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India’s Nuclear Doctrine

India's stance on nuclear weapons has been full of contradictions. While leaders like Pandit Nehru and Gandhi expressed their opposition to nuclear arms, India's atomic energy program was never entirely peaceful. This article discusses the reasons behind India's nuclear program, the timing of its nuclear tests, and the salient features of its nuclear doctrine, along with the debates surrounding it.

Reasons for India's Nuclear Program

• India's atomic energy program was made secret, beyond the purview of the press. Homi Jahangir Bhabha, who was made the head of the program, had made it clear that he was not against the development of nuclear weapons for India's defense. Furthermore, research by George Perkovich has shown that Pandit Nehru did recognize the importance of nuclear weapons for India's defense.
• According to C Rajamohan, Indian leaders were fearful about possessing nuclear weapons, and the only dilemma they faced was not whether India would acquire them but when. Thus, the right time to possess nuclear weapons was a critical issue.

India's Nuclear Tests and Timing

• India conducted its first peaceful nuclear explosion, titled 'Smiling Buddha,' in 1974. India had to face sanctions against its nuclear program after the testing. The question remains as to why Indian elites waited for so long and why they had chosen the year 1998 to declare India as a nuclear-weapon state.
• C Rajamohan, in his book Crossing the Rubicon, explains the reason for the testing in 1998. Indian elites knew that there would be economic sanctions against India, but they calculated that the international community could not continue with sanctions for long, due to the attraction of the Indian economy and the changed nature of India-US relations. US strategists felt that a nuclear India would be a better balancer than a non-nuclear India.

India's Nuclear Doctrine: Salient Features and Debates

• India released its official nuclear doctrine on 4th January 2003, although all features are not made public, resulting in uncertainty regarding India's approach to nuclear weapons. The doctrine explains India's posture and rationale behind acquiring nuclear weapons, based on 'defensive realism' and reflecting India's pacific culture.
• According to Raja Menon, India's nuclear doctrine reflects not so much India's strategic choice but rather its culture. Rajesh Basrur adds that India's nuclear doctrine is in line with its strategic culture, which is defensive.

Features of Nuclear Doctrine of India

The key features of India's nuclear doctrine are as follows:

• No first use: India pledges not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against any adversary. The policy is aimed at ensuring that nuclear weapons are used only as a deterrent against potential aggressors.
• Retaliation against chemical or biological attacks: India reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological attack on its territory or forces.
• Ambiguity regarding non-nuclear weapon states: India's former national security advisor, Shivshankar Menon, suggested that the no first use policy only applies to non-nuclear weapon states. However, this statement was later retracted.
• Credible minimum deterrence: India aims to maintain a credible minimum deterrent by developing a second-strike capability, which includes the development of a nuclear triad (land, sea, and air-based nuclear forces).
• Massive retaliation: In the event of a nuclear attack on Indian territory or forces, India pledges to respond with massive retaliation, causing unacceptable damage to the aggressor.
• Civilian control of nuclear weapons: The command and control of India's nuclear weapons is under civilian authority, ensuring that the use of nuclear weapons is subject to political decision-making.
• Commitment to disarmament: Despite possessing nuclear weapons, India's nuclear doctrine states that the country continues to believe in a nuclear weapon-free world and will work towards global disarmament.
• No use against non-nuclear states: India pledges not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, further reinforcing its commitment to the principle of no first use.

Debates on India’s Nuclear doctrine

In 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) manifesto stated that if they rose to power, they would change India's nuclear doctrine from 'no first use' to 'first use.' This has initiated a debate among scholars and experts over the policy.

Arguments in favor of first use:

• Some strategists, like Bharat Karnard, argue that the no first use policy is relevant only for countries with extreme confidence in the survivability of their nuclear forces. They believe that no first use requires efficient crisis management, which is not a strength of India's bureaucracy.
• Former Lt. General B. S. Nagal, former commander in chief of strategic forces command, argues that no first use is morally wrong, as it puts India's population under significant threat. He believes that there is no logic in accepting large scale destruction in the first strike.

Arguments against first use:

• Shivashankar Menan, in his book "Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy," references the views of K Subramaniam, who argued that deterrence is more about perception than posture. A first-use posture may be highly provocative, forcing a country to attack to save itself from attack. No first use is better for deterrence.
• Menan also argues that a first-use policy would destabilize the security environment in South Asia. Instead, he emphasizes the importance of survivability, citing China as an example. Despite asymmetry with the USA, China maintains no first use and still has credible deterrence.
• Manpreet Sethi highlights the advantages of a no first use policy, such as reduced need for expensive nuclear weapon infrastructure, no need to keep nuclear forces on trigger, and no need for security systems to prevent unauthorized use. First use capabilities require a significant investment in research and development, which India does not currently possess.
• Rakesh Sood argues that India does not have the actual capacity to handle the complexities and expenditures involved in the first use. No first use reflects India's traditional abhorrence towards nuclear weapons.

There is also debate over India's position of maintaining "credible minimum deterrence." Some argue that it would be more beneficial for India to adopt a "minimum credible deterrence" policy. According to K Subramaniam, credibility depends on command, control, and the ability to respond, making credible minimum deterrence the right posture. Experts like Raja Menan emphasize the need for India to focus on crisis management, survivability, building a nuclear triad, addressing loopholes, and developing infrastructure rather than changing to first use. They argue that India should introduce a permanent chief of defense staff for better command and coordination. P K Chari suggests that nuclear doctrines should not be static and should evolve as necessary.

India's Position on Disarmament: A Comprehensive and Verifiable Approach

India has consistently advocated for a comprehensive, verifiable, and universal disarmament, with a focus on nuclear disarmament. This stance has been expressed through various international platforms, such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).
1. Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan: In 1988, then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi presented the 'Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan' at the UNGA. This plan garnered appreciation from the international community and laid out a blueprint for achieving global disarmament.

Key features of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan include:

• Time-bound elimination of nuclear weapons: The plan emphasized the need for a time-bound framework to eliminate nuclear weapons globally. This aspect underscored the urgency of disarmament and aimed to prevent a perpetual arms race between nations.
• Phased approach with verification: The action plan proposed a phased approach to disarmament, consisting of three stages. Each stage would involve specific disarmament measures and would be subject to verification by relevant international bodies. This approach aimed to ensure that disarmament efforts were transparent and accountable.
• Binding commitments: The Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan called for countries to make binding commitments to disarmament, which would hold nations legally accountable for their progress. These commitments would be crucial in ensuring that disarmament efforts were genuine and not merely symbolic.

2. India's Commitment to Non-Proliferation: India has consistently maintained a commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, despite not being a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This stance is based on the belief that the NPT is inherently discriminatory, as it allows only five countries to possess nuclear weapons. However, India has voluntarily implemented measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology.

3. India's No-First-Use Policy: As part of its commitment to responsible nuclear disarmament, India has adopted a No-First-Use (NFU) policy regarding nuclear weapons. This policy asserts that India will not use nuclear weapons unless it is first attacked with nuclear weapons by another country. The NFU policy demonstrates India's commitment to using nuclear weapons only as a deterrent and not for aggressive purposes.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement holds significant geopolitical implications and reflects a strategic partnership between India and the United States. The deal has allowed India to overcome nuclear apartheid and develop its nuclear capabilities while adhering to its commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation. India's nuclear doctrine, which emphasizes no first use, massive retaliation, and credible minimum deterrence, showcases the country's defensive approach to nuclear weapons. Despite ongoing debates about potential changes to the doctrine, India's commitment to disarmament and responsible nuclear posture remains evident.