India-China LAC Standoff | Gist of Rajya Sabha TV / RSTV (now Sansad TV) - UPSC PDF Download

Introduction:

Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane has said that India expects to hold a 13th round of talks with China on the Ladakh standoff and disengagement of military forces next week. He also said that there has been an increase in the deployment of Chinese troops which has been a matter of concern however for the last six months the situation has been quite normal. The last round of talks between both countries took place on 31^st July this year after which the two sides had stepped back from Gogra Post, going back to their traditional bases and creating a temporary no-patrolling zone. Last week in response to a media query about remarks by Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry, the MEA spokesperson had said that China continues to deploy a large number of troops and armaments in the border areas and it was in response to Chinese actions, that our armed forces had to make appropriate counter deployments in these areas to ensure that India’s security interests are fully protected.

Why do face-offs occur?

• Face-off and stand-off situations occur along the LAC in areas where India and China have overlapping claim lines.
• The LAC has never been demarcated. Differing perceptions are particularly acute in around two dozen spots across the Western (Ladakh), Middle (Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand), Sikkim, and Eastern (Arunachal Pradesh) sectors of the India-China border.
• The boundary in the Sikkim sector is broadly agreed, but has not been delineated. Face-offs occur when patrols encounter each other in the contested zones between overlapping claim lines.
• Protocols agreed to in 2005 and 2013 detail rules of engagement to prevent such incidents, but have not always been adhered to.

Why has not the LAC been clarified?

• India has long proposed an exercise to clarify differing perceptions of the LAC to prevent such incidents.
• Maps were exchanged in the Middle Sector, but the exercise fell through in the Western Sector where divergence is the greatest.
• China has since rejected this exercise, viewing it as adding another complication to the on-going boundary negotiations.
• India’s argument is rather than agree on one LAC, the exercise could help both sides understand the claims of the other, paving the way to regulate activities in contested areas until a final settlement of the boundary dispute.

What is the state of boundary negotiations?

• The 22nd round of talks between the Special Representatives, National Security Adviser and China’s State Councillor was held in Delhi in December 2019.
• Both “agreed that an early settlement of the boundary question serves the fundamental interests of both countries” and “resolved to intensify their efforts to achieve a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution”.
• In 2005, an agreement on political parameters and guiding principles completed the first of three stages of the talks.
• The current, and most difficult, stage involves agreeing a framework to resolve the dispute in all sectors.
• The final step will involve delineating and demarcating the boundary in maps and on the ground.

India committed to peace and tranquillity along border with China: MEA:

• India said it remained committed to maintaining peace and tranquillity along the border with China noting that such incidents could have been avoided if there was a common perception about the frontier.
• India and China attach utmost importance to ensuring peace and tranquillity in all areas of Sino-India border regions and referred to affirmation about it by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in their two informal summits.
• In the summit, the two leaders decided to issue “strategic guidance” to their militaries to strengthen communications so that they can build trust and understanding.

What are the prospects of a settlement?

• The likelihood appears remote. The main differences are in the Western and Eastern sectors.
• India sees China as occupying 38,000 sq km in Aksai Chin. In the east, China claims as much as 90,000 sq km, extending all across Arunachal Pradesh.
• A swap was hinted at by China in 1960 and in the early 1980s, which would have essentially formalised the status quo. Both sides have now ruled out the status quo as a settlement, agreeing to meaningful and mutual adjustments.

Conclusion:

• Good neighbourhood relations are crucial for national stability and well-being.
• If India is to disengage from economic involvement with China and build the capacities and capabilities it needs in manufacturing, and in supply chain networks closer home, it cannot be a prisoner of the short term.
• At the same time, the most realistic solution will involve only minor adjustments along the LAC, considering neither side will be willing to part with territory already held.
• The 2005 agreement said both sides “shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in border areas”.
• One particular sticking point appears to involve China’s claims to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, which has been increasingly referenced in public statements in recent years.
• The Tawang demand is, however, more a symptom than the root of the problem. In truth, China knows ceding Tawang will be impossible for any Indian government to consider. The broader issue appears to be a fundamental difference in how both sides view the boundary question.
• China’s experience indicates that resolving border disputes is usually the result, rather than the cause, of improvement in relations.
• But India insists that its relations with China won’t improve fundamentally until the border dispute is resolved.
• Therein lies the crux of the problem. In some sense, Beijing appears to view an unsettled border as holding some leverage with India, one of the many pressure points it could use to keep India off-guard.