Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow.
Over the past 18 months, corporate India and the world of finance has been roiled by a peculiar problem: the promoters of a slew of companies have been eased out of board rooms because they pledged their shares to avail loans and then defaulted.
The suicide of Cafe Coffee Day’s V.G. Siddhartha in July this year; the roller-coaster ride that Yes Bank Ltd’s stock went through when its former promoter Rana Kapoor dealt with lenders; and even the unfolding financial scandal at Karvy Stock Broking Ltd have one thing in common—the use, or rather, overuse of a humble instrument called LAS (loan against shares).
The product has been in existence since trading began in Indian markets. It was primarily meant as a tool for stock market operators, who used their existing shares as security to borrow and speculate in the market. It was meant to be short term. And the sums were supposed to be small. Traditional banks even have an upper limit: Rs.20 lakh, if the collateral is purely shares (not applicable to brokerage firms). But mutual funds and non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) have no such limit.
Caught in a credit squeeze and a slowdown in traditional bank lending, promoters increasingly began to rely on pledged share to raise funds. In many cases, those funds came in through channels that are relatively less regulated than traditional banks, setting up a perfect storm.
When economic growth began to fall and “sentiments" began to collapse, lenders inevitably began calling in on the pledge or, in some cases, even selling the equity, reducing company promoters to minor shareholders in their own firms. The fortunes of at least six big promoters are on the line, including Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd’s Subhash Chandra and Reliance Group’s Anil Ambani.
The sparkling diamonds, or shares, which are forever, are usually never meant to be sold. It is the equivalent of bringing out the family silver. “How do you get funding in any market—you borrow, beg or steal," said Amit Tandon, managing director of Institutional Investors Advisory Services (IIAS). “In a bad market such as this, borrowing is not happening because no one will lend. You are too proud to beg. So, you steal from your existing pool which is shares, pledge them, and borrow."
Perhaps, the promoters never thought they would lose control. Perhaps, corporate India never anticipated a multi-quarter economic slowdown. Perhaps, internal risk-management mechanisms were extremely weak resulting in risky hedges and abuse of LAS. One thing is certain though: The unfolding saga of India Inc.’s troubled dalliance with LAS captures, in many ways, the degree of desperation among certain sections of the business community. It is a cautionary tale which could only get worse before it gets any better.
As per regulations issued by capital market regulator Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), a company needs to disclose the amount of pledged shares, when the pledge is created, to whom the shares are pledged, and for what reason they have been pledged.
However, an analysis done by Mint shows that despite regulatory tightening, the disclosures are missing. In the case of at least four companies including Yes Bank, firms have not even disclosed to whom the shares have been pledged—a clear violation of disclosure norms.
Other companies such as Zee Entertainment, the Adani Group, GMR Group and Vedanta Ltd practice a more innovative strategy. They disclose the name of the trustee but not the pledgee, giving investors no indication regarding the purpose of the pledge.
For quite some time, SEBI and RBI have been on the same page regarding the need to crack down on excessive pledging. The capital market regulator had expressed concern particularly about how regulated mutual funds have now assumed the role of lenders, rather than acting on behalf of investors.
Several mutual funds have begun to invest in LAS products in their fixed maturity plan schemes, that is, papers with pledged shares as the underlying collateral. Due to a fear of default, the funds sometimes roll over the maturity date in the hope that a stake sale would result in realization of dues. SEBI has taken one step after another to stem this practice.
Q. Why did the promoters of many companies not find a seat in the board room?
Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow.
Over the past 18 months, corporate India and the world of finance has been roiled by a peculiar problem: the promoters of a slew of companies have been eased out of board rooms because they pledged their shares to avail loans and then defaulted.
The suicide of Cafe Coffee Day’s V.G. Siddhartha in July this year; the roller-coaster ride that Yes Bank Ltd’s stock went through when its former promoter Rana Kapoor dealt with lenders; and even the unfolding financial scandal at Karvy Stock Broking Ltd have one thing in common—the use, or rather, overuse of a humble instrument called LAS (loan against shares).
The product has been in existence since trading began in Indian markets. It was primarily meant as a tool for stock market operators, who used their existing shares as security to borrow and speculate in the market. It was meant to be short term. And the sums were supposed to be small. Traditional banks even have an upper limit: Rs.20 lakh, if the collateral is purely shares (not applicable to brokerage firms). But mutual funds and non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) have no such limit.
Caught in a credit squeeze and a slowdown in traditional bank lending, promoters increasingly began to rely on pledged share to raise funds. In many cases, those funds came in through channels that are relatively less regulated than traditional banks, setting up a perfect storm.
When economic growth began to fall and “sentiments" began to collapse, lenders inevitably began calling in on the pledge or, in some cases, even selling the equity, reducing company promoters to minor shareholders in their own firms. The fortunes of at least six big promoters are on the line, including Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd’s Subhash Chandra and Reliance Group’s Anil Ambani.
The sparkling diamonds, or shares, which are forever, are usually never meant to be sold. It is the equivalent of bringing out the family silver. “How do you get funding in any market—you borrow, beg or steal," said Amit Tandon, managing director of Institutional Investors Advisory Services (IIAS). “In a bad market such as this, borrowing is not happening because no one will lend. You are too proud to beg. So, you steal from your existing pool which is shares, pledge them, and borrow."
Perhaps, the promoters never thought they would lose control. Perhaps, corporate India never anticipated a multi-quarter economic slowdown. Perhaps, internal risk-management mechanisms were extremely weak resulting in risky hedges and abuse of LAS. One thing is certain though: The unfolding saga of India Inc.’s troubled dalliance with LAS captures, in many ways, the degree of desperation among certain sections of the business community. It is a cautionary tale which could only get worse before it gets any better.
As per regulations issued by capital market regulator Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), a company needs to disclose the amount of pledged shares, when the pledge is created, to whom the shares are pledged, and for what reason they have been pledged.
However, an analysis done by Mint shows that despite regulatory tightening, the disclosures are missing. In the case of at least four companies including Yes Bank, firms have not even disclosed to whom the shares have been pledged—a clear violation of disclosure norms.
Other companies such as Zee Entertainment, the Adani Group, GMR Group and Vedanta Ltd practice a more innovative strategy. They disclose the name of the trustee but not the pledgee, giving investors no indication regarding the purpose of the pledge.
For quite some time, SEBI and RBI have been on the same page regarding the need to crack down on excessive pledging. The capital market regulator had expressed concern particularly about how regulated mutual funds have now assumed the role of lenders, rather than acting on behalf of investors.
Several mutual funds have begun to invest in LAS products in their fixed maturity plan schemes, that is, papers with pledged shares as the underlying collateral. Due to a fear of default, the funds sometimes roll over the maturity date in the hope that a stake sale would result in realization of dues. SEBI has taken one step after another to stem this practice.
Q. Which of the following statements are true regarding the financial instrument ‘loan against shares’ (LAS)?
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Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow.
Over the past 18 months, corporate India and the world of finance has been roiled by a peculiar problem: the promoters of a slew of companies have been eased out of board rooms because they pledged their shares to avail loans and then defaulted.
The suicide of Cafe Coffee Day’s V.G. Siddhartha in July this year; the roller-coaster ride that Yes Bank Ltd’s stock went through when its former promoter Rana Kapoor dealt with lenders; and even the unfolding financial scandal at Karvy Stock Broking Ltd have one thing in common—the use, or rather, overuse of a humble instrument called LAS (loan against shares).
The product has been in existence since trading began in Indian markets. It was primarily meant as a tool for stock market operators, who used their existing shares as security to borrow and speculate in the market. It was meant to be short term. And the sums were supposed to be small. Traditional banks even have an upper limit: Rs.20 lakh, if the collateral is purely shares (not applicable to brokerage firms). But mutual funds and non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) have no such limit.
Caught in a credit squeeze and a slowdown in traditional bank lending, promoters increasingly began to rely on pledged share to raise funds. In many cases, those funds came in through channels that are relatively less regulated than traditional banks, setting up a perfect storm.
When economic growth began to fall and “sentiments" began to collapse, lenders inevitably began calling in on the pledge or, in some cases, even selling the equity, reducing company promoters to minor shareholders in their own firms. The fortunes of at least six big promoters are on the line, including Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd’s Subhash Chandra and Reliance Group’s Anil Ambani.
The sparkling diamonds, or shares, which are forever, are usually never meant to be sold. It is the equivalent of bringing out the family silver. “How do you get funding in any market—you borrow, beg or steal," said Amit Tandon, managing director of Institutional Investors Advisory Services (IIAS). “In a bad market such as this, borrowing is not happening because no one will lend. You are too proud to beg. So, you steal from your existing pool which is shares, pledge them, and borrow."
Perhaps, the promoters never thought they would lose control. Perhaps, corporate India never anticipated a multi-quarter economic slowdown. Perhaps, internal risk-management mechanisms were extremely weak resulting in risky hedges and abuse of LAS. One thing is certain though: The unfolding saga of India Inc.’s troubled dalliance with LAS captures, in many ways, the degree of desperation among certain sections of the business community. It is a cautionary tale which could only get worse before it gets any better.
As per regulations issued by capital market regulator Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), a company needs to disclose the amount of pledged shares, when the pledge is created, to whom the shares are pledged, and for what reason they have been pledged.
However, an analysis done by Mint shows that despite regulatory tightening, the disclosures are missing. In the case of at least four companies including Yes Bank, firms have not even disclosed to whom the shares have been pledged—a clear violation of disclosure norms.
Other companies such as Zee Entertainment, the Adani Group, GMR Group and Vedanta Ltd practice a more innovative strategy. They disclose the name of the trustee but not the pledgee, giving investors no indication regarding the purpose of the pledge.
For quite some time, SEBI and RBI have been on the same page regarding the need to crack down on excessive pledging. The capital market regulator had expressed concern particularly about how regulated mutual funds have now assumed the role of lenders, rather than acting on behalf of investors.
Several mutual funds have begun to invest in LAS products in their fixed maturity plan schemes, that is, papers with pledged shares as the underlying collateral. Due to a fear of default, the funds sometimes roll over the maturity date in the hope that a stake sale would result in realization of dues. SEBI has taken one step after another to stem this practice.
Q. What does the author mean by the expression: ‘It is a cautionary tale which could only get worse before it gets any better.’?
Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow.
Over the past 18 months, corporate India and the world of finance has been roiled by a peculiar problem: the promoters of a slew of companies have been eased out of board rooms because they pledged their shares to avail loans and then defaulted.
The suicide of Cafe Coffee Day’s V.G. Siddhartha in July this year; the roller-coaster ride that Yes Bank Ltd’s stock went through when its former promoter Rana Kapoor dealt with lenders; and even the unfolding financial scandal at Karvy Stock Broking Ltd have one thing in common—the use, or rather, overuse of a humble instrument called LAS (loan against shares).
The product has been in existence since trading began in Indian markets. It was primarily meant as a tool for stock market operators, who used their existing shares as security to borrow and speculate in the market. It was meant to be short term. And the sums were supposed to be small. Traditional banks even have an upper limit: Rs.20 lakh, if the collateral is purely shares (not applicable to brokerage firms). But mutual funds and non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) have no such limit.
Caught in a credit squeeze and a slowdown in traditional bank lending, promoters increasingly began to rely on pledged share to raise funds. In many cases, those funds came in through channels that are relatively less regulated than traditional banks, setting up a perfect storm.
When economic growth began to fall and “sentiments" began to collapse, lenders inevitably began calling in on the pledge or, in some cases, even selling the equity, reducing company promoters to minor shareholders in their own firms. The fortunes of at least six big promoters are on the line, including Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd’s Subhash Chandra and Reliance Group’s Anil Ambani.
The sparkling diamonds, or shares, which are forever, are usually never meant to be sold. It is the equivalent of bringing out the family silver. “How do you get funding in any market—you borrow, beg or steal," said Amit Tandon, managing director of Institutional Investors Advisory Services (IIAS). “In a bad market such as this, borrowing is not happening because no one will lend. You are too proud to beg. So, you steal from your existing pool which is shares, pledge them, and borrow."
Perhaps, the promoters never thought they would lose control. Perhaps, corporate India never anticipated a multi-quarter economic slowdown. Perhaps, internal risk-management mechanisms were extremely weak resulting in risky hedges and abuse of LAS. One thing is certain though: The unfolding saga of India Inc.’s troubled dalliance with LAS captures, in many ways, the degree of desperation among certain sections of the business community. It is a cautionary tale which could only get worse before it gets any better.
As per regulations issued by capital market regulator Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), a company needs to disclose the amount of pledged shares, when the pledge is created, to whom the shares are pledged, and for what reason they have been pledged.
However, an analysis done by Mint shows that despite regulatory tightening, the disclosures are missing. In the case of at least four companies including Yes Bank, firms have not even disclosed to whom the shares have been pledged—a clear violation of disclosure norms.
Other companies such as Zee Entertainment, the Adani Group, GMR Group and Vedanta Ltd practice a more innovative strategy. They disclose the name of the trustee but not the pledgee, giving investors no indication regarding the purpose of the pledge.
For quite some time, SEBI and RBI have been on the same page regarding the need to crack down on excessive pledging. The capital market regulator had expressed concern particularly about how regulated mutual funds have now assumed the role of lenders, rather than acting on behalf of investors.
Several mutual funds have begun to invest in LAS products in their fixed maturity plan schemes, that is, papers with pledged shares as the underlying collateral. Due to a fear of default, the funds sometimes roll over the maturity date in the hope that a stake sale would result in realization of dues. SEBI has taken one step after another to stem this practice.
Q. What does the analysis done by Mint show?
Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow.
Over the past 18 months, corporate India and the world of finance has been roiled by a peculiar problem: the promoters of a slew of companies have been eased out of board rooms because they pledged their shares to avail loans and then defaulted.
The suicide of Cafe Coffee Day’s V.G. Siddhartha in July this year; the roller-coaster ride that Yes Bank Ltd’s stock went through when its former promoter Rana Kapoor dealt with lenders; and even the unfolding financial scandal at Karvy Stock Broking Ltd have one thing in common—the use, or rather, overuse of a humble instrument called LAS (loan against shares).
The product has been in existence since trading began in Indian markets. It was primarily meant as a tool for stock market operators, who used their existing shares as security to borrow and speculate in the market. It was meant to be short term. And the sums were supposed to be small. Traditional banks even have an upper limit: Rs.20 lakh, if the collateral is purely shares (not applicable to brokerage firms). But mutual funds and non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) have no such limit.
Caught in a credit squeeze and a slowdown in traditional bank lending, promoters increasingly began to rely on pledged share to raise funds. In many cases, those funds came in through channels that are relatively less regulated than traditional banks, setting up a perfect storm.
When economic growth began to fall and “sentiments" began to collapse, lenders inevitably began calling in on the pledge or, in some cases, even selling the equity, reducing company promoters to minor shareholders in their own firms. The fortunes of at least six big promoters are on the line, including Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd’s Subhash Chandra and Reliance Group’s Anil Ambani.
The sparkling diamonds, or shares, which are forever, are usually never meant to be sold. It is the equivalent of bringing out the family silver. “How do you get funding in any market—you borrow, beg or steal," said Amit Tandon, managing director of Institutional Investors Advisory Services (IIAS). “In a bad market such as this, borrowing is not happening because no one will lend. You are too proud to beg. So, you steal from your existing pool which is shares, pledge them, and borrow."
Perhaps, the promoters never thought they would lose control. Perhaps, corporate India never anticipated a multi-quarter economic slowdown. Perhaps, internal risk-management mechanisms were extremely weak resulting in risky hedges and abuse of LAS. One thing is certain though: The unfolding saga of India Inc.’s troubled dalliance with LAS captures, in many ways, the degree of desperation among certain sections of the business community. It is a cautionary tale which could only get worse before it gets any better.
As per regulations issued by capital market regulator Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), a company needs to disclose the amount of pledged shares, when the pledge is created, to whom the shares are pledged, and for what reason they have been pledged.
However, an analysis done by Mint shows that despite regulatory tightening, the disclosures are missing. In the case of at least four companies including Yes Bank, firms have not even disclosed to whom the shares have been pledged—a clear violation of disclosure norms.
Other companies such as Zee Entertainment, the Adani Group, GMR Group and Vedanta Ltd practice a more innovative strategy. They disclose the name of the trustee but not the pledgee, giving investors no indication regarding the purpose of the pledge.
For quite some time, SEBI and RBI have been on the same page regarding the need to crack down on excessive pledging. The capital market regulator had expressed concern particularly about how regulated mutual funds have now assumed the role of lenders, rather than acting on behalf of investors.
Several mutual funds have begun to invest in LAS products in their fixed maturity plan schemes, that is, papers with pledged shares as the underlying collateral. Due to a fear of default, the funds sometimes roll over the maturity date in the hope that a stake sale would result in realization of dues. SEBI has taken one step after another to stem this practice.
Q. Which of the following is the author’s opinion regarding shares?
Directions: In this question, a sentence has been divided into four parts marked as I, II, III and IV. You need to find which part/parts does not/do not have any error in terms of grammatical or contextual usage. If the sentence is absolutely correct, mark (D) as your answer.
I. A tradition, said to have been starting by St Francis of Assisi
II. in 1223 at Greccio, central Italy, the Nativity scene
III. emphasises the spiritual aspects of Christ’s birth and advocates
IV. worship over materialism during the festivity season
Directions: In this question, a sentence has been divided into four parts marked as I, II, III and IV. You need to find which part/parts does not/do not have any error in terms of grammatical or contextual usage. If the sentence is absolutely correct, mark (D) as your answer.
I. The consumer economy scorecard
II. of India appear particularly bleak,
III. with vehicle sales growth losing momentum,
IV. after hinting at a turnaround in the previous month.
Directions: In this question, a sentence has been divided into four parts marked as I, II, III and IV. You need to find which part/parts does not/do not have any error in terms of grammatical or contextual usage. If the sentence is absolutely correct, mark (D) as your answer.
I. With new tools and new expeditions,
II. scientists are peering into Antarctica's nooks and crannies
III. and even its subsurface, discovering a world
IV. that seems unimaginable from more temperate climes.
Choose the most appropriate option to change the voice (active /passive) form of the given sentence.
I am to do it immediately.
Identify the best way to improve the bold part of the given sentence. If there is no improvement required, select ‘No
improvement’.
In today's time, many private companies follow the concept of corporate social responsibility.
Given below are four jumbled sentences. Pick the option that gives their correct order.
A. The shift to stringent emissions norms, the transition to electrification, and potentially changing consumer preferences with shared mobility and a connected ecosystem.
B. Change may be the only constant, but the pace with which it takes place is not.
C. There are primarily three factors causing this disruption.
D. The automotive industry is seeing a spectrum of disruptions, as we move towards a cleaner, safer and convenient transport ecosystem.
Choose the most appropriate option to change the Narration (direct/indirect) form of the given sentence.
Meena inquired of me why I had done that.
Identify the best way to improve the bold part of the given sentence. If there is no improvement required, select ‘No
improvement’.
The blogger asks their followers to share the feedback on his recent post.
Given below are four jumbled sentences. Pick the option that gives their correct order.
A. Instead of spending meagre local resources to rebuild faltering demand, India is betting that world's growth this year will be down in the dumps.
B. Luring overseas investors to high yielding Indian assets is the preferred strategy.
C. An all-out push to revive its sputtering economy is not within India’s reach.
D. And that will make India appear attractive to foreigners even when it really isn’t.
Given below are four jumbled sentences. Pick the option that gives their correct order.
A. Especially where the penetration of mobile telephony and social media exceeds that of education and awareness.
B. Also because it may induce people to act on the information.
C. Fake news is a menace because it is usually motivated by an intent to deceive and misinform.
D. This can have grave consequences beyond imagination.
Identify the segment in the sentence, which contains the grammatical error.
The egg were fragile, with the thin outer shell protecting its liquid interior until it was put in the boiling water.
Choose the most appropriate option to change the voice (active / passive) form of the given sentence.
Somebody built the house last year.
Identify the best way to improve the bold part of the given sentence. If there is no improvement required, select ‘No
improvement’.
We all can succeed if we focus major on our personal growth.
Given below are four jumbled sentences. Pick the option that gives their correct order.
A. Banijay’s acquisition of the Endemol Shine Group globally may still be a work-in-progress, but the latter is already working on the Dutch show Penoza for India.
B. The Indian arm of Paris-based company Banijay Group is developing the Indian versions of American reality show Survivor and legal thriller Damages, Belgian TV series The Mole and Turkish drama Public Enemy.
C. Meanwhile, Sameer Nair-led Applause Entertainment is bringing the Indian versions of Israeli shows Your Honour and Fauda.
D. New-age content creators on video streaming services are now looking at popular international formats that they can localize as the next bait to hook Indian audiences.
Identify the segment in the sentence, which contains the grammatical error.
Once upon a time, a daughter complained to her father that his life was miserable and that she didn’t know how she was going to make it.