In the ongoing Asia Cup 2022, which team has become the first to qualify for Super Four Stage?a)Bangladeshb)Afghanistanc)Pakistand)IndiaCorrect answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?

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Banking Exams Exam > Banking Exams Questions > In the ongoing Asia Cup 2022, which team has ...

In the ongoing Asia Cup 2022, which team has become the first to qualify for Super Four Stage?

a)
Bangladesh
b)
Afghanistan
c)
Pakistan
d)
India

Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?

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In the ongoing Asia Cup 2022, which team has become the first to quali...

Afghanistan Cricket team has qualified for the Super four stage of the ongoing Asia Cup 2022 tournament after beating Bangladesh by 7 wickets.

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In the ongoing Asia Cup 2022, which team has become the first to quali...

Team Afghanistan has become the first team to qualify for the Super Four stage in the ongoing Asia Cup 2022.

The Asia Cup 2022 is a cricket tournament featuring teams from the Asian region. The teams participating in the tournament are Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Oman. The tournament is divided into two stages - the group stage and the Super Four stage.

Group Stage:
In the group stage, the six teams are divided into two groups of three teams each. Each team plays against the other two teams in their group, and the top two teams from each group qualify for the Super Four stage.

Performance of Afghanistan in the Group Stage:
Afghanistan was placed in Group B along with Bangladesh and Oman. In their first match, Afghanistan faced Oman and registered a comprehensive victory, winning the match by 72 runs. They displayed a dominant performance with both bat and ball, with several players contributing significantly.

In their second match, Afghanistan faced Bangladesh, which was a crucial game for both teams as the winner would secure a spot in the Super Four stage. Afghanistan once again put up a strong performance, this time with the ball, restricting Bangladesh to a below-par total of 121 runs. They chased down the target comfortably with 9 wickets in hand and secured their place in the Super Four stage.

Qualification for Super Four Stage:
By winning both their matches in the group stage, Afghanistan finished at the top of Group B with 4 points. This ensured their qualification for the Super Four stage as the first team from their group.

Impressive Performances:
Afghanistan's success in the group stage can be attributed to their all-round team performance. Their batsmen have been consistent in putting up good totals, while their bowlers have consistently picked up wickets and restricted the opposition.

Players like Rahmanullah Gurbaz, Hashmatullah Shahidi, and Gulbadin Naib have played crucial roles with the bat, while spinners Rashid Khan and Mujeeb Ur Rahman have been exceptional with the ball.

Conclusion:
In conclusion, Team Afghanistan has become the first team to qualify for the Super Four stage in the ongoing Asia Cup 2022. Their impressive performances in the group stage, particularly the victory against Bangladesh, secured their place in the next stage of the tournament.

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Directions :Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is aperceptiblechange in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. Indeed, India’s new northwestern strategic environment, in which the relegation of the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership is merely one element, is undergoing a grand geopolitical transformation, but New Delhi seems to be clueless about how to engage with it. Moreover, it is worrisome that while the mostformidablechallenges to India’s national security invariably originate from its northwestern frontiers, both historically and presently, the focus of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has primarily been on the global stage and the country’s southern and eastern neighbours.The most important element of the new strategic landscape in Southern Asia is the ongoing withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the resultant power vacuum, as well as the subsequent rebalancing of forces in the region. China has begun the process of filling the post-American power vacuum, albeit without military involvement for the moment. The withdrawal by the U.S. and the attendant strategic uncertainty could also provide a favourable environment for forces like the Taliban and the Islamic State (IS) to enhance their influence in the region. This clearly worries Kabul. Given the American withdrawal and India’s unwillingness to involve itself militarily in Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is left with no choice but to engage both Pakistan and China. Moreover, he realises that Beijing is perhaps the only actor today that has some traction in Islamabad. It is this that has led to a flurry of activity among the three countries. 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Directions :Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is aperceptiblechange in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. 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Directions :Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold to help you locate them.The uneventful visit of the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi last month has further strengthened the widespread belief that India is losing strategic influence and geopolitical standing as far as its northwestern frontier is concerned, especially Iran and Afghanistan. Just a year ago, during the Karzai presidency, India was the “most favoured nation” in Afghanistan. Today, there is aperceptiblechange in the new Afghan government’s attitude towards India. For instance, no major agreements were signed during Mr. Ghani’s visit and the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011, hardly figured in the agenda. 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" Direction: Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions that follow.The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) mega project has been widely welcomed in Pakistan as a game changer. The core of the project is a 2,500-km road and rail link, which will connect the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea to the Chinese city of Kashgar in Central Asia. The Chinese government, the principal sponsor, says it will invest $46 billion on the project.The money will be spent not just on the road and rail link but also on a host of other infrastructure projects. These include an expansion of Gwadar port and a new international airport in the city. Also included are several power projects based on coal and renewable energy that will add about 10.4GW to Pakistan's power grid. Oil and gas pipelines are in the offing as well.There can be no dispute that the CPEC is a game changer. Pakistan's faltering economy will get a huge boost. China will get access to a warm water port. Shipping time and cost for exports from Western China will be reduced. Oil and gas will be offloaded at Gwadar and piped along the corridor to China.The announcement of the project shone a bright light in the gloom that surrounds the Pakistani economy. Elation is the order of the day. There is broad consensus that CPEC is an unqualified “good.” But could it be that, dazzled by the light, we have neglected to conduct a rigorous analysis of this mega project and what it means to Pakistan?In a deal like this emotions have to be set aside. There is no doubt that China has been a strong and constant supporter of Pakistan throughout our history. But it should also be clear that when it makes investment decisions such as the proposed $46 billion CPEC it makes them in the cold light of its self-interest — as one would expect from any responsible nation. And as a responsible nation, conscious of its sovereignty and self-respect, Pakistan should also apply the same standard to its assessment of the project.Clearly the advantages of the CPEC are many, significant, and undeniable. But are there any aspects that may be detrimental to our interests in the long term? The first issue that comes to mind is sovereignty.By leasing out vast tracts of land in the city of Gwadar and all along the route of the corridor, we in fact transfer sovereignty of some of our territory to a foreign power. And this is no ordinary foreign power. China is an emerging superpower with global ambitions. Have we built into the deal the necessary safeguards that will allow us to retain control of our territory if circumstances change?It is proposed that most of the construction work will be done by thousands of Chinese workers. Does this make sense for Pakistan given widespread and painful unemployment? Would it not be in our interest to have Pakistanis do the work? Should contracts not include provisions for contractors to train and employ Pakistani workers and engineers?As a global manufacturing powerhouse China plans to bring all or most of the equipment it needs for projects from its own suppliers. But would not our interest be better served if we insisted on having equipment made in Pakistan? Part of the proposed investment should be diverted to setting up factories inside Pakistan to supply the diverse range of equipment and machinery to the various CPEC projects.Have we asked the right questions in regard to the financing? Forty-six billion dollars is a lot of money. Is it a grant or gift to Pakistan? Is it a loan? If the latter, what is the payback period and the applicable rate? What happens if there is a default? Have the tariff rates payable to Pakistan for use of port facilities, road and rail links, and oil and gas pipelines been established and agreed?These and a whole range of other issues must be addressed when so much is at stake. But it seems that the euphoria of attracting this mega project has perhaps distracted us from the imperative of due diligence and the rigorous risk-based cost benefit analysis that this entails.Let there be no doubt: The CPEC is wonderful news for Pakistan. But it must move forward with its eyes wide open. And with a full understanding of not only the rewards that the project holds for Pakistan, but also the possible pitfalls that may lie in wait for us."Elation is the order of the day.Q. According to the passage, which of the following is TRUE?

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Direction: Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions that follow.The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) mega project has been widely welcomed in Pakistan as a game changer. The core of the project is a 2,500-km road and rail link, which will connect the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea to the Chinese city of Kashgar in Central Asia. The Chinese government, the principal sponsor, says it will invest $46 billion on the project.The money will be spent not just on the road and rail link but also on a host of other infrastructure projects. These include an expansion of Gwadar port and a new international airport in the city. Also included are several power projects based on coal and renewable energy that will add about 10.4GW to Pakistan's power grid. Oil and gas pipelines are in the offing as well.There can be no dispute that the CPEC is a game changer. Pakistan's faltering economy will get a huge boost. China will get access to a warm water port. Shipping time and cost for exports from Western China will be reduced. Oil and gas will be offloaded at Gwadar and piped along the corridor to China.The announcement of the project shone a bright light in the gloom that surrounds the Pakistani economy. Elation is the order of the day. There is broad consensus that CPEC is an unqualified “good.” But could it be that, dazzled by the light, we have neglected to conduct a rigorous analysis of this mega project and what it means to Pakistan?In a deal like this emotions have to be set aside. There is no doubt that China has been a strong and constant supporter of Pakistan throughout our history. But it should also be clear that when it makes investment decisions such as the proposed $46 billion CPEC it makes them in the cold light of its self-interest — as one would expect from any responsible nation. And as a responsible nation, conscious of its sovereignty and self-respect, Pakistan should also apply the same standard to its assessment of the project.Clearly the advantages of the CPEC are many, significant, and undeniable. But are there any aspects that may be detrimental to our interests in the long term? The first issue that comes to mind is sovereignty.By leasing out vast tracts of land in the city of Gwadar and all along the route of the corridor, we in fact transfer sovereignty of some of our territory to a foreign power. And this is no ordinary foreign power. China is an emerging superpower with global ambitions. Have we built into the deal the necessary safeguards that will allow us to retain control of our territory if circumstances change?It is proposed that most of the construction work will be done by thousands of Chinese workers. Does this make sense for Pakistan given widespread and painful unemployment? Would it not be in our interest to have Pakistanis do the work? Should contracts not include provisions for contractors to train and employ Pakistani workers and engineers?As a global manufacturing powerhouse China plans to bring all or most of the equipment it needs for projects from its own suppliers. But would not our interest be better served if we insisted on having equipment made in Pakistan? Part of the proposed investment should be diverted to setting up factories inside Pakistan to supply the diverse range of equipment and machinery to the various CPEC projects.Have we asked the right questions in regard to the financing? Forty-six billion dollars is a lot of money. Is it a grant or gift to Pakistan? Is it a loan? If the latter, what is the payback period and the applicable rate? What happens if there is a default? Have the tariff rates payable to Pakistan for use of port facilities, road and rail links, and oil and gas pipelines been established and agreed?These and a whole range of other issues must be addressed when so much is at stake. But it seems that the euphoria of attracting this mega project has perhaps distracted us from the imperative of due diligence and the rigorous risk-based cost benefit analysis that this entails.Let there be no doubt: The CPEC is wonderful news for Pakistan. But it must move forward with its eyes wide open. And with a full understanding of not only the rewards that the project holds for Pakistan, but also the possible pitfalls that may lie in wait for us."Elation is the order of the day.Q. Which of the following best elaborates the given statement?

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