Daily Analysis of 'The Hindu' - 29th June, 2020 | Additional Study Material for UPSC PDF Download

 Page 1


Making sense of China’s calculations
Brief reprieve
Letter and spirit
IN-SPACe
Kartarpur bridge
NEWS
Page 2


Making sense of China’s calculations
Brief reprieve
Letter and spirit
IN-SPACe
Kartarpur bridge
NEWS
Making sense of China’s calculations
?June 15, Galwan heights: a direct confrontation
lead to fatal casualties.
?Policy planners, both in Delhi and Beijing feared this
the most.
?Highest number of casualties since 1967.
?Chinese post in Galwan are getting bigger in size.
?New and fractious phase in China-India relations.
?From now on it will be “new and different normal”
?China’s reaction has been consistent — India must
move out of Galwan.
Page 3


Making sense of China’s calculations
Brief reprieve
Letter and spirit
IN-SPACe
Kartarpur bridge
NEWS
Making sense of China’s calculations
?June 15, Galwan heights: a direct confrontation
lead to fatal casualties.
?Policy planners, both in Delhi and Beijing feared this
the most.
?Highest number of casualties since 1967.
?Chinese post in Galwan are getting bigger in size.
?New and fractious phase in China-India relations.
?From now on it will be “new and different normal”
?China’s reaction has been consistent — India must
move out of Galwan.
?Today’s situation is different from Depsang
(2013), Chumar (2014) and Doklam (2017).
?Point 14 gives China a virtual stranglehold over
the newly completed, and strategically significant,
Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie Road, which leads
on to the Karakoram Pass.
?Ambiguity has existed regarding the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) in this sector.
?Chinese “claim line” is that of November 1959
?For India the LAC is that of September 1962
Page 4


Making sense of China’s calculations
Brief reprieve
Letter and spirit
IN-SPACe
Kartarpur bridge
NEWS
Making sense of China’s calculations
?June 15, Galwan heights: a direct confrontation
lead to fatal casualties.
?Policy planners, both in Delhi and Beijing feared this
the most.
?Highest number of casualties since 1967.
?Chinese post in Galwan are getting bigger in size.
?New and fractious phase in China-India relations.
?From now on it will be “new and different normal”
?China’s reaction has been consistent — India must
move out of Galwan.
?Today’s situation is different from Depsang
(2013), Chumar (2014) and Doklam (2017).
?Point 14 gives China a virtual stranglehold over
the newly completed, and strategically significant,
Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie Road, which leads
on to the Karakoram Pass.
?Ambiguity has existed regarding the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) in this sector.
?Chinese “claim line” is that of November 1959
?For India the LAC is that of September 1962
?China has consistently asserted its claims over the
whole of Aksai Chin and successive administrations
from our side have chosen to overlook China’s
more recent postures.
?Importance of Aksai Chin for China: it provides
direct connectivity between two of the most
troubled regions of China, viz., Xinjiang and
Tibet.
?Home Minister Amit Shah’s statement on Aksai
Chin.
?Questions are now being raised about the failure
of intelligence.
?Inadequate appreciation of what the build-up
meant
Page 5


Making sense of China’s calculations
Brief reprieve
Letter and spirit
IN-SPACe
Kartarpur bridge
NEWS
Making sense of China’s calculations
?June 15, Galwan heights: a direct confrontation
lead to fatal casualties.
?Policy planners, both in Delhi and Beijing feared this
the most.
?Highest number of casualties since 1967.
?Chinese post in Galwan are getting bigger in size.
?New and fractious phase in China-India relations.
?From now on it will be “new and different normal”
?China’s reaction has been consistent — India must
move out of Galwan.
?Today’s situation is different from Depsang
(2013), Chumar (2014) and Doklam (2017).
?Point 14 gives China a virtual stranglehold over
the newly completed, and strategically significant,
Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie Road, which leads
on to the Karakoram Pass.
?Ambiguity has existed regarding the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) in this sector.
?Chinese “claim line” is that of November 1959
?For India the LAC is that of September 1962
?China has consistently asserted its claims over the
whole of Aksai Chin and successive administrations
from our side have chosen to overlook China’s
more recent postures.
?Importance of Aksai Chin for China: it provides
direct connectivity between two of the most
troubled regions of China, viz., Xinjiang and
Tibet.
?Home Minister Amit Shah’s statement on Aksai
Chin.
?Questions are now being raised about the failure
of intelligence.
?Inadequate appreciation of what the build-up
meant
?Failure to decipher China’s intentions.
?Principal responsibility for intelligence
assessment and analysis
?National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS)
?Decision of the NSCS to dismantle the Joint Intelligence
Committee has contributed to a weakening of the
intelligence assessment system.
?R&AW: lack of domain expertise, and an inadequacy of
China specialists.
?India’s Summit diplomacy has tended to
marginalise the External Affairs Ministry with
regard to policy making, and we are probably
paying a price for it.