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Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.
There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.
Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.
Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.
Q. In which of the following situations is the obligation likely to be overruled, based on the author’s reasoning?
  • a)
    I have a dinner appointment with my friend, but I am lazy to go.
  • b)
    I have crossed the speed limit because I am delayed and likely to miss the flight if I do not reach on time. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.
  • c)
    I have crossed the speed limit while I am taking my sick mother to the hospital for emergency treatment. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.
  • d)
    I have an appointment with the dentist for my son’s consultation, and I am stuck in office.
Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?
Verified Answer
Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think ...
Option C is the best answer. People generally expect to stick to their obligations unless there is a compelling reason. In this case, taking sick mother for emergency treatment is a compelling reason for the traffic cop to overrule his obligation.
Option A is about dinner appointment. One is expected to keep up the obligation. Option B is about speeding to the airport. The traffic cop is likely to fine for speeding. Option D is about dentist consultation. It is an obligation that needs to be kept. Alternative arrangements could be made for the son to be taken for the consultation.
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Most Upvoted Answer
Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think ...
Understanding the Obligation to Override
The author's reasoning emphasizes that certain obligations can be overridden by stronger obligations, particularly in urgent or exceptional circumstances. Let's analyze the options provided:
Option A: Dinner Appointment
- The obligation to attend the dinner is based on social norms, but it lacks the urgency or a stronger moral obligation. Thus, this obligation is likely to hold firm.
Option B: Missed Flight
- While missing a flight is significant, the urgency is still primarily personal. The obligation to adhere to traffic laws is likely to prevail since the situation is not life-threatening.
Option C: Taking Sick Mother to Hospital
- This situation presents a clear moral and urgent obligation. The commitment to help a sick relative holds more weight than a traffic violation. Law enforcement often recognizes such emergencies, suggesting that a police officer may choose not to issue a ticket, thereby allowing the obligation to transport a sick individual to override the obligation to obey speed limits.
Option D: Dentist Appointment for Son
- Although this is important, it does not carry the same immediate urgency as a medical emergency. Therefore, the obligation to attend the dentist's appointment may be disregarded, but not as strongly as in the case of taking a sick relative to the hospital.
Conclusion
- Based on the author’s reasoning, option 'C' stands out as the situation where the obligation to take a sick mother to the hospital is likely to be recognized as overriding, illustrating the principle that genuine obligations can be justifiably set aside when faced with more pressing moral duties.
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Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.Q. According to the author, what is the general impression of a binding precedent?

Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.Q. Which of the following statements is the author most likely to agree with?

Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.Q. What is the validity of the following statement, based on the information provided in the passage? “The decisions of the Supreme Court are binding on future decisions based on the principle of stare decisis and there cannot be any deviation.

Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.Q. Based on the information provided in the passage, if there is a case in the District court, and there are precedents in the High Court and Supreme Court with contradictory outcomes, which outcome is binding on the District court?

Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2( d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.A enters into a contract with B that he will sell his land to B for 5 rupees since B has been a really good friend of his. A is later told by one of his employees that the actual worth of the land is 5 crore rupees. A decides not to perform the contract with B. B sues A for performance of contract. Decide.

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Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.Q. In which of the following situations is the obligation likely to be overruled, based on the author’s reasoning?a)I have a dinner appointment with my friend, but I am lazy to go.b)I have crossed the speed limit because I am delayed and likely to miss the flight if I do not reach on time. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.c)I have crossed the speed limit while I am taking my sick mother to the hospital for emergency treatment. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.d)I have an appointment with the dentist for my son’s consultation, and I am stuck in office.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?
Question Description
Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.Q. In which of the following situations is the obligation likely to be overruled, based on the author’s reasoning?a)I have a dinner appointment with my friend, but I am lazy to go.b)I have crossed the speed limit because I am delayed and likely to miss the flight if I do not reach on time. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.c)I have crossed the speed limit while I am taking my sick mother to the hospital for emergency treatment. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.d)I have an appointment with the dentist for my son’s consultation, and I am stuck in office.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2024 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.Q. In which of the following situations is the obligation likely to be overruled, based on the author’s reasoning?a)I have a dinner appointment with my friend, but I am lazy to go.b)I have crossed the speed limit because I am delayed and likely to miss the flight if I do not reach on time. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.c)I have crossed the speed limit while I am taking my sick mother to the hospital for emergency treatment. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.d)I have an appointment with the dentist for my son’s consultation, and I am stuck in office.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2024 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.Q. In which of the following situations is the obligation likely to be overruled, based on the author’s reasoning?a)I have a dinner appointment with my friend, but I am lazy to go.b)I have crossed the speed limit because I am delayed and likely to miss the flight if I do not reach on time. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.c)I have crossed the speed limit while I am taking my sick mother to the hospital for emergency treatment. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.d)I have an appointment with the dentist for my son’s consultation, and I am stuck in office.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?.
Solutions for Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.Q. In which of the following situations is the obligation likely to be overruled, based on the author’s reasoning?a)I have a dinner appointment with my friend, but I am lazy to go.b)I have crossed the speed limit because I am delayed and likely to miss the flight if I do not reach on time. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.c)I have crossed the speed limit while I am taking my sick mother to the hospital for emergency treatment. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.d)I have an appointment with the dentist for my son’s consultation, and I am stuck in office.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CLAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CLAT Exam by signing up for free.
Here you can find the meaning of Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.Q. In which of the following situations is the obligation likely to be overruled, based on the author’s reasoning?a)I have a dinner appointment with my friend, but I am lazy to go.b)I have crossed the speed limit because I am delayed and likely to miss the flight if I do not reach on time. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.c)I have crossed the speed limit while I am taking my sick mother to the hospital for emergency treatment. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.d)I have an appointment with the dentist for my son’s consultation, and I am stuck in office.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.Q. In which of the following situations is the obligation likely to be overruled, based on the author’s reasoning?a)I have a dinner appointment with my friend, but I am lazy to go.b)I have crossed the speed limit because I am delayed and likely to miss the flight if I do not reach on time. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.c)I have crossed the speed limit while I am taking my sick mother to the hospital for emergency treatment. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.d)I have an appointment with the dentist for my son’s consultation, and I am stuck in office.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.Q. In which of the following situations is the obligation likely to be overruled, based on the author’s reasoning?a)I have a dinner appointment with my friend, but I am lazy to go.b)I have crossed the speed limit because I am delayed and likely to miss the flight if I do not reach on time. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.c)I have crossed the speed limit while I am taking my sick mother to the hospital for emergency treatment. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.d)I have an appointment with the dentist for my son’s consultation, and I am stuck in office.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.Q. In which of the following situations is the obligation likely to be overruled, based on the author’s reasoning?a)I have a dinner appointment with my friend, but I am lazy to go.b)I have crossed the speed limit because I am delayed and likely to miss the flight if I do not reach on time. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.c)I have crossed the speed limit while I am taking my sick mother to the hospital for emergency treatment. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.d)I have an appointment with the dentist for my son’s consultation, and I am stuck in office.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice Typically, when we imagine a rule or constraint as binding, we think of it as unavoidable. Binding constraints are those we suppose to be absolute and incapable of being overridden by other considerations. If a precedent is binding, then a court bound by it simply must follow it. Period.There is no reason, however, why even a binding authority should be understood in this way. Although a binding authority creates an obligation on the part of the bound court to use that authority, such an obligation need not be absolute. In life, genuine obligations can be overridden by even stronger ones. I am obliged to keep my promises, so I must keep my lunch date with you even if I no longer find you interesting. But if a close relative has fallen ill, it is understood that my obligation is overridden by the even stronger one to attend to ailing relatives. Similarly, a police officer refrains from giving a speeding ticket to the man who is rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Indeed, rights operate in the same way.Just as obligations can be obligatory without being absolutely so, so too can authorities be authoritative without being absolutely authoritative. Most authorities are therefore not binding or controlling in the absolute sense, and treating a source as authoritative or even mandatory does not entail following it come what may. A judge of the District Court is bound by the decisions of the High Court, but he is also bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, and if in some case the relevant High Court precedent turns out to dictate one outcome while the relevant Supreme Court case indicates another, the obligation to follow the Supreme Court will override the obligation to follow the High Court.Similarly, the best understanding of stare decisis is that a subsequent court is bound to follow the earlier decisions of the same court, but this too is not an absolute obligation. The Supreme Court can overturn its own precedents when there is a “special justification”, not that it believes that the previous Court was mistaken. Something more is required, something “special,” but it is possible to overrule. The earlier case is a binding precedent, but here, unlike in the situation involving vertical precedent, where we understand binding to mean non overridable by any other consideration, the binding force of stare decisis is real but decidedly non absolute.Q. In which of the following situations is the obligation likely to be overruled, based on the author’s reasoning?a)I have a dinner appointment with my friend, but I am lazy to go.b)I have crossed the speed limit because I am delayed and likely to miss the flight if I do not reach on time. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.c)I have crossed the speed limit while I am taking my sick mother to the hospital for emergency treatment. The traffic cops stop me for speeding.d)I have an appointment with the dentist for my son’s consultation, and I am stuck in office.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CLAT tests.
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