The Indian Evidence Act - 2 | Civil Law for Judiciary Exams PDF Download

Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat (2001)

• This case involves the concept of dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act (IEA).

Facts of the Case

• Asha Ben, the victim, was married and had two children.
• Her husband was Vinod Bhai.
• The appellant, Hiralal Joitaram, was having an affair with Asha Ben's sister, which Asha resented.
• Asha expressed her dislike for this relationship to her sister and others.
• On October 21, 1988, while going to pick up her child from school, Asha was stopped by Hiralal.
• Hiralal attacked Asha by throwing flame on her from a lighter, causing her to be burnt alive.
• Asha managed to escape to a nearby water source, which helped extinguish the flames, but she suffered severe burns.
• A passerby helped her cover up and arranged a rickshaw to take her to the hospital.
• Asha was treated for almost two weeks but died from her injuries on November 15, 1988.
• Before her death, she identified Hiralal Joitaram as her attacker in statements recorded by police and a magistrate.

Legal Issues

• Was the identity of Asha's attacker clearly established as Hiralal Joitaram?
• Did Asha's dying declaration unmistakably identify him as the assailant?

Supreme Court Observations

• The Supreme Court confirmed that Asha's death resulted from the burns she suffered during the attack.
• The court analyzed her dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the IEA.
• It noted that Asha's statements were made to clarify who set her on fire, moving beyond any confusion about names.
• The victim clearly identified Hiralal Joitaram as the person who attacked her.
• There was no reason to doubt her identification, as she was familiar with him.
• Hiralal knew that his actions would likely cause Asha’s death.
• Even though Asha died weeks later, this did not change the nature of the crime under Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Hiralal Joitaram for murder based on Asha’s dying declaration.
• The appeal against his conviction was dismissed.

Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana 1975 SCR (3) 453

The case revolves around the admissibility of approver's evidence in criminal trials.

Facts

• The accused, an Air Force employee, and the approver, both stationed at Sirsa, were close friends.
• The accused developed an intimate relationship with Balbir Kaur, posing as a bachelor and pressuring her for marriage.
• On June 12 and 13, heated arguments arose when the accused attempted to bring Balbir back, and his wife, Bimla, returned home.
• The accused demanded a divorce, expressing intentions to harm and kill his wife.
• In July 1968, the accused, his wife, the approver, and two others boarded a train.
• When the train left Rewari, only these five individualswere in the compartment.
• The accused threw Bimla on the floor, while the approver held her feet.
• Bhanu Parkash Singh poured acid in her mouth, and Ravinder threw her from the moving train.

Judicial History

• Trial Court: Acquitted the accused, citing lack of evidence.
• Additional Sessions Judge: Disbelieved the approver's testimony due to lack of corroboration.
• High Court:
  • Found the approver credible under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA).
  • Cited corroboration in material particulars and convicted the accused under Section 302 of IPC, 1860.

Issue Involved

• Did the husband cause the murder of his wife?

Observations

• The accused’s presence on the train with the deceased in July 1968 is corroborated by independent evidence.
• The deceased's body being found near a distant railway track supports the train journey claim.
• Approver’s testimonywas examined based on two key tests:
  • A plausible and detailed narrative implicating the approver himself.
  • Evidence pointing to the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Rarely, uncorroborated approver evidence can suffice, but corroboration is generally crucial.
• In this case:
  • The approver, a close associate of the accused, showed no signs of unreliability or inconsistency.
  • The High Court rejected the Trial Court's skepticism, highlighting the crime’s premeditation.
• The Supreme Court affirmed the approver’s credibility and corroboration with independent witnesses.

Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy AIR 2015 SC 418

This case involves significant issues under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) concerning the legitimacy of a child and the chastity of a woman.

Facts

• A husband believed his wife was unfaithful and requested a DNA test to prove he was not the father of their child.
• The husband aimed to support his divorce petition by showing that the child was born from an extramarital affair.
• The wife denied the allegations, claiming they had a continuous marital relationship and that the husband fulfilled all his duties.
• Initially, the Family Court rejected the husband's request for a DNA test.
• The husband appealed to the Calcutta High Court, which allowed the DNA test.
• The wife then challenged this decision in the Supreme Court.

Issue

• Was the wife disloyal to her husband?

Observations

• The husband clearly stated in his petition that he believed his wife was unfaithful and named the alleged father of the child.
• To prove his claim, the husband sought a DNA test, which the Supreme Court deemed necessary.
• The Supreme Court noted that while Section 112 of the IEA provides a presumption of legitimacy for children born during marriage, this presumption can be challenged by scientific evidence.
• The court emphasized that modern scientific methods, such as DNA tests, should take precedence when they contradict legal presumptions.
• The court stated, “In cases where evidence contradicts the presumption, the court should rely on the best available scientific methods.”

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court concluded that the DNA test proved the husband had no access to the wife at the time the child was conceived.
• The court upheld the High Court's order for the DNA test, stating that the wife could not be compelled to accept fatherhood based on the scientific evidence.
• If the wife refuses to comply with the court's direction, the allegations would be assessed by the court, considering Section 114 of the IEA.

M.C. Vergheese v. T.J. Ponnan 1970 AIR 1876

• This case involves the topic of defamation and privileged communication between a husband and wife.
• The case is titled M.C. Vergheese v. T.J. Ponnan, decided by the Supreme Court in 1970.

Facts of the Case

• M.C. Vergheese's daughter was married to T.J. Ponnan.
• On three occasions in July 1964, Ponnan sent letters from Bombay to his wife, Rathi, who was living with her parents in Trivandrum.
• These letters allegedly contained statements that harmed Vergheese's reputation.
• At the time the letters were presented in court, a case for nullity of marriage between Ponnan and Rathi was ongoing.
• This appeal was brought to the Supreme Court under Article 132 of the Constitution of India.

Legal Issues

• Are the letters admissible in evidence, or are they barred by law from being disclosed?
• Does a husband speaking defamatory statements to his wife count as publication under Indian law?

Supreme Court Observations

• The Supreme Court ruled that since the letters were written while the couple was still married, they are protected as privileged communication.
• The court emphasized that the admissibility of such communications is judged based on the status of the couple at the time the communication was made, not when it is presented in court.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturned the Kerala High Court's decision, and sent the case back to the District Magistrate for further proceedings.

Aghnoo Nagesia v. The State of Bihar (1966) 1966 SCR (1) 134

This case is a landmark decision on the evidentiary value of a confessionary First Information Report (FIR). It addresses the conflict between Sections 25, 26, and 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA).

Facts

• In 1963, the appellant, Aghnoo Nagesia, was charged under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 for the murder of four individuals.
• The appellant himself reported these offences to the police.
• The Sub-Inspector, who was the officer-in-charge, reduced the information to writing, and the appellant confirmed it with his left thumbprint before being arrested.
• During a joint visit with the appellant, the bodies of the victims and the murder weapon were discovered at the victims' house and other locations.
• A blood-stained cloth (chadar) was recovered from the appellant’s residence.
• Medical evidence confirmed that the victims had incised wounds inflicted by a sharp weapon, likely a tangi.
• There were no eyewitnesses, and the primary evidence was the confessional FIR filed by the appellant.
• The Judicial Commissioner of Chotanagpur convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death, which was upheld by the High Court of Patna.
• The appellant then approached the Supreme Court through a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Issue Involved

• Whether the statement or any portion of the FIR is admissible as evidence?

Observations

• Section 25 of IEA: Prohibits the admissibility of a confession made to a police officer under any circumstances, regardless of whether it was made freely or during an investigation.
• Section 26 of IEA: Prohibits the use of confessions made by an accused while in police custody, unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.
• Section 27 of IEA: Partially lifts the ban imposed by Sections 25 and 26.
• Allows police to prove evidence discovered as a direct consequence of information provided by the accused while in police custody.
• Applies only to the specific fact or evidence discovered due to the accused’s information.

Key Principles:

• A confession made in an FIR is inadmissible under Section 25 unless the ban is lifted by Section 27.
• Confessions include not only the admission of the offence but also other incriminating facts related to the offence.
• No part of a confessional FIR can be admitted unless it complies with Section 27.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and overturned the conviction, ruling that the confessional FIR given by the appellant was inadmissible as he was not in police custody when it was made.

Badri Rai v. State of Bihar (1958) AIR 953

• This case is about the admissibility of statements made by one person against a co-conspirator.
• Such statements can be accepted as evidence under Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Facts of the Case

• Two accused were charged with conspiring to bribe a police officer.
• One accused was under investigation for possessing stolen property (molten silver).
• Both accused approached the police officer, asking him to cover up the case for a bribe.
• The police officer instructed them to visit the station and reported their actions to his superior.
• About a week later, one accused, Badri Rai, went to the station with a packet of money.
• He claimed the money was sent by the second accused as part of their previous discussion to hush up the ongoing case.
• The police seized the money and registered an FIR (First Information Report).
• Both the Trial Court and the High Court found the accused guilty under Section 120B (criminal conspiracy) and Section 165A (public servant taking a gratification, for exercising personal influence with public servant) of the IPC.

Key Legal Issue

• Can the statement made by Badri Rai be considered valid evidence under Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act?

Supreme Court Observations

• The Supreme Court emphasized that Section 10 is crucial for this case.
• The initial approach by both accused to the police officer clearly shows they conspired to bribe him.
• This previous incident serves as strong evidence of their conspiracy to commit bribery.
• The actions and statements made during the conspiracy are relevant and admissible.

Conclusion

• The court concluded that the consideration (the bribe) and the statements made by one conspirator against another during the conspiracy are covered under Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

State of Maharashtra v. Prafulla B. Desai (Dr.) (2003) 4 SCC 601

• This case addresses the issue of whether evidence can be recorded through video conferencing under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
• As technology evolves, it raises questions about the admissibility of evidence collected via modern means.

Facts of the Case

• The complainant's wife was diagnosed with cancer. Dr. Greenberg advised that she could be treated with medication and did not require surgery.
• After consulting another doctor, surgery was performed, resulting in the removal of her uterus, after which she died.
• The complainant filed a case against the doctors under Sections 338, 109, and 114 of the Indian Penal Code.
• The Maharashtra Medical Council found the respondent guilty after an inquiry.
• The prosecution wanted Dr. Greenberg to provide his opinion, but he refused to travel to India and offered to testify via video conferencing.
• The trial court allowed the video conferencing, but the High Court ruled that evidence must be presented in the physical presence of the accused.

Issues Involved

• Can evidence recorded through video conferencing be considered admissible?
• Does "physical presence" under Section 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only mean actual presence in court?

Supreme Court Observations

• The Supreme Court noted that the High Court misinterpreted Section 273 of the Cr.P.C., which allows for constructive presence, meaning actual physical presence is not mandatory.
• Evidence can be oral, documentary, or electronically recorded, including through video conferencing.
• The court's primary duty is to ensure justice. A failure to produce evidence can lead to unjust acquittals or convictions.
• The law must adapt to societal changes and embrace new technology.
• Video conferencing can fulfill the requirements of Section 273 of the Cr.P.C.
• If a witness prefers to give evidence via video conferencing, measures must be taken to ensure the accused and their counsel are present during the process.
• The court emphasized that Dr. Greenberg's testimony was crucial for justice.
• The magistrate must ensure that the witness answers questions properly during the proceedings.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court concluded that evidence can be recorded through video conferencing.
• It clarified that "presence" under Section 273 of the Cr.P.C. includes both physical and virtual presence.
• The court overturned the High Court's judgment.

Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B. (2002) 7 SCC 334

• This case is about Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B. decided by the Supreme Court in 2002.
• The focus is on Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which deals with the admissibility of statements made by co-conspirators.

Facts of the Case

• The accused were involved in a conspiracy to illegally manufacture bombs to create terror and disrupt communal harmony.
• During the investigation, 8 individuals, including 6 appellants, were linked to the crime.
• They were charged under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) and found guilty.
• The charges included Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 related to criminal conspiracy.

Key Legal Issue

• The main question was whether statements made by a co-conspirator two days after the incident could be used as evidence under Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Court Observations

• The court highlighted that there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the accused conspired together.
• Even if there is some evidence of conspiracy, this condition must be met.
• Section 10 allows statements made by one conspirator to be used against another only if made during the time of conspiracy.
• Once the conspiracy ends, statements made after that are not admissible as evidence of their common intention.
• The court referred to an earlier case, Mirza Akbar v. Emperor (1940), which stated that only statements made while the conspiracy was ongoing are relevant.

Conclusion

• The court concluded that the prosecution failed to show that any accused remained part of the conspiracy after the incident.
• As a result, the appeal was dismissed.

Mirza Akbar v. Emperor (1940) PC 176

• The case involves Mirza Akbar v. Emperor, decided in 1940 by the Privy Council.
• It focuses on conspiracy under Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
• The case centers around a wife (W) and her lover (M), who were charged with murder and conspiracy to murder her husband.

Key Facts

• The wife and her paramour hired a sharpshooter (U) to kill the husband.
• The guilt of sharpshooter U was clear as he was caught in the act.
• The main evidence against W and M consisted of love letters that showed their deep affection for each other.
• The authenticity of these letters was confirmed during the trial.
• During the trial, W made statements that implicated M, which were admitted as evidence against U under Section 10.
• Both the Trial Court and Appellate Court upheld the conviction of the accused under Section 302 (murder) and Section 120B (criminal conspiracy) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Legal Issue

• The main question was whether the statements made by the wife were wrongly admitted as evidence by the courts.

Privy Council Observations

• The Privy Council noted that the language in Section 10 must be interpreted strictly and does not allow for broad interpretation.
• It stated that a statement made by one conspirator in the absence of another cannot be included if it refers to past actions after the conspiracy has ended.
• While the letters were written during the conspiracy to achieve their goal, W's statement to the Magistrate occurred after the conspiracy was over.
• Thus, the statement made before the Magistrate was not admissible under Section 10.
• The letters themselves indicated a conspiracy to kill the husband.

Conclusion

• The Privy Council concluded that the wife's statements were not consistent with ongoing conspiracy because they were made after the objective was achieved.
• These statements were deemed inadmissible as evidence but did not invalidate the court proceedings.