The Battle of Taraori and its Aftermath - 1 | HPSC Preparation: All subjects - HPSC (Haryana) PDF Download

Maratha and Durrani Conflict in India

• Dattaji, after lifting the siege of Sukkartal, decided to meet Ahmad Shah Durrani. He crossed the Jamuna at Andhera Ghat on December 18, 1759 and finalised his plans at Kunjapura. He retained the best 25,000 troops for himself, while the others under Janakoji and Imad formed his rear towards Delhi to give support to the main body in case of an emergency or disaster. 
• Dattaji then proceeded towards Kurukshetra and sent Janakoji and Imad to Karnal. The Maratha advance guard of 5000 under Bhoite, along with 1000 Mughalia troops, routed an Afghan party of scouts near Taraori and pursued them further. The Shah ordered Shah Pasand Khan with 4000 troops to advance, and the Marathas fled away at the sight of the advancing Afghan army, giving hundreds of their men to slaughter. 
• When Dattaji arrived and saw numerous headless trunks scattered all over, he decided to retire immediately to his base at Kunjapura. The Abdali forded the Jamuna near Buria and was joined at Saharanpur by Najib. The combined forces then marched along the eastern bank of the Jamuna to Delhi. Upon hearing the news, Dattaji decided to leave Kunjapura and protect the capital from falling into enemy hands. 
• However, his efforts were hindered by the treacherous wazir who deserted him and sought refuge with Surajmal. Dattaji stopped at Sonepat to gather intelligence on the enemy's movements but was hindered by the hostile peasantry who had been angered by past Maratha actions. Dattaji posted his men at all the fords on the Jamuna, and Sabaji Patel arrived at Barari ghat with 700 men. 
• After a short visit to Delhi, Dattaji sent all the families in his camp to Rewari and then camped at Barari ghat on January 4, 1760. Unfortunately, a serious encounter with the Afghans led to the Maratha defeat, resulting in the loss of Dattaji, his brother Jotiba, and Janakoji being badly wounded. 
• The Marathas fled towards Delhi but were pursued beyond the capital, and a large number of them were killed. Malhar Rao took over as the leader of the Maratha cavalry after Janakoji's injury, but he was relentlessly pursued by Durrani forces at Narnaul, Rewari, and Delhi. He managed to evade the enemy each time, moving from Bahadurgarh to Kalkaji and then into the doab. 
• The Marathas intended to devastate Blajib's territories and intercept his treasury worth ten lakhs on its way to the Afghan camp. However, the plan failed because the Abdali had already sent a strong force under his able commanders to protect Rohilkhand from the Marathas. 
• Ultimately, Malhar had to seek refuge with Surajmal. The invading Durrani army, on Najib's advice, established its headquarters at Aligarh. This allowed them to capture Maratha outposts in the Gangetic doab and establish direct contact with Avadh.

Sadashiv Rao Bhau's Mission to Restore Maratha Power in the North

• After losing Punjab and suffering reverses at Taraori and Bararighat, the Maratha ascendancy in northern India vanished. To recover their power, the Peshwa dispatched Sadashiv Rao Bhau, known as "the hero of Udgir," with a large army, accompanied by the Peshwa's son, Vishwasrao, as the nominal commander-in-chief. 
• Bhau faced numerous challenges, including inadequate troops, insufficient ammunition, meager finances, and little time to plan his campaign. He had to cross the Chambal and Gambhir rivers, which delayed his advance, allowing the Durrani to unite his potential Indian Muslim allies and turn the war into a religious conflict.
• Bhau's diplomatic negotiations with the Rajputs and Suja-ud-daulah to gain alliances in northern India failed, as they were eventually won over by the Durrani. Bhau was later joined by Malhar Rao, Janakoji, Suraj Mai, and Imad-ul-mulk at his camp between the Chambal and Gambhir rivers in June. 
• However, he learned that collecting money from the Gangetic doab was no longer possible due to the presence of Jahan Khan and Najib. Peace negotiations between Malhar Rao and Hafiz Rehmat Khan ended abruptly upon Bhau's arrival because the Marathas were not serious about them, and their demands were excessive. 
• Bhau's campaign was set to be the most significant action of his time, but his mission to restore Maratha power in the north was fraught with difficulties and setbacks. Suraj Mai suggested a guerrilla fighting approach instead of a dangerous pitched battle, as he could be a potential ally of the Marathas. He advised leaving heavy equipment, artillery, and families in Jhansi, Gwalior, or any Jat forts while the Maratha cavalry engaged in foraging and skirmishing to threaten the home lands of the Afghans and Rohillas. 
• This would compel them to desert Durrani, who would then leave for Afghanistan. Malhar Rao agreed to this plan, but Sadashiv Rao Bhau rejected it, considering it as the "chatter of goatherds and zamindars" who were not knowledgeable in scientific war. Bhau instead chose to march on Delhi. On July 22, Bhau's advance guard, led by Malhar Rao, Janakoji, and Balvant Rao Mehendale, attacked the capital and captured it on August 1. 
• Although the capture of Delhi did not hold much significance as long as the Muslim confederacy remained united, it made Bhau very proud and haughty, as described by Nana Phadnis and Mir Dard. The capture did cause despair and dismay in the Afghan camp, and there were reports of Abdali's readiness to return to Afghanistan. 
• However, Sadashiv Rao, who was responsible for protecting the Maratha interests in the north, should have only fought the formidable enemy, Abdali, when his resources were superior. Imad, the treacherous wazir, found out that Bhau was trying to win over his enemy Suja-ud-daulah by promising him the wazirship. As a result, Imad went under the tutelage of Surajmal and incited him against the Marathas. Surajmal had never been pleased with the Marathas and their involvement in the conflict. 
• He desired to have control of the imperial capital, which the Marathas were unwilling to grant him. Bhau's support of Shuja was just an excuse for Surajmal. It appears that the accusations made by Grant Duff, Prof. J.N. Sarkar, and Natwar Singh that Surajmal's desertion was solely due to Bhau's mismanagement have no factual basis.

Challenges faced by the Marathas during their stay at the capital

• The Maratha army faced several difficulties during their stay at the capital. The rainy season caused health problems for both men and animals. There was a shortage of money, food, and fodder, and the local bankers had left the area. The upkeep of the royal family and the palace staff also added to Bhau's difficulties. 
• Bhau's despatches to the Peshwa expressed his despair about the situation. Reports from his camp in Delhi stated that there was not enough money to pay for even one week's subsistence in a month, and that the men and horses were starving. The Marathas were facing a lot of difficulties during their stay in Delhi. 
• The rainy season had adversely affected the health of their men and animals, and there was a scarcity of money, food, and fodder. Bhau found it challenging to maintain the royal family and pay the palace staff. In September 1760, Bhau wrote to the Peshwa that his troops were starving, and he was unable to get any loans or revenue from the collectors. Nana Phadnis and Bapuji Ballal also expressed their despair in their letters, mentioning that even high-ranking officials had to go without food for a day, and the army had lost its spirit. The Marathas were unable to raise loans anywhere, and both men and animals had become weak. 
• The situation seemed bleak, and the end did not appear to be good. By mid-September 1760, the situation had deteriorated significantly and Bhau was forced to consider peace negotiations with Suja. The terms proposed by Durrani were that Sarhind would remain the eastern boundary of his empire, and Shah Alam, Shuja-ud-daulah, and Najib-ud-daulah would be recognized as the Emperor, Wazir, and Mir Bakshi, respectively. 
• Additionally, Sadashiv Rao Bhau was not to interfere in this arrangement any further. In effect, this proposal meant that the Punjab would be ceded to the Afghans, and the Marathas would have to withdraw from the north, with the farthest limit of their empire not to extend beyond the river Chambal. 
• Although Bhau did not accept these terms, as he did not believe in "expediency and political compromises", their acceptance would have averted the catastrophe that befell the Marathas a few months later. Protecting the lives of his soldiers should have been the highest priority for a commander, more important than personal honour and prestige. It would have been easier to recover lost ground later.  
• In late September, Bhau made the decision to depart from Delhi. His intention was to travel to Kunjapura and Kurukshetra and then either return to Delhi or cross the Jamuna River and engage in combat in the Gangetic doab located in Saharanpur or the Meerut district. However, Bhau's preparations for the protection of the capital and communication line were found to be insufficient.
• On October 10, 1760, Bhau departed from Delhi and headed towards Kunjapura, a fortified town located on the Jamuna river, under the control of Najabat Khan. This town served as a gathering point for Durrani's supplies of money and materials from the Punjab. At the time of Bhau's arrival, Abdus Samad Khan, the Governor of Sarhind, was also present there. When the Marathas attacked, the Afghans retreated on October 17. 
• The battle resulted in the deaths of Abdus Samad Khan, Najabat Khan, and Qutab Shah. The Marathas gained a vast amount of loot, including 6.5 lakh rupees in cash, two lakh maunds of wheat and other provisions, 3000 horses, many camels, large numbers of guns, and stores of munitions. On October 19, 1760, the Marathas celebrated their victory over the Afghans at Kunjapura with great enthusiasm during the Dusehra festival. 
• After staying in Kunjapura for some time, they planned to visit Kurukshetra for performing religious rites and then return to Delhi. They left Kunjapura on October 25 and were near Taraori when they received the news that Abdali had crossed the Jamuna at Baghpat. As a result, Bhau quickly marched towards Panipat and sent some contingents ahead to gather information about the enemy's actual position. On October 25, Ahmad Shah and his army crossed the Jamuna at Baghpat and set up their camp at Fakhru garden in Sonipat. 
• During this time, a Maratha contingent of 1,000 soldiers led by Baji Hari Deshpande was caught off guard and massacred while they slept. A battle took place between the advanced Maratha patrols and the Afghans in Samalakha on October 28, resulting in the loss of around 1,500 Maratha soldiers and 1,000 Afghan soldiers. 
• Ahmad Shah then stayed in Ganaur for three days before arriving in Samalakha on the following day. Finally, he set up his camp in the vicinity of Panipat on November 1, 1760, where Sadashivrao Bhau and the Maratha army had already arrived on October 29, 1760.

Description of Maratha Camp at Panipat

• The Maratha camp at Panipat was established near the Shah Nahar, which was the primary source of water for the encampment. The camp was located to the northwest and southwest of Panipat, with the canal and the Panipat hill providing protection to the west and east. In front of the camp lay a large, dry, and dusty plain, which offered little room for manoeuvring. 
• The Maratha camp was well-fortified, covering a vast area of around 10 kilometres in length and 4 kilometres in depth. The camp's defences included the city, which was incorporated within the perimeter. The construction of the entrenchments was planned, designed, and executed under the guidance of Ibrahim Khan Gardi. The use of artillery ensured that the whole camp was defensible from all sides, resembling a well-defended moat. 
• In contrast, the Abdali was flexible and made adjustments to his camp as needed when the Marathas were attacking and continuously firing at his position. He moved his camp 10 kilometers to the southeast to get away from polluted air and water. The Afghan encampment was spread across several villages including Behrampur, Bapauli, Mirzapur, and Goyenla with the battle taking place in Chhajpur. By the end of December, Abdali moved northward along the Delhi road. The battlefield then shifted to the villages of Risalu and Nimbdi. 
• According to two eyewitnesses, Kashiraj and Muhammad Jafar Shamlu, the number of soldiers in the opposing armies at the Battle of Panipat varies widely. However, a more reliable estimate given by Prof. J.N. Sarkar suggests that the Afghan army consisted of 60,000 soldiers, half of which were Abdali's own men (23,000 horse and 7,000 foot), and the other half were Indian allies (7,000 horse and 23,000 foot). On the other hand, the Maratha army had 45,000 soldiers in total, including cavalry, infantry, and artillery.
• J.N. Sarkar has provided an estimated breakdown of the two armies, which is as follows: For Durrani's army, the Shah Pasand wing consisted of 5,000 horsemen, Najib's wing comprised 15,000 foot soldiers and dismounted cavalry, and Shuja's wing consisted of 3,000 men, of which one-third were foot-musketeers. In the center of the army, there were 19,000 soldiers under Shah Wali Khan, who had 1,000 camel-swivels. On the right wing, there were Ahmad Bangash's 1,000 foot soldiers, followed by a small gap and then Hafiz Rahmat and Dundi Khan's 14,000 soldiers, of which only one-fourth or less were cavalry. Amir Beg's Kabuli infantry and Barkhurdar Khan's Persian cavalry together had 3,000 men. On the other hand, the Maratha army had 45,000 soldiers consisting of cavalry, infantry, and artillery. 
• According to J.N. Sarkar's estimation, the Afghan army had a total of 60,000 soldiers, while the Maratha army had 45,000 soldiers. Sarkar provided a detailed breakdown of the Afghan army, which included Shah Pasand with 5,000 soldiers on the wing, Najib with 15,000 soldiers on foot and dismounted cavalry, Shuja with 3,000 soldiers, and Shah Wali Khan with 19,000 soldiers and 1,000 camel-swivels in the center. Ahmad Bangash had 1,000 foot soldiers on the right wing, followed by Hafiz Rahmat and Dundi Khan with 14,000 soldiers, Amir Beg (Kabuli infantry), and Barkhurdar Khan (Persian cavalry) with a combined total of 3,000 soldiers.
• On the other hand, the Maratha army had Ibrahim Khan Gargi with 8,000 foot-musketeers, Damaji Gaikwad with 2,500 horse, Vittal Shivdev with 1,500 horse, and a few minor captains with 2,000 horse soldiers on the left wing. In the center were Bhau and Vishwas Rao with 13,500 household troops, and on the right wing were Antaji Manakeshwar with 1,000 horse soldiers, Satvoji Jadav with 1,500 horse soldiers, and a few minor captains with 2,000 horse soldiers. Jaswant Rao Pawar had 1,500 soldiers, Shamsher Bahadur had 1,500 soldiers, Jankoji Sindhia had 7,000 soldiers, and Malharrao Holkar had 3,000 soldiers.

Disadvantages of the Maratha Army

• The Maratha army had several drawbacks, including a feudal character, a lack of a common bond between its different contingents, poor coordination among its commanders, and a large number of non-combatants attached to its cavalry. In addition, the Maratha horsemen were lightly equipped and scantily clad, which led to Ahmad Shah's contemptuous remark about them being "naked-backed." 
• The Maratha army's heavy and large guns were difficult to adjust at their level, resulting in their shots usually passing over enemy troops and falling away in the rear. According to Prof. J.N. Sarkar, the Afghan army had several advantages over the Maratha army. They had better horses, more efficient and mobile artillery, and their officers wore armours, unlike the Marathas who hardly did. 
• The Afghan army was also superior in terms of its composition, movements, and discipline. They strictly enforced order in both camp and battlefield, punished even the slightest disobedience from any subordinate, and controlled every officer's movements according to the plan of the supreme chief. 
• The officers formed a chain of command from the generalissimo to the common soldier, and their orders were transmitted regularly by an efficient staff organization. Above all, the control of the troops was excellent, which distinguished Ahmad Shah's army from any other Asian force of that time. Ahmad Shah's transcendent genius for war and diplomacy and his towering personality had risen like Nadir from dust and attained almost the same pre-eminence of fortune and invincibility in war as Nadir.

Skirmishes and Engagements between the Marathas and Afghans in the Battle of Panipat

• From November 1 to January 14, the Marathas and Afghans engaged in skirmishes almost every day, with occasional fire exchanges. The most significant battles occurred on November 19, 22, and December 7. The November 19 encounter was a close battle between Marathas and Wazir Shah Wali Khan's patrol parties, which initially favored the Marathas but they had to withdraw to their camp due to enemy reinforcement. 
• Although the Marathas were in high spirits and morale throughout November, it could be an exaggeration due to their misunderstanding of Abdali's initial restraint and his preoccupation with shifting his camp. On December 7, a major battle between Sultan Khan and Balwant Rao Mehendale took place. Despite successfully repelling the Rohilla attack, the Marathas suffered a severe loss in the death of Balwant Rao, who was not only a brave soldier and fearless general but also a close relative and personal friend of Sadashivrao Bhau. 
• On December 17, Govindpant, who was given the task of attacking the upper doab to disrupt the grain convoys and raid the homes of the Rohillas and Shuja's northern districts to trap Abdali at Panipat, was killed in action against Atai Khan. 
• His death posed a serious threat to the Maratha line of communication, and most of the collection he sent to Bhau fell into the hands of Abdali's troops. Additionally, 20,000 non-combatant Marathas were massacred by Shah Pasand Khan and his men on a night patrol while they were gathering firewood and fodder. The Maratha camp became like a besieged town towards the end of December due to a series of unfortunate events. 
• The route to Delhi was blocked and the rear of the camp at Kunjapura was seized by Dalei Khan. The only direction from which supplies sometimes arrived was the northwest, from Alba Singh Jat of Patiala, but this source was also cut off eventually. 
• The dire situation of the Maratha camp led Bhau to make a final attempt to negotiate peace with the Shah, regardless of the cost. Contemporary writers and J.N. Sarkar paint a vivid picture of the Maratha camp on the eve of the final battle, where there was a shortage of food, firewood, and grass for horses. The uncremated corpses of men and beasts and the excrement of the large number of living creatures created an unbearable stench, making the living conditions in the entrenchment unbearable. 
• The Durrani was initially inclined to accept Bhau's peace offer, but influential figures like Najib-ud-daulah and Qazi Idris convinced him not to miss the opportunity to rid Hindustan of the Marathas.
• Sadashiv Rao Bhau's decision to engage in battle did not seem to be an impromptu decision, nor was it a unanimous decision among his officers. While Holkar and Janakoji preferred to delay the battle until they received a final reply from the other side, Bhau was feeling quite desperate since his officers and men were starving and there was a scarcity of food. 
• The soldiers were crying out in agony, urging them to make a valiant struggle against the enemy, and whatever fate awaited them after that, they were willing to face it. Bhau attempted to prevent the outbreak of war by sending a message to Kashiraja through his envoy, Balak Ram, requesting a response as soon as possible due to the urgency of the situation. 
• He emphasized that time was running out and that action needed to be taken immediately. However, as soon as the message was sent, the Maratha army began to mobilize, indicating that Bhau did not receive a response in time and had to take action regardless.