnessed the nikah but did not offer further details about the ceremony.
• Mohammad Ramzan was identified as the plaintiff’s neighbor, and Mohammad Din as his employer for the past 8–9 years.
• The trial judge concluded that the girl was eligible for marriage at the time of the nikah and declared the marriage valid. He granted the decree as requested against all defendants.
• An appeal was filed at the District Court, where both parties agreed the girl was eligible to marry when the marriage took place.
• The Judge upheld the restitution of conjugal rights but overturned the injunction against the girl's parents.
• The appeal was partially accepted, specifically changing the injunction-related part of the order.

Issues Involved

• Whether the parties were competent to give consent at the time of marriage?
• Was there a proposal and acceptance of the marriage?
• Were witnesses present, and was the bride’s consent given in front of them?
• Can restitution of conjugal rights be granted?

Observation

• The Court emphasized that the customary practices followed in India for solemnizing marriages require clear evidence of the entire marriage procedure.
• The vague claims of two witnesses needed to be substantiated to prove that the marriage was properly conducted.
• The officiating Mullah testified that no one checked the girl’s willingness to marry.
• The girl was 17 years old when the marriage occurred, and the court noted that the parties were likely unaware of Islamic law stating a girl reaches marriageable age upon puberty (typically at 15), not necessarily at 18 years, as per general law.
• The girl was given away by her grandfather without direct consultation.
• Under Islamic law, a minor girl can be given away by her father, grandfather, or other paternal relatives, and this results in a valid nikah.
• However, there was uncertainty about whether the witnesses had seen the girl being given away by her grandfather.
• Given these considerations, the court ruled that no valid marriage took place, and thus Mohammad Shafi had no right to seek restitution of conjugal rights.

Conclusion

• The appeal of Mt. Ghulam Kubra was accepted, and the suit of Mohammad Shafi was dismissed with costs throughout.

Chand Patel v. Bismillah Begum, 1 (2008) DMC 588 (SC)

Abdul Hafiz Beg v. Sahebbi, AIR 1975 Bom. 165 178

This case deals with the doctrine of Marz-ul-maut under Muslim law, which refers to a gift made during a terminal illness or near-death condition. For a gift to be valid under this doctrine, it must be made during the period of Marz-ul-maut (death-illness), which is defined as a condition where death is highly probable.
A gift is considered to be made during Marz-ul-maut if it is made under the pressure of the sense of imminent death.

Facts

• The case centers on whether a gift made by an ill Muslim man falls under the doctrine of Marz-ul-maut.
• A man named Abdul Kadar fell severely ill and never recovered from his ailment.
• During his sickness, he was unable to take care of himself and eventually passed away.
• In the final stages of his illness, Abdul Kadar struggled to communicate and, when his daughters visited him, he could only express himself through gestures and tears, signifying his helplessness.
• Approximately 24 hours before his death, Abdul Kadar made a gift under these circumstances.
• This situation strongly indicates that he was aware of his imminent death when making the gift.

Issue Involved

• The central question in this case is whether the gift was made "under the pressure of the sense of the imminence of death".

Observation

The Bombay High Court outlined the essential conditions for applying the doctrine of Marz-ul-maut:

• The person must be seriously ill.
• There must be an expectation of a fatal outcome.
• There must be physical signs of the illness indicating its seriousness.

The court further clarified that:

• Merely fearing death due to old age or without any illness is insufficient to apply the doctrine.
• The possibility of death, a natural part of life, is not grounds for challenging a will.
• What matters is the cause of death and the individual’s condition. If death is certain, but the illness causes an immediate risk of death, this can influence the person’s behavior.
• The court also emphasized that if there is sufficient evidence (such as testimonies from close relatives or relevant documents), further investigation of the gift made during illness is unnecessary in a second appeal.
• If there is suspicion that the person was aware of their impending death, the burden of proof shifts to the party challenging the gift. Simply asserting that the death was accidental is not enough evidence to challenge the gift.

Conclusion

• The Court concluded that the doctrine of Marz-ul-maut cannot be challenged in a second appeal unless there is conclusive evidence to support the challenge. As such, the appeal was dismissed.

Shamim Ara v. State of U.P. (2002) SC 4726

Noor Saba Khatoon v. Mohd. Quasim AIR 1997 SC 3280

This case examines whether children of Muslim parents are entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) despite provisions under Muslim personal law.

Facts

• The appellant (wife) married the respondent (husband) according to Muslim customs.
• The couple had three children.
• Differences led to the respondent allegedly ejecting the appellant and the children from their marital home.
• The respondent failed to provide financial support after the expulsion.

In 1992, the appellant sought:

• ₹400/month for herself
• ₹300/month for each child.

The Trial Court ordered maintenance:

• ₹200/month for the appellant.
• ₹150/month for each child until they reached majority.

The respondent:

• Filed an application for modification under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.
• The Trial Court adjusted the appellant’s maintenance but upheld the order for the children.
• His revision petition was rejected by the Revisional Court.
• The respondent approached the High Court, which ruled partially in his favor.
• The appellant filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court.
• The SC considered Section 3(1)(b) of the Act of 1986 and Section 125, CrPC.

Issues Involved

• Does Section 3(1)(b) of the Act of 1986 impact the rights of minor children of divorced Muslim parents to claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC?

Observations

• A Muslim father with sufficient means has a clear obligation under both personal and statutory lawsto financially support minor children who are unable to sustain themselves.
• This obligation:
  • Continues until the children reach adulthood or, for females, until marriage.
  • Exists even if the divorced wife is caring for the children.
• Section 3(1)(b) of the Act of 1986 provides maintenance for the mother’s own support for two yearsafter a child’s birth.
• This does not affect the minor children’s right to claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC.
• The conditions for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC remain valid for minor children.
• Beneficial provisions like Section 125 CrPC should not be curtailed unless explicitly stated in the law.
• A Muslim father’s responsibilityto maintain his minor children is:
  • Absolute, akin to a Hindu father’s obligation under Section 125 CrPC.
  • Not overridden by Section 3(1)(b) of the Act of 1986.

Conclusion

Section 125 CrPC and Section 3(1)(b) of the Act of 1986operate in different spheres:

• The 1986 Act addresses a husband’s obligations to his divorced wife, including limited maintenance for children up to two years.
• Section 125 CrPC governs a Muslim father’s long-term maintenance obligation to minor children until they attain adulthood or self-sufficiency.
• The provisions do not conflict, ensuring children’s rights to maintenance remain intact.

Mohd. Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum,1985 SCR (3) 844

This landmark judgment under Muslim Law empowers a divorced woman to claim maintenance even after the Iddat period.

Facts

• The appellant husband married the respondent wife in 1932.
• In 1975, the appellant compelled the respondent to leave their shared residence.
• In April 1978, the respondent initiated legal proceedings under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), seeking Rs. 500 per month as maintenance.
• On 6th November 1978, the appellant finalized the divorce through irrevocable talaq.
• The appellant contended that under Muslim Law, he was not obliged to provide maintenance post-Iddat and claimed to have:
• Paid Rs. 200 per month for two years.
• Deposited Rs. 3000 as dower in court during the Iddat period.
• The Magistrate initially ordered Rs. 25 per month as maintenance, which was later increased to Rs. 179.20 by the High Court.
• The appellant then filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court.

Issues Involved

• Can Muslim women claim maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC?
• Does Muslim Personal Law absolve a husband of the obligation to provide maintenance to his divorced wife?
• Is there a conflict between Section 125 of CrPC and Muslim Personal Law regarding a husband's liability to maintain his divorced wife?

Observations

On 23rd April 1985, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled:

• Muslim Personal Law, which restricts the husband's responsibility to the Iddat period, does not apply to the scenario described in Section 125 of CrPC.
• Section 125 CrPC applies to any person with sufficient means neglecting or refusing to maintain his wife who cannot maintain herself.
• If the divorced wife is self-sufficient, the husband’s duty ends with the Iddat period.
• However, if she cannot sustain herself, she is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC.
• There is no conflict between Section 125 CrPC and Muslim Personal Law, as both recognize the obligation of a Muslim husband to provide maintenance to a divorced wife unable to maintain herself.
• Cited a translation of Holy Quran, Ayat 241by Dr. Allamah Khadim Rashmani Nuri:
  • “For divorced women, a provision should be made with fairness in addition to dower; this is a duty on the reverent.”

Conclusion

• The Court ruled in favor of Shah Bano Begum, directing the appellant to pay Rs. 10,000 as maintenance.
• This judgment expanded the maintenance rights of Muslim women under Section 125 of CrPC, affirming the husband's obligation to provide maintenance beyond the Iddat period if the wife is unable to sustain herself.