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Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.Which among the following options highlight the central problem with Section 35 of the bill?a)The clause is vaguely wordedb)The clause is not in conformity global constitutional standards of proportionalityc)The clause is seemingly unconstitutional for not providing adequate safeguardsd)The clause is a departure from what the bill originally described.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2025 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.Which among the following options highlight the central problem with Section 35 of the bill?a)The clause is vaguely wordedb)The clause is not in conformity global constitutional standards of proportionalityc)The clause is seemingly unconstitutional for not providing adequate safeguardsd)The clause is a departure from what the bill originally described.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2025 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.Which among the following options highlight the central problem with Section 35 of the bill?a)The clause is vaguely wordedb)The clause is not in conformity global constitutional standards of proportionalityc)The clause is seemingly unconstitutional for not providing adequate safeguardsd)The clause is a departure from what the bill originally described.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?.

Solutions for Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.Which among the following options highlight the central problem with Section 35 of the bill?a)The clause is vaguely wordedb)The clause is not in conformity global constitutional standards of proportionalityc)The clause is seemingly unconstitutional for not providing adequate safeguardsd)The clause is a departure from what the bill originally described.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CLAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CLAT Exam by signing up for free.

Here you can find the meaning of Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.Which among the following options highlight the central problem with Section 35 of the bill?a)The clause is vaguely wordedb)The clause is not in conformity global constitutional standards of proportionalityc)The clause is seemingly unconstitutional for not providing adequate safeguardsd)The clause is a departure from what the bill originally described.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.Which among the following options highlight the central problem with Section 35 of the bill?a)The clause is vaguely wordedb)The clause is not in conformity global constitutional standards of proportionalityc)The clause is seemingly unconstitutional for not providing adequate safeguardsd)The clause is a departure from what the bill originally described.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.Which among the following options highlight the central problem with Section 35 of the bill?a)The clause is vaguely wordedb)The clause is not in conformity global constitutional standards of proportionalityc)The clause is seemingly unconstitutional for not providing adequate safeguardsd)The clause is a departure from what the bill originally described.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.Which among the following options highlight the central problem with Section 35 of the bill?a)The clause is vaguely wordedb)The clause is not in conformity global constitutional standards of proportionalityc)The clause is seemingly unconstitutional for not providing adequate safeguardsd)The clause is a departure from what the bill originally described.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.Which among the following options highlight the central problem with Section 35 of the bill?a)The clause is vaguely wordedb)The clause is not in conformity global constitutional standards of proportionalityc)The clause is seemingly unconstitutional for not providing adequate safeguardsd)The clause is a departure from what the bill originally described.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CLAT tests.