Test: Legal Reasoning - 1 - CLAT MCQ

Passage - 1

The law of torts has been evolving throughout its existence. There are certain principles which are used to counter claims for compensation. These counterclaims or defences are used to evict those citizens from tortious liability who have been unfairly been implicated with wrong claims imposed on them. These defences have been formulated from time to time to keep up with the basis of imposition of tortious liability on a person.
INEVITABLE ACCIDENT
Inevitable Accidents are, as evident from the name, events which could not have been prevented by the parties through the exercise of ordinary care, caution, and skill. An inevitable accident is one which could not be possibly prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill and hence it does not apply to anything which either of the parties might have avoided. Sir Frederick Pollock defined an inevitable accident as an accident which is not avoidable by any precautions, a reasonable man could have expected to take.
In the past cases, the defence of inevitable accident used to be very relevant in actions for trespass when the older rule was that even an innocent trespass was actionable unless the defendant could prove that the accident was caused due to it being inevitable in nature. The term "inevitable accident" is used in instances where the accidents occur by chance and in the absence of human error. Both of these are similar in terms of negligence, if it is proved by the plaintiff that there was negligence on the part of the defendant then the defendant will not be able to escape liability by using these defenses. The plea of an inevitable accident has lost its practicality in today's day and age, as it has lost its utility since the principle of absolute liability, applies even in the absence of defendant's negligence and with the growth in the dimension of science the number of accidents which were considered to be inevitable is fastly diminishing.
To sum it all up, an inevitable accident is an event which happens not only without the concurrence of the will of a man but in spite of all the efforts that a man may put on his part to prevent it from happening i.e. an accident which is physically unavoidable and can't be prevented by human skill or foresight.

Q. An inevitable accident is that which could not possibly be prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill. Raju had a gun, which he was cleaning when he was called to attend an urgent matter at his office. He left the gun empty at the table. While he was at his office, Bhola, his servant took the gun and went out for shooting and in a hurry kept the loaded gun on the table when he returned. Raju later took the gun and thinking that the gun was empty, started cleaning it again and accidently fired which killed Madhulika, his daughter who was playing in the room. If Bhola while unloading the gun in a hurry, shot Madhulika by mistake, would he be liable?

Passage - 1

The law of torts has been evolving throughout its existence. There are certain principles which are used to counter claims for compensation. These counterclaims or defences are used to evict those citizens from tortious liability who have been unfairly been implicated with wrong claims imposed on them. These defences have been formulated from time to time to keep up with the basis of imposition of tortious liability on a person.
INEVITABLE ACCIDENT
Inevitable Accidents are, as evident from the name, events which could not have been prevented by the parties through the exercise of ordinary care, caution, and skill. An inevitable accident is one which could not be possibly prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill and hence it does not apply to anything which either of the parties might have avoided. Sir Frederick Pollock defined an inevitable accident as an accident which is not avoidable by any precautions, a reasonable man could have expected to take.
In the past cases, the defence of inevitable accident used to be very relevant in actions for trespass when the older rule was that even an innocent trespass was actionable unless the defendant could prove that the accident was caused due to it being inevitable in nature. The term "inevitable accident" is used in instances where the accidents occur by chance and in the absence of human error. Both of these are similar in terms of negligence, if it is proved by the plaintiff that there was negligence on the part of the defendant then the defendant will not be able to escape liability by using these defenses. The plea of an inevitable accident has lost its practicality in today's day and age, as it has lost its utility since the principle of absolute liability, applies even in the absence of defendant's negligence and with the growth in the dimension of science the number of accidents which were considered to be inevitable is fastly diminishing.
To sum it all up, an inevitable accident is an event which happens not only without the concurrence of the will of a man but in spite of all the efforts that a man may put on his part to prevent it from happening i.e. an accident which is physically unavoidable and can't be prevented by human skill or foresight.

Q. Ankit was a college student and was living with his grandfather, who had recently got a kidney transplant treatment done. Though he was doing well, he was not allowed to be administered any medication without doctor's consultation. One day, his grandfather slipped in the bathroom and twisted his ankle. Ankit got an ointment to reduce pain and rubbed it well on his ankle. After two hours, his grandfather suffered a severe pain in his abdomen and by the time he was taken to the hospital, he passed away on the way. It was diagnosed that the pain killer ointment seeped through his skin and mixed with the blood because of which the kidneys failed. Is Ankit liable for his grandfather's death?

Passage - 1

The law of torts has been evolving throughout its existence. There are certain principles which are used to counter claims for compensation. These counterclaims or defences are used to evict those citizens from tortious liability who have been unfairly been implicated with wrong claims imposed on them. These defences have been formulated from time to time to keep up with the basis of imposition of tortious liability on a person.
INEVITABLE ACCIDENT
Inevitable Accidents are, as evident from the name, events which could not have been prevented by the parties through the exercise of ordinary care, caution, and skill. An inevitable accident is one which could not be possibly prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill and hence it does not apply to anything which either of the parties might have avoided. Sir Frederick Pollock defined an inevitable accident as an accident which is not avoidable by any precautions, a reasonable man could have expected to take.
In the past cases, the defence of inevitable accident used to be very relevant in actions for trespass when the older rule was that even an innocent trespass was actionable unless the defendant could prove that the accident was caused due to it being inevitable in nature. The term "inevitable accident" is used in instances where the accidents occur by chance and in the absence of human error. Both of these are similar in terms of negligence, if it is proved by the plaintiff that there was negligence on the part of the defendant then the defendant will not be able to escape liability by using these defenses. The plea of an inevitable accident has lost its practicality in today's day and age, as it has lost its utility since the principle of absolute liability, applies even in the absence of defendant's negligence and with the growth in the dimension of science the number of accidents which were considered to be inevitable is fastly diminishing.
To sum it all up, an inevitable accident is an event which happens not only without the concurrence of the will of a man but in spite of all the efforts that a man may put on his part to prevent it from happening i.e. an accident which is physically unavoidable and can't be prevented by human skill or foresight.

Q. Uday owned XY Courier Works, a firm of shipments and carriers. One day Uday received a wooden carton from their old trusted client at New Delhi office which was to be shipped to Mumbai through their "Express - Same day delivery" service. The carton was ordinary in its appearance and carried no suspicion as to its content and since it had reached two hours later than the usual time, it was immediately sent for shipment, without anything being said or asked. On arrival at Mumbai, the carton was taken to Uday's office (which had been rented from Roshni) in the regular course of business. There some greasy liquid substance was found leaking from it. An employee of Uday proceeded to open the case with a hammer and chisel. The contents, in fact being nitro-glycerine, exploded. All the persons present in Uday's office were killed and the office was destroyed. Action was brought by Roshni for damages. Uday claims the defence of inevitable accident. Decide.

Passage - 1

The law of torts has been evolving throughout its existence. There are certain principles which are used to counter claims for compensation. These counterclaims or defences are used to evict those citizens from tortious liability who have been unfairly been implicated with wrong claims imposed on them. These defences have been formulated from time to time to keep up with the basis of imposition of tortious liability on a person.
INEVITABLE ACCIDENT
Inevitable Accidents are, as evident from the name, events which could not have been prevented by the parties through the exercise of ordinary care, caution, and skill. An inevitable accident is one which could not be possibly prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill and hence it does not apply to anything which either of the parties might have avoided. Sir Frederick Pollock defined an inevitable accident as an accident which is not avoidable by any precautions, a reasonable man could have expected to take.
In the past cases, the defence of inevitable accident used to be very relevant in actions for trespass when the older rule was that even an innocent trespass was actionable unless the defendant could prove that the accident was caused due to it being inevitable in nature. The term "inevitable accident" is used in instances where the accidents occur by chance and in the absence of human error. Both of these are similar in terms of negligence, if it is proved by the plaintiff that there was negligence on the part of the defendant then the defendant will not be able to escape liability by using these defenses. The plea of an inevitable accident has lost its practicality in today's day and age, as it has lost its utility since the principle of absolute liability, applies even in the absence of defendant's negligence and with the growth in the dimension of science the number of accidents which were considered to be inevitable is fastly diminishing.
To sum it all up, an inevitable accident is an event which happens not only without the concurrence of the will of a man but in spite of all the efforts that a man may put on his part to prevent it from happening i.e. an accident which is physically unavoidable and can't be prevented by human skill or foresight.

Q. The master is liable for all the acts done by his servant during the course of employment. Nina had a 4 horse driven carriage which she used to rent for marriage purposes. The horses were very tame and listened to its caretaker. One day she asked her servant Rinku to take the carriage to the customer's desired destination and Rinku did likewise. At the time of the baraat ceremony, the groom was sitting on the carriage and the baraat was moving towards the wedding venue. In the meantime, 2-3 dogs came and started barking at the horses. The horses panicked and started to run. Rinku tried to calm them down but they became so unmanageable that he could not stop them. While unsuccessfully trying to turn a corner safely, the carriage tumbled and the groom sustained injuries. The customer asked Nina for compensation.

Passage - 1

The law of torts has been evolving throughout its existence. There are certain principles which are used to counter claims for compensation. These counterclaims or defences are used to evict those citizens from tortious liability who have been unfairly been implicated with wrong claims imposed on them. These defences have been formulated from time to time to keep up with the basis of imposition of tortious liability on a person.
INEVITABLE ACCIDENT
Inevitable Accidents are, as evident from the name, events which could not have been prevented by the parties through the exercise of ordinary care, caution, and skill. An inevitable accident is one which could not be possibly prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill and hence it does not apply to anything which either of the parties might have avoided. Sir Frederick Pollock defined an inevitable accident as an accident which is not avoidable by any precautions, a reasonable man could have expected to take.
In the past cases, the defence of inevitable accident used to be very relevant in actions for trespass when the older rule was that even an innocent trespass was actionable unless the defendant could prove that the accident was caused due to it being inevitable in nature. The term "inevitable accident" is used in instances where the accidents occur by chance and in the absence of human error. Both of these are similar in terms of negligence, if it is proved by the plaintiff that there was negligence on the part of the defendant then the defendant will not be able to escape liability by using these defenses. The plea of an inevitable accident has lost its practicality in today's day and age, as it has lost its utility since the principle of absolute liability, applies even in the absence of defendant's negligence and with the growth in the dimension of science the number of accidents which were considered to be inevitable is fastly diminishing.
To sum it all up, an inevitable accident is an event which happens not only without the concurrence of the will of a man but in spite of all the efforts that a man may put on his part to prevent it from happening i.e. an accident which is physically unavoidable and can't be prevented by human skill or foresight.

Q. Sharman's horses while being driven by his servant Sushant on a public road, got scared from barking of a dog and became unmanageable. Sushant tried his best to stop the horses but did not succeed in the endeavor. He was however able to control them to some extent. While trying to turn around a corner safely, the horses knocked down and injured Shyamlal who was waiting for a bus on the highway. Can Sushant be held liable?
(i) Sushant is liable as he should not have taken the horses on the road. He did not exercise ordinary care and caution.
(ii) Sushant is not liable as he could not have foreseen that a dog's bark would cause the horses to become unmanageable.
(iii) Sushant is not liable as he used his skill under the circumstances to control the scared horses.
(iv) Sushant is liable as he did not have enough skill to handle the horses.

Passage - 1

The law of torts has been evolving throughout its existence. There are certain principles which are used to counter claims for compensation. These counterclaims or defences are used to evict those citizens from tortious liability who have been unfairly been implicated with wrong claims imposed on them. These defences have been formulated from time to time to keep up with the basis of imposition of tortious liability on a person.
INEVITABLE ACCIDENT
Inevitable Accidents are, as evident from the name, events which could not have been prevented by the parties through the exercise of ordinary care, caution, and skill. An inevitable accident is one which could not be possibly prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill and hence it does not apply to anything which either of the parties might have avoided. Sir Frederick Pollock defined an inevitable accident as an accident which is not avoidable by any precautions, a reasonable man could have expected to take.
In the past cases, the defence of inevitable accident used to be very relevant in actions for trespass when the older rule was that even an innocent trespass was actionable unless the defendant could prove that the accident was caused due to it being inevitable in nature. The term "inevitable accident" is used in instances where the accidents occur by chance and in the absence of human error. Both of these are similar in terms of negligence, if it is proved by the plaintiff that there was negligence on the part of the defendant then the defendant will not be able to escape liability by using these defenses. The plea of an inevitable accident has lost its practicality in today's day and age, as it has lost its utility since the principle of absolute liability, applies even in the absence of defendant's negligence and with the growth in the dimension of science the number of accidents which were considered to be inevitable is fastly diminishing.
To sum it all up, an inevitable accident is an event which happens not only without the concurrence of the will of a man but in spite of all the efforts that a man may put on his part to prevent it from happening i.e. an accident which is physically unavoidable and can't be prevented by human skill or foresight.

Q. Nothing is an offence which is done by accident and without any criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner and with proper care and caution. Ram is a police officer deputed at DhaulaKuan Police Station, New Delhi. One day, Ram went for night patrolling after consuming alcohol. During his duty, Ram saw Rawan (a dreaded criminal) trying to break open an ATM Machine. Ram started chasing him as he started to flee. Whilst chasing Rawan, Ram ran his jeep over pedestrians sleeping on the road. Which of the following derivations is correct?

Passage - 2

Europe's top court said on Thursday that individual countries can order Facebook to take down posts, photographs and videos not only in their own countries but elsewhere, in a ruling that extends the reach of the region's internet-related laws beyond its own borders. The European Court of Justice said Facebook could be forced to remove a post globally by a national court in the European Union's 28-member bloc if the content was determined to be defamatory or otherwise illegal. Its decision cannot be appealed.

The decision sets a new benchmark for the purview of European laws that govern the internet, giving European countries the power to apply takedown requests internationally. That foreshadows future disputes over Europe's role in setting rules on the internet, especially as other nations increasingly pass their own laws to deal with privacy, hate speech and disinformation. "There is this impulse in Europe that is trying to set global regulatory standards," said Ben Wagner, director of the Privacy and Sustainable Computing Lab at Vienna University. The effort, he said, is a "pushback against the self-regulatory impulses of these platforms." Facebook said in a statement that the European court's decision "undermines the longstanding principle that one country does not have the right to impose its laws on speech on another country." It added that the judgment raised questions about freedom of expression and "the role that internet companies should play in monitoring, interpreting and removing speech that might be illegal in any particular country." The court said on Thursday that while Facebook wasn't liable for the disparaging comments posted the company had an obligation to take them down after an Austrian court found them defamatory. Facebook, the court said, "did not act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to that information." The court left to national court systems in each European Union country to decide what cases merit forcing an internet company to take down content in foreign countries. That raised questions about what other laws Facebook and other internet platforms can be forced to comply with by governments in Europe.

Q. Which of the following statements can be attributed to the author?

Passage - 2

Europe's top court said on Thursday that individual countries can order Facebook to take down posts, photographs and videos not only in their own countries but elsewhere, in a ruling that extends the reach of the region's internet-related laws beyond its own borders. The European Court of Justice said Facebook could be forced to remove a post globally by a national court in the European Union's 28-member bloc if the content was determined to be defamatory or otherwise illegal. Its decision cannot be appealed.

The decision sets a new benchmark for the purview of European laws that govern the internet, giving European countries the power to apply takedown requests internationally. That foreshadows future disputes over Europe's role in setting rules on the internet, especially as other nations increasingly pass their own laws to deal with privacy, hate speech and disinformation. "There is this impulse in Europe that is trying to set global regulatory standards," said Ben Wagner, director of the Privacy and Sustainable Computing Lab at Vienna University. The effort, he said, is a "pushback against the self-regulatory impulses of these platforms." Facebook said in a statement that the European court's decision "undermines the longstanding principle that one country does not have the right to impose its laws on speech on another country." It added that the judgment raised questions about freedom of expression and "the role that internet companies should play in monitoring, interpreting and removing speech that might be illegal in any particular country." The court said on Thursday that while Facebook wasn't liable for the disparaging comments posted the company had an obligation to take them down after an Austrian court found them defamatory. Facebook, the court said, "did not act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to that information." The court left to national court systems in each European Union country to decide what cases merit forcing an internet company to take down content in foreign countries. That raised questions about what other laws Facebook and other internet platforms can be forced to comply with by governments in Europe.

Q. Based on the passage, decide : A person posted hate speech on facebook, and a EU country asked to take it down, what is the liability of facebook in here?

Passage - 2

Europe's top court said on Thursday that individual countries can order Facebook to take down posts, photographs and videos not only in their own countries but elsewhere, in a ruling that extends the reach of the region's internet-related laws beyond its own borders. The European Court of Justice said Facebook could be forced to remove a post globally by a national court in the European Union's 28-member bloc if the content was determined to be defamatory or otherwise illegal. Its decision cannot be appealed.

The decision sets a new benchmark for the purview of European laws that govern the internet, giving European countries the power to apply takedown requests internationally. That foreshadows future disputes over Europe's role in setting rules on the internet, especially as other nations increasingly pass their own laws to deal with privacy, hate speech and disinformation. "There is this impulse in Europe that is trying to set global regulatory standards," said Ben Wagner, director of the Privacy and Sustainable Computing Lab at Vienna University. The effort, he said, is a "pushback against the self-regulatory impulses of these platforms." Facebook said in a statement that the European court's decision "undermines the longstanding principle that one country does not have the right to impose its laws on speech on another country." It added that the judgment raised questions about freedom of expression and "the role that internet companies should play in monitoring, interpreting and removing speech that might be illegal in any particular country." The court said on Thursday that while Facebook wasn't liable for the disparaging comments posted the company had an obligation to take them down after an Austrian court found them defamatory. Facebook, the court said, "did not act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to that information." The court left to national court systems in each European Union country to decide what cases merit forcing an internet company to take down content in foreign countries. That raised questions about what other laws Facebook and other internet platforms can be forced to comply with by governments in Europe.

Q. Which of the following principles were undermined in the judgement :

Passage - 2

Europe's top court said on Thursday that individual countries can order Facebook to take down posts, photographs and videos not only in their own countries but elsewhere, in a ruling that extends the reach of the region's internet-related laws beyond its own borders. The European Court of Justice said Facebook could be forced to remove a post globally by a national court in the European Union's 28-member bloc if the content was determined to be defamatory or otherwise illegal. Its decision cannot be appealed.

The decision sets a new benchmark for the purview of European laws that govern the internet, giving European countries the power to apply takedown requests internationally. That foreshadows future disputes over Europe's role in setting rules on the internet, especially as other nations increasingly pass their own laws to deal with privacy, hate speech and disinformation. "There is this impulse in Europe that is trying to set global regulatory standards," said Ben Wagner, director of the Privacy and Sustainable Computing Lab at Vienna University. The effort, he said, is a "pushback against the self-regulatory impulses of these platforms." Facebook said in a statement that the European court's decision "undermines the longstanding principle that one country does not have the right to impose its laws on speech on another country." It added that the judgment raised questions about freedom of expression and "the role that internet companies should play in monitoring, interpreting and removing speech that might be illegal in any particular country." The court said on Thursday that while Facebook wasn't liable for the disparaging comments posted the company had an obligation to take them down after an Austrian court found them defamatory. Facebook, the court said, "did not act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to that information." The court left to national court systems in each European Union country to decide what cases merit forcing an internet company to take down content in foreign countries. That raised questions about what other laws Facebook and other internet platforms can be forced to comply with by governments in Europe.

Q. Which of the following statements is correct?

Passage - 2

Europe's top court said on Thursday that individual countries can order Facebook to take down posts, photographs and videos not only in their own countries but elsewhere, in a ruling that extends the reach of the region's internet-related laws beyond its own borders. The European Court of Justice said Facebook could be forced to remove a post globally by a national court in the European Union's 28-member bloc if the content was determined to be defamatory or otherwise illegal. Its decision cannot be appealed.

The decision sets a new benchmark for the purview of European laws that govern the internet, giving European countries the power to apply takedown requests internationally. That foreshadows future disputes over Europe's role in setting rules on the internet, especially as other nations increasingly pass their own laws to deal with privacy, hate speech and disinformation. "There is this impulse in Europe that is trying to set global regulatory standards," said Ben Wagner, director of the Privacy and Sustainable Computing Lab at Vienna University. The effort, he said, is a "pushback against the self-regulatory impulses of these platforms." Facebook said in a statement that the European court's decision "undermines the longstanding principle that one country does not have the right to impose its laws on speech on another country." It added that the judgment raised questions about freedom of expression and "the role that internet companies should play in monitoring, interpreting and removing speech that might be illegal in any particular country." The court said on Thursday that while Facebook wasn't liable for the disparaging comments posted the company had an obligation to take them down after an Austrian court found them defamatory. Facebook, the court said, "did not act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to that information." The court left to national court systems in each European Union country to decide what cases merit forcing an internet company to take down content in foreign countries. That raised questions about what other laws Facebook and other internet platforms can be forced to comply with by governments in Europe.

Q. If the report of Donald Trump's removal on Facebook is posted, what remedy does he have?

Passage - 3

One of the reasons for recusal of a Judge is that litigants/ the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension about his impartiality. As Lord Chief Justice Hewart said:
"It is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." And therefore, in order to uphold the credibility of the integrity institution, the Judge recuses from hearing the case.
A Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, while assuming Office, takes an oath as prescribed under Schedule III to the Constitution of India, that:
"... I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will duly and faithfully and to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment perform the duties of my office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws."
Called upon to discharge the duties of the Office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will, it is only desirable, if not proper, that a Judge, for any unavoidable reason like some pecuniary interest, affinity or adversity with the parties in the case, direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the litigation, family directly involved in litigation on the same issue elsewhere, the Judge being aware that he or someone in his immediate family has an interest, financial or otherwise that could have a substantial bearing as a consequence of the decision in the litigation, etc., to recuse himself from the adjudication of a particular matter. No doubt, these examples are not exhaustive.
The simple question is, whether the adjudication by the Judge concerned, would cause a reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonably informed litigant and fair-minded public as to his impartiality. Being an institution whose hallmark is transparency, it is only proper that the Judge discharging high and noble duties, at least broadly indicate the reasons for recusing from the case so that the litigants or the well-meaning public may not entertain any misunderstanding.
Once reasons for recusal are indicated, there will not be any room for attributing any motive for the recusal. To put it differently, it is part of his duty to be accountable to the Constitution by upholding it without fear or favour, affection or ill- will. Therefore, I am of the view that it is the constitutional duty, as reflected in one's oath, to be transparent and accountable, and hence, a Judge is required to indicate reasons for his recusal from a particular case.

Q. Which of the following is the main point of the author in the given passage?

Passage - 3

One of the reasons for recusal of a Judge is that litigants/ the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension about his impartiality. As Lord Chief Justice Hewart said:
"It is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." And therefore, in order to uphold the credibility of the integrity institution, the Judge recuses from hearing the case.
A Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, while assuming Office, takes an oath as prescribed under Schedule III to the Constitution of India, that:
"... I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will duly and faithfully and to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment perform the duties of my office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws."
Called upon to discharge the duties of the Office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will, it is only desirable, if not proper, that a Judge, for any unavoidable reason like some pecuniary interest, affinity or adversity with the parties in the case, direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the litigation, family directly involved in litigation on the same issue elsewhere, the Judge being aware that he or someone in his immediate family has an interest, financial or otherwise that could have a substantial bearing as a consequence of the decision in the litigation, etc., to recuse himself from the adjudication of a particular matter. No doubt, these examples are not exhaustive.
The simple question is, whether the adjudication by the Judge concerned, would cause a reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonably informed litigant and fair-minded public as to his impartiality. Being an institution whose hallmark is transparency, it is only proper that the Judge discharging high and noble duties, at least broadly indicate the reasons for recusing from the case so that the litigants or the well-meaning public may not entertain any misunderstanding.
Once reasons for recusal are indicated, there will not be any room for attributing any motive for the recusal. To put it differently, it is part of his duty to be accountable to the Constitution by upholding it without fear or favour, affection or ill- will. Therefore, I am of the view that it is the constitutional duty, as reflected in one's oath, to be transparent and accountable, and hence, a Judge is required to indicate reasons for his recusal from a particular case.

Q. If a Judge recused from hearing the review petition of four death row convicts in the gang rape-murder case after finding the name of his/her nephew, in the orders of the review petitions. Is the recusal consistent with the essence of recusal provided in the passage?

Passage - 3

One of the reasons for recusal of a Judge is that litigants/ the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension about his impartiality. As Lord Chief Justice Hewart said:
"It is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." And therefore, in order to uphold the credibility of the integrity institution, the Judge recuses from hearing the case.
A Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, while assuming Office, takes an oath as prescribed under Schedule III to the Constitution of India, that:
"... I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will duly and faithfully and to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment perform the duties of my office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws."
Called upon to discharge the duties of the Office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will, it is only desirable, if not proper, that a Judge, for any unavoidable reason like some pecuniary interest, affinity or adversity with the parties in the case, direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the litigation, family directly involved in litigation on the same issue elsewhere, the Judge being aware that he or someone in his immediate family has an interest, financial or otherwise that could have a substantial bearing as a consequence of the decision in the litigation, etc., to recuse himself from the adjudication of a particular matter. No doubt, these examples are not exhaustive.
The simple question is, whether the adjudication by the Judge concerned, would cause a reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonably informed litigant and fair-minded public as to his impartiality. Being an institution whose hallmark is transparency, it is only proper that the Judge discharging high and noble duties, at least broadly indicate the reasons for recusing from the case so that the litigants or the well-meaning public may not entertain any misunderstanding.
Once reasons for recusal are indicated, there will not be any room for attributing any motive for the recusal. To put it differently, it is part of his duty to be accountable to the Constitution by upholding it without fear or favour, affection or ill- will. Therefore, I am of the view that it is the constitutional duty, as reflected in one's oath, to be transparent and accountable, and hence, a Judge is required to indicate reasons for his recusal from a particular case.

Q. As per the passage if right-minded persons entertain a feeling that there is any likelihood of bias on the part of the Judge, he must recuse. Does the passage also mentions about the recourse to be taken if there is mere possibility of such a feeling is

Passage - 3

One of the reasons for recusal of a Judge is that litigants/ the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension about his impartiality. As Lord Chief Justice Hewart said:
"It is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." And therefore, in order to uphold the credibility of the integrity institution, the Judge recuses from hearing the case.
A Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, while assuming Office, takes an oath as prescribed under Schedule III to the Constitution of India, that:
"... I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will duly and faithfully and to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment perform the duties of my office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws."
Called upon to discharge the duties of the Office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will, it is only desirable, if not proper, that a Judge, for any unavoidable reason like some pecuniary interest, affinity or adversity with the parties in the case, direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the litigation, family directly involved in litigation on the same issue elsewhere, the Judge being aware that he or someone in his immediate family has an interest, financial or otherwise that could have a substantial bearing as a consequence of the decision in the litigation, etc., to recuse himself from the adjudication of a particular matter. No doubt, these examples are not exhaustive.
The simple question is, whether the adjudication by the Judge concerned, would cause a reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonably informed litigant and fair-minded public as to his impartiality. Being an institution whose hallmark is transparency, it is only proper that the Judge discharging high and noble duties, at least broadly indicate the reasons for recusing from the case so that the litigants or the well-meaning public may not entertain any misunderstanding.
Once reasons for recusal are indicated, there will not be any room for attributing any motive for the recusal. To put it differently, it is part of his duty to be accountable to the Constitution by upholding it without fear or favour, affection or ill- will. Therefore, I am of the view that it is the constitutional duty, as reflected in one's oath, to be transparent and accountable, and hence, a Judge is required to indicate reasons for his recusal from a particular case.

Q. Suppose a situation arises where a recusal by a Judge is used as a means to allow a party to choose its own bench, will it be axiomatic from the passage that such a recusal is proper, morally or/and constitutionally?

Passage - 3

One of the reasons for recusal of a Judge is that litigants/ the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension about his impartiality. As Lord Chief Justice Hewart said:
"It is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." And therefore, in order to uphold the credibility of the integrity institution, the Judge recuses from hearing the case.
A Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, while assuming Office, takes an oath as prescribed under Schedule III to the Constitution of India, that:
"... I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will duly and faithfully and to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment perform the duties of my office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws."
Called upon to discharge the duties of the Office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will, it is only desirable, if not proper, that a Judge, for any unavoidable reason like some pecuniary interest, affinity or adversity with the parties in the case, direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the litigation, family directly involved in litigation on the same issue elsewhere, the Judge being aware that he or someone in his immediate family has an interest, financial or otherwise that could have a substantial bearing as a consequence of the decision in the litigation, etc., to recuse himself from the adjudication of a particular matter. No doubt, these examples are not exhaustive.
The simple question is, whether the adjudication by the Judge concerned, would cause a reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonably informed litigant and fair-minded public as to his impartiality. Being an institution whose hallmark is transparency, it is only proper that the Judge discharging high and noble duties, at least broadly indicate the reasons for recusing from the case so that the litigants or the well-meaning public may not entertain any misunderstanding.
Once reasons for recusal are indicated, there will not be any room for attributing any motive for the recusal. To put it differently, it is part of his duty to be accountable to the Constitution by upholding it without fear or favour, affection or ill- will. Therefore, I am of the view that it is the constitutional duty, as reflected in one's oath, to be transparent and accountable, and hence, a Judge is required to indicate reasons for his recusal from a particular case.

Q. If a judge reflects a predisposition so strong that it seems he had already made up his mind as to the outcome of the case, will it be according to judicial norms to ask for a recusal by the litigants?

Passage - 3

One of the reasons for recusal of a Judge is that litigants/ the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension about his impartiality. As Lord Chief Justice Hewart said:
"It is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." And therefore, in order to uphold the credibility of the integrity institution, the Judge recuses from hearing the case.
A Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, while assuming Office, takes an oath as prescribed under Schedule III to the Constitution of India, that:
"... I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will duly and faithfully and to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment perform the duties of my office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws."
Called upon to discharge the duties of the Office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will, it is only desirable, if not proper, that a Judge, for any unavoidable reason like some pecuniary interest, affinity or adversity with the parties in the case, direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the litigation, family directly involved in litigation on the same issue elsewhere, the Judge being aware that he or someone in his immediate family has an interest, financial or otherwise that could have a substantial bearing as a consequence of the decision in the litigation, etc., to recuse himself from the adjudication of a particular matter. No doubt, these examples are not exhaustive.
The simple question is, whether the adjudication by the Judge concerned, would cause a reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonably informed litigant and fair-minded public as to his impartiality. Being an institution whose hallmark is transparency, it is only proper that the Judge discharging high and noble duties, at least broadly indicate the reasons for recusing from the case so that the litigants or the well-meaning public may not entertain any misunderstanding.
Once reasons for recusal are indicated, there will not be any room for attributing any motive for the recusal. To put it differently, it is part of his duty to be accountable to the Constitution by upholding it without fear or favour, affection or ill- will. Therefore, I am of the view that it is the constitutional duty, as reflected in one's oath, to be transparent and accountable, and hence, a Judge is required to indicate reasons for his recusal from a particular case.

Q. What kind of institution the judiciary is referred to in the passage?

Passage - 4

Over the years, mediation has been recognised as the fastest growing method to resolve disputes worldwide. Mediation allows parties to relook at mutual interests and rights of each other, and to come up with amicable and innovative solutions. This helps in maintaining cordial relations between the parties.
The role of courts or arbitrators is adjudicative and more formal in nature. In contrast, the nature of mediators or the process of mediation is very practical and flexible. Many a time, it can prove to be speedier, more effective and economical than the other adjudicative processes.
Mediation needs to be promoted as a mechanism that complements the judicial process. To achieve acceptance and popularity of Mediation as the first step before approaching the court or any other Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) method, it is crucial to develop confidence in the process of Mediation. Court-annexed mediation, to a certain extent, has been adopted as a measure of docket management and must go hand in hand with promotion of mediation as a successful, revolutionary, economical and time-saving method for all the stakeholders.
From the websites of several High Courts, it can be ascertained that most High Courts have their separate set of rules governing Mediation and Conciliation. Barring for a few High Courts, there is no data available to show the status of mediation cases referred, successes/failure of matters, and number of settlements arrived at and effectively implemented.

Q. As per the author, which of the following views can be correctly inferred?

Passage - 4

Over the years, mediation has been recognised as the fastest growing method to resolve disputes worldwide. Mediation allows parties to relook at mutual interests and rights of each other, and to come up with amicable and innovative solutions. This helps in maintaining cordial relations between the parties.
The role of courts or arbitrators is adjudicative and more formal in nature. In contrast, the nature of mediators or the process of mediation is very practical and flexible. Many a time, it can prove to be speedier, more effective and economical than the other adjudicative processes.
Mediation needs to be promoted as a mechanism that complements the judicial process. To achieve acceptance and popularity of Mediation as the first step before approaching the court or any other Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) method, it is crucial to develop confidence in the process of Mediation. Court-annexed mediation, to a certain extent, has been adopted as a measure of docket management and must go hand in hand with promotion of mediation as a successful, revolutionary, economical and time-saving method for all the stakeholders.
From the websites of several High Courts, it can be ascertained that most High Courts have their separate set of rules governing Mediation and Conciliation. Barring for a few High Courts, there is no data available to show the status of mediation cases referred, successes/failure of matters, and number of settlements arrived at and effectively implemented.

Q. Based on the author's arguments in the passage above, choose the appropriate statement with respect to how mediation is better?

Passage - 4

Over the years, mediation has been recognised as the fastest growing method to resolve disputes worldwide. Mediation allows parties to relook at mutual interests and rights of each other, and to come up with amicable and innovative solutions. This helps in maintaining cordial relations between the parties.
The role of courts or arbitrators is adjudicative and more formal in nature. In contrast, the nature of mediators or the process of mediation is very practical and flexible. Many a time, it can prove to be speedier, more effective and economical than the other adjudicative processes.
Mediation needs to be promoted as a mechanism that complements the judicial process. To achieve acceptance and popularity of Mediation as the first step before approaching the court or any other Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) method, it is crucial to develop confidence in the process of Mediation. Court-annexed mediation, to a certain extent, has been adopted as a measure of docket management and must go hand in hand with promotion of mediation as a successful, revolutionary, economical and time-saving method for all the stakeholders.
From the websites of several High Courts, it can be ascertained that most High Courts have their separate set of rules governing Mediation and Conciliation. Barring for a few High Courts, there is no data available to show the status of mediation cases referred, successes/failure of matters, and number of settlements arrived at and effectively implemented.

Q. As per the author, which of the following views can be correctly attributed about Court-annexed mediation?
(i) Easier mediation process
(ii) Informal in real senses
(iii) Court rules do not apply
(iv) Ineffective mediation
(v) Lack of recognition of mediation

Passage - 4

Over the years, mediation has been recognised as the fastest growing method to resolve disputes worldwide. Mediation allows parties to relook at mutual interests and rights of each other, and to come up with amicable and innovative solutions. This helps in maintaining cordial relations between the parties.
The role of courts or arbitrators is adjudicative and more formal in nature. In contrast, the nature of mediators or the process of mediation is very practical and flexible. Many a time, it can prove to be speedier, more effective and economical than the other adjudicative processes.
Mediation needs to be promoted as a mechanism that complements the judicial process. To achieve acceptance and popularity of Mediation as the first step before approaching the court or any other Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) method, it is crucial to develop confidence in the process of Mediation. Court-annexed mediation, to a certain extent, has been adopted as a measure of docket management and must go hand in hand with promotion of mediation as a successful, revolutionary, economical and time-saving method for all the stakeholders.
From the websites of several High Courts, it can be ascertained that most High Courts have their separate set of rules governing Mediation and Conciliation. Barring for a few High Courts, there is no data available to show the status of mediation cases referred, successes/failure of matters, and number of settlements arrived at and effectively implemented.

Q. Based on the author's arguments in the passage above, choose the appropriate statement?

Passage - 5

The Union government has called upon the Supreme Court to form a seven-judge Bench to reconsider the formulation in M. Nagaraj vs Union of India (2006) that it should be applied to the SC and ST communities. This verdict was a reality check to the concept of reservation. Even while upholding Constitution amendments meant to preserve reservation in promotions as well as consequential seniority; it contained an exposition of the equality principle that hedged reservation against a set of constitutional requirements, without which the structure of equal opportunity would collapse. These were 'quantifiable data' to show the backwardness of a community, the inadequacy of its representation in service, and the lack of adverse impact on "the overall efficiency of administration". In Jarnail Singh (2018), another Constitution Bench reaffirmed the applicability of creamy layer norms to SC/STs. However, it ruled that Nagaraj was wrong to require a demonstration of backwardness for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, as it was directly contrary to the nine-judge Bench judgment in Indra Sawhney (1992).

It is curious that Jarnail Singh accepted the presumption of the backwardness of Scheduled Castes and Tribes, but favoured applying the 'means test' to exclude from the purview of SC/ST reservation those who had achieved some level of economic advancement. While the Centre has accepted that the 'creamy layer' norm is needed to ensure that only those genuinely backward get reservation benefits, it is justifiably upset that this principle has been extended to Dalits, who have been acknowledged to be the most backward among the backward sections. Another problem is the question whether the exclusion of the advanced sections among SC/ST candidates can be disallowed only for promotions. Most of them may not fall under the 'creamy layer' category at the entry level, but after some years of service and promotions, they may reach an income level at which they fall under the 'creamy layer'. This may result in the defeat of the object of the Constitution amendments that the court itself had upheld to protect reservation in promotions as well as consequential seniority. Another landmark verdict in the history of affirmative action jurisprudence may be needed to settle these questions.

Q. Based on the author's arguments in the passage above, which of the following statements is least inferential with respect to introduction of creamy layer in the SC/ST reservation made in the passage above?

Passage - 5

The Union government has called upon the Supreme Court to form a seven-judge Bench to reconsider the formulation in M. Nagaraj vs Union of India (2006) that it should be applied to the SC and ST communities. This verdict was a reality check to the concept of reservation. Even while upholding Constitution amendments meant to preserve reservation in promotions as well as consequential seniority; it contained an exposition of the equality principle that hedged reservation against a set of constitutional requirements, without which the structure of equal opportunity would collapse. These were 'quantifiable data' to show the backwardness of a community, the inadequacy of its representation in service, and the lack of adverse impact on "the overall efficiency of administration". In Jarnail Singh (2018), another Constitution Bench reaffirmed the applicability of creamy layer norms to SC/STs. However, it ruled that Nagaraj was wrong to require a demonstration of backwardness for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, as it was directly contrary to the nine-judge Bench judgment in Indra Sawhney (1992).

It is curious that Jarnail Singh accepted the presumption of the backwardness of Scheduled Castes and Tribes, but favoured applying the 'means test' to exclude from the purview of SC/ST reservation those who had achieved some level of economic advancement. While the Centre has accepted that the 'creamy layer' norm is needed to ensure that only those genuinely backward get reservation benefits, it is justifiably upset that this principle has been extended to Dalits, who have been acknowledged to be the most backward among the backward sections. Another problem is the question whether the exclusion of the advanced sections among SC/ST candidates can be disallowed only for promotions. Most of them may not fall under the 'creamy layer' category at the entry level, but after some years of service and promotions, they may reach an income level at which they fall under the 'creamy layer'. This may result in the defeat of the object of the Constitution amendments that the court itself had upheld to protect reservation in promotions as well as consequential seniority. Another landmark verdict in the history of affirmative action jurisprudence may be needed to settle these questions.

Q. Teacher's recruitment to Sainik School is strictly merit based through a competitive exam and medical fitness. It has been decided on 10th January, 2020 to have 27% reservation for SC/ST in admissions to align with the constitutional mandate. However, reservation in promotion to SC/STs are denied if they fall in creamy layer i.e. 10 lakh salary p.a. Based on the inference drawn, what should be the author's stand on the creamy layer in the SC/ST reservation?

Passage - 5

The Union government has called upon the Supreme Court to form a seven-judge Bench to reconsider the formulation in M. Nagaraj vs Union of India (2006) that it should be applied to the SC and ST communities. This verdict was a reality check to the concept of reservation. Even while upholding Constitution amendments meant to preserve reservation in promotions as well as consequential seniority; it contained an exposition of the equality principle that hedged reservation against a set of constitutional requirements, without which the structure of equal opportunity would collapse. These were 'quantifiable data' to show the backwardness of a community, the inadequacy of its representation in service, and the lack of adverse impact on "the overall efficiency of administration". In Jarnail Singh (2018), another Constitution Bench reaffirmed the applicability of creamy layer norms to SC/STs. However, it ruled that Nagaraj was wrong to require a demonstration of backwardness for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, as it was directly contrary to the nine-judge Bench judgment in Indra Sawhney (1992).

It is curious that Jarnail Singh accepted the presumption of the backwardness of Scheduled Castes and Tribes, but favoured applying the 'means test' to exclude from the purview of SC/ST reservation those who had achieved some level of economic advancement. While the Centre has accepted that the 'creamy layer' norm is needed to ensure that only those genuinely backward get reservation benefits, it is justifiably upset that this principle has been extended to Dalits, who have been acknowledged to be the most backward among the backward sections. Another problem is the question whether the exclusion of the advanced sections among SC/ST candidates can be disallowed only for promotions. Most of them may not fall under the 'creamy layer' category at the entry level, but after some years of service and promotions, they may reach an income level at which they fall under the 'creamy layer'. This may result in the defeat of the object of the Constitution amendments that the court itself had upheld to protect reservation in promotions as well as consequential seniority. Another landmark verdict in the history of affirmative action jurisprudence may be needed to settle these questions.

Q. Based on the author's arguments that may result in the defeat of the object of the Constitution amendments, which of the following would be most correct:

Passage - 5

The Union government has called upon the Supreme Court to form a seven-judge Bench to reconsider the formulation in M. Nagaraj vs Union of India (2006) that it should be applied to the SC and ST communities. This verdict was a reality check to the concept of reservation. Even while upholding Constitution amendments meant to preserve reservation in promotions as well as consequential seniority; it contained an exposition of the equality principle that hedged reservation against a set of constitutional requirements, without which the structure of equal opportunity would collapse. These were 'quantifiable data' to show the backwardness of a community, the inadequacy of its representation in service, and the lack of adverse impact on "the overall efficiency of administration". In Jarnail Singh (2018), another Constitution Bench reaffirmed the applicability of creamy layer norms to SC/STs. However, it ruled that Nagaraj was wrong to require a demonstration of backwardness for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, as it was directly contrary to the nine-judge Bench judgment in Indra Sawhney (1992).

It is curious that Jarnail Singh accepted the presumption of the backwardness of Scheduled Castes and Tribes, but favoured applying the 'means test' to exclude from the purview of SC/ST reservation those who had achieved some level of economic advancement. While the Centre has accepted that the 'creamy layer' norm is needed to ensure that only those genuinely backward get reservation benefits, it is justifiably upset that this principle has been extended to Dalits, who have been acknowledged to be the most backward among the backward sections. Another problem is the question whether the exclusion of the advanced sections among SC/ST candidates can be disallowed only for promotions. Most of them may not fall under the 'creamy layer' category at the entry level, but after some years of service and promotions, they may reach an income level at which they fall under the 'creamy layer'. This may result in the defeat of the object of the Constitution amendments that the court itself had upheld to protect reservation in promotions as well as consequential seniority. Another landmark verdict in the history of affirmative action jurisprudence may be needed to settle these questions.

Q. Article 16(6) have been inserted in the constitution. This enables the State to provide the benefits of reservation on preferential basis to the Economically Weaker Sections (EWSs) in civil posts and services in the Government of India without adversely affecting the proportionate seats of Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes. Based on the author's argument and given information, will the EWS reservation adversely affect the SC/STs reservation?

Passage - 5

The Union government has called upon the Supreme Court to form a seven-judge Bench to reconsider the formulation in M. Nagaraj vs Union of India (2006) that it should be applied to the SC and ST communities. This verdict was a reality check to the concept of reservation. Even while upholding Constitution amendments meant to preserve reservation in promotions as well as consequential seniority; it contained an exposition of the equality principle that hedged reservation against a set of constitutional requirements, without which the structure of equal opportunity would collapse. These were 'quantifiable data' to show the backwardness of a community, the inadequacy of its representation in service, and the lack of adverse impact on "the overall efficiency of administration". In Jarnail Singh (2018), another Constitution Bench reaffirmed the applicability of creamy layer norms to SC/STs. However, it ruled that Nagaraj was wrong to require a demonstration of backwardness for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, as it was directly contrary to the nine-judge Bench judgment in Indra Sawhney (1992).

It is curious that Jarnail Singh accepted the presumption of the backwardness of Scheduled Castes and Tribes, but favoured applying the 'means test' to exclude from the purview of SC/ST reservation those who had achieved some level of economic advancement. While the Centre has accepted that the 'creamy layer' norm is needed to ensure that only those genuinely backward get reservation benefits, it is justifiably upset that this principle has been extended to Dalits, who have been acknowledged to be the most backward among the backward sections. Another problem is the question whether the exclusion of the advanced sections among SC/ST candidates can be disallowed only for promotions. Most of them may not fall under the 'creamy layer' category at the entry level, but after some years of service and promotions, they may reach an income level at which they fall under the 'creamy layer'. This may result in the defeat of the object of the Constitution amendments that the court itself had upheld to protect reservation in promotions as well as consequential seniority. Another landmark verdict in the history of affirmative action jurisprudence may be needed to settle these questions.

Q. Under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, the administrative control over the members of district and subordinate judiciary in the States vest with the concerned High Court. Further, the State Government, in consultation with the High Court, frames the Rules and Regulations regarding the issues of appointment, promotion, and reservations etc. of Judicial Officers in the State Judicial Service. Therefore, Central Government has no role in this regard. Based only on the principle of law and argument identified by the author above, would such a reservation be valid if made by the Central Government?

Passage - 5

The Union government has called upon the Supreme Court to form a seven-judge Bench to reconsider the formulation in M. Nagaraj vs Union of India (2006) that it should be applied to the SC and ST communities. This verdict was a reality check to the concept of reservation. Even while upholding Constitution amendments meant to preserve reservation in promotions as well as consequential seniority; it contained an exposition of the equality principle that hedged reservation against a set of constitutional requirements, without which the structure of equal opportunity would collapse. These were 'quantifiable data' to show the backwardness of a community, the inadequacy of its representation in service, and the lack of adverse impact on "the overall efficiency of administration". In Jarnail Singh (2018), another Constitution Bench reaffirmed the applicability of creamy layer norms to SC/STs. However, it ruled that Nagaraj was wrong to require a demonstration of backwardness for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, as it was directly contrary to the nine-judge Bench judgment in Indra Sawhney (1992).

It is curious that Jarnail Singh accepted the presumption of the backwardness of Scheduled Castes and Tribes, but favoured applying the 'means test' to exclude from the purview of SC/ST reservation those who had achieved some level of economic advancement. While the Centre has accepted that the 'creamy layer' norm is needed to ensure that only those genuinely backward get reservation benefits, it is justifiably upset that this principle has been extended to Dalits, who have been acknowledged to be the most backward among the backward sections. Another problem is the question whether the exclusion of the advanced sections among SC/ST candidates can be disallowed only for promotions. Most of them may not fall under the 'creamy layer' category at the entry level, but after some years of service and promotions, they may reach an income level at which they fall under the 'creamy layer'. This may result in the defeat of the object of the Constitution amendments that the court itself had upheld to protect reservation in promotions as well as consequential seniority. Another landmark verdict in the history of affirmative action jurisprudence may be needed to settle these questions.

Q. Constitution has no provision for the reservation in the private sector. Government has notified the reservation in jobs in the private sector companies where Government has even partial shares. In the absence of Constitutional provision, the notification is challenged, would the petition deserve to be dismissed?