Legal Mock Test - 17 - CLAT MCQ

Passage: Chief Justice JS Khehar has expressed concern over the media trial of suspects in any case and hinted that the Supreme Court would draw the line on how much policemen can tell the media during the pre-trial, investigation stage as reportage sometimes undermines free and fair trial.
The proposed guidelines, in line with an existing central government advisory, will decide whether policemen can parade the accused before cameras, whether their identities can be revealed, etc.
A bench, comprising CJI Khehar and Justice NV Ramana, agreed with a suggestion by amicus curiae Gopal Shankarnarayan that there be some norms on police briefings for the media. “Reputation of a person is very important. People may be arrested… If they are shown on electronic media, their reputation is smeared forever, even though they may be acquitted later,” CJI Khehar observed. The court was dealing with a host of petitions calling for guidelines for the police or investigating agencies briefing the media about any ongoing investigation. The petitions have been pending since 1999.
In another case, a Constitution bench had already ruled that if any accused faces a smear campaign during trial which may prejudice his case, he would be free to approach the trial court to postpone the reporting of an order. Activist lawyer Prashant Bhushan argued that releasing the names of suspects even before the FIR was filed in some cases in press statements results in pre-judging a case. Often the reputation of totally innocent people are smeared beyond repair. “This not only causes serious harm to the reputation of the person but also affects the trial,” he said.
The CJI directed the central government and all interested parties such as state governments, the Press Council of India, NHRC etc to submit their views through a questionnaire prepared by the amicus curiae which would decide whether an accused can be paraded before the media, whether his identity can be revealed or the evidence against him played out live on TV, etc.
The court will base its orders on the responses of all stakeholders and revise the existing central government advisory to investigative agencies on the dos and don’ts of media briefings by police.
This would decide how much they can reveal to the press without compromising the possibility of upsetting the fundamental premise of our criminal justice system –– that a person is innocent until proven guilty.

Q. The above passage indicates that media trial directly harms

Passage: Chief Justice JS Khehar has expressed concern over the media trial of suspects in any case and hinted that the Supreme Court would draw the line on how much policemen can tell the media during the pre-trial, investigation stage as reportage sometimes undermines free and fair trial.
The proposed guidelines, in line with an existing central government advisory, will decide whether policemen can parade the accused before cameras, whether their identities can be revealed, etc.
A bench, comprising CJI Khehar and Justice NV Ramana, agreed with a suggestion by amicus curiae Gopal Shankarnarayan that there be some norms on police briefings for the media. “Reputation of a person is very important. People may be arrested… If they are shown on electronic media, their reputation is smeared forever, even though they may be acquitted later,” CJI Khehar observed. The court was dealing with a host of petitions calling for guidelines for the police or investigating agencies briefing the media about any ongoing investigation. The petitions have been pending since 1999.
In another case, a Constitution bench had already ruled that if any accused faces a smear campaign during trial which may prejudice his case, he would be free to approach the trial court to postpone the reporting of an order. Activist lawyer Prashant Bhushan argued that releasing the names of suspects even before the FIR was filed in some cases in press statements results in pre-judging a case. Often the reputation of totally innocent people are smeared beyond repair. “This not only causes serious harm to the reputation of the person but also affects the trial,” he said.
The CJI directed the central government and all interested parties such as state governments, the Press Council of India, NHRC etc to submit their views through a questionnaire prepared by the amicus curiae which would decide whether an accused can be paraded before the media, whether his identity can be revealed or the evidence against him played out live on TV, etc.
The court will base its orders on the responses of all stakeholders and revise the existing central government advisory to investigative agencies on the dos and don’ts of media briefings by police.
This would decide how much they can reveal to the press without compromising the possibility of upsetting the fundamental premise of our criminal justice system –– that a person is innocent until proven guilty.

Q. For framing guidelines regulating media trial, Supreme Court adopted the process of

Passage: Chief Justice JS Khehar has expressed concern over the media trial of suspects in any case and hinted that the Supreme Court would draw the line on how much policemen can tell the media during the pre-trial, investigation stage as reportage sometimes undermines free and fair trial.
The proposed guidelines, in line with an existing central government advisory, will decide whether policemen can parade the accused before cameras, whether their identities can be revealed, etc.
A bench, comprising CJI Khehar and Justice NV Ramana, agreed with a suggestion by amicus curiae Gopal Shankarnarayan that there be some norms on police briefings for the media. “Reputation of a person is very important. People may be arrested… If they are shown on electronic media, their reputation is smeared forever, even though they may be acquitted later,” CJI Khehar observed. The court was dealing with a host of petitions calling for guidelines for the police or investigating agencies briefing the media about any ongoing investigation. The petitions have been pending since 1999.
In another case, a Constitution bench had already ruled that if any accused faces a smear campaign during trial which may prejudice his case, he would be free to approach the trial court to postpone the reporting of an order. Activist lawyer Prashant Bhushan argued that releasing the names of suspects even before the FIR was filed in some cases in press statements results in pre-judging a case. Often the reputation of totally innocent people are smeared beyond repair. “This not only causes serious harm to the reputation of the person but also affects the trial,” he said.
The CJI directed the central government and all interested parties such as state governments, the Press Council of India, NHRC etc to submit their views through a questionnaire prepared by the amicus curiae which would decide whether an accused can be paraded before the media, whether his identity can be revealed or the evidence against him played out live on TV, etc.
The court will base its orders on the responses of all stakeholders and revise the existing central government advisory to investigative agencies on the dos and don’ts of media briefings by police.
This would decide how much they can reveal to the press without compromising the possibility of upsetting the fundamental premise of our criminal justice system –– that a person is innocent until proven guilty.

Q. The above passage indicates that the role of "amicus curiae" is to

Principle: Mere silence as to the facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not a fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are such that, on close examination it is found to be the duty of the person keeping silent to speak, or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent to speech.
Facts: X sells by auction to Y, a horse which X knows to be of unsound state of mind. X says nothing to Y about the horse’s unsound state of mind. Give the correct answer.

Principles 1: Any person who interferes with the discharge of duties by a public servant is liable for punishment.
Principles 2: Nothing is an offence if the person who committed it was winnable to appreciate the consequences of his act, due to intoxication, provided such intoxication was administered against his will and without his consent.
Facts: Krishna got drunk of his own volition and on his way back home he assaulted a policeman. He is prosecuted for intimidating a public servant.

Q. Is Mr. Krishna liable for punishment"?

Principle: Every person has a right to defend his own person, property or possession against an immediate harm, and to that end, may use reasonable amount of force.
Facts: Mr. Kaul was passing by Mrs. Mattoo's house. At that time, Mrs. Mattoo's dog ran out and bit Mr. Kaul's overcoat. Mr. Kaul turned around and raised the pistol he was carrying in the pocket of his overcoat. The dog ran away, and Mr. Kaul shot the dog as it was running away. Mr. Kaul knew that the dog had attacked so many other people in that locality of Jammu. Mrs. Mattoo claims that her dog was of a rare breed and it was worth Rs. 5000/-. She is planning to bring a legal action against Mr. Kaul for compensation.

Agni enters into a contract with Tanuj whereby Tanuj will supply Agni with 10 grams of cocaine for a specified amount. Is the contract void?
Principle: If the consideration or object o f an agreement is forbidden by law, or is of such a nature that would defeat the provisions of any law, or is fraudulent, or is injurious to the person or property of another or, the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy, then the object or consideration shall be deemed unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void.

Which of the following is the oldest High Court in India?

Principle: Law does not take notice of trifles.
Facts: A proposes to his neighbor B that they both should go together for a morning walk. B agrees to the proposal and it is decided that both of them would meet at a particular point 6 A.M. from where they would set off for the morning walk. In spite of the agreement, B does not turn up. A waited for him at 6 a.m. every day, for a continuous period of seven days. Thereafter he files a suit against B claiming damages for the agony and mental torture suffered by him. Decide.

Legal Principle: An agreement, the meaning of which is not certain, or capable of being made certain, is void.
Factual Situation: Mohan offered to sell land to Nimrat at 80 lakhs. Nimrat replied accepting the offer and enclosing 30 lakhs and promising to pay the balance amount by monthly installments of 50000 each. Since Nimrat accepted the offer subject to making full payments in installments, decide as a judge whether there is a valid contract?

What is the reasonable time to perform a Contract is _________.

Indian Constitution is a 
A) Written
B) Unwritten    
C) Flexible
D) Rigid
Chose the correct answer:

Passage: Unlike the US, free speech in India is not absolute. Our Constitution, while guaranteeing the freedom of speech and expression, places “reasonable restrictions” on this basic human right.
Journalists are often targeted by state authorities for their comments on social media. In September, last year, a Delhi-based journalist was arrested for his tweets on sculptures at the Sun Temple in Konark, Odisha, and another journalist from Manipur was booked under the stringent National Security Act, 1980, and jailed for uploading a video on the internet in which he made remarks deemed to be “derogatory” towards the Chief Minister of the State.
In December, the Union Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, the nodal ministry for regulating matters on information technology and the internet, released a draft amendment to guidelines under the Information Technology Act, which prescribe certain conditions for content hosting platforms to seek protection for third party content.
The amendment, which was brought along to tackle the menace of “fake news” and reduce the flow of obscene and illegal content on social media, seeks to mandate the use of “automated filters” for content takedowns on internet platforms and requires them to trace the originator of that information on their services (this traceability requirement is believed to be targeted at messaging apps like WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram).
Apart from state authorities, content sharing and social media companies take down content in tandem with their community standards and terms and conditions. This is often arbitrary and inconsistent.
We believe that the draft amendment to the rules that regulate platform liability undermines free speech and privacy rights of Indians in the online world, while promoting private censorship by companies.
Having said that, acknowledging the problems of circulation of illegal content, legitimate access to law enforcement and disinformation on the internet, the law should mandate governance structures and grievance mechanisms on the part of intermediaries, enabling quick takedown of content determined as illegal by the judiciary or appropriate government agencies.
The “filter bubble” effect, where users are shown similar content, results in readers not being exposed to opposing views, due to which they become easy targets of disinformation.
Tech-companies must re-think their internal policies to ensure that self-initiated content takedowns are not arbitrary and users have a right to voice their concerns.
Government agencies should work with internet platforms to educate users in identifying disinformation to check its spread.
Lastly, the government should adhere to constitutionally mandated principles and conduct multi-stakeholder consultations before drafting internet policy to safeguard the varying interests of interested parties.

Q. Which of the following views can be correctly attributed to author of the passage.

Passage: Unlike the US, free speech in India is not absolute. Our Constitution, while guaranteeing the freedom of speech and expression, places “reasonable restrictions” on this basic human right.
Journalists are often targeted by state authorities for their comments on social media. In September, last year, a Delhi-based journalist was arrested for his tweets on sculptures at the Sun Temple in Konark, Odisha, and another journalist from Manipur was booked under the stringent National Security Act, 1980, and jailed for uploading a video on the internet in which he made remarks deemed to be “derogatory” towards the Chief Minister of the State.
In December, the Union Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, the nodal ministry for regulating matters on information technology and the internet, released a draft amendment to guidelines under the Information Technology Act, which prescribe certain conditions for content hosting platforms to seek protection for third party content.
The amendment, which was brought along to tackle the menace of “fake news” and reduce the flow of obscene and illegal content on social media, seeks to mandate the use of “automated filters” for content takedowns on internet platforms and requires them to trace the originator of that information on their services (this traceability requirement is believed to be targeted at messaging apps like WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram).
Apart from state authorities, content sharing and social media companies take down content in tandem with their community standards and terms and conditions. This is often arbitrary and inconsistent.
We believe that the draft amendment to the rules that regulate platform liability undermines free speech and privacy rights of Indians in the online world, while promoting private censorship by companies.
Having said that, acknowledging the problems of circulation of illegal content, legitimate access to law enforcement and disinformation on the internet, the law should mandate governance structures and grievance mechanisms on the part of intermediaries, enabling quick takedown of content determined as illegal by the judiciary or appropriate government agencies.
The “filter bubble” effect, where users are shown similar content, results in readers not being exposed to opposing views, due to which they become easy targets of disinformation.
Tech-companies must re-think their internal policies to ensure that self-initiated content takedowns are not arbitrary and users have a right to voice their concerns.
Government agencies should work with internet platforms to educate users in identifying disinformation to check its spread.
Lastly, the government should adhere to constitutionally mandated principles and conduct multi-stakeholder consultations before drafting internet policy to safeguard the varying interests of interested parties.

Q. If a social website, say Twitter, uses automated filter to take down personal details, posted by a celebrity, of people who sent her rape threats and obscene pictures, in order to expose them but does not take down the obscene content directed at the celebrity, would such action be in line with the amendment discussed by the author.

Passage: Unlike the US, free speech in India is not absolute. Our Constitution, while guaranteeing the freedom of speech and expression, places “reasonable restrictions” on this basic human right.
Journalists are often targeted by state authorities for their comments on social media. In September, last year, a Delhi-based journalist was arrested for his tweets on sculptures at the Sun Temple in Konark, Odisha, and another journalist from Manipur was booked under the stringent National Security Act, 1980, and jailed for uploading a video on the internet in which he made remarks deemed to be “derogatory” towards the Chief Minister of the State.
In December, the Union Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, the nodal ministry for regulating matters on information technology and the internet, released a draft amendment to guidelines under the Information Technology Act, which prescribe certain conditions for content hosting platforms to seek protection for third party content.
The amendment, which was brought along to tackle the menace of “fake news” and reduce the flow of obscene and illegal content on social media, seeks to mandate the use of “automated filters” for content takedowns on internet platforms and requires them to trace the originator of that information on their services (this traceability requirement is believed to be targeted at messaging apps like WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram).
Apart from state authorities, content sharing and social media companies take down content in tandem with their community standards and terms and conditions. This is often arbitrary and inconsistent.
We believe that the draft amendment to the rules that regulate platform liability undermines free speech and privacy rights of Indians in the online world, while promoting private censorship by companies.
Having said that, acknowledging the problems of circulation of illegal content, legitimate access to law enforcement and disinformation on the internet, the law should mandate governance structures and grievance mechanisms on the part of intermediaries, enabling quick takedown of content determined as illegal by the judiciary or appropriate government agencies.
The “filter bubble” effect, where users are shown similar content, results in readers not being exposed to opposing views, due to which they become easy targets of disinformation.
Tech-companies must re-think their internal policies to ensure that self-initiated content takedowns are not arbitrary and users have a right to voice their concerns.
Government agencies should work with internet platforms to educate users in identifying disinformation to check its spread.
Lastly, the government should adhere to constitutionally mandated principles and conduct multi-stakeholder consultations before drafting internet policy to safeguard the varying interests of interested parties.

Q. According to the author, which of the following methods ensures better efficacy of new laws proposed to be enacted in India.

Passage: Unlike the US, free speech in India is not absolute. Our Constitution, while guaranteeing the freedom of speech and expression, places “reasonable restrictions” on this basic human right.
Journalists are often targeted by state authorities for their comments on social media. In September, last year, a Delhi-based journalist was arrested for his tweets on sculptures at the Sun Temple in Konark, Odisha, and another journalist from Manipur was booked under the stringent National Security Act, 1980, and jailed for uploading a video on the internet in which he made remarks deemed to be “derogatory” towards the Chief Minister of the State.
In December, the Union Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, the nodal ministry for regulating matters on information technology and the internet, released a draft amendment to guidelines under the Information Technology Act, which prescribe certain conditions for content hosting platforms to seek protection for third party content.
The amendment, which was brought along to tackle the menace of “fake news” and reduce the flow of obscene and illegal content on social media, seeks to mandate the use of “automated filters” for content takedowns on internet platforms and requires them to trace the originator of that information on their services (this traceability requirement is believed to be targeted at messaging apps like WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram).
Apart from state authorities, content sharing and social media companies take down content in tandem with their community standards and terms and conditions. This is often arbitrary and inconsistent.
We believe that the draft amendment to the rules that regulate platform liability undermines free speech and privacy rights of Indians in the online world, while promoting private censorship by companies.
Having said that, acknowledging the problems of circulation of illegal content, legitimate access to law enforcement and disinformation on the internet, the law should mandate governance structures and grievance mechanisms on the part of intermediaries, enabling quick takedown of content determined as illegal by the judiciary or appropriate government agencies.
The “filter bubble” effect, where users are shown similar content, results in readers not being exposed to opposing views, due to which they become easy targets of disinformation.
Tech-companies must re-think their internal policies to ensure that self-initiated content takedowns are not arbitrary and users have a right to voice their concerns.
Government agencies should work with internet platforms to educate users in identifying disinformation to check its spread.
Lastly, the government should adhere to constitutionally mandated principles and conduct multi-stakeholder consultations before drafting internet policy to safeguard the varying interests of interested parties.

Q. Judicial review is the process wherein validity of laws can be tested by the judiciary. Which of the following options is correct?

In law, the term ‘neighbour’ means

Principle: Any direct physical interference with goods in somebody’s possession without lawful justification is called trespass of goods.
Facts: Z purchased a car from a person who had no title to it and sent it to a garage for repair. X believing wrongly that the car was his, removed it from the garage.

Tanvi and Ashrita were residents of Jahnvi Devi Society. Ashrita has been into the habit of practicing Nitinnatyam before sunrise each morning since the past 25 years. She plays loud dance beats in her music system each morning to help her practice. The loud noise emanating from her music system disturbs Tanvi who is woken up each morning due to the sound. After putting up with this for 25 years, Tanvi finally decides she can take it no more and decides to sue Ashrita for nuisance.
Principle: Whoever causes unreasonable interference to the right of another over his property and space is causing nuisance.

Passage: The hurriedly enacted Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, invalidates, as well as criminalises, instant triple talaq (ITT) with a sentence up to three years of jail for Muslim men found guilty. ITT is prevalent among one sub-sect (maslak) of Sunnis, a majority among India’s Muslims.
Ever since the Jawaharlal Nehru led government legislated the Hindu Marriage Act 1956, a section of society has been harbouring a grievance regarding why Muslims were ‘spared’ from as similar reform.
In 1986, when the Rajiv Gandhi led administration overturned the Supreme Court verdict in favour of Shah Bano through a legislation, snatching away her right to maintenance, this grievance was reinforced.
This overturning of the verdict was conducted under pressure from the Muslim clergy, who fanned social conservatism in the worst possible ways, taking recourse to street mobilisations. Notably, this grievance was not limited to the Hindu Right.
Former All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) president, Ali MiyanNadvi, ‘confesses’ in his 1988 memoir, Karwan-e-Zindagi (Procession of Life), how he misled Rajiv Gandhi and made the prime minister upturn the apex court verdict through a retrogressive legislation.
Shah Bano, married in 1932 and separated from her husband in 1975, was the 62-year-old wife of a well-off advocate in Indore when she approached the court in April 1978 for maintenance. An instant triple talaq was uttered against her inside the Indore court only after the judge, in course of the plea, said that under Muslim Personal Law, she was entitled to maintenance.
This historical fact is pertinent for many reasons, including for being at the core of the notion of maintenance of a divorced Muslim woman in India.
The tragedy with Tuesday’s legislation is that it does not say a word on maintenance. Muslim women remain as potentially hapless and helpless as Shah Bano — as are so many women abandoned by their husbands in other communities, including Hindu.
Sadly, even the citadels of modern education such as Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) and Jamia Millia Islamia (JMI) have also miserably failed in reaching out to the Muslim masses and freeing them from the clutches of religious reactionaries. But enough of modern, educated, middle-class Muslims have emerged, even from earlier marginalised sections of the ommunity. They shall have to play their roles in bringing about reforms. The new anti-ITT law, too, shall have to be amended — as soon as better sense prevails on enough legislators. 

Q. From the above passage, which of the following conclusions can be inferred?

Passage: The hurriedly enacted Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, invalidates, as well as criminalises, instant triple talaq (ITT) with a sentence up to three years of jail for Muslim men found guilty. ITT is prevalent among one sub-sect (maslak) of Sunnis, a majority among India’s Muslims.
Ever since the Jawaharlal Nehru led government legislated the Hindu Marriage Act 1956, a section of society has been harbouring a grievance regarding why Muslims were ‘spared’ from as similar reform.
In 1986, when the Rajiv Gandhi led administration overturned the Supreme Court verdict in favour of Shah Bano through a legislation, snatching away her right to maintenance, this grievance was reinforced.
This overturning of the verdict was conducted under pressure from the Muslim clergy, who fanned social conservatism in the worst possible ways, taking recourse to street mobilisations. Notably, this grievance was not limited to the Hindu Right.
Former All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) president, Ali MiyanNadvi, ‘confesses’ in his 1988 memoir, Karwan-e-Zindagi (Procession of Life), how he misled Rajiv Gandhi and made the prime minister upturn the apex court verdict through a retrogressive legislation.
Shah Bano, married in 1932 and separated from her husband in 1975, was the 62-year-old wife of a well-off advocate in Indore when she approached the court in April 1978 for maintenance. An instant triple talaq was uttered against her inside the Indore court only after the judge, in course of the plea, said that under Muslim Personal Law, she was entitled to maintenance.
This historical fact is pertinent for many reasons, including for being at the core of the notion of maintenance of a divorced Muslim woman in India.
The tragedy with Tuesday’s legislation is that it does not say a word on maintenance. Muslim women remain as potentially hapless and helpless as Shah Bano — as are so many women abandoned by their husbands in other communities, including Hindu.
Sadly, even the citadels of modern education such as Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) and Jamia Millia Islamia (JMI) have also miserably failed in reaching out to the Muslim masses and freeing them from the clutches of religious reactionaries. But enough of modern, educated, middle-class Muslims have emerged, even from earlier marginalised sections of the ommunity. They shall have to play their roles in bringing about reforms. The new anti-ITT law, too, shall have to be amended — as soon as better sense prevails on enough legislators. 

Q. In the Shah Bano case, husband of Shah Bano -

Passage: The hurriedly enacted Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, invalidates, as well as criminalises, instant triple talaq (ITT) with a sentence up to three years of jail for Muslim men found guilty. ITT is prevalent among one sub-sect (maslak) of Sunnis, a majority among India’s Muslims.
Ever since the Jawaharlal Nehru led government legislated the Hindu Marriage Act 1956, a section of society has been harbouring a grievance regarding why Muslims were ‘spared’ from as similar reform.
In 1986, when the Rajiv Gandhi led administration overturned the Supreme Court verdict in favour of Shah Bano through a legislation, snatching away her right to maintenance, this grievance was reinforced.
This overturning of the verdict was conducted under pressure from the Muslim clergy, who fanned social conservatism in the worst possible ways, taking recourse to street mobilisations. Notably, this grievance was not limited to the Hindu Right.
Former All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) president, Ali MiyanNadvi, ‘confesses’ in his 1988 memoir, Karwan-e-Zindagi (Procession of Life), how he misled Rajiv Gandhi and made the prime minister upturn the apex court verdict through a retrogressive legislation.
Shah Bano, married in 1932 and separated from her husband in 1975, was the 62-year-old wife of a well-off advocate in Indore when she approached the court in April 1978 for maintenance. An instant triple talaq was uttered against her inside the Indore court only after the judge, in course of the plea, said that under Muslim Personal Law, she was entitled to maintenance.
This historical fact is pertinent for many reasons, including for being at the core of the notion of maintenance of a divorced Muslim woman in India.
The tragedy with Tuesday’s legislation is that it does not say a word on maintenance. Muslim women remain as potentially hapless and helpless as Shah Bano — as are so many women abandoned by their husbands in other communities, including Hindu.
Sadly, even the citadels of modern education such as Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) and Jamia Millia Islamia (JMI) have also miserably failed in reaching out to the Muslim masses and freeing them from the clutches of religious reactionaries. But enough of modern, educated, middle-class Muslims have emerged, even from earlier marginalised sections of the ommunity. They shall have to play their roles in bringing about reforms. The new anti-ITT law, too, shall have to be amended — as soon as better sense prevails on enough legislators. 

Q. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 is a Central Act which can be amended only by Indian Parliament. In this context, the phrase "enough legislators" used by the author means

Passage: The hurriedly enacted Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, invalidates, as well as criminalises, instant triple talaq (ITT) with a sentence up to three years of jail for Muslim men found guilty. ITT is prevalent among one sub-sect (maslak) of Sunnis, a majority among India’s Muslims.
Ever since the Jawaharlal Nehru led government legislated the Hindu Marriage Act 1956, a section of society has been harbouring a grievance regarding why Muslims were ‘spared’ from as similar reform.
In 1986, when the Rajiv Gandhi led administration overturned the Supreme Court verdict in favour of Shah Bano through a legislation, snatching away her right to maintenance, this grievance was reinforced.
This overturning of the verdict was conducted under pressure from the Muslim clergy, who fanned social conservatism in the worst possible ways, taking recourse to street mobilisations. Notably, this grievance was not limited to the Hindu Right.
Former All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) president, Ali MiyanNadvi, ‘confesses’ in his 1988 memoir, Karwan-e-Zindagi (Procession of Life), how he misled Rajiv Gandhi and made the prime minister upturn the apex court verdict through a retrogressive legislation.
Shah Bano, married in 1932 and separated from her husband in 1975, was the 62-year-old wife of a well-off advocate in Indore when she approached the court in April 1978 for maintenance. An instant triple talaq was uttered against her inside the Indore court only after the judge, in course of the plea, said that under Muslim Personal Law, she was entitled to maintenance.
This historical fact is pertinent for many reasons, including for being at the core of the notion of maintenance of a divorced Muslim woman in India.
The tragedy with Tuesday’s legislation is that it does not say a word on maintenance. Muslim women remain as potentially hapless and helpless as Shah Bano — as are so many women abandoned by their husbands in other communities, including Hindu.
Sadly, even the citadels of modern education such as Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) and Jamia Millia Islamia (JMI) have also miserably failed in reaching out to the Muslim masses and freeing them from the clutches of religious reactionaries. But enough of modern, educated, middle-class Muslims have emerged, even from earlier marginalised sections of the ommunity. They shall have to play their roles in bringing about reforms. The new anti-ITT law, too, shall have to be amended — as soon as better sense prevails on enough legislators. 

Q. The author's opinion is that

What is a lispendens?

A contract can be discharged _________.

Legal Principle: Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is bound by law to do it.
Facts: ‘A’, a police officer, without warrant, apprehends Rohan, who has committed murder and is running for cover.
Decide as a judge.

What is the meaning of the maxim “nemojudex in suacausa”?