CLAT Practice Test - 19 - CLAT MCQ

The background of the emergence of political secularism in Europe is profound religious homogenization — dissenters, and adherents of non-dominant religions were exterminated around the wars of religion. Rulers publicly confessed allegiance to one of the many churches in these predominantly single-religion societies, thereby consolidating a strong alliance between the state and the dominant church. Trouble began, however, when this church became increasingly politically meddlesome and socially oppressive. The key issue then was how to tame the power of this church. The state’s disentanglement from the dominant church was necessary to realize a number of goals, including the enhancement of individual liberty and equality. But for this secularism, tackling religious diversity was simply not an issue, because it had already been liquidated in all kinds of ethically undesirable ways.

By contrast, in India, deep religious diversity was not an optional extra but part of its social, cultural, and historical landscape. Gandhi understood this and never tired of stating it: India is “one nation in the ancient world which had recognized cultural democracy, whereby it is held that the roads to one and the same God are many, but the goal was one because God was one and the same. The various religions were as so many leaves of a tree; at the trunk, they are one”. Gandhi dismissed the idea that there could ever be a uniform religious code, as it were, for all humankind.

What is needed then is due recognition of different religious communities and to ensure comfort and trust among their members. This was viable because, for Gandhi, all humans had a fundamental desire of deep sociability. They value human relations as an end in itself. They desire a constructive relationship with others. Why else would they be motivated to seek agreement? Why, upon realizing that they can’t resolve the disagreement on one issue, would they seek agreement on something else? Why are they motivated to renew conversation after it has been violently disrupted? Why, after a period of mutual recrimination, breakdown, and silence, do people still begin talking to one another? Humans simply can’t do without one another, and no matter how much they like to be with people of their own ilk, they invariably also need to live with those with who they differ, to reach out to people with whom they disagree.

The world’s religious diversity, the impossibility of there ever being one religion for humankind, makes mutual respect, equal regard, and communal harmony a necessity. Gandhi believed that this can become a reality by virtue of the human quality of deep sociability.

Humans occasionally wish to live independently of their communities, but as participants of historically embedded cultural and religious traditions, they also meet each other as members of religious-cultural communities. They must actively shape these encounters, ensure that they do not become bitter or turn sour but be good, decent, friendly and respectful. Humans can’t really be good to each other unless they are respectful to each other’s religious and traditions.

Q. As per Gandhiji's concept of religious diversity, which of these analogies best describes the relation between the different religions and God:

The background of the emergence of political secularism in Europe is profound religious homogenization — dissenters, and adherents of non-dominant religions were exterminated around the wars of religion. Rulers publicly confessed allegiance to one of the many churches in these predominantly single-religion societies, thereby consolidating a strong alliance between the state and the dominant church. Trouble began, however, when this church became increasingly politically meddlesome and socially oppressive. The key issue then was how to tame the power of this church. The state’s disentanglement from the dominant church was necessary to realize a number of goals, including the enhancement of individual liberty and equality. But for this secularism, tackling religious diversity was simply not an issue, because it had already been liquidated in all kinds of ethically undesirable ways.

By contrast, in India, deep religious diversity was not an optional extra but part of its social, cultural, and historical landscape. Gandhi understood this and never tired of stating it: India is “one nation in the ancient world which had recognized cultural democracy, whereby it is held that the roads to one and the same God are many, but the goal was one because God was one and the same. The various religions were as so many leaves of a tree; at the trunk, they are one”. Gandhi dismissed the idea that there could ever be a uniform religious code, as it were, for all humankind.

What is needed then is due recognition of different religious communities and to ensure comfort and trust among their members. This was viable because, for Gandhi, all humans had a fundamental desire of deep sociability. They value human relations as an end in itself. They desire a constructive relationship with others. Why else would they be motivated to seek agreement? Why, upon realizing that they can’t resolve the disagreement on one issue, would they seek agreement on something else? Why are they motivated to renew conversation after it has been violently disrupted? Why, after a period of mutual recrimination, breakdown, and silence, do people still begin talking to one another? Humans simply can’t do without one another, and no matter how much they like to be with people of their own ilk, they invariably also need to live with those with who they differ, to reach out to people with whom they disagree.

The world’s religious diversity, the impossibility of there ever being one religion for humankind, makes mutual respect, equal regard, and communal harmony a necessity. Gandhi believed that this can become a reality by virtue of the human quality of deep sociability.

Humans occasionally wish to live independently of their communities, but as participants of historically embedded cultural and religious traditions, they also meet each other as members of religious-cultural communities. They must actively shape these encounters, ensure that they do not become bitter or turn sour but be good, decent, friendly and respectful. Humans can’t really be good to each other unless they are respectful to each other’s religious and traditions.

Q. Which of the following is true regarding gandhiji’s conjecture with respect to humans?

The Allahabad High Court ruling that people marrying under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, can choose not to publicise their union with a notice 30 days in advance may not exactly be a judicial pushback against problematic anti-conversion laws enacted by several BJP-ruled States. But it serves to get a major irritant out of the way of couples wanting to marry against the wishes of their parents or their immediate community. Many inter caste and inter-faith marriages have faced violent opposition from those acting in the name of community pride or those raising the bogey of ‘love jihad’. Hindutva activists have been targeting Muslim men marrying Hindu women, especially if the women have converted to Islam prior to the marriage. The court said that mandatorily publishing a notice of the intended marriage and calling for objections violates the right to privacy. According to the new order, if a couple gives it in writing that they do not want the notice publicised, the Marriage Officer can solemnise the marriage. Under Section 5 of the Act, which enables inter-faith marriages, the couple has to give notice to the Marriage Officer; and under Sections 6 and 7, the officer has to publicise the notice and call for objections. But, in his order, Justice Vivek Chaudhary said the Act’s interpretation has to be such that it upholds fundamental rights, not violate them. Laws should not invade liberty and privacy, he said, “including within its sphere freedom to choose for marriage without interference from state and non-state actors, of the persons concerned.

The HC ruling came on the plea of a Muslim woman who converted to Hinduism for marriage as the couple saw the notice period under the Special Marriage Act as an invasion of their privacy. Justice Chaudhary’s remarks on ‘state and non-state actors’ will undoubtedly be read in the context of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, that particularly targets inter-faith marriages. This new law declares conversion of religion by marriage to be unlawful, mandates a 60-day notice to the District Magistrate and also requires the Magistrate to conduct a police inquiry to find out the explicit reason for the conversion. Enacted last November, there have been 54 arrests till date by the U.P. police. The HC ruling can now be cited across India to prevent public notices under the Special Marriage Act. Interfaith couples will hope that when the Supreme Court hears pleas on the U.P. conversion law, it will be guided by progressive verdicts, such as the 2017 Aadhaar ruling, on the right to privacy as a basic right, and the 2018 judgment on Hadiya, upholding the student’s right to choose a partner, a Muslim man in Kerala, as an essential freedom.

Q. Which of the following could be extrapolated from the passage?

The Allahabad High Court ruling that people marrying under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, can choose not to publicise their union with a notice 30 days in advance may not exactly be a judicial pushback against problematic anti-conversion laws enacted by several BJP-ruled States. But it serves to get a major irritant out of the way of couples wanting to marry against the wishes of their parents or their immediate community. Many inter caste and inter-faith marriages have faced violent opposition from those acting in the name of community pride or those raising the bogey of ‘love jihad’. Hindutva activists have been targeting Muslim men marrying Hindu women, especially if the women have converted to Islam prior to the marriage. The court said that mandatorily publishing a notice of the intended marriage and calling for objections violates the right to privacy. According to the new order, if a couple gives it in writing that they do not want the notice publicised, the Marriage Officer can solemnise the marriage. Under Section 5 of the Act, which enables inter-faith marriages, the couple has to give notice to the Marriage Officer; and under Sections 6 and 7, the officer has to publicise the notice and call for objections. But, in his order, Justice Vivek Chaudhary said the Act’s interpretation has to be such that it upholds fundamental rights, not violate them. Laws should not invade liberty and privacy, he said, “including within its sphere freedom to choose for marriage without interference from state and non-state actors, of the persons concerned.

The HC ruling came on the plea of a Muslim woman who converted to Hinduism for marriage as the couple saw the notice period under the Special Marriage Act as an invasion of their privacy. Justice Chaudhary’s remarks on ‘state and non-state actors’ will undoubtedly be read in the context of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, that particularly targets inter-faith marriages. This new law declares conversion of religion by marriage to be unlawful, mandates a 60-day notice to the District Magistrate and also requires the Magistrate to conduct a police inquiry to find out the explicit reason for the conversion. Enacted last November, there have been 54 arrests till date by the U.P. police. The HC ruling can now be cited across India to prevent public notices under the Special Marriage Act. Interfaith couples will hope that when the Supreme Court hears pleas on the U.P. conversion law, it will be guided by progressive verdicts, such as the 2017 Aadhaar ruling, on the right to privacy as a basic right, and the 2018 judgment on Hadiya, upholding the student’s right to choose a partner, a Muslim man in Kerala, as an essential freedom.

Q. Which of the following is the synonym to the word interpretation?

The Allahabad High Court ruling that people marrying under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, can choose not to publicise their union with a notice 30 days in advance may not exactly be a judicial pushback against problematic anti-conversion laws enacted by several BJP-ruled States. But it serves to get a major irritant out of the way of couples wanting to marry against the wishes of their parents or their immediate community. Many inter caste and inter-faith marriages have faced violent opposition from those acting in the name of community pride or those raising the bogey of ‘love jihad’. Hindutva activists have been targeting Muslim men marrying Hindu women, especially if the women have converted to Islam prior to the marriage. The court said that mandatorily publishing a notice of the intended marriage and calling for objections violates the right to privacy. According to the new order, if a couple gives it in writing that they do not want the notice publicised, the Marriage Officer can solemnise the marriage. Under Section 5 of the Act, which enables inter-faith marriages, the couple has to give notice to the Marriage Officer; and under Sections 6 and 7, the officer has to publicise the notice and call for objections. But, in his order, Justice Vivek Chaudhary said the Act’s interpretation has to be such that it upholds fundamental rights, not violate them. Laws should not invade liberty and privacy, he said, “including within its sphere freedom to choose for marriage without interference from state and non-state actors, of the persons concerned.

The HC ruling came on the plea of a Muslim woman who converted to Hinduism for marriage as the couple saw the notice period under the Special Marriage Act as an invasion of their privacy. Justice Chaudhary’s remarks on ‘state and non-state actors’ will undoubtedly be read in the context of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, that particularly targets inter-faith marriages. This new law declares conversion of religion by marriage to be unlawful, mandates a 60-day notice to the District Magistrate and also requires the Magistrate to conduct a police inquiry to find out the explicit reason for the conversion. Enacted last November, there have been 54 arrests till date by the U.P. police. The HC ruling can now be cited across India to prevent public notices under the Special Marriage Act. Interfaith couples will hope that when the Supreme Court hears pleas on the U.P. conversion law, it will be guided by progressive verdicts, such as the 2017 Aadhaar ruling, on the right to privacy as a basic right, and the 2018 judgment on Hadiya, upholding the student’s right to choose a partner, a Muslim man in Kerala, as an essential freedom.

Q. Which of the following is true regarding the tone of the author in the passage?

The Allahabad High Court ruling that people marrying under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, can choose not to publicise their union with a notice 30 days in advance may not exactly be a judicial pushback against problematic anti-conversion laws enacted by several BJP-ruled States. But it serves to get a major irritant out of the way of couples wanting to marry against the wishes of their parents or their immediate community. Many inter caste and inter-faith marriages have faced violent opposition from those acting in the name of community pride or those raising the bogey of ‘love jihad’. Hindutva activists have been targeting Muslim men marrying Hindu women, especially if the women have converted to Islam prior to the marriage. The court said that mandatorily publishing a notice of the intended marriage and calling for objections violates the right to privacy. According to the new order, if a couple gives it in writing that they do not want the notice publicised, the Marriage Officer can solemnise the marriage. Under Section 5 of the Act, which enables inter-faith marriages, the couple has to give notice to the Marriage Officer; and under Sections 6 and 7, the officer has to publicise the notice and call for objections. But, in his order, Justice Vivek Chaudhary said the Act’s interpretation has to be such that it upholds fundamental rights, not violate them. Laws should not invade liberty and privacy, he said, “including within its sphere freedom to choose for marriage without interference from state and non-state actors, of the persons concerned.

The HC ruling came on the plea of a Muslim woman who converted to Hinduism for marriage as the couple saw the notice period under the Special Marriage Act as an invasion of their privacy. Justice Chaudhary’s remarks on ‘state and non-state actors’ will undoubtedly be read in the context of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, that particularly targets inter-faith marriages. This new law declares conversion of religion by marriage to be unlawful, mandates a 60-day notice to the District Magistrate and also requires the Magistrate to conduct a police inquiry to find out the explicit reason for the conversion. Enacted last November, there have been 54 arrests till date by the U.P. police. The HC ruling can now be cited across India to prevent public notices under the Special Marriage Act. Interfaith couples will hope that when the Supreme Court hears pleas on the U.P. conversion law, it will be guided by progressive verdicts, such as the 2017 Aadhaar ruling, on the right to privacy as a basic right, and the 2018 judgment on Hadiya, upholding the student’s right to choose a partner, a Muslim man in Kerala, as an essential freedom.

Q. Which of the following is true on the basis of the passage?

1.The laws shall not conflict with the fundamental rights

2.Under special marriage act, the application has to be made to the marriage officer for scrutinizing the conduct of the marriage

3.Changing of religion prior to the wedding is considered to be one of the major issues for Muslims being targeted in an interfaith marriage

The Allahabad High Court ruling that people marrying under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, can choose not to publicise their union with a notice 30 days in advance may not exactly be a judicial pushback against problematic anti-conversion laws enacted by several BJP-ruled States. But it serves to get a major irritant out of the way of couples wanting to marry against the wishes of their parents or their immediate community. Many inter caste and inter-faith marriages have faced violent opposition from those acting in the name of community pride or those raising the bogey of ‘love jihad’. Hindutva activists have been targeting Muslim men marrying Hindu women, especially if the women have converted to Islam prior to the marriage. The court said that mandatorily publishing a notice of the intended marriage and calling for objections violates the right to privacy. According to the new order, if a couple gives it in writing that they do not want the notice publicised, the Marriage Officer can solemnise the marriage. Under Section 5 of the Act, which enables inter-faith marriages, the couple has to give notice to the Marriage Officer; and under Sections 6 and 7, the officer has to publicise the notice and call for objections. But, in his order, Justice Vivek Chaudhary said the Act’s interpretation has to be such that it upholds fundamental rights, not violate them. Laws should not invade liberty and privacy, he said, “including within its sphere freedom to choose for marriage without interference from state and non-state actors, of the persons concerned.

The HC ruling came on the plea of a Muslim woman who converted to Hinduism for marriage as the couple saw the notice period under the Special Marriage Act as an invasion of their privacy. Justice Chaudhary’s remarks on ‘state and non-state actors’ will undoubtedly be read in the context of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, that particularly targets inter-faith marriages. This new law declares conversion of religion by marriage to be unlawful, mandates a 60-day notice to the District Magistrate and also requires the Magistrate to conduct a police inquiry to find out the explicit reason for the conversion. Enacted last November, there have been 54 arrests till date by the U.P. police. The HC ruling can now be cited across India to prevent public notices under the Special Marriage Act. Interfaith couples will hope that when the Supreme Court hears pleas on the U.P. conversion law, it will be guided by progressive verdicts, such as the 2017 Aadhaar ruling, on the right to privacy as a basic right, and the 2018 judgment on Hadiya, upholding the student’s right to choose a partner, a Muslim man in Kerala, as an essential freedom.

Q. Which of the following is not consistent with the passage?

The Allahabad High Court ruling that people marrying under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, can choose not to publicise their union with a notice 30 days in advance may not exactly be a judicial pushback against problematic anti-conversion laws enacted by several BJP-ruled States. But it serves to get a major irritant out of the way of couples wanting to marry against the wishes of their parents or their immediate community. Many inter caste and inter-faith marriages have faced violent opposition from those acting in the name of community pride or those raising the bogey of ‘love jihad’. Hindutva activists have been targeting Muslim men marrying Hindu women, especially if the women have converted to Islam prior to the marriage. The court said that mandatorily publishing a notice of the intended marriage and calling for objections violates the right to privacy. According to the new order, if a couple gives it in writing that they do not want the notice publicised, the Marriage Officer can solemnise the marriage. Under Section 5 of the Act, which enables inter-faith marriages, the couple has to give notice to the Marriage Officer; and under Sections 6 and 7, the officer has to publicise the notice and call for objections. But, in his order, Justice Vivek Chaudhary said the Act’s interpretation has to be such that it upholds fundamental rights, not violate them. Laws should not invade liberty and privacy, he said, “including within its sphere freedom to choose for marriage without interference from state and non-state actors, of the persons concerned.

The HC ruling came on the plea of a Muslim woman who converted to Hinduism for marriage as the couple saw the notice period under the Special Marriage Act as an invasion of their privacy. Justice Chaudhary’s remarks on ‘state and non-state actors’ will undoubtedly be read in the context of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, that particularly targets inter-faith marriages. This new law declares conversion of religion by marriage to be unlawful, mandates a 60-day notice to the District Magistrate and also requires the Magistrate to conduct a police inquiry to find out the explicit reason for the conversion. Enacted last November, there have been 54 arrests till date by the U.P. police. The HC ruling can now be cited across India to prevent public notices under the Special Marriage Act. Interfaith couples will hope that when the Supreme Court hears pleas on the U.P. conversion law, it will be guided by progressive verdicts, such as the 2017 Aadhaar ruling, on the right to privacy as a basic right, and the 2018 judgment on Hadiya, upholding the student’s right to choose a partner, a Muslim man in Kerala, as an essential freedom.

Q. Which of the following could be an apt title to the passage?

[1]Johnson, a poet and critic, had taken up the task of producing a dictionary. [2]It was on such a large scale that it had seemed impossible without the establishment of an academy to make decisions about right and wrong usage. [3]Johnson decided he did not need an academy to settle arguments about language; and he would do it single-handed.

[4]The Dictionary work shop had a long desk running down the middle at which the copying clerks would work standing up. [5]Johnson himself was stationed on a rickety chair at an ‘old crazy deal table’ surrounded by a chaos of borrowed books. [6]He was also helped by six assistants, two of whom died whilst the Dictionary was still in preparation.

[7]The work was immense; Johnson wrote the definitions of over 40,000 words, and illustrates their many meanings with some 114,000 quotations drawn from English writing on every subject, from the Elizabethans to his own time. [8]He did not expel to achieve complete originality. [9]Working to a deadline, he had to draw on the best of all previous dictionaries, and to make his work one of heroic synthesis. [10]In fact, it was very much more. [11]Unlike his predecessors, Johnson treated English very practically, as a living language, with many different shades of meaning. [12]After its publication, his Dictionary was not seriously rivalled for over a century.

[13]After many vicissitudes the Dictionary was finally published on 15 April 1775. [14]It was instantly recognised as a landmark throughout Europe. [15]The fact that Johnson had taken on the Academies of Europe and matched them (everyone knew that forty French academics had taken forty years to produce the first French national dictionary) was cause for much English celebration.

[16]Johnson was working for a year short of a decade. [17]For all its faults and eccentricities his two-volume work is a masterpiece and a landmark. [18]The Dictionary, together with his other writing, made Johnson famous and so well esteemed that his friends were able to prevail upon King George III to offer him a pension. [19]From then on, he was to become the Johnson of folklore.

Q. Which of the following are not true about the words in Johnsons’ Dictionary?

[1]Johnson, a poet and critic, had taken up the task of producing a dictionary. [2]It was on such a large scale that it had seemed impossible without the establishment of an academy to make decisions about right and wrong usage. [3]Johnson decided he did not need an academy to settle arguments about language; and he would do it single-handed.

[4]The Dictionary work shop had a long desk running down the middle at which the copying clerks would work standing up. [5]Johnson himself was stationed on a rickety chair at an ‘old crazy deal table’ surrounded by a chaos of borrowed books. [6]He was also helped by six assistants, two of whom died whilst the Dictionary was still in preparation.

[7]The work was immense; Johnson wrote the definitions of over 40,000 words, and illustrates their many meanings with some 114,000 quotations drawn from English writing on every subject, from the Elizabethans to his own time. [8]He did not expel to achieve complete originality. [9]Working to a deadline, he had to draw on the best of all previous dictionaries, and to make his work one of heroic synthesis. [10]In fact, it was very much more. [11]Unlike his predecessors, Johnson treated English very practically, as a living language, with many different shades of meaning. [12]After its publication, his Dictionary was not seriously rivalled for over a century.

[13]After many vicissitudes the Dictionary was finally published on 15 April 1775. [14]It was instantly recognised as a landmark throughout Europe. [15]The fact that Johnson had taken on the Academies of Europe and matched them (everyone knew that forty French academics had taken forty years to produce the first French national dictionary) was cause for much English celebration.

[16]Johnson was working for a year short of a decade. [17]For all its faults and eccentricities his two-volume work is a masterpiece and a landmark. [18]The Dictionary, together with his other writing, made Johnson famous and so well esteemed that his friends were able to prevail upon King George III to offer him a pension. [19]From then on, he was to become the Johnson of folklore.

Q. Which of the following are true about the dictionary?

[1]Johnson, a poet and critic, had taken up the task of producing a dictionary. [2]It was on such a large scale that it had seemed impossible without the establishment of an academy to make decisions about right and wrong usage. [3]Johnson decided he did not need an academy to settle arguments about language; and he would do it single-handed.

[4]The Dictionary work shop had a long desk running down the middle at which the copying clerks would work standing up. [5]Johnson himself was stationed on a rickety chair at an ‘old crazy deal table’ surrounded by a chaos of borrowed books. [6]He was also helped by six assistants, two of whom died whilst the Dictionary was still in preparation.

[7]The work was immense; Johnson wrote the definitions of over 40,000 words, and illustrates their many meanings with some 114,000 quotations drawn from English writing on every subject, from the Elizabethans to his own time. [8]He did not expel to achieve complete originality. [9]Working to a deadline, he had to draw on the best of all previous dictionaries, and to make his work one of heroic synthesis. [10]In fact, it was very much more. [11]Unlike his predecessors, Johnson treated English very practically, as a living language, with many different shades of meaning. [12]After its publication, his Dictionary was not seriously rivalled for over a century.

[13]After many vicissitudes the Dictionary was finally published on 15 April 1775. [14]It was instantly recognised as a landmark throughout Europe. [15]The fact that Johnson had taken on the Academies of Europe and matched them (everyone knew that forty French academics had taken forty years to produce the first French national dictionary) was cause for much English celebration.

[16]Johnson was working for a year short of a decade. [17]For all its faults and eccentricities his two-volume work is a masterpiece and a landmark. [18]The Dictionary, together with his other writing, made Johnson famous and so well esteemed that his friends were able to prevail upon King George III to offer him a pension. [19]From then on, he was to become the Johnson of folklore.

Q. Which of the following words best describe the ‘dictionary workshop’

[1]Johnson, a poet and critic, had taken up the task of producing a dictionary. [2]It was on such a large scale that it had seemed impossible without the establishment of an academy to make decisions about right and wrong usage. [3]Johnson decided he did not need an academy to settle arguments about language; and he would do it single-handed.

[4]The Dictionary work shop had a long desk running down the middle at which the copying clerks would work standing up. [5]Johnson himself was stationed on a rickety chair at an ‘old crazy deal table’ surrounded by a chaos of borrowed books. [6]He was also helped by six assistants, two of whom died whilst the Dictionary was still in preparation.

[7]The work was immense; Johnson wrote the definitions of over 40,000 words, and illustrates their many meanings with some 114,000 quotations drawn from English writing on every subject, from the Elizabethans to his own time. [8]He did not expel to achieve complete originality. [9]Working to a deadline, he had to draw on the best of all previous dictionaries, and to make his work one of heroic synthesis. [10]In fact, it was very much more. [11]Unlike his predecessors, Johnson treated English very practically, as a living language, with many different shades of meaning. [12]After its publication, his Dictionary was not seriously rivalled for over a century.

[13]After many vicissitudes the Dictionary was finally published on 15 April 1775. [14]It was instantly recognised as a landmark throughout Europe. [15]The fact that Johnson had taken on the Academies of Europe and matched them (everyone knew that forty French academics had taken forty years to produce the first French national dictionary) was cause for much English celebration.

[16]Johnson was working for a year short of a decade. [17]For all its faults and eccentricities his two-volume work is a masterpiece and a landmark. [18]The Dictionary, together with his other writing, made Johnson famous and so well esteemed that his friends were able to prevail upon King George III to offer him a pension. [19]From then on, he was to become the Johnson of folklore.

Q. Sentence[7] has one or more words that appear in a form that is grammatically incorrect in the context of that sentence. What is the word(s) that appear(s) in an incorrect form, and what would be its appropriate form in the context of the sentence?

[1]Johnson, a poet and critic, had taken up the task of producing a dictionary. [2]It was on such a large scale that it had seemed impossible without the establishment of an academy to make decisions about right and wrong usage. [3]Johnson decided he did not need an academy to settle arguments about language; and he would do it single-handed.

[4]The Dictionary work shop had a long desk running down the middle at which the copying clerks would work standing up. [5]Johnson himself was stationed on a rickety chair at an ‘old crazy deal table’ surrounded by a chaos of borrowed books. [6]He was also helped by six assistants, two of whom died whilst the Dictionary was still in preparation.

[7]The work was immense; Johnson wrote the definitions of over 40,000 words, and illustrates their many meanings with some 114,000 quotations drawn from English writing on every subject, from the Elizabethans to his own time. [8]He did not expel to achieve complete originality. [9]Working to a deadline, he had to draw on the best of all previous dictionaries, and to make his work one of heroic synthesis. [10]In fact, it was very much more. [11]Unlike his predecessors, Johnson treated English very practically, as a living language, with many different shades of meaning. [12]After its publication, his Dictionary was not seriously rivalled for over a century.

[13]After many vicissitudes the Dictionary was finally published on 15 April 1775. [14]It was instantly recognised as a landmark throughout Europe. [15]The fact that Johnson had taken on the Academies of Europe and matched them (everyone knew that forty French academics had taken forty years to produce the first French national dictionary) was cause for much English celebration.

[16]Johnson was working for a year short of a decade. [17]For all its faults and eccentricities his two-volume work is a masterpiece and a landmark. [18]The Dictionary, together with his other writing, made Johnson famous and so well esteemed that his friends were able to prevail upon King George III to offer him a pension. [19]From then on, he was to become the Johnson of folklore.

Q. All the sentences in the last paragraph of the passage are grammatically correct in the context of the passage, except –

Killings of men, women and even couples belonging to separate castes have become a staple of casteism all over India. Their dismay associated with inter-caste involvement in any manner invites all kinds of judgments from like-minded peers who thrive around them. Indian Caste crimes have existed ever since the inception of India as an independent nation, with violent attacks against Brahmins by the kunbi-Maratha community after the assassination of MK Gandhi by Nathuram Godse, a Brahmin himself. The caste system, although one of the oldest forms of social stratification which divides Hindus on the basis of their karma (work) and dharma (duty) has become an elaborate excuse for some in recent years for violent inflictions over the lower classes. The caste system as mentioned in the Manusmriti exists as a basis of order and regularity of the Hindu society, and nowhere mentions the need for stratification with bloodshed or an uncalled-for oppression of lower castes. The Dalits have belonged, according to the caste system, outside the four major varnas namely Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras. Every year, events such as inter-caste marriages, the involvement of a lower caste with the upper ones, and several other menial ones call for brutal bloodshed and murders in the name of honor and protection of one's make-believe casteist sanctity, which are really only crimes against humanity and equality and root from an uneducated, oftentimes narrow mind.

The colonization of India shaped the caste system into what it is today. Susan Bayly, a Professor of Historical Anthropology in the Cambridge University states that the British caste tables ""ranked, standardised and cross-referenced jati listings for Indians on principles similar to zoology and botanical classifications, aiming to establish who was superior to whom by virtue of their supposed purity, occupational origins and collective moral worth."" This enabled the Brits to segregate between castes and provide jobs and other work opportunities to the upper castes only. Inter-caste feuds and tensions after almost a century of the inhumane British system's existence was inevitable, and came to a full bloom after India's independence in 1947. Since 1947, there has not been a single year up until 2019 in India where caste-related killings and violence (both reported and unreported) haven't sprouted up at different places within the country. Moreover, what's deeply disturbing is the fact that the people who strictly follow their caste guidelines do not care of the implications of indulging into caste related crimes, and hence become an ongoing threat to a nation which aims to chase humanitarian equality and steep developments.

Q. Which of the following castes does not belong to the four varnas as per the paragraph above?

Killings of men, women and even couples belonging to separate castes have become a staple of casteism all over India. Their dismay associated with inter-caste involvement in any manner invites all kinds of judgments from like-minded peers who thrive around them. Indian Caste crimes have existed ever since the inception of India as an independent nation, with violent attacks against Brahmins by the kunbi-Maratha community after the assassination of MK Gandhi by Nathuram Godse, a Brahmin himself. The caste system, although one of the oldest forms of social stratification which divides Hindus on the basis of their karma (work) and dharma (duty) has become an elaborate excuse for some in recent years for violent inflictions over the lower classes. The caste system as mentioned in the Manusmriti exists as a basis of order and regularity of the Hindu society, and nowhere mentions the need for stratification with bloodshed or an uncalled-for oppression of lower castes. The Dalits have belonged, according to the caste system, outside the four major varnas namely Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras. Every year, events such as inter-caste marriages, the involvement of a lower caste with the upper ones, and several other menial ones call for brutal bloodshed and murders in the name of honor and protection of one's make-believe casteist sanctity, which are really only crimes against humanity and equality and root from an uneducated, oftentimes narrow mind.

The colonization of India shaped the caste system into what it is today. Susan Bayly, a Professor of Historical Anthropology in the Cambridge University states that the British caste tables ""ranked, standardised and cross-referenced jati listings for Indians on principles similar to zoology and botanical classifications, aiming to establish who was superior to whom by virtue of their supposed purity, occupational origins and collective moral worth."" This enabled the Brits to segregate between castes and provide jobs and other work opportunities to the upper castes only. Inter-caste feuds and tensions after almost a century of the inhumane British system's existence was inevitable, and came to a full bloom after India's independence in 1947. Since 1947, there has not been a single year up until 2019 in India where caste-related killings and violence (both reported and unreported) haven't sprouted up at different places within the country. Moreover, what's deeply disturbing is the fact that the people who strictly follow their caste guidelines do not care of the implications of indulging into caste related crimes, and hence become an ongoing threat to a nation which aims to chase humanitarian equality and steep developments.

Q. Which of the following is not true to the above passage?

Killings of men, women and even couples belonging to separate castes have become a staple of casteism all over India. Their dismay associated with inter-caste involvement in any manner invites all kinds of judgments from like-minded peers who thrive around them. Indian Caste crimes have existed ever since the inception of India as an independent nation, with violent attacks against Brahmins by the kunbi-Maratha community after the assassination of MK Gandhi by Nathuram Godse, a Brahmin himself. The caste system, although one of the oldest forms of social stratification which divides Hindus on the basis of their karma (work) and dharma (duty) has become an elaborate excuse for some in recent years for violent inflictions over the lower classes. The caste system as mentioned in the Manusmriti exists as a basis of order and regularity of the Hindu society, and nowhere mentions the need for stratification with bloodshed or an uncalled-for oppression of lower castes. The Dalits have belonged, according to the caste system, outside the four major varnas namely Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras. Every year, events such as inter-caste marriages, the involvement of a lower caste with the upper ones, and several other menial ones call for brutal bloodshed and murders in the name of honor and protection of one's make-believe casteist sanctity, which are really only crimes against humanity and equality and root from an uneducated, oftentimes narrow mind.

The colonization of India shaped the caste system into what it is today. Susan Bayly, a Professor of Historical Anthropology in the Cambridge University states that the British caste tables ""ranked, standardised and cross-referenced jati listings for Indians on principles similar to zoology and botanical classifications, aiming to establish who was superior to whom by virtue of their supposed purity, occupational origins and collective moral worth."" This enabled the Brits to segregate between castes and provide jobs and other work opportunities to the upper castes only. Inter-caste feuds and tensions after almost a century of the inhumane British system's existence was inevitable, and came to a full bloom after India's independence in 1947. Since 1947, there has not been a single year up until 2019 in India where caste-related killings and violence (both reported and unreported) haven't sprouted up at different places within the country. Moreover, what's deeply disturbing is the fact that the people who strictly follow their caste guidelines do not care of the implications of indulging into caste related crimes, and hence become an ongoing threat to a nation which aims to chase humanitarian equality and steep developments.

Q. Which of the following factors gave rise to the Caste System in India as per the author in the above passage?

Killings of men, women and even couples belonging to separate castes have become a staple of casteism all over India. Their dismay associated with inter-caste involvement in any manner invites all kinds of judgments from like-minded peers who thrive around them. Indian Caste crimes have existed ever since the inception of India as an independent nation, with violent attacks against Brahmins by the kunbi-Maratha community after the assassination of MK Gandhi by Nathuram Godse, a Brahmin himself. The caste system, although one of the oldest forms of social stratification which divides Hindus on the basis of their karma (work) and dharma (duty) has become an elaborate excuse for some in recent years for violent inflictions over the lower classes. The caste system as mentioned in the Manusmriti exists as a basis of order and regularity of the Hindu society, and nowhere mentions the need for stratification with bloodshed or an uncalled-for oppression of lower castes. The Dalits have belonged, according to the caste system, outside the four major varnas namely Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras. Every year, events such as inter-caste marriages, the involvement of a lower caste with the upper ones, and several other menial ones call for brutal bloodshed and murders in the name of honor and protection of one's make-believe casteist sanctity, which are really only crimes against humanity and equality and root from an uneducated, oftentimes narrow mind.

The colonization of India shaped the caste system into what it is today. Susan Bayly, a Professor of Historical Anthropology in the Cambridge University states that the British caste tables ""ranked, standardised and cross-referenced jati listings for Indians on principles similar to zoology and botanical classifications, aiming to establish who was superior to whom by virtue of their supposed purity, occupational origins and collective moral worth."" This enabled the Brits to segregate between castes and provide jobs and other work opportunities to the upper castes only. Inter-caste feuds and tensions after almost a century of the inhumane British system's existence was inevitable, and came to a full bloom after India's independence in 1947. Since 1947, there has not been a single year up until 2019 in India where caste-related killings and violence (both reported and unreported) haven't sprouted up at different places within the country. Moreover, what's deeply disturbing is the fact that the people who strictly follow their caste guidelines do not care of the implications of indulging into caste related crimes, and hence become an ongoing threat to a nation which aims to chase humanitarian equality and steep developments.

Q. As per the author, what has become a staple of casteism all over India?

Killings of men, women and even couples belonging to separate castes have become a staple of casteism all over India. Their dismay associated with inter-caste involvement in any manner invites all kinds of judgments from like-minded peers who thrive around them. Indian Caste crimes have existed ever since the inception of India as an independent nation, with violent attacks against Brahmins by the kunbi-Maratha community after the assassination of MK Gandhi by Nathuram Godse, a Brahmin himself. The caste system, although one of the oldest forms of social stratification which divides Hindus on the basis of their karma (work) and dharma (duty) has become an elaborate excuse for some in recent years for violent inflictions over the lower classes. The caste system as mentioned in the Manusmriti exists as a basis of order and regularity of the Hindu society, and nowhere mentions the need for stratification with bloodshed or an uncalled-for oppression of lower castes. The Dalits have belonged, according to the caste system, outside the four major varnas namely Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras. Every year, events such as inter-caste marriages, the involvement of a lower caste with the upper ones, and several other menial ones call for brutal bloodshed and murders in the name of honor and protection of one's make-believe casteist sanctity, which are really only crimes against humanity and equality and root from an uneducated, oftentimes narrow mind.

The colonization of India shaped the caste system into what it is today. Susan Bayly, a Professor of Historical Anthropology in the Cambridge University states that the British caste tables ""ranked, standardised and cross-referenced jati listings for Indians on principles similar to zoology and botanical classifications, aiming to establish who was superior to whom by virtue of their supposed purity, occupational origins and collective moral worth."" This enabled the Brits to segregate between castes and provide jobs and other work opportunities to the upper castes only. Inter-caste feuds and tensions after almost a century of the inhumane British system's existence was inevitable, and came to a full bloom after India's independence in 1947. Since 1947, there has not been a single year up until 2019 in India where caste-related killings and violence (both reported and unreported) haven't sprouted up at different places within the country. Moreover, what's deeply disturbing is the fact that the people who strictly follow their caste guidelines do not care of the implications of indulging into caste related crimes, and hence become an ongoing threat to a nation which aims to chase humanitarian equality and steep developments.

Q. What Is the author trying to convey from the above passage?

Killings of men, women and even couples belonging to separate castes have become a staple of casteism all over India. Their dismay associated with inter-caste involvement in any manner invites all kinds of judgments from like-minded peers who thrive around them. Indian Caste crimes have existed ever since the inception of India as an independent nation, with violent attacks against Brahmins by the kunbi-Maratha community after the assassination of MK Gandhi by Nathuram Godse, a Brahmin himself. The caste system, although one of the oldest forms of social stratification which divides Hindus on the basis of their karma (work) and dharma (duty) has become an elaborate excuse for some in recent years for violent inflictions over the lower classes. The caste system as mentioned in the Manusmriti exists as a basis of order and regularity of the Hindu society, and nowhere mentions the need for stratification with bloodshed or an uncalled-for oppression of lower castes. The Dalits have belonged, according to the caste system, outside the four major varnas namely Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras. Every year, events such as inter-caste marriages, the involvement of a lower caste with the upper ones, and several other menial ones call for brutal bloodshed and murders in the name of honor and protection of one's make-believe casteist sanctity, which are really only crimes against humanity and equality and root from an uneducated, oftentimes narrow mind.

The colonization of India shaped the caste system into what it is today. Susan Bayly, a Professor of Historical Anthropology in the Cambridge University states that the British caste tables ""ranked, standardised and cross-referenced jati listings for Indians on principles similar to zoology and botanical classifications, aiming to establish who was superior to whom by virtue of their supposed purity, occupational origins and collective moral worth."" This enabled the Brits to segregate between castes and provide jobs and other work opportunities to the upper castes only. Inter-caste feuds and tensions after almost a century of the inhumane British system's existence was inevitable, and came to a full bloom after India's independence in 1947. Since 1947, there has not been a single year up until 2019 in India where caste-related killings and violence (both reported and unreported) haven't sprouted up at different places within the country. Moreover, what's deeply disturbing is the fact that the people who strictly follow their caste guidelines do not care of the implications of indulging into caste related crimes, and hence become an ongoing threat to a nation which aims to chase humanitarian equality and steep developments.

Q. Choose the correct meanings of the words in the order as provided herein - “Dismay, Infliction, Menial”.

In light of the recent communal riots in Delhi, it has again become pertinent for policymakers and urban planners to look at urban residential segregation as one of the major factors that precipitate communal violence in India.

Neighborhood diversity, for Indian urban planners, mostly meant reserving a few low-income group plots/apartments in new housing projects. The dominant strands in Indian urbanism have not studied caste or religion as a significant factor influencing the politics of space making. Any segregation, as research on race in US cities shows, is detrimental to economic growth, societal equity, and economic mobility, and leads to alienation of communities.

The Harvard research found that less residential segregation results in upward social and economic mobility. Residential segregation aggravates existing socio-economic inequality. There is enough empirical evidence to suggest that neighborhoods with more diversity have lower crime rates when compared to homogeneous neighborhoods.

Segregation also results in the ghettoization of minority and poor groups, and this aspect of stratification spills over to the next generations. In times of communal violence, it becomes easy to target individuals of a particular group or community — as it happened in Delhi recently.

The Los Angeles riots of 1992, for example, were also a result of highly segregated residential neighborhoods with “unequal social and political endowments and economic niches”, as shown by a study conducted by the Rand Corporation.

Various studies have shown that people living in heterogeneous neighborhoods are less discriminatory towards people belonging to other races and ethnic groups. If you live in segregated neighborhoods, it is easy to demonize the ‘other’— which often happens to Muslims in India. Previous research showed that many Indian cities are segregated along caste lines. Since the Census of India doesn’t make enumeration block-level data of the religious public, it becomes difficult to study residential segregation along religious lines.

Researchers like Raphael Susewind have tried to overcome this lack of data by using polling booth-level data to study the residential segregation of Muslims in Indian cities. In his research study titled ‘Muslims in Indian cities: Degrees of segregation and the elusive ghetto’, Susewind uses a probabilistic algorithm to deduce the religion of the person in the voter list. The findings show that Delhi and Ahmedabad are the most segregated cities for Muslims while Jaipur, Kozhikode, and Lucknow are the least segregated.

Lucknow and Jaipur have not experienced communal riots in the past many decades. As scholar Ashutosh Varshney notes, Lucknow’s only major communal riot took place in 1924, and there were no communal riots during India’s partition in 1947, or even during heightened tensions after the 1992 Babri Masjid demolition. According to him, the economic integration of Muslims and Hindus in the city is the major reason for the absence of communal riots.

Whether economic integration leads to diverse neighborhoods or diverse neighborhoods result in the economic integration of communities requires further research.

Q. Which of the following points would the author agree with?

1. Segregation of households aggravates communal violence

2. In India, the town planners segregate certain accommodations for minorities

3. Jaipur might have lower crime rate against minorities than Lucknow

In light of the recent communal riots in Delhi, it has again become pertinent for policymakers and urban planners to look at urban residential segregation as one of the major factors that precipitate communal violence in India.

Neighborhood diversity, for Indian urban planners, mostly meant reserving a few low-income group plots/apartments in new housing projects. The dominant strands in Indian urbanism have not studied caste or religion as a significant factor influencing the politics of space making. Any segregation, as research on race in US cities shows, is detrimental to economic growth, societal equity, and economic mobility, and leads to alienation of communities.

The Harvard research found that less residential segregation results in upward social and economic mobility. Residential segregation aggravates existing socio-economic inequality. There is enough empirical evidence to suggest that neighborhoods with more diversity have lower crime rates when compared to homogeneous neighborhoods.

Segregation also results in the ghettoization of minority and poor groups, and this aspect of stratification spills over to the next generations. In times of communal violence, it becomes easy to target individuals of a particular group or community — as it happened in Delhi recently.

The Los Angeles riots of 1992, for example, were also a result of highly segregated residential neighborhoods with “unequal social and political endowments and economic niches”, as shown by a study conducted by the Rand Corporation.

Various studies have shown that people living in heterogeneous neighborhoods are less discriminatory towards people belonging to other races and ethnic groups. If you live in segregated neighborhoods, it is easy to demonize the ‘other’— which often happens to Muslims in India. Previous research showed that many Indian cities are segregated along caste lines. Since the Census of India doesn’t make enumeration block-level data of the religious public, it becomes difficult to study residential segregation along religious lines.

Researchers like Raphael Susewind have tried to overcome this lack of data by using polling booth-level data to study the residential segregation of Muslims in Indian cities. In his research study titled ‘Muslims in Indian cities: Degrees of segregation and the elusive ghetto’, Susewind uses a probabilistic algorithm to deduce the religion of the person in the voter list. The findings show that Delhi and Ahmedabad are the most segregated cities for Muslims while Jaipur, Kozhikode, and Lucknow are the least segregated.

Lucknow and Jaipur have not experienced communal riots in the past many decades. As scholar Ashutosh Varshney notes, Lucknow’s only major communal riot took place in 1924, and there were no communal riots during India’s partition in 1947, or even during heightened tensions after the 1992 Babri Masjid demolition. According to him, the economic integration of Muslims and Hindus in the city is the major reason for the absence of communal riots.

Whether economic integration leads to diverse neighborhoods or diverse neighborhoods result in the economic integration of communities requires further research.

Q. Which of the following reasons can be ascribed to absence of communal riots in Jaipur for past many decades?

1. There seems to be economic integration among Muslims and Hindus

2. The diverse neighborhood provided the opportunity for economic integration

3. The city has the least segregation on basis of identity

In light of the recent communal riots in Delhi, it has again become pertinent for policymakers and urban planners to look at urban residential segregation as one of the major factors that precipitate communal violence in India.

Neighborhood diversity, for Indian urban planners, mostly meant reserving a few low-income group plots/apartments in new housing projects. The dominant strands in Indian urbanism have not studied caste or religion as a significant factor influencing the politics of space making. Any segregation, as research on race in US cities shows, is detrimental to economic growth, societal equity, and economic mobility, and leads to alienation of communities.

The Harvard research found that less residential segregation results in upward social and economic mobility. Residential segregation aggravates existing socio-economic inequality. There is enough empirical evidence to suggest that neighborhoods with more diversity have lower crime rates when compared to homogeneous neighborhoods.

Segregation also results in the ghettoization of minority and poor groups, and this aspect of stratification spills over to the next generations. In times of communal violence, it becomes easy to target individuals of a particular group or community — as it happened in Delhi recently.

The Los Angeles riots of 1992, for example, were also a result of highly segregated residential neighborhoods with “unequal social and political endowments and economic niches”, as shown by a study conducted by the Rand Corporation.

Various studies have shown that people living in heterogeneous neighborhoods are less discriminatory towards people belonging to other races and ethnic groups. If you live in segregated neighborhoods, it is easy to demonize the ‘other’— which often happens to Muslims in India. Previous research showed that many Indian cities are segregated along caste lines. Since the Census of India doesn’t make enumeration block-level data of the religious public, it becomes difficult to study residential segregation along religious lines.

Researchers like Raphael Susewind have tried to overcome this lack of data by using polling booth-level data to study the residential segregation of Muslims in Indian cities. In his research study titled ‘Muslims in Indian cities: Degrees of segregation and the elusive ghetto’, Susewind uses a probabilistic algorithm to deduce the religion of the person in the voter list. The findings show that Delhi and Ahmedabad are the most segregated cities for Muslims while Jaipur, Kozhikode, and Lucknow are the least segregated.

Lucknow and Jaipur have not experienced communal riots in the past many decades. As scholar Ashutosh Varshney notes, Lucknow’s only major communal riot took place in 1924, and there were no communal riots during India’s partition in 1947, or even during heightened tensions after the 1992 Babri Masjid demolition. According to him, the economic integration of Muslims and Hindus in the city is the major reason for the absence of communal riots.

Whether economic integration leads to diverse neighborhoods or diverse neighborhoods result in the economic integration of communities requires further research.

Q. Which of the following happens to be the findings of Raphael Susewind?

In light of the recent communal riots in Delhi, it has again become pertinent for policymakers and urban planners to look at urban residential segregation as one of the major factors that precipitate communal violence in India.

Neighborhood diversity, for Indian urban planners, mostly meant reserving a few low-income group plots/apartments in new housing projects. The dominant strands in Indian urbanism have not studied caste or religion as a significant factor influencing the politics of space making. Any segregation, as research on race in US cities shows, is detrimental to economic growth, societal equity, and economic mobility, and leads to alienation of communities.

The Harvard research found that less residential segregation results in upward social and economic mobility. Residential segregation aggravates existing socio-economic inequality. There is enough empirical evidence to suggest that neighborhoods with more diversity have lower crime rates when compared to homogeneous neighborhoods.

Segregation also results in the ghettoization of minority and poor groups, and this aspect of stratification spills over to the next generations. In times of communal violence, it becomes easy to target individuals of a particular group or community — as it happened in Delhi recently.

The Los Angeles riots of 1992, for example, were also a result of highly segregated residential neighborhoods with “unequal social and political endowments and economic niches”, as shown by a study conducted by the Rand Corporation.

Various studies have shown that people living in heterogeneous neighborhoods are less discriminatory towards people belonging to other races and ethnic groups. If you live in segregated neighborhoods, it is easy to demonize the ‘other’— which often happens to Muslims in India. Previous research showed that many Indian cities are segregated along caste lines. Since the Census of India doesn’t make enumeration block-level data of the religious public, it becomes difficult to study residential segregation along religious lines.

Researchers like Raphael Susewind have tried to overcome this lack of data by using polling booth-level data to study the residential segregation of Muslims in Indian cities. In his research study titled ‘Muslims in Indian cities: Degrees of segregation and the elusive ghetto’, Susewind uses a probabilistic algorithm to deduce the religion of the person in the voter list. The findings show that Delhi and Ahmedabad are the most segregated cities for Muslims while Jaipur, Kozhikode, and Lucknow are the least segregated.

Lucknow and Jaipur have not experienced communal riots in the past many decades. As scholar Ashutosh Varshney notes, Lucknow’s only major communal riot took place in 1924, and there were no communal riots during India’s partition in 1947, or even during heightened tensions after the 1992 Babri Masjid demolition. According to him, the economic integration of Muslims and Hindus in the city is the major reason for the absence of communal riots.

Whether economic integration leads to diverse neighborhoods or diverse neighborhoods result in the economic integration of communities requires further research.

Q. Which among the following is the most appropriate meaning of ghettoisation?

In light of the recent communal riots in Delhi, it has again become pertinent for policymakers and urban planners to look at urban residential segregation as one of the major factors that precipitate communal violence in India.

Neighborhood diversity, for Indian urban planners, mostly meant reserving a few low-income group plots/apartments in new housing projects. The dominant strands in Indian urbanism have not studied caste or religion as a significant factor influencing the politics of space making. Any segregation, as research on race in US cities shows, is detrimental to economic growth, societal equity, and economic mobility, and leads to alienation of communities.

The Harvard research found that less residential segregation results in upward social and economic mobility. Residential segregation aggravates existing socio-economic inequality. There is enough empirical evidence to suggest that neighborhoods with more diversity have lower crime rates when compared to homogeneous neighborhoods.

Segregation also results in the ghettoization of minority and poor groups, and this aspect of stratification spills over to the next generations. In times of communal violence, it becomes easy to target individuals of a particular group or community — as it happened in Delhi recently.

The Los Angeles riots of 1992, for example, were also a result of highly segregated residential neighborhoods with “unequal social and political endowments and economic niches”, as shown by a study conducted by the Rand Corporation.

Various studies have shown that people living in heterogeneous neighborhoods are less discriminatory towards people belonging to other races and ethnic groups. If you live in segregated neighborhoods, it is easy to demonize the ‘other’— which often happens to Muslims in India. Previous research showed that many Indian cities are segregated along caste lines. Since the Census of India doesn’t make enumeration block-level data of the religious public, it becomes difficult to study residential segregation along religious lines.

Researchers like Raphael Susewind have tried to overcome this lack of data by using polling booth-level data to study the residential segregation of Muslims in Indian cities. In his research study titled ‘Muslims in Indian cities: Degrees of segregation and the elusive ghetto’, Susewind uses a probabilistic algorithm to deduce the religion of the person in the voter list. The findings show that Delhi and Ahmedabad are the most segregated cities for Muslims while Jaipur, Kozhikode, and Lucknow are the least segregated.

Lucknow and Jaipur have not experienced communal riots in the past many decades. As scholar Ashutosh Varshney notes, Lucknow’s only major communal riot took place in 1924, and there were no communal riots during India’s partition in 1947, or even during heightened tensions after the 1992 Babri Masjid demolition. According to him, the economic integration of Muslims and Hindus in the city is the major reason for the absence of communal riots.

Whether economic integration leads to diverse neighborhoods or diverse neighborhoods result in the economic integration of communities requires further research.

Q. Which of the following is not true regarding homogenous neighbourhoods?

In simple terms, TRPs represent how many people, from which socio-economic categories, watched which channels for how much time during a particular period. This could be for an hour, a day, or even a week; India follows the international standard of one minute. The data is usually made public every week. BARC has installed “BAR-O-meters” in over 45,000 empanelled households. While watching a show, members of the household register their presence by pressing their viewer ID button — every person in household has a separate ID — thus capturing the duration for which the channel was watched and by whom, and providing data on viewership habits across age and socio-economic groups. The panel chosen to capture TRPs must be representative of the country’s population, and the methodology must be economically viable for the industry. If broadcasters can find the households where devices are installed, they can either bribe them to watch their channels, or ask cable operators or multi-system operators to ensure their channel is available as the “landing page” when the TV is switched on. For TRPs, it does not matter what the entire country is watching, but essentially what the 45,000-odd households supposed to represent TV viewership of the country have watched. Broadcasters can target these households to fudge actual viewership data. TRAI mentioned “panel infiltration has a significant impact when the panel size is smaller” and “with the increase in panel size, infiltration of panel homes becomes challenging”. When the sample is smaller, “manipulation becomes easier”. In a genre like English news, “because fewer homes will have larger weightage, change in behaviour of one home gets amplified at a much larger scale nationwide”. Additionally, as each channel tries to project itself as a market leader in a particular segment, it slices the data into socio-economic brackets on the basis of NCCS, age, gender, time slots (primetime) etc to find the perfect data slice. This too increases relative error in the data, because of the small sample size.

Q. Which of the following statements shows the relevance of the TRP system?

In simple terms, TRPs represent how many people, from which socio-economic categories, watched which channels for how much time during a particular period. This could be for an hour, a day, or even a week; India follows the international standard of one minute. The data is usually made public every week. BARC has installed “BAR-O-meters” in over 45,000 empanelled households. While watching a show, members of the household register their presence by pressing their viewer ID button — every person in household has a separate ID — thus capturing the duration for which the channel was watched and by whom, and providing data on viewership habits across age and socio-economic groups. The panel chosen to capture TRPs must be representative of the country’s population, and the methodology must be economically viable for the industry. If broadcasters can find the households where devices are installed, they can either bribe them to watch their channels, or ask cable operators or multi-system operators to ensure their channel is available as the “landing page” when the TV is switched on. For TRPs, it does not matter what the entire country is watching, but essentially what the 45,000-odd households supposed to represent TV viewership of the country have watched. Broadcasters can target these households to fudge actual viewership data. TRAI mentioned “panel infiltration has a significant impact when the panel size is smaller” and “with the increase in panel size, infiltration of panel homes becomes challenging”. When the sample is smaller, “manipulation becomes easier”. In a genre like English news, “because fewer homes will have larger weightage, change in behaviour of one home gets amplified at a much larger scale nationwide”. Additionally, as each channel tries to project itself as a market leader in a particular segment, it slices the data into socio-economic brackets on the basis of NCCS, age, gender, time slots (primetime) etc to find the perfect data slice. This too increases relative error in the data, because of the small sample size.

Q. Which of the following conditions is considered while making the TRP panel?

In simple terms, TRPs represent how many people, from which socio-economic categories, watched which channels for how much time during a particular period. This could be for an hour, a day, or even a week; India follows the international standard of one minute. The data is usually made public every week. BARC has installed “BAR-O-meters” in over 45,000 empanelled households. While watching a show, members of the household register their presence by pressing their viewer ID button — every person in household has a separate ID — thus capturing the duration for which the channel was watched and by whom, and providing data on viewership habits across age and socio-economic groups. The panel chosen to capture TRPs must be representative of the country’s population, and the methodology must be economically viable for the industry. If broadcasters can find the households where devices are installed, they can either bribe them to watch their channels, or ask cable operators or multi-system operators to ensure their channel is available as the “landing page” when the TV is switched on. For TRPs, it does not matter what the entire country is watching, but essentially what the 45,000-odd households supposed to represent TV viewership of the country have watched. Broadcasters can target these households to fudge actual viewership data. TRAI mentioned “panel infiltration has a significant impact when the panel size is smaller” and “with the increase in panel size, infiltration of panel homes becomes challenging”. When the sample is smaller, “manipulation becomes easier”. In a genre like English news, “because fewer homes will have larger weightage, change in behaviour of one home gets amplified at a much larger scale nationwide”. Additionally, as each channel tries to project itself as a market leader in a particular segment, it slices the data into socio-economic brackets on the basis of NCCS, age, gender, time slots (primetime) etc to find the perfect data slice. This too increases relative error in the data, because of the small sample size.

Q. Which of the following statements, most aptly tells the criticism of the TRP system?