The Hindu Editorial Analysis- 29th October, 2020 | Additional Study Material for UPSC PDF Download

1. TWO TOGETHER

GS 3- Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and affecting India’s interests.

Context
(i) The India­U.S. Foreign and Defence Ministers meet for the “2+2” mechanism just a week before the U.S. elections is proof that bilateral ties between the two countries are on a firm footing.
(ii) Ostensibly (as it appears) , the purpose was to conduct an annual review of ties and to wrap up the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for Geo­spatial Cooperation, the last of the three enabling agreements which will facilitate easier interoperability (the ability of computer systems to exchange data and use it) between the Indian and American defence forces.

Bilateral Agreements
(i) Other agreements signed or reviewed included those in the areas of health and COVID­19 cooperation, building strategic petroleum reserves in the U.S., renewable energy, space, cyberspace, counter­terrorism and counter­narcotics.
(ii) In the Joint statement they issued, the Ministers also called on Pakistan to take “immediate, sustained and irreversible action” against cross­border terror groups on its soil, and to bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and 2016 Uri and Pathankot strikes.
(iii) However, the timing and the tenor (course of thought) of the American pronouncements prior to the visit made it clear that the larger import of the visit for the Trump administration was about dealing with China.
(iv) In every interaction, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo referred to the challenge from Beijing, of the need to build a counter coalition to the “Chinese Communist Party”, and to further U.S. Indo­Pacific policy in this regard.
(v) In India, he made a reference to the “increasing aggression and destabilising activities by China” and mentioned Indian soldiers killed in clashes with the PLA on the LAC in June.
(vi) He is taking the same message to his next stops. In Colombo and Male on Wednesday — he is also visiting Indonesia — Mr. Pompeo raised the need to counter and provide alternatives to what he called China’s “bad deals, violations of sovereignty and lawlessness on land and sea”.

Security Convergence
(i) For New Delhi, the visit by the U.S. officials was a way to demonstrate that the bilateral relationship is “poll-proof” and will grow regardless of the November 3 election result.
(ii) The BECA agreement signed is an important addition to India’s defence and strategic capabilities, and it is significant that India­U.S. ties have been reaffirmed now given that it could take some months for the U.S. administration to restart bilateral engagements post­elections.
(iii) While welcoming their U.S. interlocutors (one who takes part in dialogue) and taking ties forward, however, it is significant that the government has chosen not to enter into the comments made by Mr. Pompeo on India’s China challenge, in keeping with New Delhi’s stated policy that the LAC tensions are a “bilateral matter”.

Conclusion
The conspicuous (easily noticed) silence from External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in response to Mr. Pompeo’s comments on China is also a sobering reminder that while India appreciates support from the U.S., it retains its strategic autonomy in dealing with threats and troubles with its biggest neighbour.

2. REAL ESTATE

GS 2- Government policies and interventions for development in various sectors and issues arising out of their design and implementation

Context
(i) The changes in land laws in Jammu and Kashmir notified by the Centre on October 26 allow the purchase of land by those who are not permanent residents of the Union Territory, for the first time.
(ii) Only permanent residents could purchase land in the erstwhile (former) State, which was reorganised as two UTs, J&K and Ladakh, in August 2019.

New Land Laws
(i) One of the arguments against the now nullified (void/ to rule out) special status of J&K was that the restrictions on land transfers hampered investments.
(ii) J&K industrial policy had limited land holding of investors to designated enclaves (specific areas).
(iii) The changes in land laws were logical steps to follow the end of the special status.
(iv) Some restrictions remain on the transfer of agricultural land for non­agricultural purposes, but this too can be cleared by the district collector.
(v) The government has said the changes will encourage investment and advance peace and progress in J&K.
(vi) The argument that these changes would help the people of the region might have been stronger if these were done in consultation (discussion) with them.
(vii) The irony (sarcasm) is that in all three regions — Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh — there is strong opposition to opening the land market to non­residents. Political parties in J&K too have opposed the changes.

Progress And Development
(i) Free movement of people, and an integrated national market can advance development but India’s governance structure accommodates fears and concerns of local populations in this context in a measured manner.
(ii) There are several States which have provisions to regulate ownership and transfer of land under Article 371 of the Constitution.
(iii) The Centre is expected to announce new land laws for the UT of Ladakh before October 30, and it has promised to “safeguard interests of the people” regarding “all issues related to language, demography, ethnicity, land and jobs”.

Resentment By Locals
(i) The Centre’s approach towards J&K has been marked by a lack of trust, which has accentuated (increase focus) the alienation (separation) of large sections of the population.
(ii) Fears of deliberate (intentional) demographic engineering have dominated politics in the Valley for long.
(iii) After the reorganisation of the State and the loss of its special status in 2019, the people of Jammu and Ladakh also turned nervous on this question. Desirable as it may be, there is no point forcing a particular path of development upon people.
(iv) The situation is precarious (uncertain) also because of the heavy hand of the state on political and civil society activities in J&K.
(v) The unilateralism (decision making by one person/party) that has come to define New Delhi’s dealings with J&K is achieving little. There is no wisdom in pushing through measures aimed to promote investment when the end result is political volatility (extreme changes).

Conclusion
The Centre’s policy towards J&K must be buttressed(supported) by a robust(strong) political process that enables people’s participation and ensures stability with growth and development.

3. COUNTERING DEEPFAKES, THE MOST SERIOUS AI THREAT

GS 3- Science and technology – developments and their application and effects in everyday life.

Context
(i) Disinformation and hoaxes(joke/lies) have evolved from mere annoyance to high stake warfare for creating social discord(conflict), increasing polarization(contrast), and in some cases, influencing an election outcome.
(ii) Deepfakes are a new tool to spread computational(relating to computers) propaganda and disinformation at scale and with speed. Access to commodity cloud computing, algorithms, and abundant data has created a perfect storm to democratise media creation and manipulation (control).
(iii) Deepfakes are the digital media (video, audio, and images) manipulated using Artificial Intelligence. This synthetic media content is referred to as deepfakes.

A Cyber Frankenstein
(i) Synthetic media can create possibilities and opportunities for all people, regardless of who they are, where they are, and how they listen, speak, or communicate.
(ii) It can give people a voice, purpose, and ability to make an impact at scale and with. But as with any new innovative technology, it can be weaponised to inflict(cause) harm.
(iii) Deepfakes, hyper­realistic digital falsification, can inflict damage to individuals, institutions, businesses and democracy.
(iv) They make it possible to fabricate(fake) media - swap faces, lip­syncing, and puppeteer — mostly without consent and bring threat to psychology, security, political stability, and business disruption.

Targeting Women
(i) The very first use case of malicious use of a deepfake was seen in pornography, inflicting emotional, reputational, and in some cases, violence towards the individual.
(ii) Pornographic deepfakes can threaten, intimidate, and inflict psychological harm and reduce women to sexual objects.
(iii) Deepfake pornography exclusively targets women.
(iv) Deepfakes can depict a person indulging in antisocial behaviours and saying vile things.
(v) Deepfakes can be deployed to extract money, confidential information, or exact favours from individuals.
(vi) Deepfakes can cause short­ and long­term social harm and accelerate(speed up) the already declining trust in news media.

Undermining Democracy
(i) A deepfake can also aid in altering(changing) the democratic discourse and undermine trust in institutions and impair diplomacy.
(ii) False information about institutions, public policy, and politicians powered by a deepfake can be exploited to spin the story and manipulate belief.
(iii) A deepfake of a political candidate can sabotage(destroy) their image and reputation.
(iv) Leaders can also use them to increase populism and consolidate power. Deepfakes can become a very effective tool to sow the seeds of polarisation, amplifying division in society, and suppressing dissent.
(v) Another concern is a liar’s dividend – an undesirable truth is dismissed as deepfake or fake news.

Major Solutions
(i) To defend the truth and secure freedom of expression, we need a multi­stakeholder and multi­modal approach.
(ii) Collaborative actions and collective techniques across legislative regulations, platform policies, technology intervention, and media literacy can provide effective and ethical countermeasures to mitigate(lessen) the threat of malicious deepfakes.
(iii) Media literacy for consumers and journalists is the most effective tool to combat disinformation and deepfakes.
(iv) Media literacy efforts must be enhanced to cultivate a discerning(well-informed) public.
(v) As consumers of media, we must have the ability to decipher, understand, translate, and use the information we encounter.
(vi) Even a short intervention with media understanding, learning the motivations and context, can lessen the damage.
(vii) Improving media literacy is a precursor to addressing the challenges presented by deepfakes.
(viii) Meaningful regulations with a collaborative discussion with the technology industry, civil society, and policymakers can facilitate disincentivising the creation and distribution of malicious deepfakes.
(ix) We also need easy­to­use and accessible technology solutions to detect deepfakes, authenticate media, and amplify authoritative sources.
(x) To counter the menace(danger) of deepfakes, we all must take the responsibility to be a critical consumer of media on the Internet, think and pause before we share on social media, and be part of the solution to this infodemic(excessive information).