The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of Article19 according to the procedure established by law. No restrictions can be placed by mere executive or departmental instructions. However, these restrictions must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Each of these rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by Parliament.Restrictions may be enacted “in the interests of” public order of the general public. A restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is direct and proximate. Hence a restriction to be constitutionally valid must satisfy the following two tests:A legislation arbitrarily invading the right of a person cannot be regarded as reasonable. A restriction to be valid must have a direct and proximate nexus with the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and the restriction must not be in excess of that object i.e., a balance between the freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) to (g) and the social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19. It is the substance of legislation and not its appearance or form which is to be taken into consideration while assessing its validity. This introduces the principle of ‘proportionality’. This means the court would consider whether the restriction imposed by legislation on the Fundamental Rights are disproportionate to the situation and are “not the least restrictive of the choices”.Retrospectivity of a law does not make it automatically unreasonable. A statute imposing a restriction with retrospective effect is not prima facie unreasonable, but retrospectivity is an element to be taken into consideration in determining whether the restriction is reasonable or not.A law may be reasonable, but the restriction imposed by it on the exercise of freedom may not be reasonable. A prohibition on the fundamental right to carry on occupation, trade or business is not regarded as reasonable if is it imposed not in the interests of the general public but keeping in view the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of a community whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.Q. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, an Act was passed to the extent that during the agricultural season, no one should engage in the manufacture of beedies. The object and intent of the legislature was that as there was dearth of labour in the agriculture sector, it was required to divert labour to the agriculture sector. This restriction of the freedom of occupation was questioned. Is this a reasonable restriction and is the state justified in doing so? a)The law is reasonable as the entire country depends on agriculture.b)The law is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of occupation.c)The law is reasonable if we understand the intent of the legislation.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?

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Restrictions may be enacted “in the interests of” public order of the general public. A restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is direct and proximate. Hence a restriction to be constitutionally valid must satisfy the following two tests:

A legislation arbitrarily invading the right of a person cannot be regarded as reasonable. A restriction to be valid must have a direct and proximate nexus with the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and the restriction must not be in excess of that object i.e., a balance between the freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) to (g) and the social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19. It is the substance of legislation and not its appearance or form which is to be taken into consideration while assessing its validity. This introduces the principle of ‘proportionality’. This means the court would consider whether the restriction imposed by legislation on the Fundamental Rights are disproportionate to the situation and are “not the least restrictive of the choices”.

Retrospectivity of a law does not make it automatically unreasonable. A statute imposing a restriction with retrospective effect is not prima facie unreasonable, but retrospectivity is an element to be taken into consideration in determining whether the restriction is reasonable or not.

A law may be reasonable, but the restriction imposed by it on the exercise of freedom may not be reasonable. A prohibition on the fundamental right to carry on occupation, trade or business is not regarded as reasonable if is it imposed not in the interests of the general public but keeping in view the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of a community whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.

Q. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, an Act was passed to the extent that during the agricultural season, no one should engage in the manufacture of beedies. The object and intent of the legislature was that as there was dearth of labour in the agriculture sector, it was required to divert labour to the agriculture sector. This restriction of the freedom of occupation was questioned. Is this a reasonable restriction and is the state justified in doing so?

a)
The law is reasonable as the entire country depends on agriculture.
b)
The law is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of occupation.
c)
The law is reasonable if we understand the intent of the legislation.
d)
None of the above.

Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?

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The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolut...

It is not reasonable as it curtails the occupational freedom of those who can not engage in the agriculture labour and no alternate occupation was provided who can not work in the agriculture sector thereby leading to idleness and unemployment.

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The demand for speedy retributive justice in the recent heinous crime done against a veterinarian has brought into light the question of extra-constitutional killings. The public sentiments, political demand of public lynching of rapists inter-alia have raised the debate whether a democratic country should follow the constitutional norms and adhere to the due process of law or shall it adopt the measures of retributive justice to bring instant and speedy justice to the victim.Retributive justice is a system of criminal justice based on thepunishment of offenders rather than on rehabilitation where as in REFORMATIVE THEORY the object of punishment should be the reform of the criminal, through the method of individualization. It is based on the humanistic principle that even if an offender commits a crime, he does not cease to be a human being.From protests on the ground, to the commentary on social media, to MPs in Parliament, the demand for the instant killing of the accused from all corners created the public opinion for theabandonment of the rule of lawthat appears to have led to the incident.Justice in any civilised society is not just about retribution, but also about deterrence, and in less serious crimes,rehabilitationof the offenders.There is a procedure prescribed by the law for criminal investigation which is embedded in constitutional principles.Article21of the Constitution (which is fundamental and non-derogabl e) states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law.Also in theSalwa Judum case in 2011a core constitutional precept was set out that in modern constitutionalism no wielder of power can be allowed to claim the right to perpetrate state’s violence against anyone. This is also the touchstone of the constitutionally prescribed rule of law(Article 14).Hence,it is the responsibility of the police, being the officers of government, to follow the Constitutional principles and uphold the Right to Lifeof every individual whether an innocent one or a criminal.According toDr. B.R. Ambedkar,the pathways of justice are not linear nor without obstacles. But we have, as a people, chosen the route of democracy and the Constitution, so we really have no option but to school ourselves in constitutional morality that with time must replace public moralityQ.What does the author mean by Retributive Justice?

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Directions: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given beside.Section 25 of the Contract Act reads- “Agreements without consideration, void unless it is writing and registered or is a promise to compensate for something or is a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation law”. This section after defining consideration in definition clause in Sec. 2( d) declares that “consideration is the vital part of a valid contract” and also states some exception to the rule that it establishes and in such exceptions, the contract cannot be rendered void even if it is without consideration. The exceptions are: When the contract is in writing and registered When it is for compensating someone for his voluntary services for the promisor in the past. When it is a promise, signed or made in writing by the person or his agent to pay whole or part of a debt which is barred by the law of limitation. Note- In case of transfer of any gift from one person to another, this section does not affect its validity. Mere inadequate consideration in a contract does not render it to be void under this section. However, inadequacy may be taken into account to check whether the consent was free or not.Q.Mr. X and Mr. Y have entered into an agreement for the sale of Mr. Xs car to Mr. Y for Rs. 2 lakhs. Notably, the contract does not specify the consideration involved. Subsequently, once the contract has been carried out, Mr. Y declines to fulfill the agreed-upon payment to Mr. X, contending that the contract is void due to the absence of consideration. Which of the following options provides the most accurate explanation regarding the validity of the contract between Mr. X and Mr. Y?

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Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2( d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.A enters into a contract with B that he will sell his land to B for 5 rupees since B has been a really good friend of his. A is later told by one of his employees that the actual worth of the land is 5 crore rupees. A decides not to perform the contract with B. B sues A for performance of contract. Decide.

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Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2( d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.Which of these is true?

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Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2( d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.Which of the following is an example of valid consideration

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The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of Article19 according to the procedure established by law. No restrictions can be placed by mere executive or departmental instructions. However, these restrictions must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Each of these rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by Parliament.Restrictions may be enacted “in the interests of” public order of the general public. A restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is direct and proximate. Hence a restriction to be constitutionally valid must satisfy the following two tests:A legislation arbitrarily invading the right of a person cannot be regarded as reasonable. A restriction to be valid must have a direct and proximate nexus with the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and the restriction must not be in excess of that object i.e., a balance between the freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) to (g) and the social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19. It is the substance of legislation and not its appearance or form which is to be taken into consideration while assessing its validity. This introduces the principle of ‘proportionality’. This means the court would consider whether the restriction imposed by legislation on the Fundamental Rights are disproportionate to the situation and are “not the least restrictive of the choices”.Retrospectivity of a law does not make it automatically unreasonable. A statute imposing a restriction with retrospective effect is not prima facie unreasonable, but retrospectivity is an element to be taken into consideration in determining whether the restriction is reasonable or not.A law may be reasonable, but the restriction imposed by it on the exercise of freedom may not be reasonable. A prohibition on the fundamental right to carry on occupation, trade or business is not regarded as reasonable if is it imposed not in the interests of the general public but keeping in view the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of a community whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.Q. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, an Act was passed to the extent that during the agricultural season, no one should engage in the manufacture of beedies. The object and intent of the legislature was that as there was dearth of labour in the agriculture sector, it was required to divert labour to the agriculture sector. This restriction of the freedom of occupation was questioned. Is this a reasonable restriction and is the state justified in doing so? a)The law is reasonable as the entire country depends on agriculture.b)The law is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of occupation.c)The law is reasonable if we understand the intent of the legislation.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?

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The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of Article19 according to the procedure established by law. No restrictions can be placed by mere executive or departmental instructions. However, these restrictions must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Each of these rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by Parliament.Restrictions may be enacted “in the interests of” public order of the general public. A restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is direct and proximate. Hence a restriction to be constitutionally valid must satisfy the following two tests:A legislation arbitrarily invading the right of a person cannot be regarded as reasonable. A restriction to be valid must have a direct and proximate nexus with the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and the restriction must not be in excess of that object i.e., a balance between the freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) to (g) and the social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19. It is the substance of legislation and not its appearance or form which is to be taken into consideration while assessing its validity. This introduces the principle of ‘proportionality’. This means the court would consider whether the restriction imposed by legislation on the Fundamental Rights are disproportionate to the situation and are “not the least restrictive of the choices”.Retrospectivity of a law does not make it automatically unreasonable. A statute imposing a restriction with retrospective effect is not prima facie unreasonable, but retrospectivity is an element to be taken into consideration in determining whether the restriction is reasonable or not.A law may be reasonable, but the restriction imposed by it on the exercise of freedom may not be reasonable. A prohibition on the fundamental right to carry on occupation, trade or business is not regarded as reasonable if is it imposed not in the interests of the general public but keeping in view the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of a community whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.Q. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, an Act was passed to the extent that during the agricultural season, no one should engage in the manufacture of beedies. The object and intent of the legislature was that as there was dearth of labour in the agriculture sector, it was required to divert labour to the agriculture sector. This restriction of the freedom of occupation was questioned. Is this a reasonable restriction and is the state justified in doing so? a)The law is reasonable as the entire country depends on agriculture.b)The law is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of occupation.c)The law is reasonable if we understand the intent of the legislation.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2024 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of Article19 according to the procedure established by law. No restrictions can be placed by mere executive or departmental instructions. However, these restrictions must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Each of these rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by Parliament.Restrictions may be enacted “in the interests of” public order of the general public. A restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is direct and proximate. Hence a restriction to be constitutionally valid must satisfy the following two tests:A legislation arbitrarily invading the right of a person cannot be regarded as reasonable. A restriction to be valid must have a direct and proximate nexus with the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and the restriction must not be in excess of that object i.e., a balance between the freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) to (g) and the social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19. It is the substance of legislation and not its appearance or form which is to be taken into consideration while assessing its validity. This introduces the principle of ‘proportionality’. This means the court would consider whether the restriction imposed by legislation on the Fundamental Rights are disproportionate to the situation and are “not the least restrictive of the choices”.Retrospectivity of a law does not make it automatically unreasonable. A statute imposing a restriction with retrospective effect is not prima facie unreasonable, but retrospectivity is an element to be taken into consideration in determining whether the restriction is reasonable or not.A law may be reasonable, but the restriction imposed by it on the exercise of freedom may not be reasonable. A prohibition on the fundamental right to carry on occupation, trade or business is not regarded as reasonable if is it imposed not in the interests of the general public but keeping in view the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of a community whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.Q. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, an Act was passed to the extent that during the agricultural season, no one should engage in the manufacture of beedies. The object and intent of the legislature was that as there was dearth of labour in the agriculture sector, it was required to divert labour to the agriculture sector. This restriction of the freedom of occupation was questioned. Is this a reasonable restriction and is the state justified in doing so? a)The law is reasonable as the entire country depends on agriculture.b)The law is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of occupation.c)The law is reasonable if we understand the intent of the legislation.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2024 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of Article19 according to the procedure established by law. No restrictions can be placed by mere executive or departmental instructions. However, these restrictions must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Each of these rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by Parliament.Restrictions may be enacted “in the interests of” public order of the general public. A restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is direct and proximate. Hence a restriction to be constitutionally valid must satisfy the following two tests:A legislation arbitrarily invading the right of a person cannot be regarded as reasonable. A restriction to be valid must have a direct and proximate nexus with the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and the restriction must not be in excess of that object i.e., a balance between the freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) to (g) and the social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19. It is the substance of legislation and not its appearance or form which is to be taken into consideration while assessing its validity. This introduces the principle of ‘proportionality’. This means the court would consider whether the restriction imposed by legislation on the Fundamental Rights are disproportionate to the situation and are “not the least restrictive of the choices”.Retrospectivity of a law does not make it automatically unreasonable. A statute imposing a restriction with retrospective effect is not prima facie unreasonable, but retrospectivity is an element to be taken into consideration in determining whether the restriction is reasonable or not.A law may be reasonable, but the restriction imposed by it on the exercise of freedom may not be reasonable. A prohibition on the fundamental right to carry on occupation, trade or business is not regarded as reasonable if is it imposed not in the interests of the general public but keeping in view the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of a community whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.Q. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, an Act was passed to the extent that during the agricultural season, no one should engage in the manufacture of beedies. The object and intent of the legislature was that as there was dearth of labour in the agriculture sector, it was required to divert labour to the agriculture sector. This restriction of the freedom of occupation was questioned. Is this a reasonable restriction and is the state justified in doing so? a)The law is reasonable as the entire country depends on agriculture.b)The law is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of occupation.c)The law is reasonable if we understand the intent of the legislation.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?.

Solutions for The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of Article19 according to the procedure established by law. No restrictions can be placed by mere executive or departmental instructions. However, these restrictions must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Each of these rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by Parliament.Restrictions may be enacted “in the interests of” public order of the general public. A restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is direct and proximate. Hence a restriction to be constitutionally valid must satisfy the following two tests:A legislation arbitrarily invading the right of a person cannot be regarded as reasonable. A restriction to be valid must have a direct and proximate nexus with the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and the restriction must not be in excess of that object i.e., a balance between the freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) to (g) and the social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19. It is the substance of legislation and not its appearance or form which is to be taken into consideration while assessing its validity. This introduces the principle of ‘proportionality’. This means the court would consider whether the restriction imposed by legislation on the Fundamental Rights are disproportionate to the situation and are “not the least restrictive of the choices”.Retrospectivity of a law does not make it automatically unreasonable. A statute imposing a restriction with retrospective effect is not prima facie unreasonable, but retrospectivity is an element to be taken into consideration in determining whether the restriction is reasonable or not.A law may be reasonable, but the restriction imposed by it on the exercise of freedom may not be reasonable. A prohibition on the fundamental right to carry on occupation, trade or business is not regarded as reasonable if is it imposed not in the interests of the general public but keeping in view the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of a community whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.Q. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, an Act was passed to the extent that during the agricultural season, no one should engage in the manufacture of beedies. The object and intent of the legislature was that as there was dearth of labour in the agriculture sector, it was required to divert labour to the agriculture sector. This restriction of the freedom of occupation was questioned. Is this a reasonable restriction and is the state justified in doing so? a)The law is reasonable as the entire country depends on agriculture.b)The law is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of occupation.c)The law is reasonable if we understand the intent of the legislation.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CLAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CLAT Exam by signing up for free.

Here you can find the meaning of The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of Article19 according to the procedure established by law. No restrictions can be placed by mere executive or departmental instructions. However, these restrictions must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Each of these rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by Parliament.Restrictions may be enacted “in the interests of” public order of the general public. A restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is direct and proximate. Hence a restriction to be constitutionally valid must satisfy the following two tests:A legislation arbitrarily invading the right of a person cannot be regarded as reasonable. A restriction to be valid must have a direct and proximate nexus with the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and the restriction must not be in excess of that object i.e., a balance between the freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) to (g) and the social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19. It is the substance of legislation and not its appearance or form which is to be taken into consideration while assessing its validity. This introduces the principle of ‘proportionality’. This means the court would consider whether the restriction imposed by legislation on the Fundamental Rights are disproportionate to the situation and are “not the least restrictive of the choices”.Retrospectivity of a law does not make it automatically unreasonable. A statute imposing a restriction with retrospective effect is not prima facie unreasonable, but retrospectivity is an element to be taken into consideration in determining whether the restriction is reasonable or not.A law may be reasonable, but the restriction imposed by it on the exercise of freedom may not be reasonable. A prohibition on the fundamental right to carry on occupation, trade or business is not regarded as reasonable if is it imposed not in the interests of the general public but keeping in view the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of a community whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.Q. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, an Act was passed to the extent that during the agricultural season, no one should engage in the manufacture of beedies. The object and intent of the legislature was that as there was dearth of labour in the agriculture sector, it was required to divert labour to the agriculture sector. This restriction of the freedom of occupation was questioned. Is this a reasonable restriction and is the state justified in doing so? a)The law is reasonable as the entire country depends on agriculture.b)The law is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of occupation.c)The law is reasonable if we understand the intent of the legislation.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of Article19 according to the procedure established by law. No restrictions can be placed by mere executive or departmental instructions. However, these restrictions must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Each of these rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by Parliament.Restrictions may be enacted “in the interests of” public order of the general public. A restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is direct and proximate. Hence a restriction to be constitutionally valid must satisfy the following two tests:A legislation arbitrarily invading the right of a person cannot be regarded as reasonable. A restriction to be valid must have a direct and proximate nexus with the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and the restriction must not be in excess of that object i.e., a balance between the freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) to (g) and the social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19. It is the substance of legislation and not its appearance or form which is to be taken into consideration while assessing its validity. This introduces the principle of ‘proportionality’. This means the court would consider whether the restriction imposed by legislation on the Fundamental Rights are disproportionate to the situation and are “not the least restrictive of the choices”.Retrospectivity of a law does not make it automatically unreasonable. A statute imposing a restriction with retrospective effect is not prima facie unreasonable, but retrospectivity is an element to be taken into consideration in determining whether the restriction is reasonable or not.A law may be reasonable, but the restriction imposed by it on the exercise of freedom may not be reasonable. A prohibition on the fundamental right to carry on occupation, trade or business is not regarded as reasonable if is it imposed not in the interests of the general public but keeping in view the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of a community whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.Q. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, an Act was passed to the extent that during the agricultural season, no one should engage in the manufacture of beedies. The object and intent of the legislature was that as there was dearth of labour in the agriculture sector, it was required to divert labour to the agriculture sector. This restriction of the freedom of occupation was questioned. Is this a reasonable restriction and is the state justified in doing so? a)The law is reasonable as the entire country depends on agriculture.b)The law is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of occupation.c)The law is reasonable if we understand the intent of the legislation.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of Article19 according to the procedure established by law. No restrictions can be placed by mere executive or departmental instructions. However, these restrictions must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Each of these rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by Parliament.Restrictions may be enacted “in the interests of” public order of the general public. A restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is direct and proximate. Hence a restriction to be constitutionally valid must satisfy the following two tests:A legislation arbitrarily invading the right of a person cannot be regarded as reasonable. A restriction to be valid must have a direct and proximate nexus with the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and the restriction must not be in excess of that object i.e., a balance between the freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) to (g) and the social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19. It is the substance of legislation and not its appearance or form which is to be taken into consideration while assessing its validity. This introduces the principle of ‘proportionality’. This means the court would consider whether the restriction imposed by legislation on the Fundamental Rights are disproportionate to the situation and are “not the least restrictive of the choices”.Retrospectivity of a law does not make it automatically unreasonable. A statute imposing a restriction with retrospective effect is not prima facie unreasonable, but retrospectivity is an element to be taken into consideration in determining whether the restriction is reasonable or not.A law may be reasonable, but the restriction imposed by it on the exercise of freedom may not be reasonable. A prohibition on the fundamental right to carry on occupation, trade or business is not regarded as reasonable if is it imposed not in the interests of the general public but keeping in view the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of a community whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.Q. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, an Act was passed to the extent that during the agricultural season, no one should engage in the manufacture of beedies. The object and intent of the legislature was that as there was dearth of labour in the agriculture sector, it was required to divert labour to the agriculture sector. This restriction of the freedom of occupation was questioned. Is this a reasonable restriction and is the state justified in doing so? a)The law is reasonable as the entire country depends on agriculture.b)The law is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of occupation.c)The law is reasonable if we understand the intent of the legislation.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of Article19 according to the procedure established by law. No restrictions can be placed by mere executive or departmental instructions. However, these restrictions must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Each of these rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by Parliament.Restrictions may be enacted “in the interests of” public order of the general public. A restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is direct and proximate. Hence a restriction to be constitutionally valid must satisfy the following two tests:A legislation arbitrarily invading the right of a person cannot be regarded as reasonable. A restriction to be valid must have a direct and proximate nexus with the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and the restriction must not be in excess of that object i.e., a balance between the freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) to (g) and the social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19. It is the substance of legislation and not its appearance or form which is to be taken into consideration while assessing its validity. This introduces the principle of ‘proportionality’. This means the court would consider whether the restriction imposed by legislation on the Fundamental Rights are disproportionate to the situation and are “not the least restrictive of the choices”.Retrospectivity of a law does not make it automatically unreasonable. A statute imposing a restriction with retrospective effect is not prima facie unreasonable, but retrospectivity is an element to be taken into consideration in determining whether the restriction is reasonable or not.A law may be reasonable, but the restriction imposed by it on the exercise of freedom may not be reasonable. A prohibition on the fundamental right to carry on occupation, trade or business is not regarded as reasonable if is it imposed not in the interests of the general public but keeping in view the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of a community whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.Q. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, an Act was passed to the extent that during the agricultural season, no one should engage in the manufacture of beedies. The object and intent of the legislature was that as there was dearth of labour in the agriculture sector, it was required to divert labour to the agriculture sector. This restriction of the freedom of occupation was questioned. Is this a reasonable restriction and is the state justified in doing so? a)The law is reasonable as the entire country depends on agriculture.b)The law is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of occupation.c)The law is reasonable if we understand the intent of the legislation.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of Article19 according to the procedure established by law. No restrictions can be placed by mere executive or departmental instructions. However, these restrictions must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Each of these rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by Parliament.Restrictions may be enacted “in the interests of” public order of the general public. A restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is direct and proximate. Hence a restriction to be constitutionally valid must satisfy the following two tests:A legislation arbitrarily invading the right of a person cannot be regarded as reasonable. A restriction to be valid must have a direct and proximate nexus with the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and the restriction must not be in excess of that object i.e., a balance between the freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) to (g) and the social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19. It is the substance of legislation and not its appearance or form which is to be taken into consideration while assessing its validity. This introduces the principle of ‘proportionality’. This means the court would consider whether the restriction imposed by legislation on the Fundamental Rights are disproportionate to the situation and are “not the least restrictive of the choices”.Retrospectivity of a law does not make it automatically unreasonable. A statute imposing a restriction with retrospective effect is not prima facie unreasonable, but retrospectivity is an element to be taken into consideration in determining whether the restriction is reasonable or not.A law may be reasonable, but the restriction imposed by it on the exercise of freedom may not be reasonable. A prohibition on the fundamental right to carry on occupation, trade or business is not regarded as reasonable if is it imposed not in the interests of the general public but keeping in view the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of a community whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.Q. In the state of Madhya Pradesh, an Act was passed to the extent that during the agricultural season, no one should engage in the manufacture of beedies. The object and intent of the legislature was that as there was dearth of labour in the agriculture sector, it was required to divert labour to the agriculture sector. This restriction of the freedom of occupation was questioned. Is this a reasonable restriction and is the state justified in doing so? a)The law is reasonable as the entire country depends on agriculture.b)The law is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of occupation.c)The law is reasonable if we understand the intent of the legislation.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CLAT tests.

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