The Indian Evidence Act - 1 | Civil Law for Judiciary Exams PDF Download

Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2012)

This is a landmark ruling that establishes the principles to be followed to avoid the misuse of the Court's process. The judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice BS Chauhan and Justice Swatanter Kumar.

Facts

• Shri Kishore Samrite (Appellant), a former Member of the Legislative Assembly of Madhya Pradesh, filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court, acting as the next friend of Sukanya Devi, Balram Singh, and Sumitra Devi.
• The petition alleged that the three individuals were illegally detained by Respondent No. 6 and were unable to file the writ petition themselves.
• The petition also included news reports claiming that on the night of 3rd December 2006, Respondent No. 6 and his associates allegedly raped Sukanya Devi (daughter of Balram Singh).
• The Appellant argued that the three individuals had not been seen publicly since 4th January 2007 when they were last spotted in Amethi.
• The Appellant invoked the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI) on behalf of the three individuals, seeking a writ of habeas corpus.
• Prior to this petition, another individual, Ram Prakash Shukla, had filed a similar writ petition which was dismissed in a detailed judgment.
• The current writ was transferred to a Division Bench without providing an opportunity for the Appellant to be heard.
• When the case was brought before the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, the Court directed the Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to initiate a case against the Appellant and others involved in framing the Respondent.
• The Appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court challenging this order, claiming that he was not given a chance to be heard before the decision was made.

Issues Involved

• Was there a violation of principles of natural justice?
• Was there an abuse of the judicial process?
• Did the Appellant have locus standi in the case?

Observations

Regarding Issue (i):

• The principle of audi alteram partem (hear the other side) and other natural justice principles are fundamental to the rule of law.
• The Court referenced various judgments emphasizing that decisions on the composition of Benches and the roster are within the exclusive domain of the Chief Justice of the respective High Courts.
• It was held that the transfer of the writ petition lacked administrative propriety, and the Appellant was not given an adequate hearing.

Regarding Issue (ii):

• The Court stressed that the role of a judge is to discern the truth from the pleadings, documents, and arguments presented by the parties.
• It is the Court's duty to actively engage in proceedings and seek the truth, which is essential for the justice system.
• Litigants must come to the Court with clean hands and must not file frivolous petitions or misuse the judicial process.
• The Court observed that the Appellant had presented falsehoods and intended to mislead the Court with frivolous petitions.

Regarding Issue (iii):

• Locus standi is both a legal and factual question.
• Normally, a person directly or indirectly affected by an order has the right to seek relief. In this case, the Appellant and Respondent No. 8 were strangers to the petitioners.
• The Court concluded that the Appellant had no locus standi as the allegations in the writ petition were untrue, and neither the Appellant nor the Respondent had a direct or indirect interest in the case.
• The Court ultimately determined that the writ petition was filed with malice and served political purposes, misusing the judicial process. The petition was seen as a camouflage for personal disputes rather than a genuine case of public interest litigation.

Directions by the Court:

• The Court declared that the writ petition was driven by malice and political vendetta.
• It was emphasized that the next friend (Appellant) did not approach the Court with clean hands and had misused the judicial process.
• The Court found no evidence to support the claims that Respondent No. 6 committed any of the alleged acts.

Conclusion

• This ruling reinforces the importance of coming to Court with clean hands and highlights the Court's duty to discover the truth. It condemns the practice of misusing legal avenues for political purposes and underscores the need for litigants to present genuine cases.

Kalyan Kumar Gogoi v. Ashutosh Agnihotri and othrs. AIR 2011 SC 760

The Supreme Court in the present case criticized the type of evidence produced by the appellant, specifically hearsay evidence.

Facts

• A notice was published inviting nominations for candidates to contest the Assam State Legislative Assembly Election.
• The appellant filed his nomination papers to contest the elections.
• Respondent No. 2 filed his nomination papers as the candidate of the Bhartiya Janata Party for the same constituency.
• The nominations were declared valid by the Returning Officer.
• On the day of polling, the notified station was not set up in the designated school. Instead, the polling was conducted in a different school, causing confusion and chaos among the voters, many of whom left without casting their votes.
• After a complaint from the appellant, the polling was shifted back to the notified polling station.
• When the votes were counted, the margin between the appellant and respondent No. 2 was 175 votes, with respondent No. 2 winning the election.
• The appellant lodged a complaint before the Returning Officer, demanding a repoll at the polling station.
• The Commissioner and District Election Officer held that the polling issue was promptly addressed on the day of the election, under the guidance of the Election Observer, with the presence of the Zonal Officer, Sector Officer, Constituency Magistrate, and Polling Agents.
• Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant filed an appeal before the Gauhati High Court, which was dismissed.
• The appellant then filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues Involved

• Whether polling at a non-notified place and the curtailing of voting time materially affected the election result?

Observations

• The Supreme Court observed that in India, not all voters always cast their votes, as various factors influence voter turnout, and it is impossible to predict how many votes will go to each candidate.
• The Court criticized the type of evidence presented by the appellant, noting that it was hearsay evidence.
• The term "hearsay evidence" is not used in the Evidence Act because it is considered inaccurate and vague.
• Hearsay evidence is inadmissible under Indian law because it cannot be tested through cross-examination and often lacks better testimony that should be presented.
• The Supreme Court noted that the appellant's claim of 200-300 voters leaving due to confusion about the polling station was vague and exaggerated.
• The witnesses presented by the appellant offered hearsay evidence, not direct evidence.
• The Court also noted non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 25 and 56 of the Act and Rule 15 of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 but concluded that no inference could be made regarding whether this non-compliance affected the election result.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court confirmed the Gauhati High Court's decision and dismissed the appeal, stating that the appellant failed to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt and the evidence provided was inadmissible.

Jabir v. State of Uttarakhand CrA 972 of 2013

Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani (AIR 2003 SC 2418)

Kushal Rao v. The State of Bombay (AIR 1958 SC 22)

In this case, the Supreme Court observed that to assess the reliability of a dying declaration, it must undergo thorough scrutiny, especially since the statement is made in the absence of the accused, who has no opportunity for cross-examination. However, if the court concludes that the dying declaration truthfully depicts the circumstances of the death and identifies the assailants, there is no need for further corroboration.

Facts

• Rival factions in Nagpur: Kushal (appellant) and Tukaram led one faction, while Ramgopal, Inayatullah, and Tantu led another.
• Conflict with Baboolal: Baboolal, who was friendly with the rival faction, had bad terms with Kushal.
• Assault: According to the prosecution, Baboolal was attacked by Kushal, Tukaram, and others using swords and spears, inflicting injuries on him.
• Dying declaration:Baboolal, after being admitted to the hospital, made a statement to the doctor about his attackers, naming Kushal and Tukaram.
  • The doctor informed the police, and Sub-Inspector recorded a dying declaration after consulting the doctor.
  • A Magistrate also recorded the dying declaration, confirming Baboolal’s fitness to give it.
• Baboolal’s death: Baboolal passed away the next morning.
• Trial and conviction: The trial court convicted Kushal and Tukaram for murder under Section 302 of IPC, sentencing Kushal to death and Tukaram to life imprisonment.
• Appeal to High Court: The High Court acquitted Tukaram but upheld Kushal's conviction based on the dying declaration. Kushal sought a certificate of fitness under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, which was granted.
• Supreme Court Appeal: Kushal appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues Involved

• Can the accused be convicted solely based on a dying declaration without any corroborative evidence?

Observations

Dying declaration as sole basis of conviction:

• The Supreme Court held that the requirement for corroboration does not stem from an inherent weakness in the dying declaration as evidence.
• The Court emphasized that each case should be decided based on its facts and the circumstances under which the dying declaration was made.

Principles governing the acceptance of dying declarations:

• Dying declarations and corroboration: It is not an absolute rule that a dying declaration requires corroboration, but each case needs individual examination.
• Status of dying declarations: A dying declaration holds the same weight as other pieces of evidence and should be evaluated based on surrounding circumstances.
• Reliability: A dying declaration recorded by a competent Magistrate is considered more reliable than one depending on oral testimony.
• Testing reliability: To assess reliability, factors like the person's condition at the time, the timing of the statement, and the possibility of influence from interested parties must be considered.
• Baboolal’s dying declarations: Baboolal made three successive declarations over two hours, consistently naming Kushal and Tukaram as his assailants. No part of his statement was shown to be false.
• Benefit of doubt to Tukaram: Due to the similarity of names in the locality, Tukaram was acquitted, and the other two accused were not named.
• Conclusion of the Court: The Court found no reason to doubt the reliability of the dying declarations, which were sufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction for murder.

Conclusion

• Need for corroboration: The necessity for corroboration arises only when the court doubts the reliability of the dying declaration due to potential infirmities. In this case, the declarations were deemed truthful and reliable, confirming the appellant's conviction for murder.

Pulukuri Kottaya v. King-Emperor (1946)

The confessional portion of a statement that does not pertain to the discovery of facts must be separated from the portion that is relevant to such discovery.

Facts

• The appellants were charged with murder.
• The police sub-inspector recorded statements from prosecution witnesses, including 4 out of 6 alleged eyewitnesses, in his notebook.
• These statements were then recorded by the Circle Inspector and documented in the case diary.
• During the Sessions trial, Witness No. 2, the principal prosecution witness, claimed that he was not provided with copies of the earlier statements and requested the court to make them available for cross-examination.
• A breach of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure occurred, as these statements were not provided to the defense.
• The Session Judge directed the public prosecutor to comply with the request for the statements.
• It was found that all 6 eyewitnesses were hostile to the accused, but their testimonies were deemed to be substantially true.
• The Session Court convicted the accused based on these findings, and the High Court upheld the conviction in an appeal.
• The accused filed an appeal by special leave against the High Court's judgment, arguing that their statements were admitted in violation of Sections 26 and 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA).

Issue Involved

• Whether a confession made to the police while in custody, leading to the discovery of a weapon, is admissible as evidence against the accused?

Observations

• Justice John Beaumont stated that only the part of the confession which leads to the discovery of facts should be considered, and this discovery must be related to a physical object rather than a mental fact.
• Therefore, the confessional portion of the statement that is not related to the discovery of facts will be inadmissible as evidence.

Conclusion

• The purpose of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is to balance the admission of statements leading to the discovery of facts while protecting the accused from coerced confessions.

Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (1949)

This case, Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (1949), addresses the use of accomplice evidence in criminal trials.

Facts

• On October 11, 1946, Kalia Behara was murdered while driving passengers in his jutka between Berbampur and Golantra.
• The appellant, along with six others, was convicted of murder under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
• The High Court of Patna upheld the conviction after rejecting the appeal.

Key Issue

• Was there sufficient evidence to convict the appellant?

Observations

• The evidence included testimony from Kholli Behara, an accomplice who became an approver, and a confession from another accused, Trinath.
• Trinath's confession was recorded but later retracted in court.
• Other evidence included the recovery of items linked to the murder, such as a loin cloth and a khantibadi (cutting tool).
• It is generally unsafe to rely solely on an accomplice's testimony without corroboration from other evidence.
• Statements made under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be used as primary evidence but can support or challenge what the individual says in court.
• An accomplice cannot reinforce their own testimony; repeated tainted evidence doesn’t lose its flaws.
• The High Court recognized the need for corroboration of the approver's testimony.
• Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act allows the court to consider confessions but emphasizes that they are weak evidence unless supported by other facts.
• Confessions from co-accused are much less reliable and cannot stand alone as proof.
• In this case, the court agreed that the evidence presented was insufficient to uphold the conviction based solely on the approver's testimony and Trinath’s confession.

Conclusion

• The court concluded that the conviction of the appellant was not valid, and the appeal was allowed.

Ram Narain v. State of UP (1973)

This case involves the evidentiary value of handwriting expert evidence.

Facts

• On August 15, 1964, a 5-year-old boy named Mannu went missing from the home of a relative of the appellant, Ram Narain.
• A police report was filed the next day, and a reward of Rs. 501 was offered through newspapers.
• On August 21, 1964, and October 21, 1964, ransom letters were sent to Mannu's father, demanding Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 5,000 respectively.
• Mannu was found on January 11, 1965, after a tip-off about his possible location.
• Ram Narain was accused of sending the ransom letters and was convicted under Sections 384/511 of the Indian Penal Code.
• Although two other individuals were acquitted of related charges, Ram Narain's conviction was upheld based on the evidence from the letters.
• His appeal was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court.

Key Issues

• Is it legal and appropriate to convict the appellant based solely on the testimony of a handwriting expert?

Court Observations

• The court recognized that expert opinions, such as those from handwriting experts, can be fallible and should be treated cautiously.
• The court stated that if the presiding officer (a judge) compares disputed and admitted writings and finds it reasonable to trust the expert’s opinion, that conclusion is typically hard to challenge.
• Each case must be carefully examined for evidence, and unless there’s a serious error or injustice, the Supreme Court usually does not interfere with the findings.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal, taking into account the lengthy legal process (over eight years) and the appellant's previous bail status.
• The Court reduced the appellant's prison sentence to time served and imposed a fine of Rs. 700, stating that failure to pay would result in an additional three months of rigorous imprisonment.

State of Bihar v. Laloo Prasad (2002)

• This case concerns the concept of a hostile witness.

Facts

• The public prosecutor wanted to treat a witness as hostile because the witness's answers favored the defense during cross-examination.
• The trial judge denied the prosecutor's request to cross-examine the witness.
• The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) appealed to the High Court, but the court refused to intervene.
• The witness mentioned a document from 1993, claiming it was a sale deed, and stated he received payment for it in 1983.
• During cross-examination, the witness provided more details about how he received the payment.
• The prosecutor asked to treat the witness as hostile only after cross-examination was completed, without seeking permission right after the chief examination.
• The trial judge declined to allow this request because it was made too late.
• The High Court supported the trial judge's decision.
• Ultimately, the CBI appealed to the Supreme Court of India.

Legal Issue

• The main question was whether the public prosecutor can get permission from the court to examine their own witness at any stage of the trial.

Supreme Court Observations

• The court stated that it has the authority to decide on requests under Section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act.
• Typically, courts grant permission to cross-examine witnesses brought by the prosecutor, but in this case, the prosecutor did not request permission after the chief examination.
• Since the prosecutor did not follow proper procedure, the trial judge was right to deny the request after cross-examination.
• The witness showed a bias towards the defense during questioning.
• The late request from the prosecutor suggested they were not fully endorsing the witness's testimony.
• The court decided that recalling the witness for further questioning was unnecessary, as the prosecutor had other options to address the witness's statements during final arguments.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, supporting the trial court's decision.

R S Maddanappa v. Chandramma (1965)

• This case is a landmark in understanding the concept of estoppel.
• The ruling emphasized that if both parties are aware of the true facts, estoppel cannot be applied.
• A party with full knowledge of facts cannot use the principle of estoppel to their advantage.

Facts

The plaintiff, elder sister of the first defendant, filed a suit in the District Judge's court, Bangalore, seeking:

• Declaration of ownership of a 50% share in certain properties.
• Partition and separate possession of her share, along with mesne profits.
• The plaintiff argued that:
• The properties belonged to her mother, Puttananjamma, and passed to her and the first defendant as heirs.
• The refusal of the first defendant to join as a co-plaintiff led to the suit.
• The properties, in possession of R.S. Maddanappa (the second defendant and their father), Gargavva (his second wife), and her children, became contentious after Maddanappa's death.

Defendants' claims:

• Oral settlement of properties by Gowramma (plaintiff's grandmother) on Puttananjamma and Maddanappa.
• Adverse possession and abandonment of rights by the plaintiff and the first defendant.
• Protection under Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (significant property improvements).
• The first defendant admitted the plaintiff's claim but sought her share against the remaining defendants.
• Defendants 2 to 8 cited estoppel based on her conduct.

Trial and High Court Rulings:

• Upheld the plaintiff's claim.
• Declared the first defendant estopped from claiming possession of her share.
• Both parties appealed to the High Court (HC):
• The HC dismissed the appeals of defendants 2 to 8 and the plaintiff’s cross-objections.
• The first defendant's appeal succeeded, granting her possession of her half-share and future mesne profits.
• Defendants 2 to 8 sought an appeal to the Supreme Court (SC).

Issues Involved

• Does failure to respond to the plaintiff’s notice by the first defendant amount to estoppel?
• Does attestation of the father's will by the first defendant amount to estoppel?
• Is the doctrine of acquiescence applicable in this case?

Observations

• The SC reiterated the principles of Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA), rooted in the doctrine from Pickard v. Sears, which aims to ensure fairness.

Key observations:

• No estoppel if true facts are known to both parties.
• The first defendant’s lack of response to the notice cannot imply an estoppel.
• Attestation of the will by the first defendant and her husband did not create an estoppel, as the will's effect depended on Maddanappa’s death.
• Doctrine of acquiescence does not apply since Maddanappa was aware of the facts and not misled by the first defendant.
• Estoppel under Section 115 requires proof of altered positions and detriment, which was absent here.
• The SC emphasized that:
• The appellant cannot claim ownership or compensation for property improvements made without the owner's consent.

Conclusion

• The SC upheld the HC's decision and dismissed the appeal with costs.
• The first defendant was not estopped from claiming her share of the property.