Test: Legal Reasoning - 7 - CLAT MCQ
30 Questions MCQ Test - Test: Legal Reasoning - 7
Principle: A person is liable for the acts which he could have foreseen and prevented.
Facts: Mr. Rishabh is very fond of sweets. He went to a local shop where he asked for the best quality of Besan Ladoo. The assistant showed him the section where the Ladoo was kept and Rishabh bought 1 kg of Ladoo. Later, it was found that the Ladoo was not fresh and was inappropriate to eat. Consequently, Rishabh fell ill after consuming it. In light of the above principle, please suggest a course of action.
Facts: Mr. Rishabh is very fond of sweets. He went to a local shop where he asked for the best quality of Besan Ladoo. The assistant showed him the section where the Ladoo was kept and Rishabh bought 1 kg of Ladoo. Later, it was found that the Ladoo was not fresh and was inappropriate to eat. Consequently, Rishabh fell ill after consuming it. In light of the above principle, please suggest a course of action.
Passage: In 2017, a group called Human Rights Network, decided to collect and collate a set of state laws which imposed a blanket ban on cow slaughter. These laws, they believed, violated the fundamental right to trade under Article 19(1)(g). In addition to that, they argued that such laws were often a potent tool to justify mob–lynching of butchers, or people who consumed beef as a part of their diet. Another group called Cow Savers decided to argue that the laws were formulated in line with the directive state policy, specifically Article 48, and thus could not be challenged before any Court as violative of fundamental rights. The Cow Savers further asked the Court to enforce Article 48 across states where no ban on cow slaughter existed. HRN argued that DPSPs are not justiciable.
The HRN cited the case of Irreligious Society v. State of Kerala. Here, there was a clash between a policy enforcing the DPSP of enforcing the Uniform Civil Code and the fundamental right to religion. The Court attempted to read the two together, and wherever there was no compatibility, the right to religion prevailed.
After the Supreme Court admitted the petition filed by HRN, Cow Savers intervened in the matter.
While the case was going on, the government of Gau Land decided to start picking up butchers from their shops under the suspicion that they were slaughtering cows late in the night. There was a protest organized by HRN against this action of the government, during which some activists were also picked up. HRN tried extremely hard to locate the activists and the butchers, but to no avail. They decided that they would approach the court regarding this as well.
Their legal advisors laid down the following writs before them–
Habeas Corpus is „To have the body of.‟; Mandamus means „We command‟ and is used by the court to order the public official who has failed to perform his duty or refused to do his duty. The literal meaning of the writ of “Certiorari‟ is “To be certified‟ or „To be informed.” This writ is against issued by a court higher in authority to a lower court. The literal meaning of the writ of „Quo– Warranto‟ is „By what authority or warrant,‟ which question one‟s appointment to a public office.
Article 19(1)(g) grants the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business to all citizens of India.
Article 48 reads that the State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle.
Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. This has been interpreted expansively to ensure a right to a wholesome life and not just guarantee bare existence.
Q. This case illustrates a clash of a fundamental right with a DPSP. The Court will rule that–
The HRN cited the case of Irreligious Society v. State of Kerala. Here, there was a clash between a policy enforcing the DPSP of enforcing the Uniform Civil Code and the fundamental right to religion. The Court attempted to read the two together, and wherever there was no compatibility, the right to religion prevailed.
After the Supreme Court admitted the petition filed by HRN, Cow Savers intervened in the matter.
While the case was going on, the government of Gau Land decided to start picking up butchers from their shops under the suspicion that they were slaughtering cows late in the night. There was a protest organized by HRN against this action of the government, during which some activists were also picked up. HRN tried extremely hard to locate the activists and the butchers, but to no avail. They decided that they would approach the court regarding this as well.
Their legal advisors laid down the following writs before them–
Habeas Corpus is „To have the body of.‟; Mandamus means „We command‟ and is used by the court to order the public official who has failed to perform his duty or refused to do his duty. The literal meaning of the writ of “Certiorari‟ is “To be certified‟ or „To be informed.” This writ is against issued by a court higher in authority to a lower court. The literal meaning of the writ of „Quo– Warranto‟ is „By what authority or warrant,‟ which question one‟s appointment to a public office.
Article 19(1)(g) grants the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business to all citizens of India.
Article 48 reads that the State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle.
Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. This has been interpreted expansively to ensure a right to a wholesome life and not just guarantee bare existence.
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Passage: In 2017, a group called Human Rights Network, decided to collect and collate a set of state laws which imposed a blanket ban on cow slaughter. These laws, they believed, violated the fundamental right to trade under Article 19(1)(g). In addition to that, they argued that such laws were often a potent tool to justify mob–lynching of butchers, or people who consumed beef as a part of their diet. Another group called Cow Savers decided to argue that the laws were formulated in line with the directive state policy, specifically Article 48, and thus could not be challenged before any Court as violative of fundamental rights. The Cow Savers further asked the Court to enforce Article 48 across states where no ban on cow slaughter existed. HRN argued that DPSPs are not justiciable.
The HRN cited the case of Irreligious Society v. State of Kerala. Here, there was a clash between a policy enforcing the DPSP of enforcing the Uniform Civil Code and the fundamental right to religion. The Court attempted to read the two together, and wherever there was no compatibility, the right to religion prevailed.
After the Supreme Court admitted the petition filed by HRN, Cow Savers intervened in the matter.
While the case was going on, the government of Gau Land decided to start picking up butchers from their shops under the suspicion that they were slaughtering cows late in the night. There was a protest organized by HRN against this action of the government, during which some activists were also picked up. HRN tried extremely hard to locate the activists and the butchers, but to no avail. They decided that they would approach the court regarding this as well.
Their legal advisors laid down the following writs before them–
Habeas Corpus is „To have the body of.‟; Mandamus means „We command‟ and is used by the court to order the public official who has failed to perform his duty or refused to do his duty. The literal meaning of the writ of “Certiorari‟ is “To be certified‟ or „To be informed.” This writ is against issued by a court higher in authority to a lower court. The literal meaning of the writ of „Quo– Warranto‟ is „By what authority or warrant,‟ which question one‟s appointment to a public office.
Article 19(1)(g) grants the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business to all citizens of India.
Article 48 reads that the State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle.
Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. This has been interpreted expansively to ensure a right to a wholesome life and not just guarantee bare existence.
Q. Can the Court hold the other states liable for not implementing a ban on cow slaughter for a violation of Article 48?
The HRN cited the case of Irreligious Society v. State of Kerala. Here, there was a clash between a policy enforcing the DPSP of enforcing the Uniform Civil Code and the fundamental right to religion. The Court attempted to read the two together, and wherever there was no compatibility, the right to religion prevailed.
After the Supreme Court admitted the petition filed by HRN, Cow Savers intervened in the matter.
While the case was going on, the government of Gau Land decided to start picking up butchers from their shops under the suspicion that they were slaughtering cows late in the night. There was a protest organized by HRN against this action of the government, during which some activists were also picked up. HRN tried extremely hard to locate the activists and the butchers, but to no avail. They decided that they would approach the court regarding this as well.
Their legal advisors laid down the following writs before them–
Habeas Corpus is „To have the body of.‟; Mandamus means „We command‟ and is used by the court to order the public official who has failed to perform his duty or refused to do his duty. The literal meaning of the writ of “Certiorari‟ is “To be certified‟ or „To be informed.” This writ is against issued by a court higher in authority to a lower court. The literal meaning of the writ of „Quo– Warranto‟ is „By what authority or warrant,‟ which question one‟s appointment to a public office.
Article 19(1)(g) grants the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business to all citizens of India.
Article 48 reads that the State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle.
Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. This has been interpreted expansively to ensure a right to a wholesome life and not just guarantee bare existence.
Passage: In 2017, a group called Human Rights Network, decided to collect and collate a set of state laws which imposed a blanket ban on cow slaughter. These laws, they believed, violated the fundamental right to trade under Article 19(1)(g). In addition to that, they argued that such laws were often a potent tool to justify mob–lynching of butchers, or people who consumed beef as a part of their diet. Another group called Cow Savers decided to argue that the laws were formulated in line with the directive state policy, specifically Article 48, and thus could not be challenged before any Court as violative of fundamental rights. The Cow Savers further asked the Court to enforce Article 48 across states where no ban on cow slaughter existed. HRN argued that DPSPs are not justiciable.
The HRN cited the case of Irreligious Society v. State of Kerala. Here, there was a clash between a policy enforcing the DPSP of enforcing the Uniform Civil Code and the fundamental right to religion. The Court attempted to read the two together, and wherever there was no compatibility, the right to religion prevailed.
After the Supreme Court admitted the petition filed by HRN, Cow Savers intervened in the matter.
While the case was going on, the government of Gau Land decided to start picking up butchers from their shops under the suspicion that they were slaughtering cows late in the night. There was a protest organized by HRN against this action of the government, during which some activists were also picked up. HRN tried extremely hard to locate the activists and the butchers, but to no avail. They decided that they would approach the court regarding this as well.
Their legal advisors laid down the following writs before them–
Habeas Corpus is „To have the body of.‟; Mandamus means „We command‟ and is used by the court to order the public official who has failed to perform his duty or refused to do his duty. The literal meaning of the writ of “Certiorari‟ is “To be certified‟ or „To be informed.” This writ is against issued by a court higher in authority to a lower court. The literal meaning of the writ of „Quo– Warranto‟ is „By what authority or warrant,‟ which question one‟s appointment to a public office.
Article 19(1)(g) grants the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business to all citizens of India.
Article 48 reads that the State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle.
Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. This has been interpreted expansively to ensure a right to a wholesome life and not just guarantee bare existence.
Q. Mr. X, an American citizen, shifts to India for a few months. He believes that this cow slaughter ban is unjust and decides to challenge it for a violation of his fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g). Will his argument be successful?
Passage: In 2017, a group called Human Rights Network, decided to collect and collate a set of state laws which imposed a blanket ban on cow slaughter. These laws, they believed, violated the fundamental right to trade under Article 19(1)(g). In addition to that, they argued that such laws were often a potent tool to justify mob–lynching of butchers, or people who consumed beef as a part of their diet. Another group called Cow Savers decided to argue that the laws were formulated in line with the directive state policy, specifically Article 48, and thus could not be challenged before any Court as violative of fundamental rights. The Cow Savers further asked the Court to enforce Article 48 across states where no ban on cow slaughter existed. HRN argued that DPSPs are not justiciable.
The HRN cited the case of Irreligious Society v. State of Kerala. Here, there was a clash between a policy enforcing the DPSP of enforcing the Uniform Civil Code and the fundamental right to religion. The Court attempted to read the two together, and wherever there was no compatibility, the right to religion prevailed.
After the Supreme Court admitted the petition filed by HRN, Cow Savers intervened in the matter.
While the case was going on, the government of Gau Land decided to start picking up butchers from their shops under the suspicion that they were slaughtering cows late in the night. There was a protest organized by HRN against this action of the government, during which some activists were also picked up. HRN tried extremely hard to locate the activists and the butchers, but to no avail. They decided that they would approach the court regarding this as well.
Their legal advisors laid down the following writs before them–
Habeas Corpus is „To have the body of.‟; Mandamus means „We command‟ and is used by the court to order the public official who has failed to perform his duty or refused to do his duty. The literal meaning of the writ of “Certiorari‟ is “To be certified‟ or „To be informed.” This writ is against issued by a court higher in authority to a lower court. The literal meaning of the writ of „Quo– Warranto‟ is „By what authority or warrant,‟ which question one‟s appointment to a public office.
Article 19(1)(g) grants the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business to all citizens of India.
Article 48 reads that the State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle.
Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. This has been interpreted expansively to ensure a right to a wholesome life and not just guarantee bare existence.
Q. Which writ is the most appropriate for HRN request the Court to order the police to produce their members and the missing butchers?
Passage: In 2017, a group called Human Rights Network, decided to collect and collate a set of state laws which imposed a blanket ban on cow slaughter. These laws, they believed, violated the fundamental right to trade under Article 19(1)(g). In addition to that, they argued that such laws were often a potent tool to justify mob–lynching of butchers, or people who consumed beef as a part of their diet. Another group called Cow Savers decided to argue that the laws were formulated in line with the directive state policy, specifically Article 48, and thus could not be challenged before any Court as violative of fundamental rights. The Cow Savers further asked the Court to enforce Article 48 across states where no ban on cow slaughter existed. HRN argued that DPSPs are not justiciable.
The HRN cited the case of Irreligious Society v. State of Kerala. Here, there was a clash between a policy enforcing the DPSP of enforcing the Uniform Civil Code and the fundamental right to religion. The Court attempted to read the two together, and wherever there was no compatibility, the right to religion prevailed.
After the Supreme Court admitted the petition filed by HRN, Cow Savers intervened in the matter.
While the case was going on, the government of Gau Land decided to start picking up butchers from their shops under the suspicion that they were slaughtering cows late in the night. There was a protest organized by HRN against this action of the government, during which some activists were also picked up. HRN tried extremely hard to locate the activists and the butchers, but to no avail. They decided that they would approach the court regarding this as well.
Their legal advisors laid down the following writs before them–
Habeas Corpus is „To have the body of.‟; Mandamus means „We command‟ and is used by the court to order the public official who has failed to perform his duty or refused to do his duty. The literal meaning of the writ of “Certiorari‟ is “To be certified‟ or „To be informed.” This writ is against issued by a court higher in authority to a lower court. The literal meaning of the writ of „Quo– Warranto‟ is „By what authority or warrant,‟ which question one‟s appointment to a public office.
Article 19(1)(g) grants the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business to all citizens of India.
Article 48 reads that the State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle.
Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. This has been interpreted expansively to ensure a right to a wholesome life and not just guarantee bare existence.
Q. Mr. Y, a chef, decides to explore recipes of beef delicacies across India and cook and consume them in the privacy of his house. However, he notices that due to the cow slaughter ban, beef is not available at all. He believes that this is a violation of his right to consume any food in the privacy of his home.
Notwithstanding any decisions on the legality of cow slaughter and cow beef, his challenge as the violation of Right to Privacy will–
Legal Principle: With the counter proposal made by the party, the original offer ceases to exist.
Facts of the Problem: Badal offered to sell his car to Pranav at the price of Rs. 3 lakhs. Pranav replies that he is ready to buy the car at Rs. 2.5 lakhs only. Badal refuses to sell at that price. Later, Pranav goes to Badal with Rs. 3 lakhs to buy the car. Is the offer to Rs. 3 lakhs still valid?
Passage: In 2017, Rageistan’s president, Mr. Agni, was invited to Shaantistan’s republic day celebrations as a chief guest. Elated by this invitation, Mr. Agni decided to use this opportunity to mend the diplomatic relations between the countries. After he landed, he was warmly received by Shaantistan’s prime minister. Halfway through their interactions, the leaders began discussing Shaantistan’s nuclear arsenal. Mr. Agni, appalled by the amount of weapons Shaantistan had amassed, admonished the prime minister. The prime minister, in a fit of rage, threatened war onto Rageistan. Mr. Agni left in a hurry and declared a national emergency under Article 352 of The nation’s constitution, citing a threat of war.
During this emergency, an eminent journalist, Mr. Debu Tante wrote an article criticizing Mr. Agni’s conduct at the ceremony. The article was published in a leading national daily. A government official spotted the article and soon, the same was removed from the paper. Enraged, Mr. Debu wrote another article criticizing the government for its actions. The government formulated a new law wherein anyone classified as a „troublemaker‟ could be picked up and detained without any charges for up to three weeks. Mr. Debu was picked up by enforcement authorities the very next day, without any warrant, and was detained for 12 days. When he was finally released by the authorities on the 13th day, he moved the Supreme Court alleging a violation of his right to life and liberty by the State.
The Constitution of Rageistan has the following provisions:
Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of Rageistan guarantees to all the citizens of Rageistan the freedom of speech and expression.
Article 358 of the Constitution provides for suspension of provisions of Article 19 of the Constitution during emergency situations.
Q. Given the circumstances of the situation, can Debu challenge the governmental action of pulling down the first article for violating his fundamental rights?
Passage: In 2017, Rageistan’s president, Mr. Agni, was invited to Shaantistan’s republic day celebrations as a chief guest. Elated by this invitation, Mr. Agni decided to use this opportunity to mend the diplomatic relations between the countries. After he landed, he was warmly received by Shaantistan’s prime minister. Halfway through their interactions, the leaders began discussing Shaantistan’s nuclear arsenal. Mr. Agni, appalled by the amount of weapons Shaantistan had amassed, admonished the prime minister. The prime minister, in a fit of rage, threatened war onto Rageistan. Mr. Agni left in a hurry and declared a national emergency under Article 352 of The nation’s constitution, citing a threat of war.
During this emergency, an eminent journalist, Mr. Debu Tante wrote an article criticizing Mr. Agni’s conduct at the ceremony. The article was published in a leading national daily. A government official spotted the article and soon, the same was removed from the paper. Enraged, Mr. Debu wrote another article criticizing the government for its actions. The government formulated a new law wherein anyone classified as a „troublemaker‟ could be picked up and detained without any charges for up to three weeks. Mr. Debu was picked up by enforcement authorities the very next day, without any warrant, and was detained for 12 days. When he was finally released by the authorities on the 13th day, he moved the Supreme Court alleging a violation of his right to life and liberty by the State.
The Constitution of Rageistan has the following provisions:
Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of Rageistan guarantees to all the citizens of Rageistan the freedom of speech and expression.
Article 358 of the Constitution provides for suspension of provisions of Article 19 of the Constitution during emergency situations.
Q. Can Debu challenge the new law for violating his right to life and liberty under Article 21?
Passage: In 2017, Rageistan’s president, Mr. Agni, was invited to Shaantistan’s republic day celebrations as a chief guest. Elated by this invitation, Mr. Agni decided to use this opportunity to mend the diplomatic relations between the countries. After he landed, he was warmly received by Shaantistan’s prime minister. Halfway through their interactions, the leaders began discussing Shaantistan’s nuclear arsenal. Mr. Agni, appalled by the amount of weapons Shaantistan had amassed, admonished the prime minister. The prime minister, in a fit of rage, threatened war onto Rageistan. Mr. Agni left in a hurry and declared a national emergency under Article 352 of The nation’s constitution, citing a threat of war.
During this emergency, an eminent journalist, Mr. Debu Tante wrote an article criticizing Mr. Agni’s conduct at the ceremony. The article was published in a leading national daily. A government official spotted the article and soon, the same was removed from the paper. Enraged, Mr. Debu wrote another article criticizing the government for its actions. The government formulated a new law wherein anyone classified as a „troublemaker‟ could be picked up and detained without any charges for up to three weeks. Mr. Debu was picked up by enforcement authorities the very next day, without any warrant, and was detained for 12 days. When he was finally released by the authorities on the 13th day, he moved the Supreme Court alleging a violation of his right to life and liberty by the State.
The Constitution of Rageistan has the following provisions:
Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of Rageistan guarantees to all the citizens of Rageistan the freedom of speech and expression.
Article 358 of the Constitution provides for suspension of provisions of Article 19 of the Constitution during emergency situations.
Q. The text of Rageistan‟s emergency provision reads–
“If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of Ragesitan or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or armed rebellion, he may, by Proclamation, made a declaration to that effect for the whole of Rageistan or any part thereof…” “Satisfaction‟ entails holding consultations with the central cabinet of ministers. However, the final proclamation has to be decision of the president. Bearing this in mind, which of the following statements holds true?
Passage: In 2017, Rageistan’s president, Mr. Agni, was invited to Shaantistan’s republic day celebrations as a chief guest. Elated by this invitation, Mr. Agni decided to use this opportunity to mend the diplomatic relations between the countries. After he landed, he was warmly received by Shaantistan’s prime minister. Halfway through their interactions, the leaders began discussing Shaantistan’s nuclear arsenal. Mr. Agni, appalled by the amount of weapons Shaantistan had amassed, admonished the prime minister. The prime minister, in a fit of rage, threatened war onto Rageistan. Mr. Agni left in a hurry and declared a national emergency under Article 352 of The nation’s constitution, citing a threat of war.
During this emergency, an eminent journalist, Mr. Debu Tante wrote an article criticizing Mr. Agni’s conduct at the ceremony. The article was published in a leading national daily. A government official spotted the article and soon, the same was removed from the paper. Enraged, Mr. Debu wrote another article criticizing the government for its actions. The government formulated a new law wherein anyone classified as a „troublemaker‟ could be picked up and detained without any charges for up to three weeks. Mr. Debu was picked up by enforcement authorities the very next day, without any warrant, and was detained for 12 days. When he was finally released by the authorities on the 13th day, he moved the Supreme Court alleging a violation of his right to life and liberty by the State.
The Constitution of Rageistan has the following provisions:
Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of Rageistan guarantees to all the citizens of Rageistan the freedom of speech and expression.
Article 358 of the Constitution provides for suspension of provisions of Article 19 of the Constitution during emergency situations.
Q. Does the provision require the existence of an actual war or armed rebellion to occur before a proclamation of emergency is made?
The first attempt to introduce a representative and popular element in the governance of India was made trough:
Legal Principle: A contract with a minor would be void if the other party knew about the minority.
Facts of the Problem: Hitesh is a leading seller of the computer hardware items in the city. His sixteen years old son has Rohan as his best friend. Rohan is also of the same age. Hitesh knowing the age of Rohan entered into a contract with him for a set of laptops for a sum of Rs. 20 lakhs to him. When Hitesh sent the consignment of the laptops, Rohan refused to take them and dishonoured the contract. Hitesh sues Rohan for the damages suffered by him. Decide the legal outcome of the situation?
Passage: The Supreme Court verdict – making it mandatory for political parties to justify fielding candidates with criminal records – marks continuation of its efforts to reverse the criminalisation of politics. In 2013, SC removed a loophole in Representation of The People Act that paved the way for instant disqualification of convicted MPs and MLAs. More recently, SC ordered the creation of special courts to try MPs/ MLAs. Henceforth, political parties must publish in newspapers, official websites and social media platforms details of criminal cases against candidates and reasons for choosing them at the expense of clean candidates.
Q. What is the preliminary assumption of the author?
Passage: The Supreme Court verdict – making it mandatory for political parties to justify fielding candidates with criminal records – marks continuation of its efforts to reverse the criminalisation of politics. In 2013, SC removed a loophole in Representation of The People Act that paved the way for instant disqualification of convicted MPs and MLAs. More recently, SC ordered the creation of special courts to try MPs/ MLAs. Henceforth, political parties must publish in newspapers, official websites and social media platforms details of criminal cases against candidates and reasons for choosing them at the expense of clean candidates.
Q. What is the main idea of the passage?
Passage: The Supreme Court verdict – making it mandatory for political parties to justify fielding candidates with criminal records – marks continuation of its efforts to reverse the criminalisation of politics. In 2013, SC removed a loophole in Representation of The People Act that paved the way for instant disqualification of convicted MPs and MLAs. More recently, SC ordered the creation of special courts to try MPs/ MLAs. Henceforth, political parties must publish in newspapers, official websites and social media platforms details of criminal cases against candidates and reasons for choosing them at the expense of clean candidates.
Q. Which of the following weakens the main argument of the author?
Passage: The Supreme Court verdict – making it mandatory for political parties to justify fielding candidates with criminal records – marks continuation of its efforts to reverse the criminalisation of politics. In 2013, SC removed a loophole in Representation of The People Act that paved the way for instant disqualification of convicted MPs and MLAs. More recently, SC ordered the creation of special courts to try MPs/ MLAs. Henceforth, political parties must publish in newspapers, official websites and social media platforms details of criminal cases against candidates and reasons for choosing them at the expense of clean candidates.
Q. What does the phrase “at the expense of clean candidates” mean?
‘Z’ threats ‘A’ to kill under the influence of madness. ‘A’ has:
Principle: Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law
Facts: Surendra received divine order in his sleep at night to sacrifice his one year old child and then he will go to heaven after dying. He carries out the order kills his son. He is
Passage: In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.
The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.
Q. Which of these is true?
Passage: In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.
The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.
Q. A enters into a contract with B that he will sell his land to B for 5 rupees since B has been a really good friend of his. A is later told by one of his employees that the actual worth of the land is 5 crore rupees. A decides not to perform the contract with B. B sues A for performance of contract. Decide.
Passage: In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.
The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.
Q. A goes to B and tells him that he knows a spell with which he can create barren lands wherever he wishes to. B agrees to pay 5 crore rupees to learn the spell. A teaches B the spell and produces a land of 10 square feet. A wants B to pay the money now but B refuses. He also says that the area of land so produce was inadequate. A sues B. Decide.
Passage: In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.
The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.
Q. What can be said rightly about the drafters of the Indian Contract Act?
Passage: In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.
The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.
Q. Which of the following is an example of valid consideration
Legal Principle: A contract which is made to restraint the legal proceedings is void under the law.
Facts of the Problem: Raj is a leading barrister of the city. His friend Nitin enters into a contract with him that he would not in represent Jatin in any law suit for the next one year. After two months, Raj represents Jatin in a civil suit. Nitin sues Raj for the breach of the contract. What would be the legal outcome of the suit against Raj?
The case of QUEEN V. DUDLEY AND STEPHEN is known for its use as criminal defence of:
Passage: Excerpts from the Chacha Nehru University Act, 1969
The Ordinances may provide, for the admission of students, the courses of study and the fees therefor, the qualifications pertaining to degrees, diplomas, certificates and other academic distinctions, the conditions for the grant of Fellowships, Awards and the like.
The Ordinances shall be made by the ViceChancellor with the previous approval of the Central Government.
Constitution of Indiana
Article 37 (Part IV): The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforced by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.
Article 45 (Part IV): The State shall endeavour to provide for economical higher education for all its citizens.
Q. Chacha Nehru University (CNU) is an internationally acclaimed university of Indiana, established under Chacha Nehru University Act, 1969 (“the Act”). It offers higher education to the bright students at a nominal fees. CNU had not raised its fees for 20 years. However, the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of Indiana recently released a notification dated 21st December, 2019, which increased the fees for the upcoming batches by nearly 200%, including an increase in the Hostel fee from 500 rupees to 5000 rupees per annum. Agitated by the fee hike, the students moved to the court. Is the fee hike valid?
Passage: Excerpts from the Chacha Nehru University Act, 1969
The Ordinances may provide, for the admission of students, the courses of study and the fees therefor, the qualifications pertaining to degrees, diplomas, certificates and other academic distinctions, the conditions for the grant of Fellowships, Awards and the like.
The Ordinances shall be made by the ViceChancellor with the previous approval of the Central Government.
Constitution of Indiana
Article 37 (Part IV): The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforced by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.
Article 45 (Part IV): The State shall endeavour to provide for economical higher education for all its citizens.
Q. The Vice Chancellor (VC) subsequently takes cognizance of the matter and issues an ordinance bringing the fee hike down to only 5 percent increase, against the government’s will. Decide. (to be read with Question 1)
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