Test: Legal Reasoning - 4 - CLAT MCQ

Paragraph: The constitutional text also creates certain express defenses to crimes. Consider the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clause. The first half bars a legislature from enacting a law that names and convicts someone of a crime without a trial.
The second half forbids a legislature from retroactively applying a statute defining a new crime or enhancing the penalty for an old one. The First Amendment also takes away from Congress the authority to make any law trespassing on certain civil liberties, which naturally includes any law making it a crime to engage in the conduct that the provision safeguards. Defendants in both federal and state criminal cases may defend against a charged federal offense on the ground that the statute violates the First Amendment. The clauses have this in common: they all address aspects of substantive criminal law. One defines a crime in the text of the Constitution. Some describe the type of conduct that the government should outlaw. Others place certain primary conduct entirely out of bounds. The Due Process Clause does none of those things. Instead it ensures that no one can be criminally punished unless he has committed a criminal offense defined by a different positive law and then only in compliance with whatever procedural restraints the law elsewhere requires.
The phrase “due process of law” comes from a fourteenth century act of Parliament, stating that “no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out of Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death, without being brought in Answer by due Process of the Law. That provision, in turn, traces its lineage to Chapter 39 of Magna Carta of 1215, a document that rivals our own Constitution in the protections it affords against arbitrary government conduct. Chapter 39 provided that no free man is to be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.

Q. (Based on question 1) In January 2020, The parliament of Zambar brought an amendment for extending the new law to the acts committed after March 2019 and punish convicts for the same. The amendment is:

Paragraph: The constitutional text also creates certain express defenses to crimes. Consider the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clause. The first half bars a legislature from enacting a law that names and convicts someone of a crime without a trial.
The second half forbids a legislature from retroactively applying a statute defining a new crime or enhancing the penalty for an old one. The First Amendment also takes away from Congress the authority to make any law trespassing on certain civil liberties, which naturally includes any law making it a crime to engage in the conduct that the provision safeguards. Defendants in both federal and state criminal cases may defend against a charged federal offense on the ground that the statute violates the First Amendment. The clauses have this in common: they all address aspects of substantive criminal law. One defines a crime in the text of the Constitution. Some describe the type of conduct that the government should outlaw. Others place certain primary conduct entirely out of bounds. The Due Process Clause does none of those things. Instead it ensures that no one can be criminally punished unless he has committed a criminal offense defined by a different positive law and then only in compliance with whatever procedural restraints the law elsewhere requires.
The phrase “due process of law” comes from a fourteenth century act of Parliament, stating that “no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out of Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death, without being brought in Answer by due Process of the Law. That provision, in turn, traces its lineage to Chapter 39 of Magna Carta of 1215, a document that rivals our own Constitution in the protections it affords against arbitrary government conduct. Chapter 39 provided that no free man is to be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.

Q. In January 2020, Zambar successfully developed a technology “Chal Jhootha” which can identify if a person is speaking a lie or not with 100% accuracy. If the government plans to use the same for convicting a person found lying by Chal Jhootha, how would the author response to it

Paragraph: The constitutional text also creates certain express defenses to crimes. Consider the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clause. The first half bars a legislature from enacting a law that names and convicts someone of a crime without a trial.
The second half forbids a legislature from retroactively applying a statute defining a new crime or enhancing the penalty for an old one. The First Amendment also takes away from Congress the authority to make any law trespassing on certain civil liberties, which naturally includes any law making it a crime to engage in the conduct that the provision safeguards. Defendants in both federal and state criminal cases may defend against a charged federal offense on the ground that the statute violates the First Amendment. The clauses have this in common: they all address aspects of substantive criminal law. One defines a crime in the text of the Constitution. Some describe the type of conduct that the government should outlaw. Others place certain primary conduct entirely out of bounds. The Due Process Clause does none of those things. Instead it ensures that no one can be criminally punished unless he has committed a criminal offense defined by a different positive law and then only in compliance with whatever procedural restraints the law elsewhere requires.
The phrase “due process of law” comes from a fourteenth century act of Parliament, stating that “no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out of Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death, without being brought in Answer by due Process of the Law. That provision, in turn, traces its lineage to Chapter 39 of Magna Carta of 1215, a document that rivals our own Constitution in the protections it affords against arbitrary government conduct. Chapter 39 provided that no free man is to be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.

Q. If “Chal Jhootha” is used to determine veracity of the statements of the Accused for his past acts and reducing his punishment if he is found to tell the truth, the author will

Paragraph: The constitutional text also creates certain express defenses to crimes. Consider the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clause. The first half bars a legislature from enacting a law that names and convicts someone of a crime without a trial.
The second half forbids a legislature from retroactively applying a statute defining a new crime or enhancing the penalty for an old one. The First Amendment also takes away from Congress the authority to make any law trespassing on certain civil liberties, which naturally includes any law making it a crime to engage in the conduct that the provision safeguards. Defendants in both federal and state criminal cases may defend against a charged federal offense on the ground that the statute violates the First Amendment. The clauses have this in common: they all address aspects of substantive criminal law. One defines a crime in the text of the Constitution. Some describe the type of conduct that the government should outlaw. Others place certain primary conduct entirely out of bounds. The Due Process Clause does none of those things. Instead it ensures that no one can be criminally punished unless he has committed a criminal offense defined by a different positive law and then only in compliance with whatever procedural restraints the law elsewhere requires.
The phrase “due process of law” comes from a fourteenth century act of Parliament, stating that “no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out of Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death, without being brought in Answer by due Process of the Law. That provision, in turn, traces its lineage to Chapter 39 of Magna Carta of 1215, a document that rivals our own Constitution in the protections it affords against arbitrary government conduct. Chapter 39 provided that no free man is to be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.

Q. Which of the following is correct in view of the above passage:

Principle: Acceptance (of offer) must be communicated by the offeree to the offeror so as to give rise to a binding obligation. The expression ‘by the offeree to the offeror’ includes communication between their authorized agents.
Facts: `Rohan’ made an offer to buy ram’s property for a stipulated price. `Ram’ accepted it and communicated his acceptance to `soham’, a stranger.

Q. Which of the following derivations is CORRECT?

Principle: Under the Strict liability principle if a person brings and keeps any dangerous thing on his land, then he is liable for any damage if the thing escapes.
Facts: A planted a poisonous tree on his land. The branches of a tree on growing extended and crossed the boundary of his land and entered B’s boundary. The cattle of A ate the leaves of the poisonous tree. His cattle died. DECIDE?

Paragraph: Fundamental rights, we have been repeatedly been told, do not exist in isolation. But, despite the theoretical affirmation of this idea, judicial practice is permeated by cases where some laws are seen as special, as untouched by the rigours of due process. Prime among them, as a recent judgment of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Mian Abdul Qayoom v. State of J&K shows us, are laws providing for preventive detention — in this case, the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (‘PSA’).
The High Court, in its judgment, opened with the now customary panegyric on freedom. The right to personal liberty, wrote Justice TashiRabstan, is a “most precious right”. It has been held, he added, to be “transcendental, inalienable and available to a person independent of the Constitution”. And the right is not to be denied “except in accordance with procedures established under law” and that procedure, as held in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, had to be “just and fair”.
Effectively, therefore, the judgment places liberty at the pleasure of government. It reduces the Constitution’s core guarantees to a trifle. Yet, extraordinary as the verdict appears, a study of the history of the law of preventive detention in India, especially as applied in the State of J&K, would show us that we ought to have little to be surprised about. The ruling, in recognising boundless executive pre-eminence, only gives effect to a long-standing jurisprudence.
In the litany of precedents that the judgment has cited, pride of place is occupied by A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras. There, the Supreme Court of India found that Article 21, which guarantees a right to life and personal liberty, does not require the state to follow due process. It was therefore, in the court’s belief, that Article 22 had been incorporated, stipulating a set of procedural parameters for preventive detention laws. And such laws, according to the court, were immunised from the limitations placed on the legislature by other fundamental rights.
The verdict in Gopalan has since been overruled. Not only has the Supreme Court held that the fundamental rights chapter comprises a network of mutually dependant promises but it has also ruled that Article 21 implicitly includes within it a guarantee of substantive due process. In other words, the clause demands that any action or law that limits liberty ought to fair, just, and reasonable, untouched by the caprices of the state.
In overruling Gopalan, the court’s rationale was simple: the absence of a substantive promise of due process would mean that the political executive is free to use the most whimsical of motives to restrict freedom. But ever since its enactment, the PSA has served precisely this purpose. It has been used by successive governments to quell even the slightest hint of dissent. And when review of the orders is sought, courts have invariably followed the model that has now been adopted in Mr. Qayoom’s case: an assumption that the executive knows best and that any decision made by it is beyond the scope of judicial enquiry.
The only thing transcendental about this approach is the omnipotent supremacy of the executive. In reducing judicial review to an irrelevance, the judgment, therefore, stands as an antithesis of the Constitution’s basic function. To understand the dangers inherent in vesting unbridled power of this kind, we do not need to see J&K as exemplifying a state of exception. Nor do we need to apprehend that the model employed will likely be adopted in other States.

Q. Does the new judgment by J&K High Court point to a new trend in the law of preventive detention as per the author? 

Paragraph: Fundamental rights, we have been repeatedly been told, do not exist in isolation. But, despite the theoretical affirmation of this idea, judicial practice is permeated by cases where some laws are seen as special, as untouched by the rigours of due process. Prime among them, as a recent judgment of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Mian Abdul Qayoom v. State of J&K shows us, are laws providing for preventive detention — in this case, the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (‘PSA’).
The High Court, in its judgment, opened with the now customary panegyric on freedom. The right to personal liberty, wrote Justice TashiRabstan, is a “most precious right”. It has been held, he added, to be “transcendental, inalienable and available to a person independent of the Constitution”. And the right is not to be denied “except in accordance with procedures established under law” and that procedure, as held in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, had to be “just and fair”.
Effectively, therefore, the judgment places liberty at the pleasure of government. It reduces the Constitution’s core guarantees to a trifle. Yet, extraordinary as the verdict appears, a study of the history of the law of preventive detention in India, especially as applied in the State of J&K, would show us that we ought to have little to be surprised about. The ruling, in recognising boundless executive pre-eminence, only gives effect to a long-standing jurisprudence.
In the litany of precedents that the judgment has cited, pride of place is occupied by A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras. There, the Supreme Court of India found that Article 21, which guarantees a right to life and personal liberty, does not require the state to follow due process. It was therefore, in the court’s belief, that Article 22 had been incorporated, stipulating a set of procedural parameters for preventive detention laws. And such laws, according to the court, were immunised from the limitations placed on the legislature by other fundamental rights.
The verdict in Gopalan has since been overruled. Not only has the Supreme Court held that the fundamental rights chapter comprises a network of mutually dependant promises but it has also ruled that Article 21 implicitly includes within it a guarantee of substantive due process. In other words, the clause demands that any action or law that limits liberty ought to fair, just, and reasonable, untouched by the caprices of the state.
In overruling Gopalan, the court’s rationale was simple: the absence of a substantive promise of due process would mean that the political executive is free to use the most whimsical of motives to restrict freedom. But ever since its enactment, the PSA has served precisely this purpose. It has been used by successive governments to quell even the slightest hint of dissent. And when review of the orders is sought, courts have invariably followed the model that has now been adopted in Mr. Qayoom’s case: an assumption that the executive knows best and that any decision made by it is beyond the scope of judicial enquiry.
The only thing transcendental about this approach is the omnipotent supremacy of the executive. In reducing judicial review to an irrelevance, the judgment, therefore, stands as an antithesis of the Constitution’s basic function. To understand the dangers inherent in vesting unbridled power of this kind, we do not need to see J&K as exemplifying a state of exception. Nor do we need to apprehend that the model employed will likely be adopted in other States.

Q. A’s passport was confiscated by the Government. A wrote to them asking for a reason for such confiscation and demanded a hearing. The Government neither gave any reasons for such confiscation, nor gave her the opportunity of a hearing. A urgently needed to travel outside India and hence decided to challenge the confiscation in Court. As per the given passage, which of the following arguments would most strengthen A’s case?

Paragraph: Fundamental rights, we have been repeatedly been told, do not exist in isolation. But, despite the theoretical affirmation of this idea, judicial practice is permeated by cases where some laws are seen as special, as untouched by the rigours of due process. Prime among them, as a recent judgment of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Mian Abdul Qayoom v. State of J&K shows us, are laws providing for preventive detention — in this case, the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (‘PSA’).
The High Court, in its judgment, opened with the now customary panegyric on freedom. The right to personal liberty, wrote Justice TashiRabstan, is a “most precious right”. It has been held, he added, to be “transcendental, inalienable and available to a person independent of the Constitution”. And the right is not to be denied “except in accordance with procedures established under law” and that procedure, as held in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, had to be “just and fair”.
Effectively, therefore, the judgment places liberty at the pleasure of government. It reduces the Constitution’s core guarantees to a trifle. Yet, extraordinary as the verdict appears, a study of the history of the law of preventive detention in India, especially as applied in the State of J&K, would show us that we ought to have little to be surprised about. The ruling, in recognising boundless executive pre-eminence, only gives effect to a long-standing jurisprudence.
In the litany of precedents that the judgment has cited, pride of place is occupied by A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras. There, the Supreme Court of India found that Article 21, which guarantees a right to life and personal liberty, does not require the state to follow due process. It was therefore, in the court’s belief, that Article 22 had been incorporated, stipulating a set of procedural parameters for preventive detention laws. And such laws, according to the court, were immunised from the limitations placed on the legislature by other fundamental rights.
The verdict in Gopalan has since been overruled. Not only has the Supreme Court held that the fundamental rights chapter comprises a network of mutually dependant promises but it has also ruled that Article 21 implicitly includes within it a guarantee of substantive due process. In other words, the clause demands that any action or law that limits liberty ought to fair, just, and reasonable, untouched by the caprices of the state.
In overruling Gopalan, the court’s rationale was simple: the absence of a substantive promise of due process would mean that the political executive is free to use the most whimsical of motives to restrict freedom. But ever since its enactment, the PSA has served precisely this purpose. It has been used by successive governments to quell even the slightest hint of dissent. And when review of the orders is sought, courts have invariably followed the model that has now been adopted in Mr. Qayoom’s case: an assumption that the executive knows best and that any decision made by it is beyond the scope of judicial enquiry.
The only thing transcendental about this approach is the omnipotent supremacy of the executive. In reducing judicial review to an irrelevance, the judgment, therefore, stands as an antithesis of the Constitution’s basic function. To understand the dangers inherent in vesting unbridled power of this kind, we do not need to see J&K as exemplifying a state of exception. Nor do we need to apprehend that the model employed will likely be adopted in other States.

Q. If the judgment in A. K. Gopalan case had not been overruled, will the verdict be different in the case of Mian Abdul Qayoom v. State of J&K, given in the passage?

Paragraph: Fundamental rights, we have been repeatedly been told, do not exist in isolation. But, despite the theoretical affirmation of this idea, judicial practice is permeated by cases where some laws are seen as special, as untouched by the rigours of due process. Prime among them, as a recent judgment of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Mian Abdul Qayoom v. State of J&K shows us, are laws providing for preventive detention — in this case, the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (‘PSA’).
The High Court, in its judgment, opened with the now customary panegyric on freedom. The right to personal liberty, wrote Justice TashiRabstan, is a “most precious right”. It has been held, he added, to be “transcendental, inalienable and available to a person independent of the Constitution”. And the right is not to be denied “except in accordance with procedures established under law” and that procedure, as held in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, had to be “just and fair”.
Effectively, therefore, the judgment places liberty at the pleasure of government. It reduces the Constitution’s core guarantees to a trifle. Yet, extraordinary as the verdict appears, a study of the history of the law of preventive detention in India, especially as applied in the State of J&K, would show us that we ought to have little to be surprised about. The ruling, in recognising boundless executive pre-eminence, only gives effect to a long-standing jurisprudence.
In the litany of precedents that the judgment has cited, pride of place is occupied by A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras. There, the Supreme Court of India found that Article 21, which guarantees a right to life and personal liberty, does not require the state to follow due process. It was therefore, in the court’s belief, that Article 22 had been incorporated, stipulating a set of procedural parameters for preventive detention laws. And such laws, according to the court, were immunised from the limitations placed on the legislature by other fundamental rights.
The verdict in Gopalan has since been overruled. Not only has the Supreme Court held that the fundamental rights chapter comprises a network of mutually dependant promises but it has also ruled that Article 21 implicitly includes within it a guarantee of substantive due process. In other words, the clause demands that any action or law that limits liberty ought to fair, just, and reasonable, untouched by the caprices of the state.
In overruling Gopalan, the court’s rationale was simple: the absence of a substantive promise of due process would mean that the political executive is free to use the most whimsical of motives to restrict freedom. But ever since its enactment, the PSA has served precisely this purpose. It has been used by successive governments to quell even the slightest hint of dissent. And when review of the orders is sought, courts have invariably followed the model that has now been adopted in Mr. Qayoom’s case: an assumption that the executive knows best and that any decision made by it is beyond the scope of judicial enquiry.
The only thing transcendental about this approach is the omnipotent supremacy of the executive. In reducing judicial review to an irrelevance, the judgment, therefore, stands as an antithesis of the Constitution’s basic function. To understand the dangers inherent in vesting unbridled power of this kind, we do not need to see J&K as exemplifying a state of exception. Nor do we need to apprehend that the model employed will likely be adopted in other States.

Q. Does the author opine that the PSA is an antithesis to the Constitution? 

Paragraph: Fundamental rights, we have been repeatedly been told, do not exist in isolation. But, despite the theoretical affirmation of this idea, judicial practice is permeated by cases where some laws are seen as special, as untouched by the rigours of due process. Prime among them, as a recent judgment of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Mian Abdul Qayoom v. State of J&K shows us, are laws providing for preventive detention — in this case, the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (‘PSA’).
The High Court, in its judgment, opened with the now customary panegyric on freedom. The right to personal liberty, wrote Justice TashiRabstan, is a “most precious right”. It has been held, he added, to be “transcendental, inalienable and available to a person independent of the Constitution”. And the right is not to be denied “except in accordance with procedures established under law” and that procedure, as held in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, had to be “just and fair”.
Effectively, therefore, the judgment places liberty at the pleasure of government. It reduces the Constitution’s core guarantees to a trifle. Yet, extraordinary as the verdict appears, a study of the history of the law of preventive detention in India, especially as applied in the State of J&K, would show us that we ought to have little to be surprised about. The ruling, in recognising boundless executive pre-eminence, only gives effect to a long-standing jurisprudence.
In the litany of precedents that the judgment has cited, pride of place is occupied by A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras. There, the Supreme Court of India found that Article 21, which guarantees a right to life and personal liberty, does not require the state to follow due process. It was therefore, in the court’s belief, that Article 22 had been incorporated, stipulating a set of procedural parameters for preventive detention laws. And such laws, according to the court, were immunised from the limitations placed on the legislature by other fundamental rights.
The verdict in Gopalan has since been overruled. Not only has the Supreme Court held that the fundamental rights chapter comprises a network of mutually dependant promises but it has also ruled that Article 21 implicitly includes within it a guarantee of substantive due process. In other words, the clause demands that any action or law that limits liberty ought to fair, just, and reasonable, untouched by the caprices of the state.
In overruling Gopalan, the court’s rationale was simple: the absence of a substantive promise of due process would mean that the political executive is free to use the most whimsical of motives to restrict freedom. But ever since its enactment, the PSA has served precisely this purpose. It has been used by successive governments to quell even the slightest hint of dissent. And when review of the orders is sought, courts have invariably followed the model that has now been adopted in Mr. Qayoom’s case: an assumption that the executive knows best and that any decision made by it is beyond the scope of judicial enquiry.
The only thing transcendental about this approach is the omnipotent supremacy of the executive. In reducing judicial review to an irrelevance, the judgment, therefore, stands as an antithesis of the Constitution’s basic function. To understand the dangers inherent in vesting unbridled power of this kind, we do not need to see J&K as exemplifying a state of exception. Nor do we need to apprehend that the model employed will likely be adopted in other States.

Q. Why does the author think that the “substantive promise of due process” is necessary?

Principle: A person, who lawfully brings on his land something which though harmless, but will do mischief it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and if he does not, he is answerable for all the damage
Facts: Mr. X was the owner of a mill. In order to supply water to the mill, he wanted to construct a reservoir and employed certain engineers for that. Besides the mill, there was a coal mine owned by Mr. Y, not adjoining the premise where the reservoir was to be constructed. While constructing the reservoir, the digging reached the boundaries of coal mines. The reservoir was completed and partially filled. Within some days, the boundaries of the reservoir got damaged and the water entered the coal mines. In light of the above principles, decide whether Mr. X is liable to pay damages to Mr. Y.

What was the exact constitutional position of the Indian Republic when the Constitution was brought into force with effect from 26th January, 1950?

Paragraph: Omar Abdullah, former chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), has been in detention since August 5, 2019, under the Public Safety Act. Every moment of his detention has been a gross violation of the right to liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The allegations against Omar are totally frivolous. In a three-page dossier served on him, it is said he made statements to the Kashmiri public against the dilution of Articles 35A and 370.All this is ipse dixit (a dogmatic and unproven statement) and is hardly a valid ground for detaining him. There is no allegation that Omar Abdullah ever gave a call for violence or organised violence. In fact, his entire political record shows that he has always abided by India’s Constitution. Criticising the government is no crime, as it is a democratic right protected by the freedom of speech in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. This was laid down by the constitution bench decision of the Supreme Court in RomeshThapparvs State of Madras in 1950 and several other decisions of the court thereafter.
As held in the historic decision of the US Supreme Court in Brandenburg vs Ohio (1969), which still holds the field, free speech can only be prohibited by the state when “it is directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action”. This decision of the US Supreme Court has been followed in two decisions of the Indian Supreme Court, Arup Bhuyanvs State of Assam and Sri Indra Das vs the State of Assam, both delivered in 2011. Hence, it is the law of the land in India too. There is no allegation that Omar said anything to incite or produce imminent lawless action.
In Ghanivs Jones (1970), Lord Denning observed that “a man’s liberty of movement is regarded so highly by the laws of England that it is not to be hindered or prevented except on the surest grounds”, and this statement has been quoted with approval by the seven-judge constitution bench judgment of our Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India and thereafter in Govt of Andhra Pradesh vs P. Laxmi Devi. Hence it is the law of the land in India too.
Omar Abdullah's sister has termed the renewed detention orders under the PSA as "unconstitutional" and a "flagrant violation of his fundamental rights".
The petition explained that Mr. Abdullah’s detention from August 5 under Section 107 CrPC (security for keeping the peace) was scheduled to end on February 5, 2020. His release was imminent. He had served the maximum period of detention.
Section 107 (1) of CrPC is used to deter any person likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity and the Magistrate is of opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding. 

Q. Mukesh, a prosperous Merchant, had suffered losses in his business due to some policy changes by the Government. Annoyed, he chastised the Government and its efficiency in public television. He was arrested on charges of sedition and produced before the Court. Assuming that the case of Romesh Thapparvs State of Madras is overruled, would Mukesh be held guilty?

Paragraph: Omar Abdullah, former chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), has been in detention since August 5, 2019, under the Public Safety Act. Every moment of his detention has been a gross violation of the right to liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The allegations against Omar are totally frivolous. In a three-page dossier served on him, it is said he made statements to the Kashmiri public against the dilution of Articles 35A and 370.All this is ipse dixit (a dogmatic and unproven statement) and is hardly a valid ground for detaining him. There is no allegation that Omar Abdullah ever gave a call for violence or organised violence. In fact, his entire political record shows that he has always abided by India’s Constitution. Criticising the government is no crime, as it is a democratic right protected by the freedom of speech in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. This was laid down by the constitution bench decision of the Supreme Court in RomeshThapparvs State of Madras in 1950 and several other decisions of the court thereafter.
As held in the historic decision of the US Supreme Court in Brandenburg vs Ohio (1969), which still holds the field, free speech can only be prohibited by the state when “it is directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action”. This decision of the US Supreme Court has been followed in two decisions of the Indian Supreme Court, Arup Bhuyanvs State of Assam and Sri Indra Das vs the State of Assam, both delivered in 2011. Hence, it is the law of the land in India too. There is no allegation that Omar said anything to incite or produce imminent lawless action.
In Ghanivs Jones (1970), Lord Denning observed that “a man’s liberty of movement is regarded so highly by the laws of England that it is not to be hindered or prevented except on the surest grounds”, and this statement has been quoted with approval by the seven-judge constitution bench judgment of our Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India and thereafter in Govt of Andhra Pradesh vs P. Laxmi Devi. Hence it is the law of the land in India too.
Omar Abdullah's sister has termed the renewed detention orders under the PSA as "unconstitutional" and a "flagrant violation of his fundamental rights".
The petition explained that Mr. Abdullah’s detention from August 5 under Section 107 CrPC (security for keeping the peace) was scheduled to end on February 5, 2020. His release was imminent. He had served the maximum period of detention.
Section 107 (1) of CrPC is used to deter any person likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity and the Magistrate is of opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding.

Q. A, a radio jockey, suffered permanent disability in his leg due to a botched operation by his doctor. Enraged, he called for the people to refuse to pay all doctors to punish them for their negligent attitude to patients. The Government banned his radio station. A decided to challenge this ban. Will A succeed?

Paragraph: Omar Abdullah, former chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), has been in detention since August 5, 2019, under the Public Safety Act. Every moment of his detention has been a gross violation of the right to liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The allegations against Omar are totally frivolous. In a three-page dossier served on him, it is said he made statements to the Kashmiri public against the dilution of Articles 35A and 370.All this is ipse dixit (a dogmatic and unproven statement) and is hardly a valid ground for detaining him. There is no allegation that Omar Abdullah ever gave a call for violence or organised violence. In fact, his entire political record shows that he has always abided by India’s Constitution. Criticising the government is no crime, as it is a democratic right protected by the freedom of speech in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. This was laid down by the constitution bench decision of the Supreme Court in RomeshThapparvs State of Madras in 1950 and several other decisions of the court thereafter.
As held in the historic decision of the US Supreme Court in Brandenburg vs Ohio (1969), which still holds the field, free speech can only be prohibited by the state when “it is directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action”. This decision of the US Supreme Court has been followed in two decisions of the Indian Supreme Court, Arup Bhuyanvs State of Assam and Sri Indra Das vs the State of Assam, both delivered in 2011. Hence, it is the law of the land in India too. There is no allegation that Omar said anything to incite or produce imminent lawless action.
In Ghanivs Jones (1970), Lord Denning observed that “a man’s liberty of movement is regarded so highly by the laws of England that it is not to be hindered or prevented except on the surest grounds”, and this statement has been quoted with approval by the seven-judge constitution bench judgment of our Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India and thereafter in Govt of Andhra Pradesh vs P. Laxmi Devi. Hence it is the law of the land in India too.
Omar Abdullah's sister has termed the renewed detention orders under the PSA as "unconstitutional" and a "flagrant violation of his fundamental rights".
The petition explained that Mr. Abdullah’s detention from August 5 under Section 107 CrPC (security for keeping the peace) was scheduled to end on February 5, 2020. His release was imminent. He had served the maximum period of detention.
Section 107 (1) of CrPC is used to deter any person likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity and the Magistrate is of opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding.

Q. Karan and Kangana are neighbors. One day, Karan sees Kangana return home carrying a large, black bag. Suspecting that it was a bomb and that Kangana was an extremist, Karan complained to the police. The police forbade Kangana from leaving her house and confiscated her passport and bank account. Kangana decides to challenge the police. Will she succeed?

Paragraph: Omar Abdullah, former chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), has been in detention since August 5, 2019, under the Public Safety Act. Every moment of his detention has been a gross violation of the right to liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The allegations against Omar are totally frivolous. In a three-page dossier served on him, it is said he made statements to the Kashmiri public against the dilution of Articles 35A and 370.All this is ipse dixit (a dogmatic and unproven statement) and is hardly a valid ground for detaining him. There is no allegation that Omar Abdullah ever gave a call for violence or organised violence. In fact, his entire political record shows that he has always abided by India’s Constitution. Criticising the government is no crime, as it is a democratic right protected by the freedom of speech in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. This was laid down by the constitution bench decision of the Supreme Court in RomeshThapparvs State of Madras in 1950 and several other decisions of the court thereafter.
As held in the historic decision of the US Supreme Court in Brandenburg vs Ohio (1969), which still holds the field, free speech can only be prohibited by the state when “it is directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action”. This decision of the US Supreme Court has been followed in two decisions of the Indian Supreme Court, Arup Bhuyanvs State of Assam and Sri Indra Das vs the State of Assam, both delivered in 2011. Hence, it is the law of the land in India too. There is no allegation that Omar said anything to incite or produce imminent lawless action.
In Ghanivs Jones (1970), Lord Denning observed that “a man’s liberty of movement is regarded so highly by the laws of England that it is not to be hindered or prevented except on the surest grounds”, and this statement has been quoted with approval by the seven-judge constitution bench judgment of our Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India and thereafter in Govt of Andhra Pradesh vs P. Laxmi Devi. Hence it is the law of the land in India too.
Omar Abdullah's sister has termed the renewed detention orders under the PSA as "unconstitutional" and a "flagrant violation of his fundamental rights".
The petition explained that Mr. Abdullah’s detention from August 5 under Section 107 CrPC (security for keeping the peace) was scheduled to end on February 5, 2020. His release was imminent. He had served the maximum period of detention.
Section 107 (1) of CrPC is used to deter any person likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity and the Magistrate is of opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding.

Q. The detention of Mr. Abdullah in the passage has been described a “flagrat violation of his fundamental rights”. Which of the following arguments, if true, would most weaken this stance?

Paragraph: Omar Abdullah, former chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), has been in detention since August 5, 2019, under the Public Safety Act. Every moment of his detention has been a gross violation of the right to liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The allegations against Omar are totally frivolous. In a three-page dossier served on him, it is said he made statements to the Kashmiri public against the dilution of Articles 35A and 370.All this is ipse dixit (a dogmatic and unproven statement) and is hardly a valid ground for detaining him. There is no allegation that Omar Abdullah ever gave a call for violence or organised violence. In fact, his entire political record shows that he has always abided by India’s Constitution. Criticising the government is no crime, as it is a democratic right protected by the freedom of speech in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. This was laid down by the constitution bench decision of the Supreme Court in RomeshThapparvs State of Madras in 1950 and several other decisions of the court thereafter.
As held in the historic decision of the US Supreme Court in Brandenburg vs Ohio (1969), which still holds the field, free speech can only be prohibited by the state when “it is directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action”. This decision of the US Supreme Court has been followed in two decisions of the Indian Supreme Court, Arup Bhuyanvs State of Assam and Sri Indra Das vs the State of Assam, both delivered in 2011. Hence, it is the law of the land in India too. There is no allegation that Omar said anything to incite or produce imminent lawless action.
In Ghanivs Jones (1970), Lord Denning observed that “a man’s liberty of movement is regarded so highly by the laws of England that it is not to be hindered or prevented except on the surest grounds”, and this statement has been quoted with approval by the seven-judge constitution bench judgment of our Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India and thereafter in Govt of Andhra Pradesh vs P. Laxmi Devi. Hence it is the law of the land in India too.
Omar Abdullah's sister has termed the renewed detention orders under the PSA as "unconstitutional" and a "flagrant violation of his fundamental rights".
The petition explained that Mr. Abdullah’s detention from August 5 under Section 107 CrPC (security for keeping the peace) was scheduled to end on February 5, 2020. His release was imminent. He had served the maximum period of detention.
Section 107 (1) of CrPC is used to deter any person likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity and the Magistrate is of opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding.

Q. Mr. Bond is a vocal critic of the incumbent Government. Fed up of the corruption, he writes a book outlining the shortcomings of the ruling dispensation. However, Mr. Bond is arrested fearing that his book would disturb the public tranquillity. Can the Government do that? 

Mala fide means:

Principle:
1. The State is liable for the acts of its employees. When the act is of private nature, in the same manner and under the same condition as any other employer. The State is not liable when the act is in exercise of sovereign power or in performance of an Act of State.
2. Even if the sovereign functions of the State are discharged negligently, the State is not vicariously liable in tort.
Facts: A trader in gold was arrested and detained in police custody after search. The gold belonging to him and all other things were seized and kept in Malkhana. Later he was discharged. All his belonging was returned, except the gold. It was discovered that one of the constables fled away with the gold to Pakistan. He sued the State in tort.

Legal Principle: The acceptance of an agreement by both the parties must be absolute and unqualified in order to constitute a valid contract.
Facts of the Problem: Rahul proposes to sell Parul two quintals of kerosene at the cost of Rs. 40/litre. Parul did not convey her acceptance, but says that she would think about it. Unable to wait for Parul to accept the contract, Rahul sells the kerosene to someone else. Parul gets furious after learning about the sale of the kerosene to someone else by Rahul. Parul files a suit for damages against Rahul for the dishonouring of the contract?

Paragraph: The establishment of Islamic Courts (Darul Qaza) is for the application & implementation of Shariat Laws on the Muslim Ummah. Establishment and functioning of Imarat-e-Sharia in Bihar and Orissa is a glaring example of Darul Qaza. These courts are rendering great services to the masses in the aforesaid states particularly for Muslims. It is headed by Chief Qazi and there are about six courts of additional Qazi at the Headquarter and there are 34 Sub-Judicial Courts in different districts of Bihar.
These courts have been established to decide the disputes amongst the Muslims with regard to the Inheritance, marriage, divorce and waqf in particular and other property related matters in accordance with Shariat Laws, so that the Muslims could be saved from costly and time taking procedure of general Courts of Land. Disputes are solved amicably, only judgements are not delivered, rather efforts are made to arouse the feeling of brotherhood, oneness and mutual love and affection between the parties in dispute. Fairness and transparent judicial pronouncement of these Islamic Courts have succeeded in attracting faith and confidence of majority of Muslims belonging to the state of Bihar and Orissa in particular and of other parts of India in general. The people believed in unbiased justice delivered by the Chief Qazi who perform the role of Judge. All India Muslim Personal Law Board has also established Darul Qaza in different parts of India. They are in Thane (Maharashtra), Akola Dholiya (Rajasthan), Indore (Madhya Pradesh), South & East Delhi, Asansol & Purulia (West Bengal), Lucknow & Sitapur (Uttar Pradesh).
The question of utmost importance before the Muslim Community is whether the Courts in India will accept the decisions given by Darul Qaza or will they pay any attention to the decisions given by the aforesaid institution? If the decisions given by this Institution are not accepted by the Courts it will lose its face value. It will be a futile exercise. Generally, in India the Courts do not recognize the existence of Shariat Court.
In 2005 the Supreme Court admitted a Public Interest Litigation petition to examine the legality of the Islamic Shariah Court in the country allegedly posing challenge to the Indian Legal System. However, the Government of India in its affidavit had said that Fatwa's issued by Muslim Clerics are simply the opinions and cannot be imposed or enforced on anyone. The Court said Darul Qaza and Nizam-e-Qaza are not parallel judicial system and did not prevent Muslims from setting up their case under the law of land.

Q. “People from religions, other than Muslims, can also approach Darul Qaza.” Determine the veracity of this statement.

Paragraph: The establishment of Islamic Courts (Darul Qaza) is for the application & implementation of Shariat Laws on the Muslim Ummah. Establishment and functioning of Imarat-e-Sharia in Bihar and Orissa is a glaring example of Darul Qaza. These courts are rendering great services to the masses in the aforesaid states particularly for Muslims. It is headed by Chief Qazi and there are about six courts of additional Qazi at the Headquarter and there are 34 Sub-Judicial Courts in different districts of Bihar.
These courts have been established to decide the disputes amongst the Muslims with regard to the Inheritance, marriage, divorce and waqf in particular and other property related matters in accordance with Shariat Laws, so that the Muslims could be saved from costly and time taking procedure of general Courts of Land. Disputes are solved amicably, only judgements are not delivered, rather efforts are made to arouse the feeling of brotherhood, oneness and mutual love and affection between the parties in dispute. Fairness and transparent judicial pronouncement of these Islamic Courts have succeeded in attracting faith and confidence of majority of Muslims belonging to the state of Bihar and Orissa in particular and of other parts of India in general. The people believed in unbiased justice delivered by the Chief Qazi who perform the role of Judge. All India Muslim Personal Law Board has also established Darul Qaza in different parts of India. They are in Thane (Maharashtra), Akola Dholiya (Rajasthan), Indore (Madhya Pradesh), South & East Delhi, Asansol & Purulia (West Bengal), Lucknow & Sitapur (Uttar Pradesh).
The question of utmost importance before the Muslim Community is whether the Courts in India will accept the decisions given by Darul Qaza or will they pay any attention to the decisions given by the aforesaid institution? If the decisions given by this Institution are not accepted by the Courts it will lose its face value. It will be a futile exercise. Generally, in India the Courts do not recognize the existence of Shariat Court.
In 2005 the Supreme Court admitted a Public Interest Litigation petition to examine the legality of the Islamic Shariah Court in the country allegedly posing challenge to the Indian Legal System. However, the Government of India in its affidavit had said that Fatwa's issued by Muslim Clerics are simply the opinions and cannot be imposed or enforced on anyone. The Court said Darul Qaza and Nizam-e-Qaza are not parallel judicial system and did not prevent Muslims from setting up their case under the law of land.

Q. A and B were brothers. They had a dispute regarding their ancestral property. While the matter was being heard in a Darul Qaza, A killed B in one heated argument. The Darul Qaza ordered A to leave the village forever for murdering B. Decide.

Paragraph: The establishment of Islamic Courts (Darul Qaza) is for the application & implementation of Shariat Laws on the Muslim Ummah. Establishment and functioning of Imarat-e-Sharia in Bihar and Orissa is a glaring example of Darul Qaza. These courts are rendering great services to the masses in the aforesaid states particularly for Muslims. It is headed by Chief Qazi and there are about six courts of additional Qazi at the Headquarter and there are 34 Sub-Judicial Courts in different districts of Bihar.
These courts have been established to decide the disputes amongst the Muslims with regard to the Inheritance, marriage, divorce and waqf in particular and other property related matters in accordance with Shariat Laws, so that the Muslims could be saved from costly and time taking procedure of general Courts of Land. Disputes are solved amicably, only judgements are not delivered, rather efforts are made to arouse the feeling of brotherhood, oneness and mutual love and affection between the parties in dispute. Fairness and transparent judicial pronouncement of these Islamic Courts have succeeded in attracting faith and confidence of majority of Muslims belonging to the state of Bihar and Orissa in particular and of other parts of India in general. The people believed in unbiased justice delivered by the Chief Qazi who perform the role of Judge. All India Muslim Personal Law Board has also established Darul Qaza in different parts of India. They are in Thane (Maharashtra), Akola Dholiya (Rajasthan), Indore (Madhya Pradesh), South & East Delhi, Asansol & Purulia (West Bengal), Lucknow & Sitapur (Uttar Pradesh).
The question of utmost importance before the Muslim Community is whether the Courts in India will accept the decisions given by Darul Qaza or will they pay any attention to the decisions given by the aforesaid institution? If the decisions given by this Institution are not accepted by the Courts it will lose its face value. It will be a futile exercise. Generally, in India the Courts do not recognize the existence of Shariat Court.
In 2005 the Supreme Court admitted a Public Interest Litigation petition to examine the legality of the Islamic Shariah Court in the country allegedly posing challenge to the Indian Legal System. However, the Government of India in its affidavit had said that Fatwa's issued by Muslim Clerics are simply the opinions and cannot be imposed or enforced on anyone. The Court said Darul Qaza and Nizam-e-Qaza are not parallel judicial system and did not prevent Muslims from setting up their case under the law of land.

Q. What according to the author is the reason of popularity for the Islamic Courts?

Paragraph: The establishment of Islamic Courts (Darul Qaza) is for the application & implementation of Shariat Laws on the Muslim Ummah. Establishment and functioning of Imarat-e-Sharia in Bihar and Orissa is a glaring example of Darul Qaza. These courts are rendering great services to the masses in the aforesaid states particularly for Muslims. It is headed by Chief Qazi and there are about six courts of additional Qazi at the Headquarter and there are 34 Sub-Judicial Courts in different districts of Bihar.
These courts have been established to decide the disputes amongst the Muslims with regard to the Inheritance, marriage, divorce and waqf in particular and other property related matters in accordance with Shariat Laws, so that the Muslims could be saved from costly and time taking procedure of general Courts of Land. Disputes are solved amicably, only judgements are not delivered, rather efforts are made to arouse the feeling of brotherhood, oneness and mutual love and affection between the parties in dispute. Fairness and transparent judicial pronouncement of these Islamic Courts have succeeded in attracting faith and confidence of majority of Muslims belonging to the state of Bihar and Orissa in particular and of other parts of India in general. The people believed in unbiased justice delivered by the Chief Qazi who perform the role of Judge. All India Muslim Personal Law Board has also established Darul Qaza in different parts of India. They are in Thane (Maharashtra), Akola Dholiya (Rajasthan), Indore (Madhya Pradesh), South & East Delhi, Asansol & Purulia (West Bengal), Lucknow & Sitapur (Uttar Pradesh).
The question of utmost importance before the Muslim Community is whether the Courts in India will accept the decisions given by Darul Qaza or will they pay any attention to the decisions given by the aforesaid institution? If the decisions given by this Institution are not accepted by the Courts it will lose its face value. It will be a futile exercise. Generally, in India the Courts do not recognize the existence of Shariat Court.
In 2005 the Supreme Court admitted a Public Interest Litigation petition to examine the legality of the Islamic Shariah Court in the country allegedly posing challenge to the Indian Legal System. However, the Government of India in its affidavit had said that Fatwa's issued by Muslim Clerics are simply the opinions and cannot be imposed or enforced on anyone. The Court said Darul Qaza and Nizam-e-Qaza are not parallel judicial system and did not prevent Muslims from setting up their case under the law of land.

Q. The decision of Darul Qaza is not binding on Indian Courts but these court are still functioning. Why?

Paragraph: The establishment of Islamic Courts (Darul Qaza) is for the application & implementation of Shariat Laws on the Muslim Ummah. Establishment and functioning of Imarat-e-Sharia in Bihar and Orissa is a glaring example of Darul Qaza. These courts are rendering great services to the masses in the aforesaid states particularly for Muslims. It is headed by Chief Qazi and there are about six courts of additional Qazi at the Headquarter and there are 34 Sub-Judicial Courts in different districts of Bihar.
These courts have been established to decide the disputes amongst the Muslims with regard to the Inheritance, marriage, divorce and waqf in particular and other property related matters in accordance with Shariat Laws, so that the Muslims could be saved from costly and time taking procedure of general Courts of Land. Disputes are solved amicably, only judgements are not delivered, rather efforts are made to arouse the feeling of brotherhood, oneness and mutual love and affection between the parties in dispute. Fairness and transparent judicial pronouncement of these Islamic Courts have succeeded in attracting faith and confidence of majority of Muslims belonging to the state of Bihar and Orissa in particular and of other parts of India in general. The people believed in unbiased justice delivered by the Chief Qazi who perform the role of Judge. All India Muslim Personal Law Board has also established Darul Qaza in different parts of India. They are in Thane (Maharashtra), Akola Dholiya (Rajasthan), Indore (Madhya Pradesh), South & East Delhi, Asansol & Purulia (West Bengal), Lucknow & Sitapur (Uttar Pradesh).
The question of utmost importance before the Muslim Community is whether the Courts in India will accept the decisions given by Darul Qaza or will they pay any attention to the decisions given by the aforesaid institution? If the decisions given by this Institution are not accepted by the Courts it will lose its face value. It will be a futile exercise. Generally, in India the Courts do not recognize the existence of Shariat Court.
In 2005 the Supreme Court admitted a Public Interest Litigation petition to examine the legality of the Islamic Shariah Court in the country allegedly posing challenge to the Indian Legal System. However, the Government of India in its affidavit had said that Fatwa's issued by Muslim Clerics are simply the opinions and cannot be imposed or enforced on anyone. The Court said Darul Qaza and Nizam-e-Qaza are not parallel judicial system and did not prevent Muslims from setting up their case under the law of land.

Q. In a dispute between Shah Rukh and Amir, an Islamic court has asked both the parties to divide the property equally as a part of settlement and has asked Amir to pay a compensation of 50,000 rupees as punishment for the mental harassment caused to Shah Rukh. Amir has approached court against this decision.

Principle: Acceptance (of offer) must be communicated by the offeree to the offeror so as to give rise to a binding obligation. The expression ‘by the offeree to the offeror’ includes communication between their authorized agents.
Facts: `Rohan’ made an offer to buy ram’s property for a stipulated price. `Ram’ accepted it and communicated his acceptance to `soham’, a stranger.

Q. Which of the following derivations is CORRECT?