India - US Relations | International Relations for UPSC 2024 (Pre & Mains) PDF Download

 Page 1


India-US 
India was in abject poverty at the time of Independence — Comprehensive development was the principle 
concern. Nehru and his successors made periodic overtures to the United States seeking some sort of special 
relationship even as they pursued working, if not close, relationships with other powers, including 
Washington’s principle adversaries during the Cold War, Russia and China. Outreach to the US was intended 
to secure material bene?ts such as food aid and high technology, cementing a partnership pro?table to India 
but not leading to — their democratic similarities notwithstanding — any formal alliance. 
Meaning of Cooperation 
For US 
•
It helps preserve American primacy and the exercise thereof by cementing an af?liation that aids in the 
preservation of the balance of power in Asia 
•Enhances American competitiveness through deepened linkages with a growing Indian economy 
•
Strengthens the American vision of a concert of democratic states by incorporating a major non-
Western exemplar of successful democracy 
For India 
•
It helps India to expand its national power more easily than it might have done otherwise 
•It limits the dangers that might be posed by unrestrained Chinese power 
•
It helps to legitimise India’s entrance on the world stage if such occurs with American acquiescence and 
support 
Ingredients for Successful Cooperation 
1. Policy entrepreneurs with ‘big ideas’ 
2. Determined leadership at the highest level on both sides 
3. Committed ‘pile drivers’ within the bureaucracy capable of implementing their leaders’ intentions 
Struggle for Partnership 
Contrasts in worldview 
•
The nationalist yearning for political greatness without entrapment in the US-Soviet contest during the 
Cold War was the key driver of India’s national strategy. India wanted freedom to choose its policies on 
the fundamental questions pertaining to its national interest, ‘when the choice come to it’ had to be 
protected at all costs  
•
United States was not able to accommodate India’s desire for a new world order that accommodated a 
respect for indigenous nationalism, the primacy of economic development and the incarnation of non-
violence internationally  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
Page 2


India-US 
India was in abject poverty at the time of Independence — Comprehensive development was the principle 
concern. Nehru and his successors made periodic overtures to the United States seeking some sort of special 
relationship even as they pursued working, if not close, relationships with other powers, including 
Washington’s principle adversaries during the Cold War, Russia and China. Outreach to the US was intended 
to secure material bene?ts such as food aid and high technology, cementing a partnership pro?table to India 
but not leading to — their democratic similarities notwithstanding — any formal alliance. 
Meaning of Cooperation 
For US 
•
It helps preserve American primacy and the exercise thereof by cementing an af?liation that aids in the 
preservation of the balance of power in Asia 
•Enhances American competitiveness through deepened linkages with a growing Indian economy 
•
Strengthens the American vision of a concert of democratic states by incorporating a major non-
Western exemplar of successful democracy 
For India 
•
It helps India to expand its national power more easily than it might have done otherwise 
•It limits the dangers that might be posed by unrestrained Chinese power 
•
It helps to legitimise India’s entrance on the world stage if such occurs with American acquiescence and 
support 
Ingredients for Successful Cooperation 
1. Policy entrepreneurs with ‘big ideas’ 
2. Determined leadership at the highest level on both sides 
3. Committed ‘pile drivers’ within the bureaucracy capable of implementing their leaders’ intentions 
Struggle for Partnership 
Contrasts in worldview 
•
The nationalist yearning for political greatness without entrapment in the US-Soviet contest during the 
Cold War was the key driver of India’s national strategy. India wanted freedom to choose its policies on 
the fundamental questions pertaining to its national interest, ‘when the choice come to it’ had to be 
protected at all costs  
•
United States was not able to accommodate India’s desire for a new world order that accommodated a 
respect for indigenous nationalism, the primacy of economic development and the incarnation of non-
violence internationally  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
•It could also not entertain the Indian quest for what was in actuality an asymmetric association that 
would disproportionately favour India by providing it with various desired material resources in 
exchange for New Delhi’s freedom to pursue its own course 
Differences in national priorities 
The contrasts in worldview were quickly re?ected in the differences in national priorities. US’ global struggle 
to defend its security and safety of its allies and its hegemonic position, against a virulent Soviet upstart 
warranted a complete mobilisation of national power and a willingness to run all the risks associated with a 
hot war, even in its nuclear variant. It contributed toward generating military power and resuscitating allies 
and neutrals as part of the larger strategy of resisting the Soviet Union 
Indian leadership came to view the US not as a champion of the post-colonial states but rather as the ‘heir’ to 
British imperialism. Perception gained ground most deeply during the Eisenhower administration when 
secretary of state John Foster Dulles set about building America’s Cold War alliances during the early phase 
of containing the Soviet Union.  
India on the contrary was desperate for an international environment that would permit it to concentrate 
wholly on economic, political and social development, while receiving assistance from all the major states 
who, being at peace with each other and having as their objective the economic resuscitation of the Third 
World, would be able to aid New Delhi in reaching its developmental goals 
Asymmetries in power capability 
Thanks to its vast actualised power, the US was a producer of its own security, whereas India was largely a 
consumer of the security provided by others, including at different points either by the US or the Soviet 
Union or the externalities ensuing from bipolarity itself. Thus, for instance, while India was content to live 
with benign American power until the 1960s, in fact, gravitating towards an unlimited military partnership 
with Washington in the face of Chinese aggression in 1962, it just as purposefully swung towards the Soviet 
Union in 1971 when faced with the prospect of Sino-American rapprochement and an overbearing Pakistan 
supported by the United States. 
India’s capacity to build its national power rapidly during the Cold War was hampered by its own economic 
choices. One strategic decision that India made during this era which offered hope of becoming self-suf?cient 
in regards to its own security was developing nuclear weapons. The bilateral altercation over India’s nuclear 
weapons program cast a shadow on every other form of cooperation, including the ones India valued most of 
all, such as technology transfer 
The contrasts in worldview, the differences in national priorities, and the asymmetries in power capability interacted 
in unproductive ways throughout the Cold War to deny both countries the opportunities to build the close 
relationship they otherwise desired in principle. These structural causes, respectively, gave rise to three outcomes:  
1. a policy of non-alignment whose ability to protect Indian interests in extremis was questionable 
2. an addiction to state control as the solution to India’s development aims despite the low economic growth it 
brought in trail 
3. a hesitant embrace of nuclear weaponry that provoked international opposition without fundamentally 
remedying India’s weaknesses in power capability 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
Page 3


India-US 
India was in abject poverty at the time of Independence — Comprehensive development was the principle 
concern. Nehru and his successors made periodic overtures to the United States seeking some sort of special 
relationship even as they pursued working, if not close, relationships with other powers, including 
Washington’s principle adversaries during the Cold War, Russia and China. Outreach to the US was intended 
to secure material bene?ts such as food aid and high technology, cementing a partnership pro?table to India 
but not leading to — their democratic similarities notwithstanding — any formal alliance. 
Meaning of Cooperation 
For US 
•
It helps preserve American primacy and the exercise thereof by cementing an af?liation that aids in the 
preservation of the balance of power in Asia 
•Enhances American competitiveness through deepened linkages with a growing Indian economy 
•
Strengthens the American vision of a concert of democratic states by incorporating a major non-
Western exemplar of successful democracy 
For India 
•
It helps India to expand its national power more easily than it might have done otherwise 
•It limits the dangers that might be posed by unrestrained Chinese power 
•
It helps to legitimise India’s entrance on the world stage if such occurs with American acquiescence and 
support 
Ingredients for Successful Cooperation 
1. Policy entrepreneurs with ‘big ideas’ 
2. Determined leadership at the highest level on both sides 
3. Committed ‘pile drivers’ within the bureaucracy capable of implementing their leaders’ intentions 
Struggle for Partnership 
Contrasts in worldview 
•
The nationalist yearning for political greatness without entrapment in the US-Soviet contest during the 
Cold War was the key driver of India’s national strategy. India wanted freedom to choose its policies on 
the fundamental questions pertaining to its national interest, ‘when the choice come to it’ had to be 
protected at all costs  
•
United States was not able to accommodate India’s desire for a new world order that accommodated a 
respect for indigenous nationalism, the primacy of economic development and the incarnation of non-
violence internationally  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
•It could also not entertain the Indian quest for what was in actuality an asymmetric association that 
would disproportionately favour India by providing it with various desired material resources in 
exchange for New Delhi’s freedom to pursue its own course 
Differences in national priorities 
The contrasts in worldview were quickly re?ected in the differences in national priorities. US’ global struggle 
to defend its security and safety of its allies and its hegemonic position, against a virulent Soviet upstart 
warranted a complete mobilisation of national power and a willingness to run all the risks associated with a 
hot war, even in its nuclear variant. It contributed toward generating military power and resuscitating allies 
and neutrals as part of the larger strategy of resisting the Soviet Union 
Indian leadership came to view the US not as a champion of the post-colonial states but rather as the ‘heir’ to 
British imperialism. Perception gained ground most deeply during the Eisenhower administration when 
secretary of state John Foster Dulles set about building America’s Cold War alliances during the early phase 
of containing the Soviet Union.  
India on the contrary was desperate for an international environment that would permit it to concentrate 
wholly on economic, political and social development, while receiving assistance from all the major states 
who, being at peace with each other and having as their objective the economic resuscitation of the Third 
World, would be able to aid New Delhi in reaching its developmental goals 
Asymmetries in power capability 
Thanks to its vast actualised power, the US was a producer of its own security, whereas India was largely a 
consumer of the security provided by others, including at different points either by the US or the Soviet 
Union or the externalities ensuing from bipolarity itself. Thus, for instance, while India was content to live 
with benign American power until the 1960s, in fact, gravitating towards an unlimited military partnership 
with Washington in the face of Chinese aggression in 1962, it just as purposefully swung towards the Soviet 
Union in 1971 when faced with the prospect of Sino-American rapprochement and an overbearing Pakistan 
supported by the United States. 
India’s capacity to build its national power rapidly during the Cold War was hampered by its own economic 
choices. One strategic decision that India made during this era which offered hope of becoming self-suf?cient 
in regards to its own security was developing nuclear weapons. The bilateral altercation over India’s nuclear 
weapons program cast a shadow on every other form of cooperation, including the ones India valued most of 
all, such as technology transfer 
The contrasts in worldview, the differences in national priorities, and the asymmetries in power capability interacted 
in unproductive ways throughout the Cold War to deny both countries the opportunities to build the close 
relationship they otherwise desired in principle. These structural causes, respectively, gave rise to three outcomes:  
1. a policy of non-alignment whose ability to protect Indian interests in extremis was questionable 
2. an addiction to state control as the solution to India’s development aims despite the low economic growth it 
brought in trail 
3. a hesitant embrace of nuclear weaponry that provoked international opposition without fundamentally 
remedying India’s weaknesses in power capability 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
Impact of Cold War on India 
1. Divided the international order intensely, thus preventing the kind of great-power cooperation that 
might have bene?ted India 
2. It led to an unproductive diversion of resources from economic cooperation into military competition, 
thus reducing the levels of assistance India might have otherwise incurred 
3. Engendered competitive alliance formation that spanning the globe reached India’s doorsteps when 
Pakistan was admitted into various US-led anti-Soviet alliances, thus imposing heightened defence 
burdens on New Delhi at a time when it could not afford them  
?US’ support for Pakistan and its rapprochement with China—examples of how the mutual US-Indian 
quest for a productive partnership during the Cold War was repeatedly frustrated by externalities  
4. India’s economic weakness throughout the Cold War made it yet another underperforming Third 
World state, not to be taken seriously by Washington except when absolutely necessary  
5. Indian emphasis on maintaining a predominantly closed economy centred on import substitution 
affected the bilateral relations by denying American and Indian enterprises of important social 
constituencies in both the US and India which would have had a stake in the establishment and 
preservation of a strong US-Indian relationship 
Convergence 
1. Shared af?nities of constitutional democracy 
2. Liberal politics  
3. Civic Nationalism 
4. Defeating jihadi terrorism 
5. Arresting further spread of weapons of mass destruction 
6. Protecting the global commons 
7. Preserving the multilateral trading order 
8. Ensuring food and energy security  
9. Managing climate change 
Areas of Cooperation 
1. Large areas of cooperation persisted despite the structural frictions and where in fact signi?cant in 
areas such as agriculture, education, health, science, and civilian space cooperation 
2. For many decades until the 1970s, India was one of the largest recipients of US development assistence 
3. Beyond food aid, Washington’s generosity paid for numerous Indian public sector programs in ?elds 
such as agriculture, infrastructure and higher education  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
Page 4


India-US 
India was in abject poverty at the time of Independence — Comprehensive development was the principle 
concern. Nehru and his successors made periodic overtures to the United States seeking some sort of special 
relationship even as they pursued working, if not close, relationships with other powers, including 
Washington’s principle adversaries during the Cold War, Russia and China. Outreach to the US was intended 
to secure material bene?ts such as food aid and high technology, cementing a partnership pro?table to India 
but not leading to — their democratic similarities notwithstanding — any formal alliance. 
Meaning of Cooperation 
For US 
•
It helps preserve American primacy and the exercise thereof by cementing an af?liation that aids in the 
preservation of the balance of power in Asia 
•Enhances American competitiveness through deepened linkages with a growing Indian economy 
•
Strengthens the American vision of a concert of democratic states by incorporating a major non-
Western exemplar of successful democracy 
For India 
•
It helps India to expand its national power more easily than it might have done otherwise 
•It limits the dangers that might be posed by unrestrained Chinese power 
•
It helps to legitimise India’s entrance on the world stage if such occurs with American acquiescence and 
support 
Ingredients for Successful Cooperation 
1. Policy entrepreneurs with ‘big ideas’ 
2. Determined leadership at the highest level on both sides 
3. Committed ‘pile drivers’ within the bureaucracy capable of implementing their leaders’ intentions 
Struggle for Partnership 
Contrasts in worldview 
•
The nationalist yearning for political greatness without entrapment in the US-Soviet contest during the 
Cold War was the key driver of India’s national strategy. India wanted freedom to choose its policies on 
the fundamental questions pertaining to its national interest, ‘when the choice come to it’ had to be 
protected at all costs  
•
United States was not able to accommodate India’s desire for a new world order that accommodated a 
respect for indigenous nationalism, the primacy of economic development and the incarnation of non-
violence internationally  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
•It could also not entertain the Indian quest for what was in actuality an asymmetric association that 
would disproportionately favour India by providing it with various desired material resources in 
exchange for New Delhi’s freedom to pursue its own course 
Differences in national priorities 
The contrasts in worldview were quickly re?ected in the differences in national priorities. US’ global struggle 
to defend its security and safety of its allies and its hegemonic position, against a virulent Soviet upstart 
warranted a complete mobilisation of national power and a willingness to run all the risks associated with a 
hot war, even in its nuclear variant. It contributed toward generating military power and resuscitating allies 
and neutrals as part of the larger strategy of resisting the Soviet Union 
Indian leadership came to view the US not as a champion of the post-colonial states but rather as the ‘heir’ to 
British imperialism. Perception gained ground most deeply during the Eisenhower administration when 
secretary of state John Foster Dulles set about building America’s Cold War alliances during the early phase 
of containing the Soviet Union.  
India on the contrary was desperate for an international environment that would permit it to concentrate 
wholly on economic, political and social development, while receiving assistance from all the major states 
who, being at peace with each other and having as their objective the economic resuscitation of the Third 
World, would be able to aid New Delhi in reaching its developmental goals 
Asymmetries in power capability 
Thanks to its vast actualised power, the US was a producer of its own security, whereas India was largely a 
consumer of the security provided by others, including at different points either by the US or the Soviet 
Union or the externalities ensuing from bipolarity itself. Thus, for instance, while India was content to live 
with benign American power until the 1960s, in fact, gravitating towards an unlimited military partnership 
with Washington in the face of Chinese aggression in 1962, it just as purposefully swung towards the Soviet 
Union in 1971 when faced with the prospect of Sino-American rapprochement and an overbearing Pakistan 
supported by the United States. 
India’s capacity to build its national power rapidly during the Cold War was hampered by its own economic 
choices. One strategic decision that India made during this era which offered hope of becoming self-suf?cient 
in regards to its own security was developing nuclear weapons. The bilateral altercation over India’s nuclear 
weapons program cast a shadow on every other form of cooperation, including the ones India valued most of 
all, such as technology transfer 
The contrasts in worldview, the differences in national priorities, and the asymmetries in power capability interacted 
in unproductive ways throughout the Cold War to deny both countries the opportunities to build the close 
relationship they otherwise desired in principle. These structural causes, respectively, gave rise to three outcomes:  
1. a policy of non-alignment whose ability to protect Indian interests in extremis was questionable 
2. an addiction to state control as the solution to India’s development aims despite the low economic growth it 
brought in trail 
3. a hesitant embrace of nuclear weaponry that provoked international opposition without fundamentally 
remedying India’s weaknesses in power capability 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
Impact of Cold War on India 
1. Divided the international order intensely, thus preventing the kind of great-power cooperation that 
might have bene?ted India 
2. It led to an unproductive diversion of resources from economic cooperation into military competition, 
thus reducing the levels of assistance India might have otherwise incurred 
3. Engendered competitive alliance formation that spanning the globe reached India’s doorsteps when 
Pakistan was admitted into various US-led anti-Soviet alliances, thus imposing heightened defence 
burdens on New Delhi at a time when it could not afford them  
?US’ support for Pakistan and its rapprochement with China—examples of how the mutual US-Indian 
quest for a productive partnership during the Cold War was repeatedly frustrated by externalities  
4. India’s economic weakness throughout the Cold War made it yet another underperforming Third 
World state, not to be taken seriously by Washington except when absolutely necessary  
5. Indian emphasis on maintaining a predominantly closed economy centred on import substitution 
affected the bilateral relations by denying American and Indian enterprises of important social 
constituencies in both the US and India which would have had a stake in the establishment and 
preservation of a strong US-Indian relationship 
Convergence 
1. Shared af?nities of constitutional democracy 
2. Liberal politics  
3. Civic Nationalism 
4. Defeating jihadi terrorism 
5. Arresting further spread of weapons of mass destruction 
6. Protecting the global commons 
7. Preserving the multilateral trading order 
8. Ensuring food and energy security  
9. Managing climate change 
Areas of Cooperation 
1. Large areas of cooperation persisted despite the structural frictions and where in fact signi?cant in 
areas such as agriculture, education, health, science, and civilian space cooperation 
2. For many decades until the 1970s, India was one of the largest recipients of US development assistence 
3. Beyond food aid, Washington’s generosity paid for numerous Indian public sector programs in ?elds 
such as agriculture, infrastructure and higher education  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
4. Substantial private activities complemented of?cial US assistance; a number of major American 
foundations such as Ford, Rockefeller, and other established residence in India 
Divergence 
The structural realities if international politics placed USA and India in antinomic positions in the evolving 
order. Unlike US which was a global hegemon, India was a weak polity that had survived over the millennia 
more because of its cultural unity than its material capabilities  
1. India’s pursuit of non-alignment: The policy of non-alignment constituted a speci?c response to the 
particular cleavages of post-war bipolar rivalry. What India wanted was the material bene?ts that 
otherwise come only from an alliance relationship with stronger powers, yet without any of the 
constraining obligations that go with such formal collaboration 
2. Emphasis on maintaining a closed command economy 
3. India’s nuclear weapons program 
4. Structural problems and the policies they provoked prevented US-Indian ties from reaching their full 
potential 
5. Competing national preferences over the strategies used to realise certain objectives, and differences 
in negotiating styles and tactics  
6. Vagaries of democratic domestic politics 
Post Cold War 
•
US pursued a policy of containment vis-a-vis USSR and after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, 
Soviet Union collapsed which in turn suddenly removed from the scene a superpower that had protected 
Indian interests since at least 1971. It made the Indian policy of non-alignment irrelevant in one full 
swoop 
•The atrophy of non-alignment and end of cold war removed a major irritant in US-Indian relations. Thus, 
it freed New Delhi to seek new forms of engagement with the sole superpower.  
•
Also New Delhi initiated some modest economic reforms which slowly increased India’s growth rates. It 
ultimately led to making India a ‘big emerging market’ and one of the motors of growth in the global 
system. Bilateral trade between India and US grew dramatically, making India for the ?rst time a 
desirable commercial partner of the United States 
•
The bickering over India’s nuclear weapons became acute from 1995 onwards when US secured the 
inde?nite extension of NPT and after an interval of many decades concluded the Comprehensive T est 
Ban Treaty. But subsequent regimes in US (Bush and Obama) developed a strong strategic partnership 
with India—fuel reprocessing rights to India and endorsed India’s candidacy for permanent membership 
in the UNSC 
•
But some differences still do exist. US views international politics as a hegemonic power and remains 
determined to preserve its primacy, in contrast, India views the international system from the 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
Page 5


India-US 
India was in abject poverty at the time of Independence — Comprehensive development was the principle 
concern. Nehru and his successors made periodic overtures to the United States seeking some sort of special 
relationship even as they pursued working, if not close, relationships with other powers, including 
Washington’s principle adversaries during the Cold War, Russia and China. Outreach to the US was intended 
to secure material bene?ts such as food aid and high technology, cementing a partnership pro?table to India 
but not leading to — their democratic similarities notwithstanding — any formal alliance. 
Meaning of Cooperation 
For US 
•
It helps preserve American primacy and the exercise thereof by cementing an af?liation that aids in the 
preservation of the balance of power in Asia 
•Enhances American competitiveness through deepened linkages with a growing Indian economy 
•
Strengthens the American vision of a concert of democratic states by incorporating a major non-
Western exemplar of successful democracy 
For India 
•
It helps India to expand its national power more easily than it might have done otherwise 
•It limits the dangers that might be posed by unrestrained Chinese power 
•
It helps to legitimise India’s entrance on the world stage if such occurs with American acquiescence and 
support 
Ingredients for Successful Cooperation 
1. Policy entrepreneurs with ‘big ideas’ 
2. Determined leadership at the highest level on both sides 
3. Committed ‘pile drivers’ within the bureaucracy capable of implementing their leaders’ intentions 
Struggle for Partnership 
Contrasts in worldview 
•
The nationalist yearning for political greatness without entrapment in the US-Soviet contest during the 
Cold War was the key driver of India’s national strategy. India wanted freedom to choose its policies on 
the fundamental questions pertaining to its national interest, ‘when the choice come to it’ had to be 
protected at all costs  
•
United States was not able to accommodate India’s desire for a new world order that accommodated a 
respect for indigenous nationalism, the primacy of economic development and the incarnation of non-
violence internationally  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
•It could also not entertain the Indian quest for what was in actuality an asymmetric association that 
would disproportionately favour India by providing it with various desired material resources in 
exchange for New Delhi’s freedom to pursue its own course 
Differences in national priorities 
The contrasts in worldview were quickly re?ected in the differences in national priorities. US’ global struggle 
to defend its security and safety of its allies and its hegemonic position, against a virulent Soviet upstart 
warranted a complete mobilisation of national power and a willingness to run all the risks associated with a 
hot war, even in its nuclear variant. It contributed toward generating military power and resuscitating allies 
and neutrals as part of the larger strategy of resisting the Soviet Union 
Indian leadership came to view the US not as a champion of the post-colonial states but rather as the ‘heir’ to 
British imperialism. Perception gained ground most deeply during the Eisenhower administration when 
secretary of state John Foster Dulles set about building America’s Cold War alliances during the early phase 
of containing the Soviet Union.  
India on the contrary was desperate for an international environment that would permit it to concentrate 
wholly on economic, political and social development, while receiving assistance from all the major states 
who, being at peace with each other and having as their objective the economic resuscitation of the Third 
World, would be able to aid New Delhi in reaching its developmental goals 
Asymmetries in power capability 
Thanks to its vast actualised power, the US was a producer of its own security, whereas India was largely a 
consumer of the security provided by others, including at different points either by the US or the Soviet 
Union or the externalities ensuing from bipolarity itself. Thus, for instance, while India was content to live 
with benign American power until the 1960s, in fact, gravitating towards an unlimited military partnership 
with Washington in the face of Chinese aggression in 1962, it just as purposefully swung towards the Soviet 
Union in 1971 when faced with the prospect of Sino-American rapprochement and an overbearing Pakistan 
supported by the United States. 
India’s capacity to build its national power rapidly during the Cold War was hampered by its own economic 
choices. One strategic decision that India made during this era which offered hope of becoming self-suf?cient 
in regards to its own security was developing nuclear weapons. The bilateral altercation over India’s nuclear 
weapons program cast a shadow on every other form of cooperation, including the ones India valued most of 
all, such as technology transfer 
The contrasts in worldview, the differences in national priorities, and the asymmetries in power capability interacted 
in unproductive ways throughout the Cold War to deny both countries the opportunities to build the close 
relationship they otherwise desired in principle. These structural causes, respectively, gave rise to three outcomes:  
1. a policy of non-alignment whose ability to protect Indian interests in extremis was questionable 
2. an addiction to state control as the solution to India’s development aims despite the low economic growth it 
brought in trail 
3. a hesitant embrace of nuclear weaponry that provoked international opposition without fundamentally 
remedying India’s weaknesses in power capability 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
Impact of Cold War on India 
1. Divided the international order intensely, thus preventing the kind of great-power cooperation that 
might have bene?ted India 
2. It led to an unproductive diversion of resources from economic cooperation into military competition, 
thus reducing the levels of assistance India might have otherwise incurred 
3. Engendered competitive alliance formation that spanning the globe reached India’s doorsteps when 
Pakistan was admitted into various US-led anti-Soviet alliances, thus imposing heightened defence 
burdens on New Delhi at a time when it could not afford them  
?US’ support for Pakistan and its rapprochement with China—examples of how the mutual US-Indian 
quest for a productive partnership during the Cold War was repeatedly frustrated by externalities  
4. India’s economic weakness throughout the Cold War made it yet another underperforming Third 
World state, not to be taken seriously by Washington except when absolutely necessary  
5. Indian emphasis on maintaining a predominantly closed economy centred on import substitution 
affected the bilateral relations by denying American and Indian enterprises of important social 
constituencies in both the US and India which would have had a stake in the establishment and 
preservation of a strong US-Indian relationship 
Convergence 
1. Shared af?nities of constitutional democracy 
2. Liberal politics  
3. Civic Nationalism 
4. Defeating jihadi terrorism 
5. Arresting further spread of weapons of mass destruction 
6. Protecting the global commons 
7. Preserving the multilateral trading order 
8. Ensuring food and energy security  
9. Managing climate change 
Areas of Cooperation 
1. Large areas of cooperation persisted despite the structural frictions and where in fact signi?cant in 
areas such as agriculture, education, health, science, and civilian space cooperation 
2. For many decades until the 1970s, India was one of the largest recipients of US development assistence 
3. Beyond food aid, Washington’s generosity paid for numerous Indian public sector programs in ?elds 
such as agriculture, infrastructure and higher education  
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
4. Substantial private activities complemented of?cial US assistance; a number of major American 
foundations such as Ford, Rockefeller, and other established residence in India 
Divergence 
The structural realities if international politics placed USA and India in antinomic positions in the evolving 
order. Unlike US which was a global hegemon, India was a weak polity that had survived over the millennia 
more because of its cultural unity than its material capabilities  
1. India’s pursuit of non-alignment: The policy of non-alignment constituted a speci?c response to the 
particular cleavages of post-war bipolar rivalry. What India wanted was the material bene?ts that 
otherwise come only from an alliance relationship with stronger powers, yet without any of the 
constraining obligations that go with such formal collaboration 
2. Emphasis on maintaining a closed command economy 
3. India’s nuclear weapons program 
4. Structural problems and the policies they provoked prevented US-Indian ties from reaching their full 
potential 
5. Competing national preferences over the strategies used to realise certain objectives, and differences 
in negotiating styles and tactics  
6. Vagaries of democratic domestic politics 
Post Cold War 
•
US pursued a policy of containment vis-a-vis USSR and after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, 
Soviet Union collapsed which in turn suddenly removed from the scene a superpower that had protected 
Indian interests since at least 1971. It made the Indian policy of non-alignment irrelevant in one full 
swoop 
•The atrophy of non-alignment and end of cold war removed a major irritant in US-Indian relations. Thus, 
it freed New Delhi to seek new forms of engagement with the sole superpower.  
•
Also New Delhi initiated some modest economic reforms which slowly increased India’s growth rates. It 
ultimately led to making India a ‘big emerging market’ and one of the motors of growth in the global 
system. Bilateral trade between India and US grew dramatically, making India for the ?rst time a 
desirable commercial partner of the United States 
•
The bickering over India’s nuclear weapons became acute from 1995 onwards when US secured the 
inde?nite extension of NPT and after an interval of many decades concluded the Comprehensive T est 
Ban Treaty. But subsequent regimes in US (Bush and Obama) developed a strong strategic partnership 
with India—fuel reprocessing rights to India and endorsed India’s candidacy for permanent membership 
in the UNSC 
•
But some differences still do exist. US views international politics as a hegemonic power and remains 
determined to preserve its primacy, in contrast, India views the international system from the 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
perspective of a subaltern state and desires a multipolar system. This divergence produces practical 
disagreements especially in regard to diplomatic cooperation over questions of global order 
Differences in National Priorities 
•US seeks to renew its civilian economy and its military power through the aggressive expansion of the 
liberal economic order internationally; India, in contrast, while pro?ting from that order and desiring its 
enlargement in principle, is wedded to a much more cautious approach, in fact, often impeding it in an 
effort to protect the nation’s economic development from the pains of globalisation 
•
Asymmetries in power between the US and India, while diminishing somewhat modestly, still survive 
quite durably. While India is steadily doing better in regards to economic performance, it still lags behind 
the US dramatically where the motor of economic growth is concerned along with sharp differentials in 
military capabilities, alliance partners, dominance in international institutions and ideational in?uence 
•US desires the rise of Indian power and has proved capable of making spectacular contributions toward 
that end, but at the same time believe that such assistance imposes on India some minimal obligations of 
‘diffuse reciprocity’ . India, in contrast, continuing in the tradition de?ned early on by Nehru himself, 
welcomes all meaningful American contributions toward enhancing its national power, but seeks to 
protect its freedom to part ways with the US whenever its other interests might so demand 
Chinese Angle  
The emergence of China as a global power fundamentally challenges both the US and India in different, but 
complementary, ways.  
•Beijing’s ascendancy would be dangerous to Washington if it precipitates a power transition at the core 
of the global system and undermines the US-backed security and trading systems in Asia, not to mention 
the other challenges posed to American values and interests in more peripheral regions of the world.  
•China’s growing preeminence would be dangerous to India if it results in the entrenchment of a new 
superpower on India’s doorstep—an outcome that could permanently eclipse New Delhi as an Asian 
center of in?uence (especially in South Asia), precipitate irreversible transformations in the local military 
balance, and enable the successful assertion of all of Beijing’s territorial claims. 
But China today, unlike the rising powers of the past, is deeply entwined with both its global and regional 
rivals by unprecedented bonds of economic interdependence, thus making security competition between 
these entities a ‘mixed-sum’ game of enormous intricacy. 
The pressures leading to convergence in US-India relations as a result of China’s rise automatically get 
diluted because of the differentials in relative interdependence, relative vulnerability, and perceived 
dependability of the other partner. Thus, the US-India ‘strategic partnership’ is something that needs to be 
produced by assiduous effort on both sides rather than a spontaneous outcome that eventuates 
automatically 
Conclusion 
Washington and New Delhi have historically been caught in a low-level equilibrium trap: whether the 
trajectory of their relationship has been upward or downward, it has not proceeded to its maxima in either 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com