SBI Clerk Prelims Mock Test - 1 - Banking Exams MCQ

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s forthcoming visit to China, beginning May 14, is of considerable interest not only to peoples inhabiting the two countries, but also to leaders and strategic analysts globally. In China, Mr. Modi will be visiting Xian, Beijing and Shanghai over three days, before leaving for Mongolia and South Korea. Mr. Modi’s visit follows Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to India in September 2014. There is a great deal hinging on its outcome with China being viewed today as a pivot-state, and India the only nation in the region capable of maintaining the balance in the region. For his part, Mr. Modi has, no doubt, indicated that trade and economic ties with China would be his main priority. However, there is much more to an Indian Prime Minister’s visit to China than economic relations — unstated though this may be. This visit is again taking place at a time when China has unveiled a new strategic vision, and elements of the strategy conform to Sun Tzu’s principle of “winning without fighting”. It implicitly includes rewarding nations that it perceives as “friends” and, by implication, excluding nations that stand in its way.

China is also currently affording an opportunity to nations in the region to become a part of a Beijing-contrived “security alliance”, holding out the promise of a new Asian security paradigm, previously embedded in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Code of Conduct for Asia” (2014). The latter contained a veiled “warning” to countries forging military alliances to counter China. Perhaps, having waded too far out by its references to the issue of maritime disputes in the South China Sea at various regional fora, and more explicitly in the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region following the U.S. President Barack Obama-Modi meeting in New Delhi in January this year, the Prime Minister may, hence, need to indulge in some intricate balancing acts to win the confidence of his hosts. Many Western analysts believe that China is presently demonstrating a degree of “strategic autism”, resulting from its growing power. The Indian side needs to factor this in its calculations. Under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, China had, by and large, displayed a benign face. It was during this period, in 2008, that India and China unveiled a “Joint Strategic Vision for the 21st Century”. This was considered unusual even then for China generally finds it difficult to endorse a common vision. Under Mr. Xi, China has moved away from Deng Xiaoping’s injunction “to hide our capabilities and bide our time and never claim leadership”. It now countenances the employment of diplomacy as an instrument for the effective application of Chinese power in support of China’s ambitious and long-term foreign policy agenda. Effectively, therefore, the 2008 “Shared Vision Concept” is all but buried, and it would be useful to see what happens next. The Indian side must avoid falling into any kind of trap of arriving at decisions on strategic issues, made seemingly easy by the Chinese employing very simplified, schematic representations of highly complex realities. Meanwhile, current realities in the region are becoming more complex having entered a period fraught with change. The emergence of new dangers in West Asia, the uncertainty in Afghanistan, with the Islamic State (IS) now siding with the Taliban, tensions among different nations in South-East Asia and East Asia, and evidence of increasing Chinese assertiveness, have produced an unstable equilibrium.

Consequently, while there are many issues that would be uppermost in Mr. Modi’s mind, the visit provides an excellent opportunity for him to assess, at first hand, where China is headed. It will give him a chance to estimate the potential impact of recent developments on Sino-Indian relations. The Prime Minister could begin by making a realistic appraisal of China’s “Defence Posture” and the kind of threat this poses to India. Rising defence budgets (the 2015 defence Budget is estimated at $141.5 billion — the 26th year of normal double digit increases since 1989), unveiling of a host of new state-of-the-art weapons such as the DF-21D “Carrier Killer” anti-ship ballistic missile (the Assassin’s Mace according to the United States) and the J-20 stealth fighter aircraft, employment of asymmetric tactics which conform to Sun Tzu’s precepts, all send out a clear message that China is no longer willing to watch from the sidelines where its immediate and long-term security interests are concerned.

Mr. Modi would also have the opportunity to understand, first hand, the implications of China’s “Outreach Programme”. The launch of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has already demonstrated Beijing’s determination to build an alternative financial architecture. The “One Belt, One Road” initiative (inclusive of a Silk Road Development Fund) aims to boost connectivity with China’s Central Asian neighbours, and establish a Eurasian land corridor from the Pacific Coast to the Baltic Sea, which possibly signals China’s determination to undermine the U.S. Pivot to Asia. The ‘Maritime Silk Road’ concept is possibly an even more audacious move, with plans to connect more than 50 countries via the sea and build a network of port cities along the Silk Road. This could well result in circumventing and circumscribing India’s own outreach diplomacy. The ambit of China’s “Public Diplomacy” including the rapid expansion of Confucius Institutes (there are over 415 such institutes around the globe including around 15 in India at present) also merits the Prime Minister’s attention. The interconnecting links between these Institutes and the authorities in China are matters which require to be better understood in the context of China’s current “soft power” offensive. As in the case of China’s “Peaceful Rise”, there is room for worry and concern. China has already notched up several diplomatic successes — some of these will have an adverse impact on India’s external relations. The transformation in China-Russia relations is clearly one. This has been facilitated by the $400 billion gas deal, but it should not be overlooked that Russia was possibly the first overseas destination for Mr. Xi. What should specially concern India and Mr. Modi, is that China and Russia are now determined to deepen their “comprehensive strategic partnership” and “contribute to lasting world peace”. Likewise, China has gained a strategic beachhead in West Asia with its Iran connection. China is reaping the reward of standing by Iran. This will clearly put India on the back foot in a region which it has carefully nursed for a long time

Q. According to the passage, PM Modi will visit the following countries?

A) China

B) Mongolia

C) South Korea

D) Russia

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s forthcoming visit to China, beginning May 14, is of considerable interest not only to peoples inhabiting the two countries, but also to leaders and strategic analysts globally. In China, Mr. Modi will be visiting Xian, Beijing and Shanghai over three days, before leaving for Mongolia and South Korea. Mr. Modi’s visit follows Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to India in September 2014. There is a great deal hinging on its outcome with China being viewed today as a pivot-state, and India the only nation in the region capable of maintaining the balance in the region. For his part, Mr. Modi has, no doubt, indicated that trade and economic ties with China would be his main priority. However, there is much more to an Indian Prime Minister’s visit to China than economic relations — unstated though this may be. This visit is again taking place at a time when China has unveiled a new strategic vision, and elements of the strategy conform to Sun Tzu’s principle of “winning without fighting”. It implicitly includes rewarding nations that it perceives as “friends” and, by implication, excluding nations that stand in its way.

China is also currently affording an opportunity to nations in the region to become a part of a Beijing-contrived “security alliance”, holding out the promise of a new Asian security paradigm, previously embedded in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Code of Conduct for Asia” (2014). The latter contained a veiled “warning” to countries forging military alliances to counter China. Perhaps, having waded too far out by its references to the issue of maritime disputes in the South China Sea at various regional fora, and more explicitly in the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region following the U.S. President Barack Obama-Modi meeting in New Delhi in January this year, the Prime Minister may, hence, need to indulge in some intricate balancing acts to win the confidence of his hosts. Many Western analysts believe that China is presently demonstrating a degree of “strategic autism”, resulting from its growing power. The Indian side needs to factor this in its calculations. Under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, China had, by and large, displayed a benign face. It was during this period, in 2008, that India and China unveiled a “Joint Strategic Vision for the 21st Century”. This was considered unusual even then for China generally finds it difficult to endorse a common vision. Under Mr. Xi, China has moved away from Deng Xiaoping’s injunction “to hide our capabilities and bide our time and never claim leadership”. It now countenances the employment of diplomacy as an instrument for the effective application of Chinese power in support of China’s ambitious and long-term foreign policy agenda. Effectively, therefore, the 2008 “Shared Vision Concept” is all but buried, and it would be useful to see what happens next. The Indian side must avoid falling into any kind of trap of arriving at decisions on strategic issues, made seemingly easy by the Chinese employing very simplified, schematic representations of highly complex realities. Meanwhile, current realities in the region are becoming more complex having entered a period fraught with change. The emergence of new dangers in West Asia, the uncertainty in Afghanistan, with the Islamic State (IS) now siding with the Taliban, tensions among different nations in South-East Asia and East Asia, and evidence of increasing Chinese assertiveness, have produced an unstable equilibrium.

Consequently, while there are many issues that would be uppermost in Mr. Modi’s mind, the visit provides an excellent opportunity for him to assess, at first hand, where China is headed. It will give him a chance to estimate the potential impact of recent developments on Sino-Indian relations. The Prime Minister could begin by making a realistic appraisal of China’s “Defence Posture” and the kind of threat this poses to India. Rising defence budgets (the 2015 defence Budget is estimated at $141.5 billion — the 26th year of normal double digit increases since 1989), unveiling of a host of new state-of-the-art weapons such as the DF-21D “Carrier Killer” anti-ship ballistic missile (the Assassin’s Mace according to the United States) and the J-20 stealth fighter aircraft, employment of asymmetric tactics which conform to Sun Tzu’s precepts, all send out a clear message that China is no longer willing to watch from the sidelines where its immediate and long-term security interests are concerned.

Mr. Modi would also have the opportunity to understand, first hand, the implications of China’s “Outreach Programme”. The launch of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has already demonstrated Beijing’s determination to build an alternative financial architecture. The “One Belt, One Road” initiative (inclusive of a Silk Road Development Fund) aims to boost connectivity with China’s Central Asian neighbours, and establish a Eurasian land corridor from the Pacific Coast to the Baltic Sea, which possibly signals China’s determination to undermine the U.S. Pivot to Asia. The ‘Maritime Silk Road’ concept is possibly an even more audacious move, with plans to connect more than 50 countries via the sea and build a network of port cities along the Silk Road. This could well result in circumventing and circumscribing India’s own outreach diplomacy. The ambit of China’s “Public Diplomacy” including the rapid expansion of Confucius Institutes (there are over 415 such institutes around the globe including around 15 in India at present) also merits the Prime Minister’s attention. The interconnecting links between these Institutes and the authorities in China are matters which require to be better understood in the context of China’s current “soft power” offensive. As in the case of China’s “Peaceful Rise”, there is room for worry and concern. China has already notched up several diplomatic successes — some of these will have an adverse impact on India’s external relations. The transformation in China-Russia relations is clearly one. This has been facilitated by the $400 billion gas deal, but it should not be overlooked that Russia was possibly the first overseas destination for Mr. Xi. What should specially concern India and Mr. Modi, is that China and Russia are now determined to deepen their “comprehensive strategic partnership” and “contribute to lasting world peace”. Likewise, China has gained a strategic beachhead in West Asia with its Iran connection. China is reaping the reward of standing by Iran. This will clearly put India on the back foot in a region which it has carefully nursed for a long time

Q. What does the author mean by the phrase “become a part of a Beijing-contrived “security alliance””?

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s forthcoming visit to China, beginning May 14, is of considerable interest not only to peoples inhabiting the two countries, but also to leaders and strategic analysts globally. In China, Mr. Modi will be visiting Xian, Beijing and Shanghai over three days, before leaving for Mongolia and South Korea. Mr. Modi’s visit follows Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to India in September 2014. There is a great deal hinging on its outcome with China being viewed today as a pivot-state, and India the only nation in the region capable of maintaining the balance in the region. For his part, Mr. Modi has, no doubt, indicated that trade and economic ties with China would be his main priority. However, there is much more to an Indian Prime Minister’s visit to China than economic relations — unstated though this may be. This visit is again taking place at a time when China has unveiled a new strategic vision, and elements of the strategy conform to Sun Tzu’s principle of “winning without fighting”. It implicitly includes rewarding nations that it perceives as “friends” and, by implication, excluding nations that stand in its way.

China is also currently affording an opportunity to nations in the region to become a part of a Beijing-contrived “security alliance”, holding out the promise of a new Asian security paradigm, previously embedded in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Code of Conduct for Asia” (2014). The latter contained a veiled “warning” to countries forging military alliances to counter China. Perhaps, having waded too far out by its references to the issue of maritime disputes in the South China Sea at various regional fora, and more explicitly in the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region following the U.S. President Barack Obama-Modi meeting in New Delhi in January this year, the Prime Minister may, hence, need to indulge in some intricate balancing acts to win the confidence of his hosts. Many Western analysts believe that China is presently demonstrating a degree of “strategic autism”, resulting from its growing power. The Indian side needs to factor this in its calculations. Under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, China had, by and large, displayed a benign face. It was during this period, in 2008, that India and China unveiled a “Joint Strategic Vision for the 21st Century”. This was considered unusual even then for China generally finds it difficult to endorse a common vision. Under Mr. Xi, China has moved away from Deng Xiaoping’s injunction “to hide our capabilities and bide our time and never claim leadership”. It now countenances the employment of diplomacy as an instrument for the effective application of Chinese power in support of China’s ambitious and long-term foreign policy agenda. Effectively, therefore, the 2008 “Shared Vision Concept” is all but buried, and it would be useful to see what happens next. The Indian side must avoid falling into any kind of trap of arriving at decisions on strategic issues, made seemingly easy by the Chinese employing very simplified, schematic representations of highly complex realities. Meanwhile, current realities in the region are becoming more complex having entered a period fraught with change. The emergence of new dangers in West Asia, the uncertainty in Afghanistan, with the Islamic State (IS) now siding with the Taliban, tensions among different nations in South-East Asia and East Asia, and evidence of increasing Chinese assertiveness, have produced an unstable equilibrium.

Consequently, while there are many issues that would be uppermost in Mr. Modi’s mind, the visit provides an excellent opportunity for him to assess, at first hand, where China is headed. It will give him a chance to estimate the potential impact of recent developments on Sino-Indian relations. The Prime Minister could begin by making a realistic appraisal of China’s “Defence Posture” and the kind of threat this poses to India. Rising defence budgets (the 2015 defence Budget is estimated at $141.5 billion — the 26th year of normal double digit increases since 1989), unveiling of a host of new state-of-the-art weapons such as the DF-21D “Carrier Killer” anti-ship ballistic missile (the Assassin’s Mace according to the United States) and the J-20 stealth fighter aircraft, employment of asymmetric tactics which conform to Sun Tzu’s precepts, all send out a clear message that China is no longer willing to watch from the sidelines where its immediate and long-term security interests are concerned.

Mr. Modi would also have the opportunity to understand, first hand, the implications of China’s “Outreach Programme”. The launch of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has already demonstrated Beijing’s determination to build an alternative financial architecture. The “One Belt, One Road” initiative (inclusive of a Silk Road Development Fund) aims to boost connectivity with China’s Central Asian neighbours, and establish a Eurasian land corridor from the Pacific Coast to the Baltic Sea, which possibly signals China’s determination to undermine the U.S. Pivot to Asia. The ‘Maritime Silk Road’ concept is possibly an even more audacious move, with plans to connect more than 50 countries via the sea and build a network of port cities along the Silk Road. This could well result in circumventing and circumscribing India’s own outreach diplomacy. The ambit of China’s “Public Diplomacy” including the rapid expansion of Confucius Institutes (there are over 415 such institutes around the globe including around 15 in India at present) also merits the Prime Minister’s attention. The interconnecting links between these Institutes and the authorities in China are matters which require to be better understood in the context of China’s current “soft power” offensive. As in the case of China’s “Peaceful Rise”, there is room for worry and concern. China has already notched up several diplomatic successes — some of these will have an adverse impact on India’s external relations. The transformation in China-Russia relations is clearly one. This has been facilitated by the $400 billion gas deal, but it should not be overlooked that Russia was possibly the first overseas destination for Mr. Xi. What should specially concern India and Mr. Modi, is that China and Russia are now determined to deepen their “comprehensive strategic partnership” and “contribute to lasting world peace”. Likewise, China has gained a strategic beachhead in West Asia with its Iran connection. China is reaping the reward of standing by Iran. This will clearly put India on the back foot in a region which it has carefully nursed for a long time

Q. Which of the following is the synonym of the word “waded”?

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s forthcoming visit to China, beginning May 14, is of considerable interest not only to peoples inhabiting the two countries, but also to leaders and strategic analysts globally. In China, Mr. Modi will be visiting Xian, Beijing and Shanghai over three days, before leaving for Mongolia and South Korea. Mr. Modi’s visit follows Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to India in September 2014. There is a great deal hinging on its outcome with China being viewed today as a pivot-state, and India the only nation in the region capable of maintaining the balance in the region. For his part, Mr. Modi has, no doubt, indicated that trade and economic ties with China would be his main priority. However, there is much more to an Indian Prime Minister’s visit to China than economic relations — unstated though this may be. This visit is again taking place at a time when China has unveiled a new strategic vision, and elements of the strategy conform to Sun Tzu’s principle of “winning without fighting”. It implicitly includes rewarding nations that it perceives as “friends” and, by implication, excluding nations that stand in its way.

China is also currently affording an opportunity to nations in the region to become a part of a Beijing-contrived “security alliance”, holding out the promise of a new Asian security paradigm, previously embedded in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Code of Conduct for Asia” (2014). The latter contained a veiled “warning” to countries forging military alliances to counter China. Perhaps, having waded too far out by its references to the issue of maritime disputes in the South China Sea at various regional fora, and more explicitly in the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region following the U.S. President Barack Obama-Modi meeting in New Delhi in January this year, the Prime Minister may, hence, need to indulge in some intricate balancing acts to win the confidence of his hosts. Many Western analysts believe that China is presently demonstrating a degree of “strategic autism”, resulting from its growing power. The Indian side needs to factor this in its calculations. Under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, China had, by and large, displayed a benign face. It was during this period, in 2008, that India and China unveiled a “Joint Strategic Vision for the 21st Century”. This was considered unusual even then for China generally finds it difficult to endorse a common vision. Under Mr. Xi, China has moved away from Deng Xiaoping’s injunction “to hide our capabilities and bide our time and never claim leadership”. It now countenances the employment of diplomacy as an instrument for the effective application of Chinese power in support of China’s ambitious and long-term foreign policy agenda. Effectively, therefore, the 2008 “Shared Vision Concept” is all but buried, and it would be useful to see what happens next. The Indian side must avoid falling into any kind of trap of arriving at decisions on strategic issues, made seemingly easy by the Chinese employing very simplified, schematic representations of highly complex realities. Meanwhile, current realities in the region are becoming more complex having entered a period fraught with change. The emergence of new dangers in West Asia, the uncertainty in Afghanistan, with the Islamic State (IS) now siding with the Taliban, tensions among different nations in South-East Asia and East Asia, and evidence of increasing Chinese assertiveness, have produced an unstable equilibrium.

Consequently, while there are many issues that would be uppermost in Mr. Modi’s mind, the visit provides an excellent opportunity for him to assess, at first hand, where China is headed. It will give him a chance to estimate the potential impact of recent developments on Sino-Indian relations. The Prime Minister could begin by making a realistic appraisal of China’s “Defence Posture” and the kind of threat this poses to India. Rising defence budgets (the 2015 defence Budget is estimated at $141.5 billion — the 26th year of normal double digit increases since 1989), unveiling of a host of new state-of-the-art weapons such as the DF-21D “Carrier Killer” anti-ship ballistic missile (the Assassin’s Mace according to the United States) and the J-20 stealth fighter aircraft, employment of asymmetric tactics which conform to Sun Tzu’s precepts, all send out a clear message that China is no longer willing to watch from the sidelines where its immediate and long-term security interests are concerned.

Mr. Modi would also have the opportunity to understand, first hand, the implications of China’s “Outreach Programme”. The launch of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has already demonstrated Beijing’s determination to build an alternative financial architecture. The “One Belt, One Road” initiative (inclusive of a Silk Road Development Fund) aims to boost connectivity with China’s Central Asian neighbours, and establish a Eurasian land corridor from the Pacific Coast to the Baltic Sea, which possibly signals China’s determination to undermine the U.S. Pivot to Asia. The ‘Maritime Silk Road’ concept is possibly an even more audacious move, with plans to connect more than 50 countries via the sea and build a network of port cities along the Silk Road. This could well result in circumventing and circumscribing India’s own outreach diplomacy. The ambit of China’s “Public Diplomacy” including the rapid expansion of Confucius Institutes (there are over 415 such institutes around the globe including around 15 in India at present) also merits the Prime Minister’s attention. The interconnecting links between these Institutes and the authorities in China are matters which require to be better understood in the context of China’s current “soft power” offensive. As in the case of China’s “Peaceful Rise”, there is room for worry and concern. China has already notched up several diplomatic successes — some of these will have an adverse impact on India’s external relations. The transformation in China-Russia relations is clearly one. This has been facilitated by the $400 billion gas deal, but it should not be overlooked that Russia was possibly the first overseas destination for Mr. Xi. What should specially concern India and Mr. Modi, is that China and Russia are now determined to deepen their “comprehensive strategic partnership” and “contribute to lasting world peace”. Likewise, China has gained a strategic beachhead in West Asia with its Iran connection. China is reaping the reward of standing by Iran. This will clearly put India on the back foot in a region which it has carefully nursed for a long time

Q. Which of the following is the synonym of the word “fora”?

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s forthcoming visit to China, beginning May 14, is of considerable interest not only to peoples inhabiting the two countries, but also to leaders and strategic analysts globally. In China, Mr. Modi will be visiting Xian, Beijing and Shanghai over three days, before leaving for Mongolia and South Korea. Mr. Modi’s visit follows Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to India in September 2014. There is a great deal hinging on its outcome with China being viewed today as a pivot-state, and India the only nation in the region capable of maintaining the balance in the region. For his part, Mr. Modi has, no doubt, indicated that trade and economic ties with China would be his main priority. However, there is much more to an Indian Prime Minister’s visit to China than economic relations — unstated though this may be. This visit is again taking place at a time when China has unveiled a new strategic vision, and elements of the strategy conform to Sun Tzu’s principle of “winning without fighting”. It implicitly includes rewarding nations that it perceives as “friends” and, by implication, excluding nations that stand in its way.

China is also currently affording an opportunity to nations in the region to become a part of a Beijing-contrived “security alliance”, holding out the promise of a new Asian security paradigm, previously embedded in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Code of Conduct for Asia” (2014). The latter contained a veiled “warning” to countries forging military alliances to counter China. Perhaps, having waded too far out by its references to the issue of maritime disputes in the South China Sea at various regional fora, and more explicitly in the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region following the U.S. President Barack Obama-Modi meeting in New Delhi in January this year, the Prime Minister may, hence, need to indulge in some intricate balancing acts to win the confidence of his hosts. Many Western analysts believe that China is presently demonstrating a degree of “strategic autism”, resulting from its growing power. The Indian side needs to factor this in its calculations. Under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, China had, by and large, displayed a benign face. It was during this period, in 2008, that India and China unveiled a “Joint Strategic Vision for the 21st Century”. This was considered unusual even then for China generally finds it difficult to endorse a common vision. Under Mr. Xi, China has moved away from Deng Xiaoping’s injunction “to hide our capabilities and bide our time and never claim leadership”. It now countenances the employment of diplomacy as an instrument for the effective application of Chinese power in support of China’s ambitious and long-term foreign policy agenda. Effectively, therefore, the 2008 “Shared Vision Concept” is all but buried, and it would be useful to see what happens next. The Indian side must avoid falling into any kind of trap of arriving at decisions on strategic issues, made seemingly easy by the Chinese employing very simplified, schematic representations of highly complex realities. Meanwhile, current realities in the region are becoming more complex having entered a period fraught with change. The emergence of new dangers in West Asia, the uncertainty in Afghanistan, with the Islamic State (IS) now siding with the Taliban, tensions among different nations in South-East Asia and East Asia, and evidence of increasing Chinese assertiveness, have produced an unstable equilibrium.

Consequently, while there are many issues that would be uppermost in Mr. Modi’s mind, the visit provides an excellent opportunity for him to assess, at first hand, where China is headed. It will give him a chance to estimate the potential impact of recent developments on Sino-Indian relations. The Prime Minister could begin by making a realistic appraisal of China’s “Defence Posture” and the kind of threat this poses to India. Rising defence budgets (the 2015 defence Budget is estimated at $141.5 billion — the 26th year of normal double digit increases since 1989), unveiling of a host of new state-of-the-art weapons such as the DF-21D “Carrier Killer” anti-ship ballistic missile (the Assassin’s Mace according to the United States) and the J-20 stealth fighter aircraft, employment of asymmetric tactics which conform to Sun Tzu’s precepts, all send out a clear message that China is no longer willing to watch from the sidelines where its immediate and long-term security interests are concerned.

Mr. Modi would also have the opportunity to understand, first hand, the implications of China’s “Outreach Programme”. The launch of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has already demonstrated Beijing’s determination to build an alternative financial architecture. The “One Belt, One Road” initiative (inclusive of a Silk Road Development Fund) aims to boost connectivity with China’s Central Asian neighbours, and establish a Eurasian land corridor from the Pacific Coast to the Baltic Sea, which possibly signals China’s determination to undermine the U.S. Pivot to Asia. The ‘Maritime Silk Road’ concept is possibly an even more audacious move, with plans to connect more than 50 countries via the sea and build a network of port cities along the Silk Road. This could well result in circumventing and circumscribing India’s own outreach diplomacy. The ambit of China’s “Public Diplomacy” including the rapid expansion of Confucius Institutes (there are over 415 such institutes around the globe including around 15 in India at present) also merits the Prime Minister’s attention. The interconnecting links between these Institutes and the authorities in China are matters which require to be better understood in the context of China’s current “soft power” offensive. As in the case of China’s “Peaceful Rise”, there is room for worry and concern. China has already notched up several diplomatic successes — some of these will have an adverse impact on India’s external relations. The transformation in China-Russia relations is clearly one. This has been facilitated by the $400 billion gas deal, but it should not be overlooked that Russia was possibly the first overseas destination for Mr. Xi. What should specially concern India and Mr. Modi, is that China and Russia are now determined to deepen their “comprehensive strategic partnership” and “contribute to lasting world peace”. Likewise, China has gained a strategic beachhead in West Asia with its Iran connection. China is reaping the reward of standing by Iran. This will clearly put India on the back foot in a region which it has carefully nursed for a long time

Q. Which of the following is the synonym of the word “countenances”?

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s forthcoming visit to China, beginning May 14, is of considerable interest not only to peoples inhabiting the two countries, but also to leaders and strategic analysts globally. In China, Mr. Modi will be visiting Xian, Beijing and Shanghai over three days, before leaving for Mongolia and South Korea. Mr. Modi’s visit follows Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to India in September 2014. There is a great deal hinging on its outcome with China being viewed today as a pivot-state, and India the only nation in the region capable of maintaining the balance in the region. For his part, Mr. Modi has, no doubt, indicated that trade and economic ties with China would be his main priority. However, there is much more to an Indian Prime Minister’s visit to China than economic relations — unstated though this may be. This visit is again taking place at a time when China has unveiled a new strategic vision, and elements of the strategy conform to Sun Tzu’s principle of “winning without fighting”. It implicitly includes rewarding nations that it perceives as “friends” and, by implication, excluding nations that stand in its way.

China is also currently affording an opportunity to nations in the region to become a part of a Beijing-contrived “security alliance”, holding out the promise of a new Asian security paradigm, previously embedded in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Code of Conduct for Asia” (2014). The latter contained a veiled “warning” to countries forging military alliances to counter China. Perhaps, having waded too far out by its references to the issue of maritime disputes in the South China Sea at various regional fora, and more explicitly in the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region following the U.S. President Barack Obama-Modi meeting in New Delhi in January this year, the Prime Minister may, hence, need to indulge in some intricate balancing acts to win the confidence of his hosts. Many Western analysts believe that China is presently demonstrating a degree of “strategic autism”, resulting from its growing power. The Indian side needs to factor this in its calculations. Under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, China had, by and large, displayed a benign face. It was during this period, in 2008, that India and China unveiled a “Joint Strategic Vision for the 21st Century”. This was considered unusual even then for China generally finds it difficult to endorse a common vision. Under Mr. Xi, China has moved away from Deng Xiaoping’s injunction “to hide our capabilities and bide our time and never claim leadership”. It now countenances the employment of diplomacy as an instrument for the effective application of Chinese power in support of China’s ambitious and long-term foreign policy agenda. Effectively, therefore, the 2008 “Shared Vision Concept” is all but buried, and it would be useful to see what happens next. The Indian side must avoid falling into any kind of trap of arriving at decisions on strategic issues, made seemingly easy by the Chinese employing very simplified, schematic representations of highly complex realities. Meanwhile, current realities in the region are becoming more complex having entered a period fraught with change. The emergence of new dangers in West Asia, the uncertainty in Afghanistan, with the Islamic State (IS) now siding with the Taliban, tensions among different nations in South-East Asia and East Asia, and evidence of increasing Chinese assertiveness, have produced an unstable equilibrium.

Consequently, while there are many issues that would be uppermost in Mr. Modi’s mind, the visit provides an excellent opportunity for him to assess, at first hand, where China is headed. It will give him a chance to estimate the potential impact of recent developments on Sino-Indian relations. The Prime Minister could begin by making a realistic appraisal of China’s “Defence Posture” and the kind of threat this poses to India. Rising defence budgets (the 2015 defence Budget is estimated at $141.5 billion — the 26th year of normal double digit increases since 1989), unveiling of a host of new state-of-the-art weapons such as the DF-21D “Carrier Killer” anti-ship ballistic missile (the Assassin’s Mace according to the United States) and the J-20 stealth fighter aircraft, employment of asymmetric tactics which conform to Sun Tzu’s precepts, all send out a clear message that China is no longer willing to watch from the sidelines where its immediate and long-term security interests are concerned.

Mr. Modi would also have the opportunity to understand, first hand, the implications of China’s “Outreach Programme”. The launch of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has already demonstrated Beijing’s determination to build an alternative financial architecture. The “One Belt, One Road” initiative (inclusive of a Silk Road Development Fund) aims to boost connectivity with China’s Central Asian neighbours, and establish a Eurasian land corridor from the Pacific Coast to the Baltic Sea, which possibly signals China’s determination to undermine the U.S. Pivot to Asia. The ‘Maritime Silk Road’ concept is possibly an even more audacious move, with plans to connect more than 50 countries via the sea and build a network of port cities along the Silk Road. This could well result in circumventing and circumscribing India’s own outreach diplomacy. The ambit of China’s “Public Diplomacy” including the rapid expansion of Confucius Institutes (there are over 415 such institutes around the globe including around 15 in India at present) also merits the Prime Minister’s attention. The interconnecting links between these Institutes and the authorities in China are matters which require to be better understood in the context of China’s current “soft power” offensive. As in the case of China’s “Peaceful Rise”, there is room for worry and concern. China has already notched up several diplomatic successes — some of these will have an adverse impact on India’s external relations. The transformation in China-Russia relations is clearly one. This has been facilitated by the $400 billion gas deal, but it should not be overlooked that Russia was possibly the first overseas destination for Mr. Xi. What should specially concern India and Mr. Modi, is that China and Russia are now determined to deepen their “comprehensive strategic partnership” and “contribute to lasting world peace”. Likewise, China has gained a strategic beachhead in West Asia with its Iran connection. China is reaping the reward of standing by Iran. This will clearly put India on the back foot in a region which it has carefully nursed for a long time

Q. Which of the following is not the synonym of the word “intricate”?

Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s forthcoming visit to China, beginning May 14, is of considerable interest not only to peoples inhabiting the two countries, but also to leaders and strategic analysts globally. In China, Mr. Modi will be visiting Xian, Beijing and Shanghai over three days, before leaving for Mongolia and South Korea. Mr. Modi’s visit follows Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to India in September 2014. There is a great deal hinging on its outcome with China being viewed today as a pivot-state, and India the only nation in the region capable of maintaining the balance in the region. For his part, Mr. Modi has, no doubt, indicated that trade and economic ties with China would be his main priority. However, there is much more to an Indian Prime Minister’s visit to China than economic relations — unstated though this may be. This visit is again taking place at a time when China has unveiled a new strategic vision, and elements of the strategy conform to Sun Tzu’s principle of “winning without fighting”. It implicitly includes rewarding nations that it perceives as “friends” and, by implication, excluding nations that stand in its way.

China is also currently affording an opportunity to nations in the region to become a part of a Beijing-contrived “security alliance”, holding out the promise of a new Asian security paradigm, previously embedded in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Code of Conduct for Asia” (2014). The latter contained a veiled “warning” to countries forging military alliances to counter China. Perhaps, having waded too far out by its references to the issue of maritime disputes in the South China Sea at various regional fora, and more explicitly in the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region following the U.S. President Barack Obama-Modi meeting in New Delhi in January this year, the Prime Minister may, hence, need to indulge in some intricate balancing acts to win the confidence of his hosts. Many Western analysts believe that China is presently demonstrating a degree of “strategic autism”, resulting from its growing power. The Indian side needs to factor this in its calculations. Under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, China had, by and large, displayed a benign face. It was during this period, in 2008, that India and China unveiled a “Joint Strategic Vision for the 21st Century”. This was considered unusual even then for China generally finds it difficult to endorse a common vision. Under Mr. Xi, China has moved away from Deng Xiaoping’s injunction “to hide our capabilities and bide our time and never claim leadership”. It now countenances the employment of diplomacy as an instrument for the effective application of Chinese power in support of China’s ambitious and long-term foreign policy agenda. Effectively, therefore, the 2008 “Shared Vision Concept” is all but buried, and it would be useful to see what happens next. The Indian side must avoid falling into any kind of trap of arriving at decisions on strategic issues, made seemingly easy by the Chinese employing very simplified, schematic representations of highly complex realities. Meanwhile, current realities in the region are becoming more complex having entered a period fraught with change. The emergence of new dangers in West Asia, the uncertainty in Afghanistan, with the Islamic State (IS) now siding with the Taliban, tensions among different nations in South-East Asia and East Asia, and evidence of increasing Chinese assertiveness, have produced an unstable equilibrium.

Consequently, while there are many issues that would be uppermost in Mr. Modi’s mind, the visit provides an excellent opportunity for him to assess, at first hand, where China is headed. It will give him a chance to estimate the potential impact of recent developments on Sino-Indian relations. The Prime Minister could begin by making a realistic appraisal of China’s “Defence Posture” and the kind of threat this poses to India. Rising defence budgets (the 2015 defence Budget is estimated at $141.5 billion — the 26th year of normal double digit increases since 1989), unveiling of a host of new state-of-the-art weapons such as the DF-21D “Carrier Killer” anti-ship ballistic missile (the Assassin’s Mace according to the United States) and the J-20 stealth fighter aircraft, employment of asymmetric tactics which conform to Sun Tzu’s precepts, all send out a clear message that China is no longer willing to watch from the sidelines where its immediate and long-term security interests are concerned.

Mr. Modi would also have the opportunity to understand, first hand, the implications of China’s “Outreach Programme”. The launch of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has already demonstrated Beijing’s determination to build an alternative financial architecture. The “One Belt, One Road” initiative (inclusive of a Silk Road Development Fund) aims to boost connectivity with China’s Central Asian neighbours, and establish a Eurasian land corridor from the Pacific Coast to the Baltic Sea, which possibly signals China’s determination to undermine the U.S. Pivot to Asia. The ‘Maritime Silk Road’ concept is possibly an even more audacious move, with plans to connect more than 50 countries via the sea and build a network of port cities along the Silk Road. This could well result in circumventing and circumscribing India’s own outreach diplomacy. The ambit of China’s “Public Diplomacy” including the rapid expansion of Confucius Institutes (there are over 415 such institutes around the globe including around 15 in India at present) also merits the Prime Minister’s attention. The interconnecting links between these Institutes and the authorities in China are matters which require to be better understood in the context of China’s current “soft power” offensive. As in the case of China’s “Peaceful Rise”, there is room for worry and concern. China has already notched up several diplomatic successes — some of these will have an adverse impact on India’s external relations. The transformation in China-Russia relations is clearly one. This has been facilitated by the $400 billion gas deal, but it should not be overlooked that Russia was possibly the first overseas destination for Mr. Xi. What should specially concern India and Mr. Modi, is that China and Russia are now determined to deepen their “comprehensive strategic partnership” and “contribute to lasting world peace”. Likewise, China has gained a strategic beachhead in West Asia with its Iran connection. China is reaping the reward of standing by Iran. This will clearly put India on the back foot in a region which it has carefully nursed for a long time

Q. Which of the following is not the synonym of the word “fraught”?

Directions: In each of the following sentences there are two blank spaces. Below each sentence there are five pair of words denoted by numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Find out which pair of words can be filled up in the blanks in the sentence in the same sequence to make the sentence meaningfully complete.

He objected to the proposal because it was founded on a ________ principle and also was ________ at times.

Directions: In each of the following sentences there are two blank spaces. Below each sentence there are five pair of words denoted by numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Find out which pair of words can be filled up in the blanks in the sentence in the same sequence to make the sentence meaningfully complete.

The criterion for ________ a player should be based on his recent performance; but unfortunately, the journalists are ________ to be carried away by earlier successes.

Directions: In each of the following sentences there are two blank spaces. Below each sentence there are five pair of words denoted by numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Find out which pair of words can be filled up in the blanks in the sentence in the same sequence to make the sentence meaningfully complete.

For the last half century he ________ himself to public affairs ________ taking a holiday.

Directions: In each of the following sentences there are two blank spaces. Below each sentence there are five pair of words denoted by numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Find out which pair of words can be filled up in the blanks in the sentence in the same sequence to make the sentence meaningfully complete.

You will see signs of ________ everywhere, which speak well for the ________ of these people.

Directions: In each of the following sentences there are two blank spaces. Below each sentence there are five pair of words denoted by numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Find out which pair of words can be filled up in the blanks in the sentence in the same sequence to make the sentence meaningfully complete.

The police arrested Ramesh on a ________ of theft but for lack of evidence ________ him.

Directions: Rearrange the following six sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E) and (F) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them. 

(A) Happiness, if at all found, is accompanied with sorrow. 

(B) This attitude helps us to cope up with our unhappiness. 

(C) The world is full of miseries, problems, risks and discomfiture. 

(D) It also helps us to be sympathetic to others who are more unhappy. 

(E) Therefore, it seems to be wise to compare our lot with the lot of those who are less fortunate. 

(F) None can find here perfect happiness. 

Q. Which of the following should be the FIRST sentence after rearrangement? 

Directions: Rearrange the following six sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E) and (F) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them. 

(A) Happiness, if at all found, is accompanied with sorrow. 

(B) This attitude helps us to cope up with our unhappiness. 

(C) The world is full of miseries, problems, risks and discomfiture. 

(D) It also helps us to be sympathetic to others who are more unhappy. 

(E) Therefore, it seems to be wise to compare our lot with the lot of those who are less fortunate. 

(F) None can find here perfect happiness. 

Q. Which of the following should be the FIFTH sentence after rearrangement? 

Directions: Rearrange the following six sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E) and (F) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them. 

(A) Happiness, if at all found, is accompanied with sorrow. 

(B) This attitude helps us to cope up with our unhappiness. 

(C) The world is full of miseries, problems, risks and discomfiture. 

(D) It also helps us to be sympathetic to others who are more unhappy. 

(E) Therefore, it seems to be wise to compare our lot with the lot of those who are less fortunate. 

(F) None can find here perfect happiness. 

Q. Which of the following should be the SIXTH (LAST) sentence after rearrangement? 

Directions: Rearrange the following six sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E) and (F) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them. 

(A) Happiness, if at all found, is accompanied with sorrow. 

(B) This attitude helps us to cope up with our unhappiness. 

(C) The world is full of miseries, problems, risks and discomfiture. 

(D) It also helps us to be sympathetic to others who are more unhappy. 

(E) Therefore, it seems to be wise to compare our lot with the lot of those who are less fortunate. 

(F) None can find here perfect happiness. 

Q. Which of the following should be the SECOND sentence after rearrangement? 

Directions: Rearrange the following six sentences (A), (B), (C), (D), (E) and (F) in the proper sequence to form a meaningful paragraph; then answer the questions given below them. 

(A) Happiness, if at all found, is accompanied with sorrow. 

(B) This attitude helps us to cope up with our unhappiness. 

(C) The world is full of miseries, problems, risks and discomfiture. 

(D) It also helps us to be sympathetic to others who are more unhappy. 

(E) Therefore, it seems to be wise to compare our lot with the lot of those who are less fortunate. 

(F) None can find here perfect happiness. 

Q. Which of the following should be the FOURTH sentence after rearrangement?

Direction: Which of the phrases (1), (2), (3) (4) given below each sentence should replace the phrase printed in bold to make the sentence grammatically correct? If the sentence is correct as it is, Mark (5) ie 'No correction required as the answer.

The famous dancer died on Mumbai recently.

Direction: Which of the phrases (1), (2), (3) (4) given below each sentence should replace the phrase printed in bold to make the sentence grammatically correct? If the sentence is correct as it is, Mark (5) ie 'No correction required as the answer.

The standard of English in the schools are highly uneven.

Direction: Which of the phrases (1), (2), (3) (4) given below each sentence should replace the phrase printed in bold to make the sentence grammatically correct? If the sentence is correct as it is, Mark (5) ie 'No correction required as the answer.

Many healthy people are been infected by the virus.

Direction: Which of the phrases (1), (2), (3) (4) given below each sentence should replace the phrase printed in bold to make the sentence grammatically correct? If the sentence is correct as it is, Mark (5) ie 'No correction required as the answer.

Balding is much more common in males than females.

Direction: Which of the phrases (1), (2), (3) (4) given below each sentence should replace the phrase printed in bold to make the sentence grammatically correct? If the sentence is correct as it is, Mark (5) ie 'No correction required as the answer.

The new airport is under construction and likely to operational in two years.

Directions : Read each sentence to find our whether there is any grammatical or idiomatic error in it the error,if any, will be in one part of the sentence. Ignore the error of punctuation, if any.

The smooth and easier 1)/ we allow people to navigate 2) / through any device at any place 3) / in the World, the better. 4) / No error 5)

Directions : Read each sentence to find our whether there is any grammatical or idiomatic error in it the error,if any, will be in one part of the sentence. Ignore the error of punctuation, if any.

Asian culture will, 1)/ sooner or later, 2) / become international norm 3)/ for entertainment industry. 4) / No error 5)

Directions : Read each sentence to find our whether there is any grammatical or idiomatic error in it the error,if any, will be in one part of the sentence. Ignore the error of punctuation, if any.

What really agonise them 1)/ is the presence of 2) / an unwanted and unscrupulous 3) / member on the panel. 4) / No error 5)

Directions : Read each sentence to find our whether there is any grammatical or idiomatic error in it the error,if any, will be in one part of the sentence. Ignore the error of punctuation, if any.

The business lobby wanted 1) / he to take over 2)/ as the new Chairman 3)/ of their coveted Board. 4) / No error 5)

Directions : Read each sentence to find our whether there is any grammatical or idiomatic error in it the error,if any, will be in one part of the sentence. Ignore the error of punctuation, if any.

Nowadays 1) / the accidents of diabetes 2) / among urban children 3) / is on the rise. 4)/ No error 5)