The Hindu Editorial Analysis- 17th May 2025 | Current Affairs & Hindu Analysis: Daily, Weekly & Monthly - UPSC PDF Download

The new normal after Pahalgam, India’s response

Introduction

Operation Sindoor is currently on ‘pause’, and although the ceasefire started off a bit unstable on Saturday evening (May 10), it appears to be holding steady.

India’s Response to the Pahalgam Attack (April–May 2025)

Background & Initial Response

• Following the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, 2025, India was determined to retaliate. The focus was on deciding the timing and method of the response.
• Initial non-military actions included:
• Reducing diplomatic presence
• Suspending trade
• Closing the Wagah-Attari border
• Cancelling visas
• Putting the Indus Waters Treaty on hold
• However, these actions were not substitutes for a military response.

Planning for Kinetic Action (April 23 – May 7)

• The period between April 23 and May 7 was used to:
• Select military targets
• Coordinate high-level diplomacy
• Nine targets were finalized from a list of approximately 24 options.
• Anticipation of a major terror attack post-2019 led to regular planning updates.
• Diplomatic groundwork was laid with key global capitals to ensure conditional support for India's actions.

Execution of Operation Sindoor (May 7, 2025)

• In the early morning of May 7, 2025, Operation Sindoor was launched, targeting nine sites linked to terrorist activities.
• Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) was informed after the strike.
• The targets were associated with groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.
• India emphasized that the strike was aimed only at terrorists and not at Pakistan’s military or civilians.
• India also warned of retaliation if Pakistan escalated the situation.

Key Actions and Developments

Weapons Used by India on May 10

• Scalp and BrahMos missiles
• Crystal Maze, Hammer, and Spice 2000 precision-guided munitions

U.S. Role in the India-Pakistan Escalation (May 2025)

Initial U.S. Stance

• The United States initially adopted a hands-off approach during the early stages of the India-Pakistan escalation. On May 8, U.S. Vice-President J.D. Vance publicly stated that the U.S. would not involve itself in what he termed “a war that is fundamentally none of our business.”

Shift in U.S. Assessment

• Within 24 hours of the initial statement, the U.S. position shifted significantly. This change was prompted by intelligence indicating impending cross-border strikes and reports suggesting that Pakistan was preparing to convene its National Command Authority (NCA), responsible for nuclear oversight in the country.

High-Level Diplomatic Engagement

Historical Context of U.S. Involvement 

• Kargil War (1999)
• Indian Parliament attack and Operation Parakram (2001–02)
• Mumbai attacks (2008)
• Balakot airstrikes (2019)

Exception: After the 2016 surgical strikes, which Pakistan denied, the U.S. did not intervene.

Pattern: U.S. involvement has been limited to de-escalation, not direct mediation.

 Conflict under the nuclear shadow 

Since 1998, after both India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed states, Pakistan has relied on nuclear threats to limit India’s conventional military options. This nuclear posturing aimed to reduce space for kinetic retaliation by flashing the nuclear card and threatening early nuclear use after terrorist attacks. However, this strategy is no longer effective. Over time, India has progressively expanded its kinetic response doctrine:

• The 2016 surgical strikes introduced ground-based retaliation as the new normal.
• The 2019 Balakot air strikes expanded this by incorporating air power.
• Operation Sindoor (2025) took it further by striking targets across all of Pakistan, not just near the LoC.

Until now, India has consistently framed its actions as retaliation against terrorist infrastructure, targeting:

• Launch pads (2016),
• The Balakot training camp (2019),
• Nine terrorist-linked locations during Operation Sindoor.

On May 12, PM Narendra Modi introduced a more assertive 'new normal', stating:

• India has the right to respond militarily to any act of terror,
• It will not be deterred by nuclear threats or “nuclear blackmail”,
• India will no longer distinguish between terrorists, their masterminds, and the governments that support them.

This marks a clear strategic warning to Pakistan’s military establishment: future responses like Operation Sindoor 2.0 may include direct action against state-linked elements. Modi’s sharp rhetoric underscores this doctrinal shift:

• “Terror and talks cannot go together”
• “Terror and trade cannot go together”
• “Water and blood cannot flow together”

These developments signal a hardening of India’s national security policy, aimed at restoring credible deterrence and ending Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear threats to shield terrorism.

 Conclusion 

By broadening the scope of regular military actions without crossing the nuclear limit, Mr. Modi aims to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. But this will need a big improvement in normal military strength. India must develop skills to neutralize enemy air defences and follow a network-based strategy that smoothly connects both manned and unmanned air systems with satellite-based tools for watching, communication, and targeting. At the same time, India should learn from the intelligence and security failures that caused the Pahalgam incident, so that it can plan, predict, and stop similar events in the future. Only then can the broad ‘new normal’ serve as a real warning to prevent future terrorist attacks.