Transfer of Property Act - 2 | Civil Law for Judiciary Exams PDF Download

Ram Newaz v. Nankoo, AIR 1926 All 283

Case Summary

• The case pertains to a condition that is contrary to the interest created under Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA).

Facts

• The case involves plaintiffs who are claiming their right to 2 bighas of land as the reversioners of Ram Charan.
• Ram Charan experienced difficulties in 1884 and signed a sale deed for his 9-pie odd share in a village.
• The main issue in the dispute is how to interpret the sale deed, specifically whether it included the 2 bighas of land or not.
• The deed starts with Ram Charan stating that he owns a 9-pie 3-kauri 2-dant zamindari share and mentions selling the entire property while excluding the 2 bighas.
• A key part of the deed indicates that the 2 bighas of nankar land will stay with Ram Charan for his lifetime.
• After Ram Charan's death, the land will go to his direct descendants without any rent or government revenue.
• The deed also states that the excluded land cannot be transferred permanently or temporarily.
• If Ram Charan has no lineal descendants left, the land will belong exclusively to the vendee.
• This legal case focuses on whether the sale covered the entire share minus the 2 bighas or if it included those 2 bighas, as per the detailed provisions of the sale deed.

Key Issues

• The main questions are whether the terms of the sale deed are valid and whether they can take away the rights of Ram Charan's heirs.

Court's Observations

• The Allahabad High Court decided that the vendee acquired the 9-pie odd share but did not include the 2 bighas of land.
• After Ram Charan's death, his son Mauzzam Ram inherited the land, but since he had no children, the 2 bighas would eventually go to the vendee.
• The court noted that the condition of keeping the land in Ram Charan's family for a long time conflicts with the law.
• As a result, the defendants cannot claim ownership based on the deed.

Conclusion:

• The court ruled that the condition set by Ram Charan regarding the property being kept in the family for a long time is repugnant to the interests created under Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Bellamy v. Sabine 1 De G&J 566

Case Summary

• This case is a significant legal precedent where Justice Turner established the Doctrine of Lis Pendens, which is noted in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TOPA).

Facts of the Case

• Mr. A sold an immovable property to Mr. B.
• Mr. A's son, Mr. P, inherited Mr. A's rights and filed a lawsuit against Mr. B to nullify the sale.
• While the lawsuit was ongoing, Mr. B sold the property to Mr. C, unaware of the legal proceedings.
• The court ruled in favor of Mr. P, declaring him the rightful owner and invalidating the sale to Mr. B.
• As a result, Mr. C had no legal claim to the property because he purchased it from someone who couldn't legally sell it.

Legal Issue

• The main question was whether selling immovable property during an ongoing lawsuit gives any rights to the new purchaser.

Court's Observations

• Justice Turner stated that the principle of Lis Pendens applies in both courts of law and equity.
• The court emphasized that allowing property transfers during a lawsuit (pendente lite) could obstruct the case's resolution.
• If such transfers were allowed, it would complicate the court's ability to reach a final judgment.
• The court noted that if defendants could sell the property before a judgment, it would put plaintiffs at a disadvantage, forcing them to start new legal proceedings.

Key Takeaway from Section 52 of TOPA

• During an ongoing lawsuit concerning immovable property, the property cannot be transferred or dealt with by any party in a way that affects the rights of others unless authorized by the court.
• The lawsuit is considered ongoing from the date it is filed until it is fully resolved or the time limit for execution has passed.

Smt. Kartari v. Kewal Krishan and Ors. AIR 1972 HP 117

Case Summary

This is a significant judgment under Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA), addressing the issue of property gifted under undue influence.

Facts

• Bansanti is an elderly and frail woman who is vulnerable and has not received much education.
• She has faced health problems that have impacted her mental health.
• Kartari, her daughter, is the one who has been taking care of her.
• In 1961, the plaintiff, Kartari, moved to live with her husband.
• While Kartari was away, a gift deed was officially recorded under Section 122 of the TPA, which transferred Bansanti’s property to the defendants due to undue influence.
• Bansanti does not remember the details of what she said; she only recalls that she was asked to sign a transfer deed for the benefit of the defendants.
• After finding out about this transaction, Kartari decided to take legal action to recover the property that her mother had given to the defendants.

Key Issue

• Was the gift deed executed without free consent from Bansanti, and can it be cancelled?

Observations from the Court

• The defendant was heavily involved in preparing the gift deed, indicating possible undue influence over Bansanti.
• Typically, a mother would favor her daughter, making it essential for the defendants to prove that Bansanti understood what she was signing.
• The court found that the gift deed was executed under undue influence, meaning Bansanti did not give her full consent.
• As a result, the gift deed was deemed void, and the defendants could not make any legitimate claims to the property.
• Kartari, as the rightful heir, was entitled to reclaim possession of the property.

Conclusion:

• A gift deed made by an elderly widow under undue influence is considered void.

Legal Notes:

• Section 122 of the TPA: Defines a gift as the voluntary transfer of property without consideration, which must be accepted by the donee during the donor's lifetime.
• Section 126 of the TPA: Details when a gift can be suspended or revoked, emphasizing that a gift cannot be revoked unless agreed upon by both parties, except in certain conditions.

Rosher v. Rosher (1884) 26 Ch D 801

Case Overview

• This case involves the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, specifically addressing issues of absolute restraint on property transfer.

Facts of the Case

• J.B. Rosher created a will on November 26, 1872, leaving his property to his son, Jeremiah Lilburn Rosher, and his descendants.
• J.B. Rosher’s widow had the first right to buy the property at a price of £3600 (or a proportional amount) if the son wanted to sell it while she was still alive.
• If the property was rented out, it could be done for a maximum of three years, after which the widow could live there for a nominal rent.
• If rented for more than seven years, she was entitled to an annual rent of £35, which had to be offered to her first.
• The son must offer the property to the widow before selling or renting it to anyone else.
• After J.B. Rosher passed away on November 26, 1874, his widow brought the case against her son.

Legal Issues

• Can the son sell or mortgage the property without first offering it to his widow at the agreed price?
• Are the provisions in the will regarding the widow's option to purchase null and void?
• Is the son allowed to rent the property for more than three years without offering it to the widow first?

Observations

• The court found that requiring the property to be sold at a price significantly below its market value constituted an absolute restriction and was therefore null and void.
• Forcing a sale at 1/5th of the property's value is effectively like saying, "you cannot sell during the widow's lifetime." This is not allowed.

Conclusion:

• The court concluded that any condition that absolutely prevents further transfer of property is null and void.

Relevant Law:

• According to Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, any condition that completely restrains the transfer of property is void.

Associated Hotels of India v. R.N. Kapoor, 1959 AIR 1262

Case Overview

• This case, Associated Hotels of India v. R.N. Kapoor, is significant under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, focusing on the difference between a lease and a license.

Facts of the Case

• The respondent ran a barbershop called Madam James in two rooms of the appellant's hotel.
• A dispute arose regarding rent standardization under the Rent Control Act, 1947, with the respondent claiming the hotel granted a lease, which resulted in high rent payments.
• The hotel argued that the arrangement was a license, not a lease, meaning it did not fall under the Rent Control Act.
• The initial ruling by the Rent Controller set the rent at Rs. 94, but the District Court later reversed this decision, stating it was just a permission (license).
• However, the Punjab High Court overturned the District Court's ruling, stating the agreement was indeed a lease.

Key Issue

• The main question was whether the agreement between the parties constituted a lease or a license.

Court Observations

• The Supreme Court explained that a hotel is a place for lodging and entertainment, but a room can also serve as a business space.
• The court emphasized that the substance of the agreement is more important than its form when determining if it is a lease or license.
• The document granted the respondent exclusive possession of the rooms without control from the hotel, indicating it was a lease.
• The terms of the agreement included typical lease covenants, and the respondent had the right to transfer their interest, further supporting the lease classification.

Conclusion:

• The Supreme Court ruled that the agreement allowed the respondent to use the two rooms, establishing a tenancy.
• As a result, the court dismissed the hotel’s appeal and upheld the High Court’s decision.

Relevant Legal Definition:

• Section 105 of TOPA: A lease is the transfer of the right to enjoy property for a specific time, in exchange for payment or other value.
• In lease terms, the lessor is the property owner, the lessee is the tenant, the premium is the payment made for the lease, and rent is the periodic payment made by the lessee.

Ganga Dhar v. Shankar Lal, AIR 1958 SC 770

Case Summary

• This case revolves around Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
• The main issue was a condition in a mortgage agreement that restricted the mortgagor's right to redeem the property after a specified period.
• The agreement stated that if the mortgagor did not redeem the mortgage within six months, he would lose all claims to the property, and the mortgage would be treated as a sale to the mortgagee. This condition was deemed invalid.

Facts

• Purshottamdas (the appellant) mortgaged a property to Dhanurpmal (the respondent).
• The mortgage involved a usufructuary mortgage for Rs. 6,300, with Rs. 5,750 used to settle a prior mortgage on the same property.
• According to the agreement, after redeeming the prior mortgage, the mortgagee would take possession of the property.
• The mortgage deed stated that the appellant and his heirs could not redeem the property for 85 years, and after that, they had a six-month window to redeem it. Failing this meant they would lose all rights to the property.
• The appellant filed a case before the 85 years were up, arguing that the six-month condition was a clog on his right to redeem.

Issue Involved

• Does the mortgage agreement prevent the mortgagor's right to redeem the property?

Judgment Observations:

• The court held that the 85-year mortgage period was legally valid, and the appellant's suit was premature since he filed it before the period expired.
• However, the court found that the clause stating the mortgagor would lose the right to redeem after six months was a clog on the equity of redemption and therefore invalid.
• The court ruled that while the right to redeem was not completely taken away, it was indeed restricted.
• Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal, stating it lacked merit and imposed costs on the appellant.

Conclusion:

• The court concluded that the length of the mortgage period alone does not constitute a clog on redemption and affirmed that the right to redeem was limited but not extinguished.

Key Legal Provision: Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act:

This section grants the mortgagor the right to redeem the property after the principal amount is due, provided he pays or tenders the mortgage money at an appropriate time and place.

Final Note: The court's decision reinforced the principle that while parties can agree on mortgage terms, restrictions that undermine the core right to redeem are not permissible under the law.

Jumma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah, AIR1962 SC 847

Introduction  

• The Supreme Court delivered a significant judgment comparing two legal concepts: Rule of Feeding the Grant by Estoppel under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and Spes Successionis under Section 6 (a) of the same Act. 
• The Court recognized that these two concepts operate in different spheres and do not conflict with each other. 

Facts 

Background: There was a joint family of three brothers: B1, B2, and B3. B1 died unmarried. B2 died in 1901, leaving behind a widow, W1. B3 died in 1907, leaving his widow, W2, who inherited all the family properties. 

• The brothers had a deceased sister, S, who had two children and three grandsons: G1, G2, and G3. 
• G1, G2, and G3 were heirs under spes successionis (a legal term meaning heirs apparent). 
• G1 was to receive ½ of the property share, while G2 and G3 would each get ¼ of the share. 

Sale of Property: On November 18, 1920, the three grandsons sold the property to Ganapathi (T), making him believe they were the actual owners. 

• W1, still alive and claiming ownership, filed a case against the grandsons. 
• The court ruled in W1's favor, but the transfer to T was still valid under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. 

Ganapathi's Actions: Ganapathi applied to the Revenue Authorities to transfer the land records from W1's name to his own, based on the sale deed. 

• Before the second appeal, W1 died, and the property passed to the grandsons. 

Claim by Jumma Masjid, Mercara: The Jumma Masjid claimed entitlement to the properties on two grounds: 

• A gift allegedly made by W1 before her death. 
• A deed of release executed by B1, one of the reversioners, giving up his half-share in the properties to the mosque for Rs. 300. 

Revenue Authorities' Decision: The Revenue Authorities rejected the Masjid's claim and directed that Ganapathi's name be entered as the owner of the properties. 

• Ganapathi's Argument: Ganapathi argued that he should be entitled to the property title because he was unaware that the three reversioners were not the actual owners. 
• He contended that they represented themselves as having the title, and under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, which includes the Rule of Estoppel, he should be recognized as the rightful owner. 

Masjid's Counterargument: The Masjid countered that the three reversioners did not have any title at the time of the transfer and were only expecting to inherit the property in the future. 

• They argued that under Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, the sale of the property to Ganapathi by the three reversioners was void. 

Issue Involved 

Does a transfer of property, made in exchange for consideration by a person who claims to have a present and transferable interest in the property, but actually only holds a future interest, fall under the protection of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act (TOPA), 1882? 

Observations 

• The appellant, Jumma Masjid, argued that the sale was invalid under Section 6(a) of the TOPA. 
• The Apex Court noted that Section 6(a) and Section 43 cover different topics and do not conflict with each other. 
• Section 6(a) focuses on specific types of property interests and prohibits the transfer of just those interests. 
• Section 43 addresses situations where a transferor claims to have a title they did not possess at the time of transfer, stating that the transfer will attach to the title the transferor later acquires. 
• While Section 6(a) establishes a rule of substantive law, Section 43 is based on the principle of estoppel, which is part of evidence law. 
• The two sections cannot be merged or applied together. 
• The court acknowledged that the claim made by Ganpathi (T) was valid. 
• As a result, the claim made by Jumma Masjid was dismissed. 

Conclusion:
The case involves a dispute over the transfer of property and the legal implications of such transfers under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 

• Court's Decision: The court ruled that when a person transfers property claiming to have a present interest in it, while actually having only a spes successionis (a mere hope of future ownership), the transferee is protected under Section 43 if they relied on that representation and provided consideration. 

Notes: The Apex Court agreed with the lower courts in affirming the title of the respondents to the property in question. 

• Section 6 (a) - Transfer of Property Act, 1882: This section outlines what can be transferred under the Act. It specifies that property of any kind may be transferred unless prohibited by the Act or other applicable laws. However, certain mere possibilities, such as the chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate or a relation obtaining a legacy, cannot be transferred. 
• Section 43 - Transfer of Property Act, 1882: This section deals with transfers by unauthorized persons who later acquire interest in the property. It states that if a person fraudulently or erroneously represents their authority to transfer immovable property and professes to do so for consideration, the transfer can operate on any interest the transferor may acquire in the property during the contract period, at the option of the transferee. 

Shantabai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 532: (1959) SCR 265

Case Overview

• The case in question is a significant legal decision regarding Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 
• It involves an unregistered document that was created between parties to grant the right to cut and take wood from a forest area.  

Facts 

Background:

• The petitioner, Shantabai Doye, is the widow of Shri Balirambhau Doye, who owned a forest. 
• Balirambhau Doye had made an unregistered agreement, termed as a lease, in favor of his wife, granting her certain rights over the forest. 

Details of the Lease:

• The lease was for a period of 12 and a half years and allowed Shantabai to take various types of wood from specific forests in exchange for Rs. 26,000. 
• It conferred upon her the right to enter the estate and collect bamboo, teak, and fuel wood. 
• One of the conditions in the lease was that teak plants under a height of one and a half feet could not be cut. 

Legislative Changes:

• In 1950, the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act was enacted, which transferred all proprietary rights in land to the state. 
• Following this, Shantabai was prohibited from cutting any more trees from the forest. 

Legal Actions and Claims:

• Shantabai claimed compensation from the government for being ousted from the forest between 1951 and 1955. 
• Initially, this claim was withdrawn with the understanding that she would be allowed to work in the forests for the remaining lease period. 
• When her requests for permission to work in the forests were denied by the Divisional Forest Officer, she began cutting trees independently but was stopped by the Forest Officer. 
• In response, Shantabai filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking to overturn the order. 

Fundamental Rights Infringement:

• The petitioner argues that her fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f) (right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property) and Article 19(1)(g) (right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business) have been violated. 

Issues Involved 

• The document's implications on proprietary rights or interests for the petitioner are under scrutiny. 
• There is a concern regarding the potential violation of the petitioner's fundamental rights. 

Observation 

• The right given by the document is a grant of profit a prendre, which under Indian law means a benefit that comes from land, creating an interest in immovable property.
• In this case, the execution of the document did not transfer a right to enjoy the land. Instead, it was merely a license to enter the land for the purpose of taking something from it, specifically a part of the soil yield.
• The court noted that something more substantial must be shown to support a claim under Article 19 (1)(f) or Article 31 (1) of the Constitution of India, 1950.
• The right to enter the land to cut and take timber that is already growing there is a benefit that comes from the land.
• There is no difference between English and Indian law regarding this context, but it still raises the question of whether it is movable or immovable property.
• According to Section 3 (26) of the General Clauses Act, 1977, it should be classified as immovable property because it is a benefit arising from the land and the trees are rooted in the ground.
• Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 states that standing wood is not considered immovable property for the purposes of that Act, similar to what is mentioned in Section 2 (6) of the Registration Act, 1908.
• The court emphasized that in the absence of a specific definition, the general definition should be applied.

Conclusion:

• In a legal case involving the grant of a lease for land with trees, the distinction between "timber trees" and "standing timber" was crucial. The court found that the lease was not just for standing timber but allowed the grantee to benefit from the soil as well. 
• The court ruled that since the unregistered lease deed pertained to rights over immovable property, the petitioner could not be granted any remedy.

Note:

• Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882: This section clarifies that "immovable property" does not include standing timber, growing crops, or grass, unless specified otherwise in the context. 

Kumar Harish Chandra Singh Deo v. Bansidhar Mohanty, AIR 1965 SC 1738: (1966) 1 SCR 153

Introduction  

• The case is significant for understanding Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which deals with the attestation of documents. 
• Attestation is meant to protect the executant (the person executing the document) from being forced to sign it under duress, fraud, or undue influence. 
• Interestingly, a person who is not a party to the deed can attest the document, even if they have an interest in the transaction. 

Facts 

• The mortgage deed was signed by Kumar Harish Chandra Deo (the appellant) in favor of Jagannath Debata (respondent no. 2) in April 1945 for Rs. 15,000.
• The appellant agreed to pay back the borrowed amount plus interest within one year of signing the deed.
• However, the appellant did not repay the amount as promised.
• As a result, Banshi Dhar Mohanty (respondent no. 1) filed a lawsuit which led to this appeal.
• Jagannath Debata contested Banshi Dhar Mohanty's right to file the lawsuit, claiming he was the one who provided the loan.
• Despite his claim, the Trial Court did not accept it.
• The Trial Court ruled in favor of Banshi Dhar Mohanty.
• Unhappy with the Trial Court's decision, Kumar Harish Chandra Deo filed an appeal in the High Court, but his appeal was dismissed.
• Later, he took the matter to the Supreme Court of India by filing another appeal.

Issues Involved 

• Is the mortgage deed that the respondent based their lawsuit on properly signed?
• Was respondent no. 1 allowed to file the lawsuit?

Observation 

• The court decided that the deed was properly witnessed.
• A person who benefits from a deal or who pays for it has the right to file a lawsuit regarding that deal.
• In the case of a mortgage, the actual lender is allowed to take legal action.
• As a result, Respondent No. 1 had the right to sue.
• The Court confirmed the decision made by the High Court and rejected the appeal.

Conclusion:

• A suit can be filed by anyone who benefits from a transaction or who provides consideration for it.
• In the case of a mortgage, the actual lender of the money has the right to sue.

Notes:

• According to Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1882, "attested" means that an instrument is witnessed by two or more people who have seen the executant sign or mark the instrument, or have seen someone else sign it in the executant's presence and by their direction, or have received a personal acknowledgment of the signature or mark from the executant.
• The witnesses must sign the instrument in the presence of the executant, but they do not all have to be present at the same time, and there is no specific form of attestation required.