Question Description
Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.Theres a kind of threat to the quality of public reason that tends to go unnoticed. This is the degradation of the core ideas mobilized in exercises of public reason, not least in the utterances of elite actors, such as bureaucrats, lawyers, politicians and representatives of international organizations and NGOs. These ideas – health, human rights, democracy and so on – are central to the way we formulate and address the main political challenges of our time, from the climate crisis to the other issues. One prominent form taken by this degradation of public reason is the phenomenon I call conceptual overreach. This occurs when a particular concept undergoes a process of expansion or inflation in which it absorbs ideas and demands that are foreign to it. In its most extreme manifestation, conceptual overreach morphs into a totalising all in one dogma.A single concept – say, human rights or the rule of law – is taken to offer a comprehensive political ideology, as opposed to picking out one among many elements upon which our political thinking needs to draw and hold in balance when arriving at justified responses to the problems of our time. Of course, well always need some very general concepts to refer to vast domains of value – the ideas of ethics, justice and morality, for example, have traditionally served this function. The problem is when there is a systematic trend for more specific concepts of value to aspire to the same level of generality. But why worry about conceptual overreach? If human rights, say, is a phrase that increasingly encompasses more and more things that are genuinely valuable goals, why should we quibble about the label attached to them? Isnt this mere pedantry? Far from it, I believe.One danger of conceptual overreach is that we lose sight of the distinctive idea conveyed by a given concept through its immersion in a sea of many other quite separate ideas, a significance that goes beyond the baseline fact that all the ideas in question identify something of value. If, for example, human rights are demands that are generally high-priority in nature, such that its seldom if ever justified to override them, then we lose our grip on that important idea if we start including under the heading of human rights valuable objectives – for example, access to a high-quality internet connection – that dont plausibly enjoy that kind of priority. Another danger is that the extraneous ideas that are subjected to a process of conceptual takeover end up being themselves distorted. So, for example, we start regarding modes of treatment that are beneficial to someone, such as mercy towards a convicted offender, as benefits to which they have a right.As a result, this conceptual overreach leaves us poorly positioned to identify the distinct values that are at stake in any given decision. It also obscures the agonizing conflicts that exist among these values in particular cases. But these two large intellectual defects also generate serious practical drawbacks when we seek to engage in deliberation with others. Conceptual overreach in its more extreme forms inhibits constructive dialogue, or even just the brokering of honorable compromises, with those whose political orientation differs significantly from ours. This is because it makes it difficult to find any point of common ground or shared understanding with them. Instead, when we try to reach some kind of reasonable accommodation with them based on, say, fairness or human rights, we find ourselves locked in opposing moral-political worldviews at every turn.Q. In context of the phrase, "to aspire to the same level of generality," in the second paragraph, each of the following statements can be inferredEXCEPT:a)Only the concepts that can be applied to different situations and incidents are capable to be termed as of general value.b)Concepts that serve a specific purpose must not be viewed as principles to be used in every sphere of life.c)Specific concepts must be applied to comprehensive political ideology since there are certain common areas between them.d)Specific concepts can aspire for increased generality if there is no systematic trend and such specific concept is capable of being general.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? for CAT 2024 is part of CAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CAT exam syllabus. Information about Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.Theres a kind of threat to the quality of public reason that tends to go unnoticed. This is the degradation of the core ideas mobilized in exercises of public reason, not least in the utterances of elite actors, such as bureaucrats, lawyers, politicians and representatives of international organizations and NGOs. These ideas – health, human rights, democracy and so on – are central to the way we formulate and address the main political challenges of our time, from the climate crisis to the other issues. One prominent form taken by this degradation of public reason is the phenomenon I call conceptual overreach. This occurs when a particular concept undergoes a process of expansion or inflation in which it absorbs ideas and demands that are foreign to it. In its most extreme manifestation, conceptual overreach morphs into a totalising all in one dogma.A single concept – say, human rights or the rule of law – is taken to offer a comprehensive political ideology, as opposed to picking out one among many elements upon which our political thinking needs to draw and hold in balance when arriving at justified responses to the problems of our time. Of course, well always need some very general concepts to refer to vast domains of value – the ideas of ethics, justice and morality, for example, have traditionally served this function. The problem is when there is a systematic trend for more specific concepts of value to aspire to the same level of generality. But why worry about conceptual overreach? If human rights, say, is a phrase that increasingly encompasses more and more things that are genuinely valuable goals, why should we quibble about the label attached to them? Isnt this mere pedantry? Far from it, I believe.One danger of conceptual overreach is that we lose sight of the distinctive idea conveyed by a given concept through its immersion in a sea of many other quite separate ideas, a significance that goes beyond the baseline fact that all the ideas in question identify something of value. If, for example, human rights are demands that are generally high-priority in nature, such that its seldom if ever justified to override them, then we lose our grip on that important idea if we start including under the heading of human rights valuable objectives – for example, access to a high-quality internet connection – that dont plausibly enjoy that kind of priority. Another danger is that the extraneous ideas that are subjected to a process of conceptual takeover end up being themselves distorted. So, for example, we start regarding modes of treatment that are beneficial to someone, such as mercy towards a convicted offender, as benefits to which they have a right.As a result, this conceptual overreach leaves us poorly positioned to identify the distinct values that are at stake in any given decision. It also obscures the agonizing conflicts that exist among these values in particular cases. But these two large intellectual defects also generate serious practical drawbacks when we seek to engage in deliberation with others. Conceptual overreach in its more extreme forms inhibits constructive dialogue, or even just the brokering of honorable compromises, with those whose political orientation differs significantly from ours. This is because it makes it difficult to find any point of common ground or shared understanding with them. Instead, when we try to reach some kind of reasonable accommodation with them based on, say, fairness or human rights, we find ourselves locked in opposing moral-political worldviews at every turn.Q. In context of the phrase, "to aspire to the same level of generality," in the second paragraph, each of the following statements can be inferredEXCEPT:a)Only the concepts that can be applied to different situations and incidents are capable to be termed as of general value.b)Concepts that serve a specific purpose must not be viewed as principles to be used in every sphere of life.c)Specific concepts must be applied to comprehensive political ideology since there are certain common areas between them.d)Specific concepts can aspire for increased generality if there is no systematic trend and such specific concept is capable of being general.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CAT 2024 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.Theres a kind of threat to the quality of public reason that tends to go unnoticed. This is the degradation of the core ideas mobilized in exercises of public reason, not least in the utterances of elite actors, such as bureaucrats, lawyers, politicians and representatives of international organizations and NGOs. These ideas – health, human rights, democracy and so on – are central to the way we formulate and address the main political challenges of our time, from the climate crisis to the other issues. One prominent form taken by this degradation of public reason is the phenomenon I call conceptual overreach. This occurs when a particular concept undergoes a process of expansion or inflation in which it absorbs ideas and demands that are foreign to it. In its most extreme manifestation, conceptual overreach morphs into a totalising all in one dogma.A single concept – say, human rights or the rule of law – is taken to offer a comprehensive political ideology, as opposed to picking out one among many elements upon which our political thinking needs to draw and hold in balance when arriving at justified responses to the problems of our time. Of course, well always need some very general concepts to refer to vast domains of value – the ideas of ethics, justice and morality, for example, have traditionally served this function. The problem is when there is a systematic trend for more specific concepts of value to aspire to the same level of generality. But why worry about conceptual overreach? If human rights, say, is a phrase that increasingly encompasses more and more things that are genuinely valuable goals, why should we quibble about the label attached to them? Isnt this mere pedantry? Far from it, I believe.One danger of conceptual overreach is that we lose sight of the distinctive idea conveyed by a given concept through its immersion in a sea of many other quite separate ideas, a significance that goes beyond the baseline fact that all the ideas in question identify something of value. If, for example, human rights are demands that are generally high-priority in nature, such that its seldom if ever justified to override them, then we lose our grip on that important idea if we start including under the heading of human rights valuable objectives – for example, access to a high-quality internet connection – that dont plausibly enjoy that kind of priority. Another danger is that the extraneous ideas that are subjected to a process of conceptual takeover end up being themselves distorted. So, for example, we start regarding modes of treatment that are beneficial to someone, such as mercy towards a convicted offender, as benefits to which they have a right.As a result, this conceptual overreach leaves us poorly positioned to identify the distinct values that are at stake in any given decision. It also obscures the agonizing conflicts that exist among these values in particular cases. But these two large intellectual defects also generate serious practical drawbacks when we seek to engage in deliberation with others. Conceptual overreach in its more extreme forms inhibits constructive dialogue, or even just the brokering of honorable compromises, with those whose political orientation differs significantly from ours. This is because it makes it difficult to find any point of common ground or shared understanding with them. Instead, when we try to reach some kind of reasonable accommodation with them based on, say, fairness or human rights, we find ourselves locked in opposing moral-political worldviews at every turn.Q. In context of the phrase, "to aspire to the same level of generality," in the second paragraph, each of the following statements can be inferredEXCEPT:a)Only the concepts that can be applied to different situations and incidents are capable to be termed as of general value.b)Concepts that serve a specific purpose must not be viewed as principles to be used in every sphere of life.c)Specific concepts must be applied to comprehensive political ideology since there are certain common areas between them.d)Specific concepts can aspire for increased generality if there is no systematic trend and such specific concept is capable of being general.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?.

Solutions for Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.Theres a kind of threat to the quality of public reason that tends to go unnoticed. This is the degradation of the core ideas mobilized in exercises of public reason, not least in the utterances of elite actors, such as bureaucrats, lawyers, politicians and representatives of international organizations and NGOs. These ideas – health, human rights, democracy and so on – are central to the way we formulate and address the main political challenges of our time, from the climate crisis to the other issues. One prominent form taken by this degradation of public reason is the phenomenon I call conceptual overreach. This occurs when a particular concept undergoes a process of expansion or inflation in which it absorbs ideas and demands that are foreign to it. In its most extreme manifestation, conceptual overreach morphs into a totalising all in one dogma.A single concept – say, human rights or the rule of law – is taken to offer a comprehensive political ideology, as opposed to picking out one among many elements upon which our political thinking needs to draw and hold in balance when arriving at justified responses to the problems of our time. Of course, well always need some very general concepts to refer to vast domains of value – the ideas of ethics, justice and morality, for example, have traditionally served this function. The problem is when there is a systematic trend for more specific concepts of value to aspire to the same level of generality. But why worry about conceptual overreach? If human rights, say, is a phrase that increasingly encompasses more and more things that are genuinely valuable goals, why should we quibble about the label attached to them? Isnt this mere pedantry? Far from it, I believe.One danger of conceptual overreach is that we lose sight of the distinctive idea conveyed by a given concept through its immersion in a sea of many other quite separate ideas, a significance that goes beyond the baseline fact that all the ideas in question identify something of value. If, for example, human rights are demands that are generally high-priority in nature, such that its seldom if ever justified to override them, then we lose our grip on that important idea if we start including under the heading of human rights valuable objectives – for example, access to a high-quality internet connection – that dont plausibly enjoy that kind of priority. Another danger is that the extraneous ideas that are subjected to a process of conceptual takeover end up being themselves distorted. So, for example, we start regarding modes of treatment that are beneficial to someone, such as mercy towards a convicted offender, as benefits to which they have a right.As a result, this conceptual overreach leaves us poorly positioned to identify the distinct values that are at stake in any given decision. It also obscures the agonizing conflicts that exist among these values in particular cases. But these two large intellectual defects also generate serious practical drawbacks when we seek to engage in deliberation with others. Conceptual overreach in its more extreme forms inhibits constructive dialogue, or even just the brokering of honorable compromises, with those whose political orientation differs significantly from ours. This is because it makes it difficult to find any point of common ground or shared understanding with them. Instead, when we try to reach some kind of reasonable accommodation with them based on, say, fairness or human rights, we find ourselves locked in opposing moral-political worldviews at every turn.Q. In context of the phrase, "to aspire to the same level of generality," in the second paragraph, each of the following statements can be inferredEXCEPT:a)Only the concepts that can be applied to different situations and incidents are capable to be termed as of general value.b)Concepts that serve a specific purpose must not be viewed as principles to be used in every sphere of life.c)Specific concepts must be applied to comprehensive political ideology since there are certain common areas between them.d)Specific concepts can aspire for increased generality if there is no systematic trend and such specific concept is capable of being general.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CAT Exam by signing up for free.

Here you can find the meaning of Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.Theres a kind of threat to the quality of public reason that tends to go unnoticed. This is the degradation of the core ideas mobilized in exercises of public reason, not least in the utterances of elite actors, such as bureaucrats, lawyers, politicians and representatives of international organizations and NGOs. These ideas – health, human rights, democracy and so on – are central to the way we formulate and address the main political challenges of our time, from the climate crisis to the other issues. One prominent form taken by this degradation of public reason is the phenomenon I call conceptual overreach. This occurs when a particular concept undergoes a process of expansion or inflation in which it absorbs ideas and demands that are foreign to it. In its most extreme manifestation, conceptual overreach morphs into a totalising all in one dogma.A single concept – say, human rights or the rule of law – is taken to offer a comprehensive political ideology, as opposed to picking out one among many elements upon which our political thinking needs to draw and hold in balance when arriving at justified responses to the problems of our time. Of course, well always need some very general concepts to refer to vast domains of value – the ideas of ethics, justice and morality, for example, have traditionally served this function. The problem is when there is a systematic trend for more specific concepts of value to aspire to the same level of generality. But why worry about conceptual overreach? If human rights, say, is a phrase that increasingly encompasses more and more things that are genuinely valuable goals, why should we quibble about the label attached to them? Isnt this mere pedantry? Far from it, I believe.One danger of conceptual overreach is that we lose sight of the distinctive idea conveyed by a given concept through its immersion in a sea of many other quite separate ideas, a significance that goes beyond the baseline fact that all the ideas in question identify something of value. If, for example, human rights are demands that are generally high-priority in nature, such that its seldom if ever justified to override them, then we lose our grip on that important idea if we start including under the heading of human rights valuable objectives – for example, access to a high-quality internet connection – that dont plausibly enjoy that kind of priority. Another danger is that the extraneous ideas that are subjected to a process of conceptual takeover end up being themselves distorted. So, for example, we start regarding modes of treatment that are beneficial to someone, such as mercy towards a convicted offender, as benefits to which they have a right.As a result, this conceptual overreach leaves us poorly positioned to identify the distinct values that are at stake in any given decision. It also obscures the agonizing conflicts that exist among these values in particular cases. But these two large intellectual defects also generate serious practical drawbacks when we seek to engage in deliberation with others. Conceptual overreach in its more extreme forms inhibits constructive dialogue, or even just the brokering of honorable compromises, with those whose political orientation differs significantly from ours. This is because it makes it difficult to find any point of common ground or shared understanding with them. Instead, when we try to reach some kind of reasonable accommodation with them based on, say, fairness or human rights, we find ourselves locked in opposing moral-political worldviews at every turn.Q. In context of the phrase, "to aspire to the same level of generality," in the second paragraph, each of the following statements can be inferredEXCEPT:a)Only the concepts that can be applied to different situations and incidents are capable to be termed as of general value.b)Concepts that serve a specific purpose must not be viewed as principles to be used in every sphere of life.c)Specific concepts must be applied to comprehensive political ideology since there are certain common areas between them.d)Specific concepts can aspire for increased generality if there is no systematic trend and such specific concept is capable of being general.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.Theres a kind of threat to the quality of public reason that tends to go unnoticed. This is the degradation of the core ideas mobilized in exercises of public reason, not least in the utterances of elite actors, such as bureaucrats, lawyers, politicians and representatives of international organizations and NGOs. These ideas – health, human rights, democracy and so on – are central to the way we formulate and address the main political challenges of our time, from the climate crisis to the other issues. One prominent form taken by this degradation of public reason is the phenomenon I call conceptual overreach. This occurs when a particular concept undergoes a process of expansion or inflation in which it absorbs ideas and demands that are foreign to it. In its most extreme manifestation, conceptual overreach morphs into a totalising all in one dogma.A single concept – say, human rights or the rule of law – is taken to offer a comprehensive political ideology, as opposed to picking out one among many elements upon which our political thinking needs to draw and hold in balance when arriving at justified responses to the problems of our time. Of course, well always need some very general concepts to refer to vast domains of value – the ideas of ethics, justice and morality, for example, have traditionally served this function. The problem is when there is a systematic trend for more specific concepts of value to aspire to the same level of generality. But why worry about conceptual overreach? If human rights, say, is a phrase that increasingly encompasses more and more things that are genuinely valuable goals, why should we quibble about the label attached to them? Isnt this mere pedantry? Far from it, I believe.One danger of conceptual overreach is that we lose sight of the distinctive idea conveyed by a given concept through its immersion in a sea of many other quite separate ideas, a significance that goes beyond the baseline fact that all the ideas in question identify something of value. If, for example, human rights are demands that are generally high-priority in nature, such that its seldom if ever justified to override them, then we lose our grip on that important idea if we start including under the heading of human rights valuable objectives – for example, access to a high-quality internet connection – that dont plausibly enjoy that kind of priority. Another danger is that the extraneous ideas that are subjected to a process of conceptual takeover end up being themselves distorted. So, for example, we start regarding modes of treatment that are beneficial to someone, such as mercy towards a convicted offender, as benefits to which they have a right.As a result, this conceptual overreach leaves us poorly positioned to identify the distinct values that are at stake in any given decision. It also obscures the agonizing conflicts that exist among these values in particular cases. But these two large intellectual defects also generate serious practical drawbacks when we seek to engage in deliberation with others. Conceptual overreach in its more extreme forms inhibits constructive dialogue, or even just the brokering of honorable compromises, with those whose political orientation differs significantly from ours. This is because it makes it difficult to find any point of common ground or shared understanding with them. Instead, when we try to reach some kind of reasonable accommodation with them based on, say, fairness or human rights, we find ourselves locked in opposing moral-political worldviews at every turn.Q. In context of the phrase, "to aspire to the same level of generality," in the second paragraph, each of the following statements can be inferredEXCEPT:a)Only the concepts that can be applied to different situations and incidents are capable to be termed as of general value.b)Concepts that serve a specific purpose must not be viewed as principles to be used in every sphere of life.c)Specific concepts must be applied to comprehensive political ideology since there are certain common areas between them.d)Specific concepts can aspire for increased generality if there is no systematic trend and such specific concept is capable of being general.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.Theres a kind of threat to the quality of public reason that tends to go unnoticed. This is the degradation of the core ideas mobilized in exercises of public reason, not least in the utterances of elite actors, such as bureaucrats, lawyers, politicians and representatives of international organizations and NGOs. These ideas – health, human rights, democracy and so on – are central to the way we formulate and address the main political challenges of our time, from the climate crisis to the other issues. One prominent form taken by this degradation of public reason is the phenomenon I call conceptual overreach. This occurs when a particular concept undergoes a process of expansion or inflation in which it absorbs ideas and demands that are foreign to it. In its most extreme manifestation, conceptual overreach morphs into a totalising all in one dogma.A single concept – say, human rights or the rule of law – is taken to offer a comprehensive political ideology, as opposed to picking out one among many elements upon which our political thinking needs to draw and hold in balance when arriving at justified responses to the problems of our time. Of course, well always need some very general concepts to refer to vast domains of value – the ideas of ethics, justice and morality, for example, have traditionally served this function. The problem is when there is a systematic trend for more specific concepts of value to aspire to the same level of generality. But why worry about conceptual overreach? If human rights, say, is a phrase that increasingly encompasses more and more things that are genuinely valuable goals, why should we quibble about the label attached to them? Isnt this mere pedantry? Far from it, I believe.One danger of conceptual overreach is that we lose sight of the distinctive idea conveyed by a given concept through its immersion in a sea of many other quite separate ideas, a significance that goes beyond the baseline fact that all the ideas in question identify something of value. If, for example, human rights are demands that are generally high-priority in nature, such that its seldom if ever justified to override them, then we lose our grip on that important idea if we start including under the heading of human rights valuable objectives – for example, access to a high-quality internet connection – that dont plausibly enjoy that kind of priority. Another danger is that the extraneous ideas that are subjected to a process of conceptual takeover end up being themselves distorted. So, for example, we start regarding modes of treatment that are beneficial to someone, such as mercy towards a convicted offender, as benefits to which they have a right.As a result, this conceptual overreach leaves us poorly positioned to identify the distinct values that are at stake in any given decision. It also obscures the agonizing conflicts that exist among these values in particular cases. But these two large intellectual defects also generate serious practical drawbacks when we seek to engage in deliberation with others. Conceptual overreach in its more extreme forms inhibits constructive dialogue, or even just the brokering of honorable compromises, with those whose political orientation differs significantly from ours. This is because it makes it difficult to find any point of common ground or shared understanding with them. Instead, when we try to reach some kind of reasonable accommodation with them based on, say, fairness or human rights, we find ourselves locked in opposing moral-political worldviews at every turn.Q. In context of the phrase, "to aspire to the same level of generality," in the second paragraph, each of the following statements can be inferredEXCEPT:a)Only the concepts that can be applied to different situations and incidents are capable to be termed as of general value.b)Concepts that serve a specific purpose must not be viewed as principles to be used in every sphere of life.c)Specific concepts must be applied to comprehensive political ideology since there are certain common areas between them.d)Specific concepts can aspire for increased generality if there is no systematic trend and such specific concept is capable of being general.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.Theres a kind of threat to the quality of public reason that tends to go unnoticed. This is the degradation of the core ideas mobilized in exercises of public reason, not least in the utterances of elite actors, such as bureaucrats, lawyers, politicians and representatives of international organizations and NGOs. These ideas – health, human rights, democracy and so on – are central to the way we formulate and address the main political challenges of our time, from the climate crisis to the other issues. One prominent form taken by this degradation of public reason is the phenomenon I call conceptual overreach. This occurs when a particular concept undergoes a process of expansion or inflation in which it absorbs ideas and demands that are foreign to it. In its most extreme manifestation, conceptual overreach morphs into a totalising all in one dogma.A single concept – say, human rights or the rule of law – is taken to offer a comprehensive political ideology, as opposed to picking out one among many elements upon which our political thinking needs to draw and hold in balance when arriving at justified responses to the problems of our time. Of course, well always need some very general concepts to refer to vast domains of value – the ideas of ethics, justice and morality, for example, have traditionally served this function. The problem is when there is a systematic trend for more specific concepts of value to aspire to the same level of generality. But why worry about conceptual overreach? If human rights, say, is a phrase that increasingly encompasses more and more things that are genuinely valuable goals, why should we quibble about the label attached to them? Isnt this mere pedantry? Far from it, I believe.One danger of conceptual overreach is that we lose sight of the distinctive idea conveyed by a given concept through its immersion in a sea of many other quite separate ideas, a significance that goes beyond the baseline fact that all the ideas in question identify something of value. If, for example, human rights are demands that are generally high-priority in nature, such that its seldom if ever justified to override them, then we lose our grip on that important idea if we start including under the heading of human rights valuable objectives – for example, access to a high-quality internet connection – that dont plausibly enjoy that kind of priority. Another danger is that the extraneous ideas that are subjected to a process of conceptual takeover end up being themselves distorted. So, for example, we start regarding modes of treatment that are beneficial to someone, such as mercy towards a convicted offender, as benefits to which they have a right.As a result, this conceptual overreach leaves us poorly positioned to identify the distinct values that are at stake in any given decision. It also obscures the agonizing conflicts that exist among these values in particular cases. But these two large intellectual defects also generate serious practical drawbacks when we seek to engage in deliberation with others. Conceptual overreach in its more extreme forms inhibits constructive dialogue, or even just the brokering of honorable compromises, with those whose political orientation differs significantly from ours. This is because it makes it difficult to find any point of common ground or shared understanding with them. Instead, when we try to reach some kind of reasonable accommodation with them based on, say, fairness or human rights, we find ourselves locked in opposing moral-political worldviews at every turn.Q. In context of the phrase, "to aspire to the same level of generality," in the second paragraph, each of the following statements can be inferredEXCEPT:a)Only the concepts that can be applied to different situations and incidents are capable to be termed as of general value.b)Concepts that serve a specific purpose must not be viewed as principles to be used in every sphere of life.c)Specific concepts must be applied to comprehensive political ideology since there are certain common areas between them.d)Specific concepts can aspire for increased generality if there is no systematic trend and such specific concept is capable of being general.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice Directions: Read the following passage carefully and answer the given question.Theres a kind of threat to the quality of public reason that tends to go unnoticed. This is the degradation of the core ideas mobilized in exercises of public reason, not least in the utterances of elite actors, such as bureaucrats, lawyers, politicians and representatives of international organizations and NGOs. These ideas – health, human rights, democracy and so on – are central to the way we formulate and address the main political challenges of our time, from the climate crisis to the other issues. One prominent form taken by this degradation of public reason is the phenomenon I call conceptual overreach. This occurs when a particular concept undergoes a process of expansion or inflation in which it absorbs ideas and demands that are foreign to it. In its most extreme manifestation, conceptual overreach morphs into a totalising all in one dogma.A single concept – say, human rights or the rule of law – is taken to offer a comprehensive political ideology, as opposed to picking out one among many elements upon which our political thinking needs to draw and hold in balance when arriving at justified responses to the problems of our time. Of course, well always need some very general concepts to refer to vast domains of value – the ideas of ethics, justice and morality, for example, have traditionally served this function. The problem is when there is a systematic trend for more specific concepts of value to aspire to the same level of generality. But why worry about conceptual overreach? If human rights, say, is a phrase that increasingly encompasses more and more things that are genuinely valuable goals, why should we quibble about the label attached to them? Isnt this mere pedantry? Far from it, I believe.One danger of conceptual overreach is that we lose sight of the distinctive idea conveyed by a given concept through its immersion in a sea of many other quite separate ideas, a significance that goes beyond the baseline fact that all the ideas in question identify something of value. If, for example, human rights are demands that are generally high-priority in nature, such that its seldom if ever justified to override them, then we lose our grip on that important idea if we start including under the heading of human rights valuable objectives – for example, access to a high-quality internet connection – that dont plausibly enjoy that kind of priority. Another danger is that the extraneous ideas that are subjected to a process of conceptual takeover end up being themselves distorted. So, for example, we start regarding modes of treatment that are beneficial to someone, such as mercy towards a convicted offender, as benefits to which they have a right.As a result, this conceptual overreach leaves us poorly positioned to identify the distinct values that are at stake in any given decision. It also obscures the agonizing conflicts that exist among these values in particular cases. But these two large intellectual defects also generate serious practical drawbacks when we seek to engage in deliberation with others. Conceptual overreach in its more extreme forms inhibits constructive dialogue, or even just the brokering of honorable compromises, with those whose political orientation differs significantly from ours. This is because it makes it difficult to find any point of common ground or shared understanding with them. Instead, when we try to reach some kind of reasonable accommodation with them based on, say, fairness or human rights, we find ourselves locked in opposing moral-political worldviews at every turn.Q. In context of the phrase, "to aspire to the same level of generality," in the second paragraph, each of the following statements can be inferredEXCEPT:a)Only the concepts that can be applied to different situations and incidents are capable to be termed as of general value.b)Concepts that serve a specific purpose must not be viewed as principles to be used in every sphere of life.c)Specific concepts must be applied to comprehensive political ideology since there are certain common areas between them.d)Specific concepts can aspire for increased generality if there is no systematic trend and such specific concept is capable of being general.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CAT tests.