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In a bizarre order, the Supreme Court of India has decided to begin hearing the petitions seeking review of its previous judgement on the Sabarimala issue from January 13, 2020. A nine-judge constitution bench has been formed to hear the sensitive case. The court will also take up other contentious issues for hearing such as alleged discrimination against Muslim and Parsi women.However, the ambit of review power conferred under Article 137 of the Constitution is extremely limited: The review court must examine the correctness of the judgment under review to ascertain if it suffers from glaring omissions, a patent mistake or grave errors apparent on the face of record. Petitions seeking review of judgments are allowed in rare instances. In Chandra Kanta vs Sheikh Habib, the Court held that Article 137 would not permit ordering of a fresh hearing by a larger bench without scrutiny of judgment under review and without pointing out a grave error apparent on the face of record. None of this has been done by the majority in the Sabarimala review judgment. Simply put, the majority opinion is erroneous.Justices R.F. Nariman and D.Y. Chandrachud dissented and opined against reviewing the original judgment. They held that what a future Constitution Bench (if ever formed) may do was not relevant to the adjudication of the review petitions, which had to be decided in accordance with well established parameters. Since none of the grounds for review had been made out, they held that the petitions were liable to be dismissed.Incorrect as it appears to be, the majority view in the Sabarimala review petitions has served one purpose: it has revived the debate around judicial interference in matters of faith. The constitution doesn’t define religion. Article 25 guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. However, the right is made subject to public order, morality and health.Article 26 allows every religious denomination or any of its sections to (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. This too is made subject to public order, morality, and health.The refusal to test personal laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights means that the validity of religious law will continue to be decided on a judge’s interpretation of religious texts. At the risk of repetition, the majority judgment in the Sabarimala review petitions is flawed. It, however, presents us with an opportunity to move towards a religious jurisprudence, which is entrenched in the Constitution rather than in religious text.Q. During a certain religious occasion, members belonging to a particular religion in state X have a tenet to defecate in the open. They usually do it at the banks of a river Y thereby polluting the river. About 5000 people in the neighbouring region depend on the river for drinking water. The government bans the practice. Members of the community challenge the government order on the grounds that it violates their fundamental right under Article 25. Decide.a)The ban was unconstitutional as it violated Article 25.b)The ban was constitutional as the government must ban animal sacrifice.c)The ban was constitutional as the practice adversely affected public order, morality and health.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2024 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about In a bizarre order, the Supreme Court of India has decided to begin hearing the petitions seeking review of its previous judgement on the Sabarimala issue from January 13, 2020. A nine-judge constitution bench has been formed to hear the sensitive case. The court will also take up other contentious issues for hearing such as alleged discrimination against Muslim and Parsi women.However, the ambit of review power conferred under Article 137 of the Constitution is extremely limited: The review court must examine the correctness of the judgment under review to ascertain if it suffers from glaring omissions, a patent mistake or grave errors apparent on the face of record. Petitions seeking review of judgments are allowed in rare instances. In Chandra Kanta vs Sheikh Habib, the Court held that Article 137 would not permit ordering of a fresh hearing by a larger bench without scrutiny of judgment under review and without pointing out a grave error apparent on the face of record. None of this has been done by the majority in the Sabarimala review judgment. Simply put, the majority opinion is erroneous.Justices R.F. Nariman and D.Y. Chandrachud dissented and opined against reviewing the original judgment. They held that what a future Constitution Bench (if ever formed) may do was not relevant to the adjudication of the review petitions, which had to be decided in accordance with well established parameters. Since none of the grounds for review had been made out, they held that the petitions were liable to be dismissed.Incorrect as it appears to be, the majority view in the Sabarimala review petitions has served one purpose: it has revived the debate around judicial interference in matters of faith. The constitution doesn’t define religion. Article 25 guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. However, the right is made subject to public order, morality and health.Article 26 allows every religious denomination or any of its sections to (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. This too is made subject to public order, morality, and health.The refusal to test personal laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights means that the validity of religious law will continue to be decided on a judge’s interpretation of religious texts. At the risk of repetition, the majority judgment in the Sabarimala review petitions is flawed. It, however, presents us with an opportunity to move towards a religious jurisprudence, which is entrenched in the Constitution rather than in religious text.Q. During a certain religious occasion, members belonging to a particular religion in state X have a tenet to defecate in the open. They usually do it at the banks of a river Y thereby polluting the river. About 5000 people in the neighbouring region depend on the river for drinking water. The government bans the practice. Members of the community challenge the government order on the grounds that it violates their fundamental right under Article 25. Decide.a)The ban was unconstitutional as it violated Article 25.b)The ban was constitutional as the government must ban animal sacrifice.c)The ban was constitutional as the practice adversely affected public order, morality and health.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2024 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for In a bizarre order, the Supreme Court of India has decided to begin hearing the petitions seeking review of its previous judgement on the Sabarimala issue from January 13, 2020. A nine-judge constitution bench has been formed to hear the sensitive case. The court will also take up other contentious issues for hearing such as alleged discrimination against Muslim and Parsi women.However, the ambit of review power conferred under Article 137 of the Constitution is extremely limited: The review court must examine the correctness of the judgment under review to ascertain if it suffers from glaring omissions, a patent mistake or grave errors apparent on the face of record. Petitions seeking review of judgments are allowed in rare instances. In Chandra Kanta vs Sheikh Habib, the Court held that Article 137 would not permit ordering of a fresh hearing by a larger bench without scrutiny of judgment under review and without pointing out a grave error apparent on the face of record. None of this has been done by the majority in the Sabarimala review judgment. Simply put, the majority opinion is erroneous.Justices R.F. Nariman and D.Y. Chandrachud dissented and opined against reviewing the original judgment. They held that what a future Constitution Bench (if ever formed) may do was not relevant to the adjudication of the review petitions, which had to be decided in accordance with well established parameters. Since none of the grounds for review had been made out, they held that the petitions were liable to be dismissed.Incorrect as it appears to be, the majority view in the Sabarimala review petitions has served one purpose: it has revived the debate around judicial interference in matters of faith. The constitution doesn’t define religion. Article 25 guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. However, the right is made subject to public order, morality and health.Article 26 allows every religious denomination or any of its sections to (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. This too is made subject to public order, morality, and health.The refusal to test personal laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights means that the validity of religious law will continue to be decided on a judge’s interpretation of religious texts. At the risk of repetition, the majority judgment in the Sabarimala review petitions is flawed. It, however, presents us with an opportunity to move towards a religious jurisprudence, which is entrenched in the Constitution rather than in religious text.Q. During a certain religious occasion, members belonging to a particular religion in state X have a tenet to defecate in the open. They usually do it at the banks of a river Y thereby polluting the river. About 5000 people in the neighbouring region depend on the river for drinking water. The government bans the practice. Members of the community challenge the government order on the grounds that it violates their fundamental right under Article 25. Decide.a)The ban was unconstitutional as it violated Article 25.b)The ban was constitutional as the government must ban animal sacrifice.c)The ban was constitutional as the practice adversely affected public order, morality and health.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?.

Solutions for In a bizarre order, the Supreme Court of India has decided to begin hearing the petitions seeking review of its previous judgement on the Sabarimala issue from January 13, 2020. A nine-judge constitution bench has been formed to hear the sensitive case. The court will also take up other contentious issues for hearing such as alleged discrimination against Muslim and Parsi women.However, the ambit of review power conferred under Article 137 of the Constitution is extremely limited: The review court must examine the correctness of the judgment under review to ascertain if it suffers from glaring omissions, a patent mistake or grave errors apparent on the face of record. Petitions seeking review of judgments are allowed in rare instances. In Chandra Kanta vs Sheikh Habib, the Court held that Article 137 would not permit ordering of a fresh hearing by a larger bench without scrutiny of judgment under review and without pointing out a grave error apparent on the face of record. None of this has been done by the majority in the Sabarimala review judgment. Simply put, the majority opinion is erroneous.Justices R.F. Nariman and D.Y. Chandrachud dissented and opined against reviewing the original judgment. They held that what a future Constitution Bench (if ever formed) may do was not relevant to the adjudication of the review petitions, which had to be decided in accordance with well established parameters. Since none of the grounds for review had been made out, they held that the petitions were liable to be dismissed.Incorrect as it appears to be, the majority view in the Sabarimala review petitions has served one purpose: it has revived the debate around judicial interference in matters of faith. The constitution doesn’t define religion. Article 25 guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. However, the right is made subject to public order, morality and health.Article 26 allows every religious denomination or any of its sections to (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. This too is made subject to public order, morality, and health.The refusal to test personal laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights means that the validity of religious law will continue to be decided on a judge’s interpretation of religious texts. At the risk of repetition, the majority judgment in the Sabarimala review petitions is flawed. It, however, presents us with an opportunity to move towards a religious jurisprudence, which is entrenched in the Constitution rather than in religious text.Q. During a certain religious occasion, members belonging to a particular religion in state X have a tenet to defecate in the open. They usually do it at the banks of a river Y thereby polluting the river. About 5000 people in the neighbouring region depend on the river for drinking water. The government bans the practice. Members of the community challenge the government order on the grounds that it violates their fundamental right under Article 25. Decide.a)The ban was unconstitutional as it violated Article 25.b)The ban was constitutional as the government must ban animal sacrifice.c)The ban was constitutional as the practice adversely affected public order, morality and health.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CLAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CLAT Exam by signing up for free.

Here you can find the meaning of In a bizarre order, the Supreme Court of India has decided to begin hearing the petitions seeking review of its previous judgement on the Sabarimala issue from January 13, 2020. A nine-judge constitution bench has been formed to hear the sensitive case. The court will also take up other contentious issues for hearing such as alleged discrimination against Muslim and Parsi women.However, the ambit of review power conferred under Article 137 of the Constitution is extremely limited: The review court must examine the correctness of the judgment under review to ascertain if it suffers from glaring omissions, a patent mistake or grave errors apparent on the face of record. Petitions seeking review of judgments are allowed in rare instances. In Chandra Kanta vs Sheikh Habib, the Court held that Article 137 would not permit ordering of a fresh hearing by a larger bench without scrutiny of judgment under review and without pointing out a grave error apparent on the face of record. None of this has been done by the majority in the Sabarimala review judgment. Simply put, the majority opinion is erroneous.Justices R.F. Nariman and D.Y. Chandrachud dissented and opined against reviewing the original judgment. They held that what a future Constitution Bench (if ever formed) may do was not relevant to the adjudication of the review petitions, which had to be decided in accordance with well established parameters. Since none of the grounds for review had been made out, they held that the petitions were liable to be dismissed.Incorrect as it appears to be, the majority view in the Sabarimala review petitions has served one purpose: it has revived the debate around judicial interference in matters of faith. The constitution doesn’t define religion. Article 25 guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. However, the right is made subject to public order, morality and health.Article 26 allows every religious denomination or any of its sections to (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. This too is made subject to public order, morality, and health.The refusal to test personal laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights means that the validity of religious law will continue to be decided on a judge’s interpretation of religious texts. At the risk of repetition, the majority judgment in the Sabarimala review petitions is flawed. It, however, presents us with an opportunity to move towards a religious jurisprudence, which is entrenched in the Constitution rather than in religious text.Q. During a certain religious occasion, members belonging to a particular religion in state X have a tenet to defecate in the open. They usually do it at the banks of a river Y thereby polluting the river. About 5000 people in the neighbouring region depend on the river for drinking water. The government bans the practice. Members of the community challenge the government order on the grounds that it violates their fundamental right under Article 25. Decide.a)The ban was unconstitutional as it violated Article 25.b)The ban was constitutional as the government must ban animal sacrifice.c)The ban was constitutional as the practice adversely affected public order, morality and health.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of In a bizarre order, the Supreme Court of India has decided to begin hearing the petitions seeking review of its previous judgement on the Sabarimala issue from January 13, 2020. A nine-judge constitution bench has been formed to hear the sensitive case. The court will also take up other contentious issues for hearing such as alleged discrimination against Muslim and Parsi women.However, the ambit of review power conferred under Article 137 of the Constitution is extremely limited: The review court must examine the correctness of the judgment under review to ascertain if it suffers from glaring omissions, a patent mistake or grave errors apparent on the face of record. Petitions seeking review of judgments are allowed in rare instances. In Chandra Kanta vs Sheikh Habib, the Court held that Article 137 would not permit ordering of a fresh hearing by a larger bench without scrutiny of judgment under review and without pointing out a grave error apparent on the face of record. None of this has been done by the majority in the Sabarimala review judgment. Simply put, the majority opinion is erroneous.Justices R.F. Nariman and D.Y. Chandrachud dissented and opined against reviewing the original judgment. They held that what a future Constitution Bench (if ever formed) may do was not relevant to the adjudication of the review petitions, which had to be decided in accordance with well established parameters. Since none of the grounds for review had been made out, they held that the petitions were liable to be dismissed.Incorrect as it appears to be, the majority view in the Sabarimala review petitions has served one purpose: it has revived the debate around judicial interference in matters of faith. The constitution doesn’t define religion. Article 25 guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. However, the right is made subject to public order, morality and health.Article 26 allows every religious denomination or any of its sections to (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. This too is made subject to public order, morality, and health.The refusal to test personal laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights means that the validity of religious law will continue to be decided on a judge’s interpretation of religious texts. At the risk of repetition, the majority judgment in the Sabarimala review petitions is flawed. It, however, presents us with an opportunity to move towards a religious jurisprudence, which is entrenched in the Constitution rather than in religious text.Q. During a certain religious occasion, members belonging to a particular religion in state X have a tenet to defecate in the open. They usually do it at the banks of a river Y thereby polluting the river. About 5000 people in the neighbouring region depend on the river for drinking water. The government bans the practice. Members of the community challenge the government order on the grounds that it violates their fundamental right under Article 25. Decide.a)The ban was unconstitutional as it violated Article 25.b)The ban was constitutional as the government must ban animal sacrifice.c)The ban was constitutional as the practice adversely affected public order, morality and health.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for In a bizarre order, the Supreme Court of India has decided to begin hearing the petitions seeking review of its previous judgement on the Sabarimala issue from January 13, 2020. A nine-judge constitution bench has been formed to hear the sensitive case. The court will also take up other contentious issues for hearing such as alleged discrimination against Muslim and Parsi women.However, the ambit of review power conferred under Article 137 of the Constitution is extremely limited: The review court must examine the correctness of the judgment under review to ascertain if it suffers from glaring omissions, a patent mistake or grave errors apparent on the face of record. Petitions seeking review of judgments are allowed in rare instances. In Chandra Kanta vs Sheikh Habib, the Court held that Article 137 would not permit ordering of a fresh hearing by a larger bench without scrutiny of judgment under review and without pointing out a grave error apparent on the face of record. None of this has been done by the majority in the Sabarimala review judgment. Simply put, the majority opinion is erroneous.Justices R.F. Nariman and D.Y. Chandrachud dissented and opined against reviewing the original judgment. They held that what a future Constitution Bench (if ever formed) may do was not relevant to the adjudication of the review petitions, which had to be decided in accordance with well established parameters. Since none of the grounds for review had been made out, they held that the petitions were liable to be dismissed.Incorrect as it appears to be, the majority view in the Sabarimala review petitions has served one purpose: it has revived the debate around judicial interference in matters of faith. The constitution doesn’t define religion. Article 25 guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. However, the right is made subject to public order, morality and health.Article 26 allows every religious denomination or any of its sections to (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. This too is made subject to public order, morality, and health.The refusal to test personal laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights means that the validity of religious law will continue to be decided on a judge’s interpretation of religious texts. At the risk of repetition, the majority judgment in the Sabarimala review petitions is flawed. It, however, presents us with an opportunity to move towards a religious jurisprudence, which is entrenched in the Constitution rather than in religious text.Q. During a certain religious occasion, members belonging to a particular religion in state X have a tenet to defecate in the open. They usually do it at the banks of a river Y thereby polluting the river. About 5000 people in the neighbouring region depend on the river for drinking water. The government bans the practice. Members of the community challenge the government order on the grounds that it violates their fundamental right under Article 25. Decide.a)The ban was unconstitutional as it violated Article 25.b)The ban was constitutional as the government must ban animal sacrifice.c)The ban was constitutional as the practice adversely affected public order, morality and health.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of In a bizarre order, the Supreme Court of India has decided to begin hearing the petitions seeking review of its previous judgement on the Sabarimala issue from January 13, 2020. A nine-judge constitution bench has been formed to hear the sensitive case. The court will also take up other contentious issues for hearing such as alleged discrimination against Muslim and Parsi women.However, the ambit of review power conferred under Article 137 of the Constitution is extremely limited: The review court must examine the correctness of the judgment under review to ascertain if it suffers from glaring omissions, a patent mistake or grave errors apparent on the face of record. Petitions seeking review of judgments are allowed in rare instances. In Chandra Kanta vs Sheikh Habib, the Court held that Article 137 would not permit ordering of a fresh hearing by a larger bench without scrutiny of judgment under review and without pointing out a grave error apparent on the face of record. None of this has been done by the majority in the Sabarimala review judgment. Simply put, the majority opinion is erroneous.Justices R.F. Nariman and D.Y. Chandrachud dissented and opined against reviewing the original judgment. They held that what a future Constitution Bench (if ever formed) may do was not relevant to the adjudication of the review petitions, which had to be decided in accordance with well established parameters. Since none of the grounds for review had been made out, they held that the petitions were liable to be dismissed.Incorrect as it appears to be, the majority view in the Sabarimala review petitions has served one purpose: it has revived the debate around judicial interference in matters of faith. The constitution doesn’t define religion. Article 25 guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. However, the right is made subject to public order, morality and health.Article 26 allows every religious denomination or any of its sections to (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. This too is made subject to public order, morality, and health.The refusal to test personal laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights means that the validity of religious law will continue to be decided on a judge’s interpretation of religious texts. At the risk of repetition, the majority judgment in the Sabarimala review petitions is flawed. It, however, presents us with an opportunity to move towards a religious jurisprudence, which is entrenched in the Constitution rather than in religious text.Q. During a certain religious occasion, members belonging to a particular religion in state X have a tenet to defecate in the open. They usually do it at the banks of a river Y thereby polluting the river. About 5000 people in the neighbouring region depend on the river for drinking water. The government bans the practice. Members of the community challenge the government order on the grounds that it violates their fundamental right under Article 25. Decide.a)The ban was unconstitutional as it violated Article 25.b)The ban was constitutional as the government must ban animal sacrifice.c)The ban was constitutional as the practice adversely affected public order, morality and health.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice In a bizarre order, the Supreme Court of India has decided to begin hearing the petitions seeking review of its previous judgement on the Sabarimala issue from January 13, 2020. A nine-judge constitution bench has been formed to hear the sensitive case. The court will also take up other contentious issues for hearing such as alleged discrimination against Muslim and Parsi women.However, the ambit of review power conferred under Article 137 of the Constitution is extremely limited: The review court must examine the correctness of the judgment under review to ascertain if it suffers from glaring omissions, a patent mistake or grave errors apparent on the face of record. Petitions seeking review of judgments are allowed in rare instances. In Chandra Kanta vs Sheikh Habib, the Court held that Article 137 would not permit ordering of a fresh hearing by a larger bench without scrutiny of judgment under review and without pointing out a grave error apparent on the face of record. None of this has been done by the majority in the Sabarimala review judgment. Simply put, the majority opinion is erroneous.Justices R.F. Nariman and D.Y. Chandrachud dissented and opined against reviewing the original judgment. They held that what a future Constitution Bench (if ever formed) may do was not relevant to the adjudication of the review petitions, which had to be decided in accordance with well established parameters. Since none of the grounds for review had been made out, they held that the petitions were liable to be dismissed.Incorrect as it appears to be, the majority view in the Sabarimala review petitions has served one purpose: it has revived the debate around judicial interference in matters of faith. The constitution doesn’t define religion. Article 25 guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. However, the right is made subject to public order, morality and health.Article 26 allows every religious denomination or any of its sections to (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. This too is made subject to public order, morality, and health.The refusal to test personal laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights means that the validity of religious law will continue to be decided on a judge’s interpretation of religious texts. At the risk of repetition, the majority judgment in the Sabarimala review petitions is flawed. It, however, presents us with an opportunity to move towards a religious jurisprudence, which is entrenched in the Constitution rather than in religious text.Q. During a certain religious occasion, members belonging to a particular religion in state X have a tenet to defecate in the open. They usually do it at the banks of a river Y thereby polluting the river. About 5000 people in the neighbouring region depend on the river for drinking water. The government bans the practice. Members of the community challenge the government order on the grounds that it violates their fundamental right under Article 25. Decide.a)The ban was unconstitutional as it violated Article 25.b)The ban was constitutional as the government must ban animal sacrifice.c)The ban was constitutional as the practice adversely affected public order, morality and health.d)None of the above.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CLAT tests.