The Code of Civil Procedure - 1 | Civil Law for Judiciary Exams PDF Download

Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (1986)

This is a significant ruling concerning the applicability of Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to writ petitions.
The judgment was delivered by a 2-judge bench comprising of Justice ES Venkataramiah and Justice MM Dutt.

Facts

• The petitioners, along with others, filed applications seeking the grant of a permit before the Regional Transport Authority, Bilaspur.
  The State Transport Appellate Tribunal overturned the decision granting the permit in favor of the petitioner.
• Dissatisfied with the Tribunal’s ruling, the petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Article 227/226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI).
• The petitioner sought permission to withdraw the petition, which was dismissed as withdrawn.
• Later, the petitioner filed a second writ petition in the High Court of MP, which was also dismissed. Aggrieved by this decision, the petitioner filed a special leave petition seeking permission to appeal against the High Court's order.

Issue Involved

• The key issue was whether a petitioner, after withdrawing a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without the Court's permission, can file a fresh writ petition under the same Article.

Observations

• The Court noted that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) are not directly applicable to writ proceedings, although the procedure prescribed therein is followed by the High Court as far as it is feasible in handling writ petitions.
• The Court observed that the principle behind Rule 1 of Order XXIII is that when a plaintiff initiates a suit in a Court and utilizes the remedy available to him under law, he should not be allowed to file a fresh suit on the same subject matter after abandoning the earlier suit or withdrawing it without the Court’s permission to file a fresh suit. Invito beneficium non datur (A benefit is not given to a person who does not desire it).
• The central question considered by the Court was whether the principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the CPC should also apply to writ petitions filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
• A Court that is unwilling to admit a petition generally would not permit the filing of a fresh petition, though it may allow the withdrawal of the petition.
• It was clear that if a writ petition is withdrawn by the petitioner, he cannot file an appeal against the order passed in that petition because he would no longer be considered an aggrieved party.
• The principle of Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the CPC should, therefore, be extended to cases involving the withdrawal of writ petitions in the interest of justice.
• While withdrawing a writ petition without permission to file a new one does not bar other remedies, such as a suit or a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the remedy under Article 226 should be considered abandoned when the writ petition is withdrawn without permission to refile.
• The Court held that the High Court was correct in ruling that a fresh writ petition on the same cause of action was not maintainable, as the earlier petition was withdrawn without the permission to file a fresh one.

Conclusion

• This judgment discusses the application of Order XXIII Rule 1 of the CPC to writ petitions.
• The Court concluded that if a writ petition is withdrawn without the Court’s permission, a fresh writ petition on the same cause of action cannot be filed.

SCG Contracts India Pvt. Ltd v. KS Chamankar Infra Pvt. Ltd. (2019)

This case is about the period of limitation for filing a written statement in court. The judgment was made by a two-judge bench, including Justice RF Nariman and Justice Vineet Saran.

Facts of the Case

• A lawsuit was filed on March 10, 2017, seeking a specific sum of money.
• The defendant received the court summons on July 14, 2017.
• The deadline for filing the written statement was November 11, 2017, which is 120 days after receiving the summons.
• No written statement was filed by the defendant by this deadline.
• The defendant's lawyer requested an additional seven days to submit the written statement.
• The court granted this request, extending the deadline for filing the written statement.
• However, this extension was disputed, leading to a Special Leave Petition being filed.

Key Issue

• Can the time limit for filing a written statement in commercial lawsuits be extended beyond 120 days?

Important Observations

• The Commercial Courts Act (2015) introduced new rules for filing written statements.
• According to the rules, a written statement must be filed within 30 days of receiving the summons.
• A grace period of 90 days can be allowed, but the court must provide reasons and impose costs for this extension.
• After 120 days, the defendant loses the right to file a written statement, and the court cannot accept it.
• The court concluded that several High Courts had determined these rules are mandatory.
• As a result, the court ordered that the written statement from the defendant should be removed from the records.

Conclusion

• This judgment clarifies the timeline for filing written statements in commercial suits.
• It confirms that the amendments to the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) regarding commercial suits must be strictly followed.

Lanka Suryaprakash Rao and Others v. Gadigatia Venkaramanna Chowdary (1992)

This is a landmark judgment concerning the attachment of property in the execution of a decree. The judgment was delivered by a single judge bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, comprising Justice V. Neeladri Rao.

Facts

Original Suit & Decree:

• R-2 (son) filed a partition suit (O.S. No. 57/83) against R-1 (father).
• The suit ended in a compromise, and a decree for Rs. 3,513 was passed in favor of R-1 (father) for decree costs.

Execution Proceedings:

• R-1 filed for execution (E.P. No. 54/85) to recover the amount.
• He requested the attachment of immovable properties, and the properties were subsequently attached.
• R-2 deposited the amount (Rs. 3,513) while maintaining his objections.

Application for Payment:

• R-1 filed an application (E.A. No. 282/85) requesting a cheque for the amount.
• The judge allowed this application but required third-party security.
• R-1 filed the security bond.

New Parties Enter:

• The revision petitioners filed a separate suit (O.S. No. 431/84) against R-2 and won the case.
• They then filed for execution (E.P. No. 201/85) on 27th December 1985.
• They sought to attach the same Rs. 3,513 that R-2 had deposited, and the attachment was made on 3rd January 1986.

Final Proceedings:

• The revision petitioners filed for either:
• Getting the full amount (Rs. 3,513) or
• Getting it distributed proportionally between them and R-1.
• The judge dismissed their application and ordered the cheque to be issued to R-1.

Issue Involved

• The key issue was whether R-1 (the original decree holder) had the right to the deposited money or whether the revision petitioners (who had a separate decree against R-2 and sought to attach the money later) had the right to it.

Observations

• The Court held that although R-1 was required to provide security, the money was still allocated to him.
• The only remaining step was to issue the cheque once the security was furnished.
• The revision petitioners filed their execution petition much later than when the money was deposited.
• Under Section 73 CPC, rateable distribution is only possible for creditors who apply for execution before the court receives the money.
• The revision petitioners admitted they were not entitled to rateable distribution.
• When money is deposited in court, the court holding the money (custody court) has the authority to decide who owns it.
• The court dismissed the revision petition, ruling that the Rs. 3,513 belonged to R-1 (father).
• R-1 was entitled to receive the money after providing the security as ordered on 9th December 1985.
• The revision petitioners had no right to either the full amount or rateable distribution.
• The attachment by the revision petitioners was ineffective because:
  • The money had already been allocated to R-1.
  • The revision petitioners only had claims against R-2, not R-1.
  • Their attempt to attach occurred after the money was already allocated to R-1.

Conclusion

• The court upheld the principle that once money is appropriated to someone by court order, it cannot be attached by other creditors who come later, even if there are conditions attached to its withdrawal.

Neemabai v. Gyanbai And others (1993)

This case was decided by Justice SK Dubey of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The key takeaway is that even if a court issues an ex-parte decree (a decision made by the court without the presence of one party), it must provide clear reasons for that decision.

Facts of the Case

• The plaintiff claimed that the father of the respondents had signed a registered agreement to sell agricultural land.
• The father of the respondents died before the agreement could be executed.
• When the respondents refused to fulfill the agreement, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit for specific performance (forcing them to honor the agreement).
• During the lawsuit, the plaintiff also requested to regain possession of the land, as he had been dispossessed.
• One respondent, Gulabbai, sold her share of the land to Nirpat Singh.
• The respondents argued that their father was never the owner of the land; it belonged to someone else.
• The trial court conducted the proceedings ex parte, meaning the respondents were not present to defend themselves.
• The trial court issued a judgment in favor of the plaintiff without addressing all the issues raised in the case.
• Nirpat Singh, who claimed to be affected by the decision, appealed to have his interests considered.
• The appellate court agreed and sent the case back to the trial court, stating that it did not adequately explain its decision.
• The plaintiff then appealed this remand decision.

Key Issue

• Was the appellate court correct to send the case back because the trial court's ex-parte judgment lacked sufficient reasoning?

Court's Observations

• The court highlighted that even if a case is held ex-parte, the plaintiff must still provide legal evidence to support their claim.
• When issues are raised, the plaintiff must prove their rights over the land unless the court finds a single issue sufficient to make a ruling.
• According to Order 20 Rule 5 of the CPC, courts should ideally address all issues in their decisions.
• Providing reasons for decisions is crucial; it ensures that the judgment is based on law and not arbitrary.
• The court concluded that the trial court's failure to follow the rules warranted no interference; hence, the case had to be sent back.

Conclusion

• A well-reasoned judgment is essential for a fair judicial system.
• The court emphasized that even for ex-parte decrees, providing reasons is necessary.

Radhika Konel Parekh v. Konel Parekh (1992)

Usha Balashaheb Swami & Ors v. Kiran Appaso Swami & Ors (2007)

Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (GAJRA)(D)

This case addresses the concept that the period of limitation should be calculated from the date when the right to sue first arises.

Facts

• The land in question was agricultural land under restrictive tenure as defined by Section 73AA of the Land Revenue Code (LRC).
  The plaintiff submitted an application to the Collector to sell the disputed property to the defendant, expressing no objection to the sale.
• The Collector granted permission for the sale, subject to the conditions outlined in Section 73AA of the LRC.
• Subsequently, the defendant sold the same property to other defendants.
• The plaintiffs filed a Special Civil Suit before the Principal Civil Judge against the original purchaser (Respondent No. 1) and also included the subsequent purchasers (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3) as defendants.
• The plaintiffs requested the court to cancel the subsequent sale by the respondent (original purchaser), declaring it illegal, void, ineffective, and not binding on them, claiming that the full sale consideration as set by the Collector had not been paid.
• Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 filed an application for the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), arguing that the plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitation and did not disclose any cause of action.
• The Trial Court ruled that the plaintiffs’ suit was barred by limitation and allowed the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.
• Dissatisfied with the Trial Court's decision, the plaintiffs filed an appeal before the Gujarat High Court.
• The Gujarat High Court upheld the Trial Court’s ruling and declared the sale deed between the respondent and the other respondents as valid.
• Aggrieved by this, the plaintiffs filed a petition before the Supreme Court.

Issues Involved

• Whether the period of limitation is to be counted from the date when the right to sue first arises?
• Whether the subsequent sale deeds are invalid due to the nonpayment of the original sale consideration?

Observations

• The Supreme Court observed that Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC mandates that a plaint be rejected if it appears from the plaint’s allegations that the suit is barred by any law.
• The Court also noted that even if the plaintiffs' assertions were true—that the full sale consideration had not been paid—it would not serve as a valid ground for canceling the sale deed.
• The Court clarified that the plaintiffs might pursue other legal remedies to recover the balance of the consideration but could not seek the cancellation of the registered sale deed.
• The Court highlighted that through clever drafting, the plaintiffs attempted to fabricate a false cause of action to bring the suit within the limitation period.
• The cause of action arose when the cheques issued by the defendant to the plaintiffs were discovered to be bogus and payment was not made on time, not when the defendant transferred the property to the other defendants.
• The delay of over 5½ years after the alleged cause of action showed that the suit was clearly barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Gujarat High Court and the Trial Court, holding that the suit was barred by limitation.

Harjyot Singh v. Manpreet Kaur, AIR 2021 DEL 518

This case addresses the discretionary power of the court to allow for condonation beyond the specified period.

Facts

• In this case, the plaintiff filed a case and an application for an interim order under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & Rule 2. The court passed an Ex-parte ad-interim order.
• The defendant filed his written statement along with an application requesting condonation of delay. The plaintiff objected to the application for condonation of delay.
• The period specified under Rule 4 of the Delhi High Court Rules states that condonation of delay cannot be requested for a period beyond 90 days.
• The defendant did not provide a justifiable reason for the delay.
• The defendant argued that in non-commercial matters, it is at the court’s discretion to grant condonation of delay beyond 90 days as per Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC.

Issue Involved

• Whether delay in filing of written statement can be condoned or not?

Observations

• The High Court referred to the case of Ram Sarup Lugani & Ors v. Nirmal Lugani & Ors. (2020) to discuss the limited jurisdiction of the court.
• The court observed, based on the judgment, that condonation of delay can only be granted up to 90 days and not beyond this limit.
• The court noted that Rule 4 of the DHC is procedural, and while a liberal view can be adopted by the court, it does not mean that this rule can be completely ignored.

Conclusion

• The High Court, after reviewing relevant cases and the rules of the CPC and DHC, concluded that condonation cannot be granted beyond 90 days and rejected the defendant’s application for condonation of delay.

Dhulabai v. State of MP, 1969 AIR 78

This case centers around the jurisdictional limits of civil courts and the authority of taxing authorities to impose non-uniform taxes.

Facts

• In this case, Tobacco dealers were the petitioners, engaged in the sale and purchase of tobacco for various activities.
• In 1950, the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act (MBSTA) was introduced, under which taxes were levied on sellers and manufacturers according to the provisions of section 3 of the act.
• As per section 5 of the MBSTA, a single point tax was applied with fixed minimum and maximum values, while the actual rate was determined by the government through notifications.
• Several notifications were issued, and taxes were collected accordingly.
• Various applications and suits were filed by the dealers under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), asserting the infringement of their rights under Article 301 of the Constitution of India (COI).
• The MBST Act was challenged based on Article 301 of COI, claiming that equal taxes were not levied on similar products, referencing the case of Bhailal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1960).
• The trial court ruled in favor of the applicant, but the state challenged the decision in the High Court.
• It was argued that no taxes could be imposed as per Article 301 of COI.
• As per section 17 of the MBST Act, no suit could be filed to question the assessment in a court of law.
• The High Court ruled that the trials were incompetent based on these contentions.
• An appeal was filed in the Supreme Court against the High Court's order.

Issues Involved

• Whether the collection of different taxes from importers and suppliers violates Article 301 of the Constitution?
• Whether the suit is triable under section 17 of the MBST Act?
• Whether the civil court has the jurisdiction to hear the case for a refund of taxes or the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution?
• Whether the Limitation Act can be used as a defense in this case?

Observations

• The Supreme Court observed that Article 301 of COI guarantees free trade, and the levying of taxes on importers and manufacturers restricts the free flow of trade and commerce. Hence, the court struck down the government’s tax notifications.
• The MBST Act includes provisions for review, revisions, appeals, rectifications, and references to the High Court.
• However, section 17 of the MBST Act contradicts this by preventing the court from reviewing the taxes levied by the authorities.
• This led to the dismissal of the High Court's order, and the appeals and suits were allowed.
• The Supreme Court, after reviewing various cases and acts, concluded that civil courts have jurisdiction to try cases unless explicitly barred by a statute.
• The court also provided guidelines for when civil courts can make an inference.
• The Supreme Court stated that when a writ is filed within three years of the tax imposition, it is triable by the High Court. After three years, relief can be sought through the civil court.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court delivered the judgment in favor of the authorities under the Indian Income Tax Act, as the authorities are covered by the statute. It was held that the collected tax cannot be overturned.

Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal (AIR 1964 SC 1810)

In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that a plea under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) based on the existence of a previous pleading cannot be entertained if the pleading on which it relies has not been produced. For such a plea to be valid, the defendant must file the pleadings from the earlier suit and prove to the court the identity of the cause of action in both suits.

Facts

• Bhooralal (respondent) filed a civil suit before the Subordinate Judge, First Class, against Gurbux (appellant). The suit was for the possession of a certain property and the recovery of mesne profits. The respondent claimed to be the absolute owner of the property, alleging that the defendant was in wrongful possession and had failed to vacate despite repeated demands. 
• Consequently, the respondent sought mesne profits. The plaint also mentioned that Bhooralal and his mother had filed another suit (previous suit) seeking recovery of mesne profits for the same property, which had been decreed in their favor.
• Gurbux filed a written statement raising a plea that Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC barred the suit, arguing that since the plaintiff had lost the remedy for possession in the previous suit, they could not seek recovery of mesne profits. The trial court dismissed the suit on the grounds of the bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC. 
• The respondent appealed to the Additional District Judge, who held that the plea under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC should not have been entertained as the pleadings from the earlier suit were not submitted in the present case. The appellant then appealed to the Rajasthan High Court, but the appeal was dismissed. Following this, the appellant filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court, challenging the order.

Issues Involved

• Whether the subsequent suit is barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC?
• Whether a suit for possession of immovable property and a suit for the recovery of mesne profits from the same property are based on the same cause of action?

Observations

• The Supreme Court held that a plea under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC cannot be sustained unless the plaintiff’s pleadings from the previous suit, which are said to create the bar, are presented as evidence. 
• The court noted that without presenting the earlier plaint, the defendant cannot ask the court to infer or deduce the facts alleged in the previous suit concerning the reliefs claimed. 
• Thus, for the plea to succeed, the defendant must prove the identity of the cause of action in both suits by submitting the pleadings from the prior suit.
• The court clarified that in order for the plea under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPCto succeed, the defendant must establish:
  • The second suit pertains to the same cause of action as the earlier suit.
  • The plaintiff was entitled to seek multiple reliefs for the same cause of action.
  • The plaintiff, having had the option to seek the second relief in the earlier suit, failed to do so without obtaining the court’s permission.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court concluded that the order of remand passed by the Additional District Judge and upheld by the High Court was correct. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court.