Theory of Basic Particulars and Persons (Quine and Strawson) | Philosophy Optional Notes for UPSC PDF Download

Introduction

The theories of basic particulars and persons, as elucidated by W.V.O. Quine and P.F. Strawson, delve into the essence of existence and the fundamental constituents of reality. By delving into their ontological and metaphysical perspectives, we can gain deeper insights into the philosophical foundations of their theories, as well as the ongoing discussions and advancements in the realm of basic particulars and persons.

Quine's Ontological Commitments

Quine's Criterion of Ontological Commitment

Ontological commitment, which asserts the existence of particular entities or categories of entities, is central to Quine's philosophy.

• Quine's criterion involves determining ontological commitments based on the quantifiers employed in a theory.
• He famously stated, "To be is to be the value of a bound variable."
• A theory is ontologically committed to an entity if it quantifies over that entity.
• For instance, a theory using the quantifier "there exists" commits to the existence of entities it refers to, such as unicorns.
• Quine's criterion aligns with ontological parsimony, emphasizing minimalistic ontological assumptions.

Quine's Views on Basic Particulars

Quine's ontology is physicalist and extensionalist:

• Physicalism posits that all existence is fundamentally physical.
• Extensionalism maintains that entities are distinguishable by their spatiotemporal location.
• Quine's basic particulars are physical objects.
• He dismisses abstract entities (e.g., numbers, properties) as ontologically dubious.
• Physical objects, individuated by spatiotemporal location, align with Quine's basic particulars.
• His naturalistic approach underscores the integration of philosophy with empirical science.

Indeterminacy of Reference and Its Implications

Quine introduces the concept of indeterminacy of reference, challenging the notion of a unique, objective ontology:

• Indeterminacy of reference posits that terms in a language lack a single, objective referent.
• It stems from Quine's analysis of the indeterminacy of translation.
• Different translation schemes may yield distinct ontologies, raising questions about the objectivity of Quine's commitment to physical objects.
• Nonetheless, Quine defends his physicalist ontology as the most parsimonious and scientifically informed choice.

Strawson's Descriptive Metaphysics

Strawson's Approach to Metaphysics

Strawson's descriptive metaphysics focuses on delineating the fundamental features of our conceptual framework without revising or constructing new systems:

• He seeks to unveil the basic categories and structures within our thought and language.
• Descriptive metaphysics relies on analyzing ordinary language and its underlying logical structure.
• It provides a "neutral" description of our conceptual scheme, avoiding specific ontological or metaphysical claims.

Strawson's Views on Basic Particulars

Strawson's ontology is object-based and particularist:

• Object-based philosophy prioritizes individual objects over properties, relations, or events.
• Particularism emphasizes particular entities over general categories or universals.
• Strawson's basic particulars include material bodies (e.g., physical objects) and persons (e.g., humans).
• He asserts that both are essential to our comprehension of the world, rooted in empirical experiences.

The Role of Ordinary Language

Ordinary language is a fundamental component of Strawson's metaphysical analysis:

• It unveils the deep-seated structures of our thought and comprehension.
• Strawson employs linguistic analysis, logic, and philosophy of language to uncover these structures.
• Ordinary language reveals the centrality of individual objects, reference, predication, and identity.
• It also distinguishes between material bodies and persons, implying their indispensability.

IV. Quine and Strawson on Persons

Quine's Views on Persons and Personal Identity

Quine's naturalistic philosophy emphasizes empirical evidence and scientific methods, rejecting metaphysical speculations.

• He views persons as spatiotemporal entities, grounded in physical and psychological aspects.
• Quine's skepticism about personal identity emphasizes the continuity of psychological states and physical processes.
• He advocates for a physicalist approach to the mind, opposing Cartesian dualism.
• Quine dismisses the notion of a substantial self, presenting the self as a bundle of experiences and mental states.

Strawson's Views on Persons and Personal Identity

Strawson's descriptive metaphysics relies on the analysis of ordinary language and its underlying logic.

• Persons, distinct from other particulars, possess both mental and physical attributes.
• Strawson emphasizes the continuity of psychological states in personal identity.
• Similar to Quine, he rejects the concept of a substantial self.
• He derives the self from our ordinary language and practices, emphasizing continuity.

Comparing Quine and Strawson's Views on Persons

• Quine adopts a naturalistic philosophical approach, viewing persons as spatiotemporal entities and adhering to a physicalist perspective. He approaches personal identity with skepticism and emphasizes the continuity of psychological states while rejecting the notion of a substantial self. Quine also takes a physicalist stance on the mind-body problem and rejects the existence of a substantial self.
• Conversely, Strawson's approach is grounded in descriptive metaphysics. He characterizes persons as basic particulars with both physical and mental aspects. Strawson also emphasizes the continuity of psychological states in personal identity, rejecting the idea of a substantial self. In terms of the mind-body problem, he offers a nuanced understanding of the mind-body relationship, departing from Cartesian dualism.

The Role of Logic and Language

Quine's Views on Logic and Language in Ontology

• Ontological relativity: Quine contends that ontological commitments depend on the language used, and there is no privileged language.
• Indispensability argument: Quine argues that entities indispensable to scientific theories should be considered existent.
• Linguistic turn: Quine highlights language's role in shaping ontological commitments.
• Logic's role: Quine sees logic as a tool for clarifying ontological commitments and detecting inconsistencies.

Strawson's Views on Logic and Language in Metaphysics

• Descriptive metaphysics: Strawson's approach is rooted in analyzing ordinary language.
• Ordinary language: He believes it reflects our common-sense categories and distinctions.
• Limits of formal logic: Strawson criticizes the notion that formal logic fully represents metaphysical commitments.
• Logic and metaphysics: He sees a close connection between logic and metaphysics, both concerned with the fundamental structure of thought and language.

Comparing Quine and Strawson's Views on Logic and Language

• Quine places emphasis on the concepts of ontological relativity and indispensability. He believes that language plays a crucial role in shaping ontological commitments and serves as a tool for analyzing these commitments. Furthermore, Quine sees logic as a means to clarify ontological commitments and identify inconsistencies in philosophical theories.
• On the other hand, Strawson's approach is centered around descriptive metaphysics, which relies heavily on ordinary language. He contends that ordinary language reflects our common-sense categories and distinctions, shedding light on the fundamental aspects of metaphysical inquiry. Strawson also highlights the limitations of formal logic and emphasizes the close connection between logic and metaphysics in understanding the structure of thought and language.

Criticisms of Quine's Ontological Commitments

Critiques of Quine's Criterion of Ontological Commitment

• Carnap's critique: Carnap questions the reality of ontological questions and argues for linguistic frameworks.
• Modal realism: Critics claim Quine's criterion cannot accommodate modal realism's rich ontology.
• Nominalism: Nominalists argue his criterion permits abstract entities, advocating for a more parsimonious ontology.

Critiques of Quine's Views on Basic Particulars

• Indeterminacy of reference: Critics argue that this concept undermines the objectivity of Quine's ontology.
• Incompatibility with abstract objects: Those who believe in abstract entities reject Quine's physicalist stance.

Criticisms of Strawson's Descriptive Metaphysics

Critiques of Strawson's Approach

• Lack of ontological commitment: Critics argue that descriptive metaphysics doesn't provide substantive answers to metaphysical questions.
• Overemphasis on language: Some claim Strawson's approach overly relies on ordinary language, neglecting other valuable sources of philosophical insight.
• Failure to address radical ontological questions: Strawson's approach might not be suitable for addressing highly abstract or speculative metaphysical questions.

Conclusion

Quine and Strawson offer distinctive perspectives on basic particulars and persons, shaped by their respective philosophical methodologies and commitments. Quine's naturalistic and empirical approach, coupled with his criterion of ontological commitment, leads to a physicalist ontology. In contrast, Strawson's descriptive metaphysics, grounded in ordinary language, emphasizes the importance of both material bodies and persons in our conceptual framework. While both philosophers reject the notion of a substantial self, they do so from different angles. Additionally, their views on the role of logic and language in philosophy shed light on the intricate relationship between these domains. Critics have raised valid concerns about both Quine and Strawson's approaches, highlighting limitations and areas for further exploration. Ultimately, the choice between their perspectives depends on one's philosophical inclinations and the specific questions at hand, illustrating the richness and diversity of philosophical inquiry.