Integration of Princely States | History Optional for UPSC (Notes) PDF Download

Introduction

At the time of Indian independence in 1947, the country was divided into two main sets of territories:

1. British Empire Territories: These were regions directly under the control of the British Empire.
2. Crown Suzerainty Territories: These were areas where the British Crown had suzerainty, but the territories were governed by their hereditary rulers.

Additionally, there were several colonial enclaves controlled by France and Portugal. The political integration of these territories into India was a clear goal of the Indian National Congress, and the Government of India pursued this objective over the following decade.

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and V. P. Menon played crucial roles in convincing the rulers of various princely states to accede to India. Once their accession was secured, Patel and Menon, along with the central government, methodically extended and secured central authority over these states. This involved transforming their administrations and integrating them into the Indian Union.

By 1956, the distinction between the territories that had been part of British India and those that had been princely states had largely disappeared. The Government of India also worked through diplomatic and military means to gain control over the remaining colonial enclaves, which were subsequently integrated into India.

Princely States in British India

• British expansion in India involved two main approaches towards princely states: annexation and indirect rule.
• Annexation: The British aimed to forcibly incorporate Indian princely states into their Empire.
• Indirect Rule: The British exercised suzerainty and paramountcy over princely states while granting them varying degrees of internal self-government.
• In the early 19th century, British policy leaned towards annexation. However, the Indian Rebellion of 1857 highlighted the challenges of this approach and the value of princely states as allies.
• After 1858, the British shifted to a policy of subsidiary alliances, respecting princely states as allies while controlling their external relations.
• Relations between the British and each princely state were dictated by individual treaties, leading to a wide range of arrangements:
• Complete internal self-government
• Significant control over internal affairs
• Limited autonomy, with rulers acting more like estate owners
• In the 20th century, the British sought closer integration of princely states with British India by establishing the Chamber of Princes in 1921 and altering the supervision of smaller states in 1936.
• The Government of India Act 1935 proposed a federal government uniting princely states and British India, but this plan was abandoned in 1939 due to World War II and the princes' lack of readiness for federation.
• Throughout the 1940s, the relationship between princely states and the British crown remained governed by paramountcy and various treaties.

What after Independence?

• Paramountcy and subsidiary alliances could not continue after India gained independence.
• The British believed that these agreements, made between the British crown and princely states, could not be transferred to the new dominions of India and Pakistan.
• The alliances also placed obligations on Britain, such as maintaining troops in India for the defense of princely states, which Britain was unwilling to continue.
• As a result, the British government decided that paramountcy and all treaties with princely states would end upon their departure from India.

Why Integration required?

• There were nearly 600 princely states in India at the time of independence.
• The Saurashtra and Kathiawar regions of Gujarat alone had over 200 princely states, many of which had non-contiguous (scattered) territories.
• The end of British paramountcy meant that the rights and privileges the princely states had under British rule would be revoked, giving them the freedom to negotiate their future with the new nations of India and Pakistan.
• Early British plans for transferring power, like those proposed by the Cripps Mission, acknowledged that some princely states might opt to remain independent. This idea was strongly opposed by the Indian National Congress, which saw it as a fragmentation of India and a betrayal of its historical unity.

Attitude of Congress before independence

• The Congress Party was initially less active in the princely states due to limited resources, a focus on independence from the British, and the unreadiness of the people for satyagraha.
• There was also a concern that the complex relationship between the princely states and the British could complicate the independence process.
• Congress leaders, especially Mahatma Gandhi, were sympathetic to the more progressive princes, viewing them as examples of Indian self-governance.
• In the 1930s, the situation changed with the Government of India Act 1935 and the emergence of socialist leaders like Jayaprakash Narayan.
• The Congress began actively engaging with political and labor activities in the princely states.
• By 1939, Congress insisted that the princely states should join independent India on the same terms and with the same autonomy as the provinces of British India.
• During negotiations with Mountbatten, Congress pushed for the incorporation of princely states into India, but the British believed they could not grant this.

Attitude of Mountbatten

• Some British leaders, especially Lord Mountbatten, the last British viceroy of India, were uneasy about completely severing ties between independent India and the princely states.
• During the 19th and 20th centuries, the growth of trade, commerce, and communications had tightly linked the princely states to British India through a complex network of interests.
• Agreements concerning railways, customs, irrigation, and the use of ports were at risk of disappearing, which posed a significant threat to the economic stability of the subcontinent.
• Mountbatten was influenced by Indian leaders like V. P. Menon, who argued that integrating the princely states into independent India would help heal the wounds of partition.
• Mountbatten had promised maximum autonomy for India if the Congress accepted partition. As a result, he personally supported and worked towards the accession of princely states to India after the transfer of power, as proposed by the Congress.

Accepting integration

• The rulers of the princely states had varying levels of enthusiasm about joining independent India.
• Some, like the kings of Bikaner and Jawhar, were motivated by ideological and patriotic reasons to join India.
• Others believed they had the right to choose between India and Pakistan, remain independent, or form their own union.
• States like Bhopal, Travancore, and Hyderabad declared they did not plan to join either dominion.
• Hyderabad even appointed trade representatives in Europe and negotiated with Portugal to lease or buy Goa for sea access.
• Travancore highlighted the strategic importance of its thorium reserves to Western countries while seeking recognition.
• Bhopal tried to forge an alliance between princely states and the Muslim League to counter pressure from the Congress.
• Some states suggested a confederation of princely states as a third option alongside India and Pakistan.

Reasons for Failure of Princely States' Resistance:

• The initial resistance of non-Muslim majority princely states to accede to India failed due to several factors.
• Lack of Unity: There was a significant lack of unity among the princes. Smaller states did not trust larger states to protect their interests. Hindu rulers were also distrustful of Muslim princes, particularly Hamidullah Khan, the Nawab of Bhopal, who was seen as an agent for Pakistan.
• Inevitability of Integration: Some princes, believing that integration was unavoidable, sought to align with the Indian National Congress to influence the final settlement. This lack of a united front weakened their bargaining power.
• Muslim League's Withdrawal: The Muslim League's decision to stay out of the Constituent Assembly undermined the princes’ strategy to form an alliance with it against the Congress. Attempts to boycott the Assembly failed when several states, including Baroda and Bikaner, joined on April 28, 1947.
• Popular Sentiment: Many princes faced pressure from popular sentiment favoring integration with India. For instance, the Maharaja of Travancore abandoned his independence plans after an assassination attempt on his dewan, Sir C. P. Ramaswami Iyer.
• Influence of Officials: In some states, chief ministers or dewans played a crucial role in persuading princes to accede to India.
• Key Figures: The efforts of Lord Mountbatten, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, and V. P. Menon were pivotal in convincing the states to accept integration into India. Patel and Menon were the political and administrative heads of the States Department, respectively, responsible for relations with the princely states.

Mountbatten's Role:

• Played a crucial role in persuading hesitant monarchs to join the Indian Union.
• Believed that securing the states' accession to India was vital for a negotiated transfer of power with the Congress.
• As a relative of the British King, he was trusted by most princes and had personal friendships with many, including the Nawab of Bhopal.
• Princes believed he could ensure that independent India would honor any agreements made, as he was asked to be the first Governor-General of India by Nehru and Patel.
• Used his influence to push princes towards accession.
• Declared that the British Government would not grant dominion status to any princely state unless they joined India or Pakistan.
• Emphasized the Indian subcontinent as a single economic entity and the challenges princes would face in maintaining order amid communal violence and communist movements.
• Assured princes that he would act as a trustee of their commitments until at least 1948.
• Engaged in personal discussions with reluctant princes, like the Nawab of Bhopal, to secure their agreement to the Instrument of Accession.
• Faced criticism from some princes who felt betrayed by Britain and from the opposition Conservative Party.
• Critics, including Winston Churchill, likened the Indian government's language to that of Hitler before the invasion of Austria.

Pressure and Diplomacy:

• Vallabhbhai Patel, as Minister for Home and States Affairs, was tasked with unifying British India, provinces, and princely states into a single India.
• The Congress Party, particularly Patel and Menon, significantly influenced the princes' decision to accede to India.
• The Congress argued that princely states were not sovereign and must join either India or Pakistan after the end of British paramountcy.
• Nehru made statements emphasizing that princely states could not resist the military strength of independent India and would not recognize the divine right of kings.
• Patel and Menon adopted a conciliatory approach, using a mix of incentives and pressure in negotiations with the princes.
• On July 5, 1947, Patel's official policy statement reassured princes about the Congress Party's intentions and invited them to join India as equals, rather than as subordinates.
• The States Department aimed to establish a relationship of equality with the princely states, unlike the British Political Department, which had been an instrument of paramountcy.

Instruments of Accession:

• Patel and Menon supported their diplomatic efforts with treaties aimed at appealing to the rulers of princely states.
• Two important documents were created:
• Standstill Agreement: This agreement ensured the continuation of existing agreements and administrative practices between the princely state and the British, now to be maintained by India.
• Instrument of Accession: Through this document, the ruler of the princely state consented to join independent India and granted India control over specific subjects.
• The subjects in the Instrument of Accession varied depending on the state:
• States with internal autonomy under the British ceded only three subjects to India: defence, external affairs, and communications, as per the Government of India Act 1935.
• Rulers of estates or talukas where the Crown held substantial power signed an Instrument of Accession that transferred all residual powers to the Government of India.
• Rulers of states with intermediate status signed a version that preserved their levels of power under the British.
• The Instruments of Accession included several safeguards:
• Clause 7 ensured that princes would not be bound by the future Indian constitution.
• Clause 8 guaranteed their autonomy in areas not explicitly ceded to the Government of India.
• Additional promises included protection of extra-territorial rights, gradual democratization, non-forced merger of major states, and eligibility for British honours.
• Lord Mountbatten supported Patel and Menon by stressing that the documents provided the princes with necessary practical independence.
• Mountbatten, Patel, and Menon also suggested that rejecting the terms could lead to less favorable conditions later.
• The Standstill Agreement was used to pressure princely states into signing the Instrument of Accession.
• The limited scope of the Instruments of Accession, along with promises of autonomy and other guarantees, reassured many rulers, who saw it as the best possible deal given the absence of British support and internal pressures.
• From May 1947 until the transfer of power on August 15, 1947, most states signed the Instruments of Accession.
• Some states delayed or resisted signing, such as Piploda, which acceded in March 1948, and border states like Jodhpur, Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir, which sought better deals or declared intentions to remain independent.

Border States:

• The ruler of Jodhpur,Hanwant Singh,was not in favor of the Congress and felt uncertain about his future in India.
• Along with the ruler of Jaisalmer,he negotiated with Muhammad Ali Jinnah,the future leader of Pakistan.
• Jinnah aimed to attract larger border states like Jodhpur and Jaisalmer to Pakistan, hoping this would draw in other Rajput states and offset the loss of Bengal and Punjab.
• He offered Jodhpur and Jaisalmer the chance to join Pakistan on their own terms, providing blank agreements for the rulers to fill out.
• While Jaisalmer declined, citing difficulties in siding with Muslims against Hindus during communal issues, Hanwant Singh was close to agreeing.
• However, the general sentiment in Jodhpur was against joining Pakistan. Mountbatten argued that a predominantly Hindu state joining Pakistan would contradict the two-nation theory and likely lead to communal violence.
• Persuaded by these points, Hanwant Singh reluctantly decided to join India.

Integration of Junagadh:

• Junagadh, a princely state in present-day Gujarat, was ruled by Nawab Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III, a Muslim who opted for Junagadh to join Pakistan despite the majority Hindu population.
• On September 15, 1947, the Nawab signed an instrument of accession to Pakistan, going against Lord Mountbatten's advice.
• Mountbatten argued that most states should join India due to geographic reasons, allowing only those sharing a border with Pakistan to choose it.
• In response to the Nawab's decision, the principalities of Babariawad and Sheikh of Mangrol claimed independence from Junagadh and sought to join India.
• The Nawab's military occupation of these states triggered a strong reaction from neighboring rulers, who sent troops to the Junagadh frontier and appealed to the Government of India for help.
• When Pakistan accepted the Nawab's accession on September 16, the Indian government was outraged, especially since Jinnah had previously argued against the coexistence of Hindus and Muslims.
• Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel believed that allowing Junagadh to join Pakistan would worsen communal tensions in Gujarat.
• Menon proposed the Aarzi Hukumat(Provisional Government) to Samaldas Gandhi, who formed a government-in-exile for Junagadh.
• Patel offered Pakistan a chance to reverse its acceptance and hold a plebiscite in Junagadh.
• Ultimately, Patel ordered the annexation of Junagadh's principalities and the reoccupation of Mangrol and Babariawad.
• Pakistan agreed to discuss a plebiscite, but India rejected the condition of withdrawing troops.
• Junagadh, surrounded by India and with access to the Arabian Sea, had its borders closed by India, halting all trade and leading to a precarious food situation.
• Due to the worsening conditions, the Nawab and his family left for Karachi on October 25, 1947, where he established a provisional government.
• On October 27, 1947, Bhutto, as Chief Minister of Junagadh, wrote to Jinnah about the critical situation in the state.
• When hopes for assistance from Pakistan faded, Bhutto informed the Nawab of the imminent danger to life and property.
• The Junagadh State Council authorized Bhutto to act in the best interests of the Muslim population and requested the Indian Government to take over administration instead of surrendering to the Provisional Government.
• Facing financial collapse and lacking resistance forces, the Junagadh state government invited India to take control.
• A plebiscite on February 20, 1948, resulted in 99% of the population voting to join India.
• Junagadh became part of the Indian Saurashtra State until November 1, 1956, when it became part of Bombay State.
• Bombay State was later divided into Gujarat and Maharashtra in 1960, with Junagadh now being a district in Gujarat.

Kashmir Problem

• The Durrani Empire ruled Kashmir in the 18th century until the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh conquered it in 1819. After the First Anglo-Sikh War(1845–1846), Kashmir was ceded to the East India Company under the Treaty of Lahore. The Company then sold it to Gulab Singh, the Raja of Jammu, through the Treaty of Amritsar, making him the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.
• Maharaja Hari Singh ruled Kashmir at the time of India's independence in 1947. Despite being a Hindu ruler, he faced pressure to accede to either India or Pakistan, as Kashmir had a Muslim majority.
• He signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan and considered a similar agreement with India but initially wanted Kashmir to remain independent.
• Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of Kashmir's National Conference party, opposed Hari Singh's rule and demanded his abdication. Meanwhile, Pakistan tried to influence Kashmir's accession by cutting off supplies and transport links.
• To make matters worse, communal violence in Punjab due to Partition disrupted transport links with India, leaving Kashmir isolated. This isolation led to unrest, particularly in Poonch, where there were allegations of atrocities against the Muslim population.
• Amidst this chaos, Pathan tribesmen from Pakistan, supported by the Pakistani government, invaded Kashmir, making swift advances towards Srinagar.
• In desperate need of help, the Maharaja appealed to India for military assistance. However, India had a non-intervention agreement with Pakistan and required the signing of an Instrument of Accession along with the establishment of an interim government led by Sheikh Abdullah.
• Despite the presence of Pakistani tribal fighters in Jammu and Kashmir, there was no concrete evidence proving Pakistan's official involvement at that time.
• India's intervention was contingent upon Jammu and Kashmir officially joining the Union of India. Once the accession was formalized, Indian forces could enter and occupy the remaining parts of the state.
• As the Pakistani tribesmen neared Srinagar, the Maharaja urgently sought military aid. Prior to their arrival, India insisted that the Maharaja finalize negotiations to cede Jammu and Kashmir to India in exchange for military support.
• The cession agreement was signed by the Maharaja and Lord Mountbatten.
• In Jammu and Kashmir, volunteers from the National Conference collaborated with the Indian Army to repel the invaders.
• Indian troops achieved control over Jammu, Srinagar, and the valley during the First Kashmir War. However, intense fighting diminished with the onset of winter, which rendered much of the state inaccessible.
• Recognizing the international attention on the conflict, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called for a ceasefire and sought UN arbitration. He argued that India might have to invade Pakistan due to its failure to stop the tribal incursions.
• The First Kashmir War continued until 1948, when India brought the issue before the UN Security Council. Sheikh Abdullah opposed this move, believing that the Indian Army could liberate the entire state from the invaders.
• The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was established, and on 21 April 1948, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 47. This resolution called for an immediate ceasefire and mandated the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals from Jammu and Kashmir who were not normally residents of the state.
• The resolution also requested the Indian government to reduce its forces to a minimum level, after which conditions for a plebiscite on the accession of the state to India or Pakistan would be established.
• However, both India and Pakistan struggled to reach a truce agreement due to differing interpretations of the demilitarization process. A major point of contention was whether the Azad Kashmiri army should be disbanded during the truce phase or the plebiscite phase.
• In November 1948, despite both governments agreeing to hold a plebiscite, the process stalled due to Pakistan's failure to withdraw its troops from Kashmir, violating the agreed conditions for the plebiscite.
• The plebiscite was never conducted. On 26 January 1950, the Constitution of India came into effect in Kashmir, but with special provisions for the state. However, India did not gain administrative control over the entire region. The northern and western parts of Kashmir came under Pakistani control in 1947 and are now known as Pakistan-administered Kashmir. During the 1962 Sino-Indian War, China occupied Aksai Chin, a northeastern region bordering Ladakh, which it continues to control and administer.

Accession of Hyderabad

Hyderabad's Unique Situation in 1947:

• Hyderabad was a large, landlocked state in southeastern India, covering over 212,000 square kilometers.
• Despite having a Hindu majority (87%), the ruler, Nizam Osman Ali Khan, was Muslim, and a Muslim elite dominated politics.
• The Muslim nobility and the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen party wanted Hyderabad to remain independent and equal to India and Pakistan.

Early Steps Toward Independence:

• In June 1947, the Nizam declared that Hyderabad would resume independence after the transfer of power.
• The Government of India rejected this claim, citing national security concerns due to Hyderabad's strategic location.
• India argued that Hyderabad's people, history, and location made it an undeniable part of India.

Negotiations and Agreements:

• The Nizam proposed a limited treaty with India, offering safeguards not in the standard Instrument of Accession, like neutrality in India-Pakistan conflicts.
• India rejected this, fearing other states would make similar demands.
• A temporary Standstill Agreement was signed, ensuring Hyderabad wouldn't join Pakistan.

Escalating Tensions:

• By December 1947, accusations flew between Hyderabad and India, with Hyderabad allegedly importing arms from Pakistan.
• Hyderabad was accused of actions like divesting Indian securities and recruiting for its army and irregular forces, the Razakars.
• Indian officials signaled intentions to invade by summer 1948.

Mountbatten's Proposal and Final Rejection:

• In June 1948, Mountbatten proposed a deal granting Hyderabad autonomous dominion status under India.
• The Nizam rejected this, demanding either complete independence or dominion status under the British Commonwealth.
• The Nizam sought help from international figures and bodies like President Harry S. Truman and the United Nations.

Internal Conflicts and Increased Pressure:

• Hyderabad faced internal turmoil, with a communist uprising in Telangana and activities of the Razakars.
• The Nizam encouraged the Razakars to terrorize Hindus and change the state's communal balance.
• Political agitation from the Hyderabad State Congress Party and communist groups added to the unrest.

Final Stages and Sardar Patel's Stance:

• Mountbatten's attempts at a negotiated solution failed.
• Sardar Patel argued that allowing Hyderabad's independence would undermine the Government's prestige and security for both Hindus and Muslims.
• He viewed an independent Hyderabad as an "ulcer in the heart of India" that needed to be removed.

Operation Polo (Hyderabad Police Action)

• On 13 September 1948, the Indian Army was deployed in Hyderabad under Operation Polo, also known as the Hyderabad Police Action. This was justified on the grounds that the law and order situation in Hyderabad posed a threat to the peace of South India.
• The operation was termed "Police Action" because it was considered an internal matter of India.
• The Indian troops encountered minimal resistance from the Razakars, and between 13 and 18 September, they gained complete control over the state of Hyderabad.

Resignation of Nizam's Government:

• On 16 September, facing imminent defeat, the Nizam of Hyderabad asked his Prime Minister, Mir Laik Ali, to resign by the next morning. This request was fulfilled, along with the resignations of the entire cabinet.

Meeting between Nizam and Indian Agent General:

• On 17 September, a messenger delivered a note from the Nizam to K.M. Munshi, India’s Agent General to Hyderabad, summoning him to the Nizam’s office.
• During the meeting, the Nizam expressed his confusion about the situation after the resignation of his ministers.
• Munshi advised the Nizam to ensure the safety of Hyderabad’s citizens by issuing orders to Major General El Edroos, Commander of the Hyderabad State Army, which the Nizam promptly did.

Nizam's Radio Broadcast after Surrender:

• On 23 September 1948, the Nizam of Hyderabad, in a radio address, explained that a group led by Qasim Razvi had forced his trusted ministers to resign and impose the Laik Ali Ministry on him.
• The Nizam described this group's actions as reminiscent of Hitler's Germany and claimed it had rendered him powerless.

Hyderabad's Accession to India:

• The Nizam was retained as the head of state in a manner similar to other princes who acceded to India.
• He retracted the complaints made to the United Nations regarding the situation in Hyderabad.
• Despite strong protests from Pakistan and criticism from other countries, the United Nations Security Council did not pursue the matter further, and Hyderabad was officially absorbed into India.

Completing integration

• Instruments of Accession: The Instruments of Accession were limited in scope, transferring control over only three matters to India. This would have resulted in a loose federation with significant differences in administration and governance across various states.
• Full Political Integration: Achieving full political integration required persuading political actors in different states to shift their loyalties and political activities towards a central authority, the Republic of India. This was a challenging task.
• Variation in Governance: Some princely states, like Mysore, had legislative systems similar to British India, with broad franchise. In contrast, other states had political decision-making confined to small aristocratic circles.
• Task of Integration: After securing the accession of princely states, the Government of India focused on unifying these states and former British provinces into a single polity under one republican constitution between 1948 and 1950.

Merger Agreements:

• The initial phase of integrating the princely states into India, conducted between 1947 and 1949, involved merging smaller states deemed unviable by the Government of India into neighboring provinces or with other princely states.
• This policy was contentious as it contradicted the guarantees made in the Instruments of Accession, where the existence of these states was assured.
• Patel and Menon argued that without integration, the economies of states would collapse, leading to anarchy. They highlighted that many smaller states lacked the resources to sustain their economies and support growing populations.
• Many small states imposed tax rules and restrictions that hindered free trade, which needed to be dismantled for a united India.
• Initially, Patel and Nehru planned to wait until Mountbatten's term as Governor-General ended to avoid breaching his guarantees. However, an adivasi uprising in Orissa in late 1947 accelerated their decision.
• In December 1947, princes from the Eastern India Agency and Chhattisgarh Agency were convened by Menon to sign Merger Agreements, integrating their states into Orissa, the Central Provinces, and Bihar, effective from January 1, 1948.
• Throughout 1948, 66 states in Gujarat and the Deccan were merged into Bombay, including significant states like Kolhapur and Baroda. Smaller states were integrated into Madras, East Punjab, West Bengal, the United Provinces, and Assam.
• Not all states that signed Merger Agreements were integrated into provinces. Thirty states from the former Punjab Hill States Agency, near the international border, were integrated into Himachal Pradesh, a distinct entity administered directly by the center for security reasons.
• The Merger Agreements required rulers to cede "full and exclusive jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to governance" of their state to the Dominion of India.
• In exchange for ceding their states, princes received numerous guarantees, including an annual payment from the Indian government in the form of a privy purse as compensation for the surrender of their powers and the dissolution of their states.
• While state property would be taken over, private property would be protected, along with personal privileges, dignities, and titles. Succession was also guaranteed according to custom.
• The provincial administration was obligated to retain the staff of the princely states with guarantees of equal pay and treatment.
• Although primarily aimed at smaller, non-viable states, the Merger Agreements were also applied to a few larger states.
• Kutch, Tripura, and Manipur, despite being larger states, were asked to sign Merger Agreements due to their locations along international borders, becoming Chief Commissioners' Provinces.
• Bhopal, known for its efficient administration, became a directly administered Chief Commissioner's Province to preserve its identity, as did Bilaspur, which faced flooding from the Bhakra dam project.

Four-step integration

Merger:

• Merger Agreements involved integrating smaller states deemed unviable by the Government of India into neighboring provinces or under Central Government administration as Chief Commissioners’ Provinces.
• Covenants of Merger were used to persuade large states to form a “princely union” such as PEPSU, Saurashtra, United States of Rajasthan, and Travancore-Cochin.
• The process for integrating larger states involved convincing them to unite under Covenants of Merger, where rulers lost their powers except for one who became the Rajpramukh.
• The Rajpramukh was supported by a council of rulers and a presidium, with the council electing the Rajpramukh and his deputy, Uprajpramukh.
• The Covenants provided for a constituent assembly to frame the constitution of the new union, offering rulers a privy purse and guarantees similar to those in Merger Agreements.
• Patel successfully unified 222 states in the Kathiawar peninsula into the princely union of Saurashtra in January 1948, with more states joining later.
• New entities like Madhya Bharat, Patiala and East Punjab States Union, United State of Rajasthan, and Travancore-Cochin were formed through similar processes.
• Kashmir, Mysore, and Hyderabad were the only princely states that did not sign Covenants of Merger or Merger Agreements.

Democratisation:

• The merger of administrative systems from different states into a single political entity faced challenges due to historical rivalries among merged states.
• In the former Central India Agency, conflicts among merged princely states led the Government of India to intervene, taking direct control as a Chief Commissioner’s State.
• Initially, the mergers did not fulfill the expectations of the Government of India or the States Department.
• To address this, in December 1947, V. P. Menon proposed that rulers of merged states take practical steps towards establishing popular government.
• The States Department adopted this suggestion, requiring rajpramukhs of merged princely unions to act as constitutional monarchs through a special covenant.
• This change aligned the powers of rajpramukhs with those of Governors in former British provinces, ensuring a similar level of responsible government for the people.
• The process was seen as an assertion of control by the Government of India over the states in a more comprehensive manner.

Centralisation and constitutionalisation:

• Despite the process of democratization, the princely states retained a distinction from former British provinces because their Instruments of Accession were limited to three subjects.
• This limitation was viewed by the Congress as an obstacle to implementing policies for social justice and national development.
• To address this, the Congress aimed to give the central government the same level of authority over princely states as it had over British provinces.
• In May 1948, under V. P. Menon’s initiative, a meeting in Delhi between Rajpramukhs of princely unions and the States Department led to new Instruments of Accession.
• These new instruments allowed the Government of India to legislate on all matters in the seventh schedule of the Government of India Act 1935.
• Subsequently, princely unions, Mysore, and Hyderabad adopted the Constitution of India as their state constitution, aligning their legal status with former British provinces.
• The exception was Kashmir, which continued to be governed by its original Instrument of Accession and its own constitution.
• The Constitution of India categorized constituent units into Part A, B, C, and D states, with Part A states including former British provinces and merged princely states.
• Part B states comprised princely unions, Mysore, and Hyderabad, while Part C states included former Chief Commissioners’ Provinces and centrally administered areas.
• Part D consisted of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
• The main difference between Part A and Part B states was the appointment of constitutional heads, with Rajpramukhs in Part B states replacing Governors in Part A states.
• The Constitution granted significant powers to the central government over former princely states, ensuring their governance was under the President’s control.
• In practice, the governance structure in Part A and Part B states was identical.

Reorganisation:

• The distinction between Part A and Part B states was meant to be temporary.
• In 1956, the States Reorganisation Act restructured former British provinces and princely states based on linguistic lines.
• During this process, the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution eliminated the difference between Part A and Part B states, treating both as “states” and renaming Part C states as “union territories.”
• Rajpramukhs lost their authority and were replaced by Governors, appointed by the central government, as the constitutional heads of state.
• This transition marked the end of princely rule.
• Legally and practically, territories that were once part of princely states became fully integrated into India, indistinguishable from those that were part of British India.
• Personal privileges of princes, such as the privy purse, customs duty exemption, and customary dignities, continued until their abolition in 1971.

Carrot and Stick Method Used by Patel to Integrate India After Independence

Carrot:

• Inspired a sense of nationalism among the rulers.
• Promised protection of their traditional rights during accession.
• Assured autonomy in internal matters, requiring only the surrender of defense, external affairs, and communication subjects.
• Guaranteed that the provisions of the new constitution would not apply to them.
• Offered privy purses, retention of personal property and titles, and inducements of Governorships as ‘Rajapramukhs’ during integration.
• Stressed that without integration, their economies would collapse, leading to a state of anarchy.

Stick:

• Used the threat of popular protest.
• Encouraged praja mandals to agitate for accession to India in places like Travancore, Mysore, Kathiawar, and Orissa.
• Cut off critical supplies and lines of communication to Junagadh.
• Threatened military action.
• Utilized military occupation in Junagadh.
• Employed police action in Hyderabad through Operation Polo.
• In the case of Kashmir, the threat of proxy war reduced Patel's role, and the issue remains unresolved.

Post-integration issues

The princes

• The integration of princely states into India was mostly peaceful, but not all princes were satisfied with the outcome.
• Many princes had expected the Instruments of Accession to be permanent and were unhappy about losing the autonomy and guaranteed continued existence of their states.
• Some princes felt uneasy about the disappearance of states that their families had controlled for generations, while others were unhappy about the loss of administrative structures they had worked hard to build.
• The majority of princes, despite the challenges of adapting to life as private citizens, were content to retire on the generous pensions provided by the privy purse.
• Several former princes took advantage of their eligibility to hold public offices under the central government.
• For example, the Maharaja of Bhavnagar, Col. Krishna Kumarasingh Bhavasingh Gohil, became the Governor of Madras State, and several others were appointed to diplomatic posts overseas.

Colonial enclaves

• The integration of princely states into India raised questions about the future of the remaining colonial enclaves.
• At the time of independence, certain regions were still under foreign colonial rule:
• French Colonies: Pondicherry, Karikal, Yanam, Mahe, and Chandernagore were still colonies of France.
• Portuguese Colonies: Daman and Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, and Goa remained colonies of Portugal.

France

• In 1948, France and India agreed on holding elections in France's remaining Indian possessions to determine their political future.
• A plebiscite in Chandernagore on June 19, 1949, showed overwhelming support for integration with India, with 7,463 votes for and 114 against.

Cession to India and Merger with West Bengal:

• Chandernagore was ceded to India on August 14, 1949 (de facto) and officially on May 2, 1950 (de jure).
• It was later merged with West Bengal on October 2, 1955.

Pro-French Resistance and Popular Discontent:

• In other enclaves, the pro-French camp, led by Edouard Goubert, suppressed pro-merger groups using administrative power.
• Popular discontent grew, leading to pro-merger groups gaining power in Yanam and Mahe in 1954 after demonstrations.

Referendum and Transfer of Control:

• A referendum in Pondicherry and Karaikal in October 1954 favored merger with India.
• On November 1, 1954, de facto control of all four enclaves was transferred to India.

Treaty of Cession and De Jure Transfer:

• A treaty of cession was signed in May 1956.
• After ratification by the French National Assembly in May 1962, de jure control of the enclaves was transferred to India.

Portugal

• Unlike France, Portugal was unwilling to find diplomatic solutions regarding its Indian enclaves. It saw holding onto these territories as a matter of national pride.
• In 1951, Portugal amended its constitution to classify its possessions in India as Portuguese provinces.

Portugal's Claims and International Disputes:

• Portugal took the matter to the International Court of Justice, trying to force India to allow its troops into the enclave. However, the Court sided with India in 1960.
• In 1961, Dadra and Nagar Haveli officially became part of India as a Union Territory.

The Struggle for Goa, Daman, and Diu:

• The situation in Goa, Daman, and Diu remained unresolved. On August 15, 1955, thousands of peaceful protesters marched against Portuguese rule but faced gunfire, resulting in 22 deaths.
• Many uprisings were suppressed through force, and leaders were either eliminated or imprisoned.

India's Response and International Pressure:

• India closed its consulate in Panjim and imposed an economic embargo on Portuguese Goa.
• From 1955 to 1961, India adopted a "wait and watch" approach, making numerous appeals to the Portuguese government and raising the issue internationally.
• The Portuguese established an airline and airports in Goa, Daman, and Diu to facilitate transportation.

International Developments and Changing Perspectives:

• In December 1960, the United Nations General Assembly rejected Portugal's claim that its overseas possessions were provinces and listed them as "non-self-governing territories."
• Despite Prime Minister Nehru's preference for negotiation, Indian public opinion shifted after Portugal's suppression of a revolt in Angola in 1961.
• African leaders also pressured Nehru to take action in Goa, arguing it would prevent further atrocities in Africa.

Military Action and Resolution:

• On December 18, 1961, after an unsuccessful American attempt to negotiate, the Indian Army invaded Portuguese India and defeated the Portuguese forces (Operation Vijay).
• Portugal appealed to the Security Council, but a resolution demanding India's withdrawal was blocked by the USSR’s veto.
• Portugal surrendered on December 19, 1961.

Establishing Citizenship:

• The Citizenship Act of 1955 allowed the Indian government to define citizenship within the Indian Union.
• On March 28, 1962, the government issued the Goa, Daman, and Diu (Citizenship) Order, granting Indian citizenship to all individuals born in these territories on or before December 20, 1961.
• This marked the end of the last European colonies in India.

Opinion Poll and Goa’s Future:

• Goa celebrates its 52nd 'Asmitai Dis' (Identity Day) or Opinion Poll Day on January 16, commemorating the 1967 vote where Goans chose not to merge with Maharashtra.
• Following Goa's liberation in 1961, discussions about merging with Maharashtra arose due to cultural similarities and language debates.
• With states being formed on linguistic lines, the demand divided Goans between those favoring Konkani and those supporting Marathi.
• Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had promised that Goa could decide its own future, but after his death in 1964 and the subsequent passing of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1966, a decision was delayed.
• In May 1966, leaders like Sequeira and Purshottam Kakodkar convinced new Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that an 'opinion poll' was necessary to determine Goa's future.
• Parliament passed the Goa, Daman, and Diu (Opinion Poll Act) in December 1966 to ascertain the wishes of the electors regarding their future status.
• The poll held on January 16, 1967, resulted in 1,72,191 votes against merger and 1,38,170 votes in favor.
• This led to demands for statehood for Goa, which was finally granted on May 30, 1987, making Goa India’s 25th state, while Daman and Diu remained Union Territories.

Sikkim

• Sikkim's Integration into India: Sikkim, a former princely state located at a crucial border point between India and China, became India's 22nd state in 1975.
• Princely States and Independence: Three princely states—Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim—remained outside the Republic of India between 1947 and 1950. Nepal was recognized as de jure independent, while Bhutan was considered a British protectorate.
• Bhutan's Status: After independence, Bhutan continued its status as a protectorate through a 1949 treaty with India, agreeing to follow India's advice on external affairs.
• Sikkim's Colonial History: Sikkim was a British dependency, similar to other princely states, but resisted full integration into India after independence.
• Treaty and Protectorate Status: The Government of India signed a Standstill Agreement and a treaty in 1950 with Sikkim, making it a protectorate with India responsible for defense, external affairs, and communications, while Sikkim retained internal autonomy.
• Chogyal's Attempts for Power: The Chogyal of Sikkim, Palden Thondup Namgyal, sought greater powers in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but faced opposition from pro-Indian factions.
• Anti-Chogyal Agitation: In 1973, an anti-Chogyal movement erupted, demanding popular elections. The Indian government intervened to restore order.
• Negotiations and New Constitution: Negotiations led to an agreement reducing the Chogyal's power and establishing elections based on ethnic power-sharing. The Chogyal's opponents won, and a new constitution was drafted for Sikkim's association with India.
• Full Integration: On April 10, 1975, the Sikkim Assembly resolved to fully integrate with India. This was endorsed by a 97% vote in a referendum on April 14, 1975. Following this, Sikkim was admitted as India's 22nd state.

Critical perspectives on the process of integration

• During negotiations, Jinnah, representing the Muslim League, strongly supported the right of the princely states to remain independent, joining neither India nor Pakistan, an attitude which was diametrically opposed to the stance taken by Nehru and the Congress and which was reflected in Pakistan’s support of Hyderabad’s bid to stay independent.
• Post-partition, the Government of Pakistan accused India of hypocrisy on the ground that there was little difference between the accession of the ruler of Junagadh to Pakistan—which India refused to recognise—and the accession of the Maharajah of Kashmir to India, and for several years refused to recognise the legality of India’s incorporation of Junagadh, treating it as de jure Pakistani territory.

Different theories have been proposed to explain the designs of Indian and Pakistani leaders in this period.

• Some postulates that an ideal deal working in the mind of Patel was that if Muhammad Ali Jinnah let India have Junagadh and Hyderabad, Patel would not object to Kashmir acceding to Pakistan.
• Jinnah sought to engage the questions of Junagadh and Hyderabad in the same battle. It is suggested that he wanted India to ask for a plebiscite in Junagadh and Hyderabad, knowing thus that the principle then would have to be applied to Kashmir, where the Muslim-majority would, he believed, vote for Pakistan.
• A speech by Patel at the Bahauddin College in Junagadh following the latter’s take-over, where he said that “we would agree to Kashmir if they agreed to Hyderabad“, suggests that he may have been amenable to this idea.
• Although Patel’s opinions were not India’s policy, nor were they shared by Nehru, both leaders were angered at Jinnah’s courting the princes of Jodhpur, Bhopal and Indore, leading them to take a harder stance on a possible deal with Pakistan.

Modern historians have also re-examined the role of the States Department and Lord Mountbatten during the accession process.

• Many historians argue that the Congress leaders did not intend the settlement contained in the Instruments of Accession to be permanent even when they were signed, and at all times privately contemplated a complete integration of the sort that ensued between 1948 and 1950.
• They point out that the mergers and cession of powers to the Government of India between 1948 and 1950 contravened the terms of the Instruments of Accession, and were incompatible with the express assurances of internal autonomy and preservation of the princely states which Mountbatten had given the princes.
• Menon in his memoirs stated that the changes to the initial terms of accession were in every instance freely consented to by the princes with no element of coercion.
• But many disagree, on the basis that foreign diplomats at the time believed that the princes had been given no choice but to sign, and that a few princes expressed their unhappiness with the arrangements.
• Mountbatten’s role is also criticised, because while he stayed within the letter of the law, he was at least under a moral obligation to do something for the princes when it became apparent that the Government of India was going to alter the terms on which accession took place, and that he should never have lent his support to the bargain given that it could not be guaranteed after independence.
• Many argue that, in the ultimate analysis, one of the reasons why the princes consented to the demise of their states was that they felt abandoned by the British, and saw themselves as having little other option.
• Older historians, in contrast, take the view that the princely states could not have survived as independent entities after the transfer of power, and that their demise was inevitable.
• They therefore view successful integration of all princely states into India as a triumph for the Government of India and Lord Mountbatten, and as a tribute to the sagacity of the majority of princes, who jointly achieved in a few months what the Empire had attempted, unsuccessfully, to do for over a century—unite all of India under one rule.