Question Description
Directions: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions given beside.New Delhi’s muted criticism of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 expectedly led to some frustration in the West, raising questions over India’s credibility as a security partner. These areas of divergences within the broader equation of role compatibility denote the real-world complexities in bilateral and minilateral partnerships. Even with converging Indo-US strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, differences persist between Washington and New Delhi. First, the US views the Indo-Pacific as a region where rules-based liberal international order needs to be preserved vis-à-vis China’s assertive rise and even the Russian threat. By contrast, India does not see the Indo-Pacific as an exclusive group of actors in a region that is against any country (read China). New Delhi considers it an “inclusive” region and has, at times, even signaled the inclusion of China and Russia within its definition of the Indo-Pacific. Second, the US is open about the threat China poses to its interest and is ready to deter and even fight if required. India, on the other hand, is wary of balancing China directly and prefers maintaining the competition cooperation model in its ties with China. New Delhi’s choice to deepen or soften engagement with the Quad is connected with how India wishes to deal with China at a given point in time, which can range from seeking a stable equation to pressurizing it against acting in a particular manner.Third, although New Delhi has been tilting towards the West for the last two decades, it continues to balance multiple partnerships, at times with countries at odds with each other. This is evident in India’s decision to cooperate with the US and its allies on the Quad and other arrangements while maintaining ties with China and Russia (thus explaining Indian silence on Russia’s actions in Ukraine). The multi alignment Posture relates to India’s obsession with “strategic autonomy” and its legacy of not depending on any of the competing countries. So far, India has effectively managed to balance its relations with odd bedfellows, but the sustainability and success of this practice, in the long run, is debatable, particularly if China poses a more urgent threat. Fourth, India’s traditional areas of interest lie in the Indian Ocean, while the US’ focus remains on the Pacific region. Regardless of the increased overlap between their areas and issues of interest more recently, New Delhi will likely remain less involved or enthusiastic about overtly addressing Chinese actions in regions that do not directly impinge on its security interests (case in point, Taiwan or even Ukraine as visible in the present context).Q.Which of the following statements about Indias subdued opposition to Russias invasion of Ukraine is true?a)India possesses intricate diplomatic factors and strategic interests that may not be readily evident to Western analysts.b)It demonstrates Indias comprehensive dedication to global standards and principles, along with its vigorous engagement in global security endeavors.c)It mirrors Indias involvement in counterterrorism endeavors, initiatives for maritime security, and partnerships with other nations.d)It signifies a departure from Western anticipations and casts uncertainties on Indias reliability as a security ally.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2024 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about Directions: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions given beside.New Delhi’s muted criticism of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 expectedly led to some frustration in the West, raising questions over India’s credibility as a security partner. These areas of divergences within the broader equation of role compatibility denote the real-world complexities in bilateral and minilateral partnerships. Even with converging Indo-US strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, differences persist between Washington and New Delhi. First, the US views the Indo-Pacific as a region where rules-based liberal international order needs to be preserved vis-à-vis China’s assertive rise and even the Russian threat. By contrast, India does not see the Indo-Pacific as an exclusive group of actors in a region that is against any country (read China). New Delhi considers it an “inclusive” region and has, at times, even signaled the inclusion of China and Russia within its definition of the Indo-Pacific. Second, the US is open about the threat China poses to its interest and is ready to deter and even fight if required. India, on the other hand, is wary of balancing China directly and prefers maintaining the competition cooperation model in its ties with China. New Delhi’s choice to deepen or soften engagement with the Quad is connected with how India wishes to deal with China at a given point in time, which can range from seeking a stable equation to pressurizing it against acting in a particular manner.Third, although New Delhi has been tilting towards the West for the last two decades, it continues to balance multiple partnerships, at times with countries at odds with each other. This is evident in India’s decision to cooperate with the US and its allies on the Quad and other arrangements while maintaining ties with China and Russia (thus explaining Indian silence on Russia’s actions in Ukraine). The multi alignment Posture relates to India’s obsession with “strategic autonomy” and its legacy of not depending on any of the competing countries. So far, India has effectively managed to balance its relations with odd bedfellows, but the sustainability and success of this practice, in the long run, is debatable, particularly if China poses a more urgent threat. Fourth, India’s traditional areas of interest lie in the Indian Ocean, while the US’ focus remains on the Pacific region. Regardless of the increased overlap between their areas and issues of interest more recently, New Delhi will likely remain less involved or enthusiastic about overtly addressing Chinese actions in regions that do not directly impinge on its security interests (case in point, Taiwan or even Ukraine as visible in the present context).Q.Which of the following statements about Indias subdued opposition to Russias invasion of Ukraine is true?a)India possesses intricate diplomatic factors and strategic interests that may not be readily evident to Western analysts.b)It demonstrates Indias comprehensive dedication to global standards and principles, along with its vigorous engagement in global security endeavors.c)It mirrors Indias involvement in counterterrorism endeavors, initiatives for maritime security, and partnerships with other nations.d)It signifies a departure from Western anticipations and casts uncertainties on Indias reliability as a security ally.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2024 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for Directions: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions given beside.New Delhi’s muted criticism of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 expectedly led to some frustration in the West, raising questions over India’s credibility as a security partner. These areas of divergences within the broader equation of role compatibility denote the real-world complexities in bilateral and minilateral partnerships. Even with converging Indo-US strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, differences persist between Washington and New Delhi. First, the US views the Indo-Pacific as a region where rules-based liberal international order needs to be preserved vis-à-vis China’s assertive rise and even the Russian threat. By contrast, India does not see the Indo-Pacific as an exclusive group of actors in a region that is against any country (read China). New Delhi considers it an “inclusive” region and has, at times, even signaled the inclusion of China and Russia within its definition of the Indo-Pacific. Second, the US is open about the threat China poses to its interest and is ready to deter and even fight if required. India, on the other hand, is wary of balancing China directly and prefers maintaining the competition cooperation model in its ties with China. New Delhi’s choice to deepen or soften engagement with the Quad is connected with how India wishes to deal with China at a given point in time, which can range from seeking a stable equation to pressurizing it against acting in a particular manner.Third, although New Delhi has been tilting towards the West for the last two decades, it continues to balance multiple partnerships, at times with countries at odds with each other. This is evident in India’s decision to cooperate with the US and its allies on the Quad and other arrangements while maintaining ties with China and Russia (thus explaining Indian silence on Russia’s actions in Ukraine). The multi alignment Posture relates to India’s obsession with “strategic autonomy” and its legacy of not depending on any of the competing countries. So far, India has effectively managed to balance its relations with odd bedfellows, but the sustainability and success of this practice, in the long run, is debatable, particularly if China poses a more urgent threat. Fourth, India’s traditional areas of interest lie in the Indian Ocean, while the US’ focus remains on the Pacific region. Regardless of the increased overlap between their areas and issues of interest more recently, New Delhi will likely remain less involved or enthusiastic about overtly addressing Chinese actions in regions that do not directly impinge on its security interests (case in point, Taiwan or even Ukraine as visible in the present context).Q.Which of the following statements about Indias subdued opposition to Russias invasion of Ukraine is true?a)India possesses intricate diplomatic factors and strategic interests that may not be readily evident to Western analysts.b)It demonstrates Indias comprehensive dedication to global standards and principles, along with its vigorous engagement in global security endeavors.c)It mirrors Indias involvement in counterterrorism endeavors, initiatives for maritime security, and partnerships with other nations.d)It signifies a departure from Western anticipations and casts uncertainties on Indias reliability as a security ally.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer?.

Solutions for Directions: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions given beside.New Delhi’s muted criticism of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 expectedly led to some frustration in the West, raising questions over India’s credibility as a security partner. These areas of divergences within the broader equation of role compatibility denote the real-world complexities in bilateral and minilateral partnerships. Even with converging Indo-US strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, differences persist between Washington and New Delhi. First, the US views the Indo-Pacific as a region where rules-based liberal international order needs to be preserved vis-à-vis China’s assertive rise and even the Russian threat. By contrast, India does not see the Indo-Pacific as an exclusive group of actors in a region that is against any country (read China). New Delhi considers it an “inclusive” region and has, at times, even signaled the inclusion of China and Russia within its definition of the Indo-Pacific. Second, the US is open about the threat China poses to its interest and is ready to deter and even fight if required. India, on the other hand, is wary of balancing China directly and prefers maintaining the competition cooperation model in its ties with China. New Delhi’s choice to deepen or soften engagement with the Quad is connected with how India wishes to deal with China at a given point in time, which can range from seeking a stable equation to pressurizing it against acting in a particular manner.Third, although New Delhi has been tilting towards the West for the last two decades, it continues to balance multiple partnerships, at times with countries at odds with each other. This is evident in India’s decision to cooperate with the US and its allies on the Quad and other arrangements while maintaining ties with China and Russia (thus explaining Indian silence on Russia’s actions in Ukraine). The multi alignment Posture relates to India’s obsession with “strategic autonomy” and its legacy of not depending on any of the competing countries. So far, India has effectively managed to balance its relations with odd bedfellows, but the sustainability and success of this practice, in the long run, is debatable, particularly if China poses a more urgent threat. Fourth, India’s traditional areas of interest lie in the Indian Ocean, while the US’ focus remains on the Pacific region. Regardless of the increased overlap between their areas and issues of interest more recently, New Delhi will likely remain less involved or enthusiastic about overtly addressing Chinese actions in regions that do not directly impinge on its security interests (case in point, Taiwan or even Ukraine as visible in the present context).Q.Which of the following statements about Indias subdued opposition to Russias invasion of Ukraine is true?a)India possesses intricate diplomatic factors and strategic interests that may not be readily evident to Western analysts.b)It demonstrates Indias comprehensive dedication to global standards and principles, along with its vigorous engagement in global security endeavors.c)It mirrors Indias involvement in counterterrorism endeavors, initiatives for maritime security, and partnerships with other nations.d)It signifies a departure from Western anticipations and casts uncertainties on Indias reliability as a security ally.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CLAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CLAT Exam by signing up for free.

Here you can find the meaning of Directions: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions given beside.New Delhi’s muted criticism of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 expectedly led to some frustration in the West, raising questions over India’s credibility as a security partner. These areas of divergences within the broader equation of role compatibility denote the real-world complexities in bilateral and minilateral partnerships. Even with converging Indo-US strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, differences persist between Washington and New Delhi. First, the US views the Indo-Pacific as a region where rules-based liberal international order needs to be preserved vis-à-vis China’s assertive rise and even the Russian threat. By contrast, India does not see the Indo-Pacific as an exclusive group of actors in a region that is against any country (read China). New Delhi considers it an “inclusive” region and has, at times, even signaled the inclusion of China and Russia within its definition of the Indo-Pacific. Second, the US is open about the threat China poses to its interest and is ready to deter and even fight if required. India, on the other hand, is wary of balancing China directly and prefers maintaining the competition cooperation model in its ties with China. New Delhi’s choice to deepen or soften engagement with the Quad is connected with how India wishes to deal with China at a given point in time, which can range from seeking a stable equation to pressurizing it against acting in a particular manner.Third, although New Delhi has been tilting towards the West for the last two decades, it continues to balance multiple partnerships, at times with countries at odds with each other. This is evident in India’s decision to cooperate with the US and its allies on the Quad and other arrangements while maintaining ties with China and Russia (thus explaining Indian silence on Russia’s actions in Ukraine). The multi alignment Posture relates to India’s obsession with “strategic autonomy” and its legacy of not depending on any of the competing countries. So far, India has effectively managed to balance its relations with odd bedfellows, but the sustainability and success of this practice, in the long run, is debatable, particularly if China poses a more urgent threat. Fourth, India’s traditional areas of interest lie in the Indian Ocean, while the US’ focus remains on the Pacific region. Regardless of the increased overlap between their areas and issues of interest more recently, New Delhi will likely remain less involved or enthusiastic about overtly addressing Chinese actions in regions that do not directly impinge on its security interests (case in point, Taiwan or even Ukraine as visible in the present context).Q.Which of the following statements about Indias subdued opposition to Russias invasion of Ukraine is true?a)India possesses intricate diplomatic factors and strategic interests that may not be readily evident to Western analysts.b)It demonstrates Indias comprehensive dedication to global standards and principles, along with its vigorous engagement in global security endeavors.c)It mirrors Indias involvement in counterterrorism endeavors, initiatives for maritime security, and partnerships with other nations.d)It signifies a departure from Western anticipations and casts uncertainties on Indias reliability as a security ally.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of Directions: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions given beside.New Delhi’s muted criticism of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 expectedly led to some frustration in the West, raising questions over India’s credibility as a security partner. These areas of divergences within the broader equation of role compatibility denote the real-world complexities in bilateral and minilateral partnerships. Even with converging Indo-US strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, differences persist between Washington and New Delhi. First, the US views the Indo-Pacific as a region where rules-based liberal international order needs to be preserved vis-à-vis China’s assertive rise and even the Russian threat. By contrast, India does not see the Indo-Pacific as an exclusive group of actors in a region that is against any country (read China). New Delhi considers it an “inclusive” region and has, at times, even signaled the inclusion of China and Russia within its definition of the Indo-Pacific. Second, the US is open about the threat China poses to its interest and is ready to deter and even fight if required. India, on the other hand, is wary of balancing China directly and prefers maintaining the competition cooperation model in its ties with China. New Delhi’s choice to deepen or soften engagement with the Quad is connected with how India wishes to deal with China at a given point in time, which can range from seeking a stable equation to pressurizing it against acting in a particular manner.Third, although New Delhi has been tilting towards the West for the last two decades, it continues to balance multiple partnerships, at times with countries at odds with each other. This is evident in India’s decision to cooperate with the US and its allies on the Quad and other arrangements while maintaining ties with China and Russia (thus explaining Indian silence on Russia’s actions in Ukraine). The multi alignment Posture relates to India’s obsession with “strategic autonomy” and its legacy of not depending on any of the competing countries. So far, India has effectively managed to balance its relations with odd bedfellows, but the sustainability and success of this practice, in the long run, is debatable, particularly if China poses a more urgent threat. Fourth, India’s traditional areas of interest lie in the Indian Ocean, while the US’ focus remains on the Pacific region. Regardless of the increased overlap between their areas and issues of interest more recently, New Delhi will likely remain less involved or enthusiastic about overtly addressing Chinese actions in regions that do not directly impinge on its security interests (case in point, Taiwan or even Ukraine as visible in the present context).Q.Which of the following statements about Indias subdued opposition to Russias invasion of Ukraine is true?a)India possesses intricate diplomatic factors and strategic interests that may not be readily evident to Western analysts.b)It demonstrates Indias comprehensive dedication to global standards and principles, along with its vigorous engagement in global security endeavors.c)It mirrors Indias involvement in counterterrorism endeavors, initiatives for maritime security, and partnerships with other nations.d)It signifies a departure from Western anticipations and casts uncertainties on Indias reliability as a security ally.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for Directions: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions given beside.New Delhi’s muted criticism of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 expectedly led to some frustration in the West, raising questions over India’s credibility as a security partner. These areas of divergences within the broader equation of role compatibility denote the real-world complexities in bilateral and minilateral partnerships. Even with converging Indo-US strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, differences persist between Washington and New Delhi. First, the US views the Indo-Pacific as a region where rules-based liberal international order needs to be preserved vis-à-vis China’s assertive rise and even the Russian threat. By contrast, India does not see the Indo-Pacific as an exclusive group of actors in a region that is against any country (read China). New Delhi considers it an “inclusive” region and has, at times, even signaled the inclusion of China and Russia within its definition of the Indo-Pacific. Second, the US is open about the threat China poses to its interest and is ready to deter and even fight if required. India, on the other hand, is wary of balancing China directly and prefers maintaining the competition cooperation model in its ties with China. New Delhi’s choice to deepen or soften engagement with the Quad is connected with how India wishes to deal with China at a given point in time, which can range from seeking a stable equation to pressurizing it against acting in a particular manner.Third, although New Delhi has been tilting towards the West for the last two decades, it continues to balance multiple partnerships, at times with countries at odds with each other. This is evident in India’s decision to cooperate with the US and its allies on the Quad and other arrangements while maintaining ties with China and Russia (thus explaining Indian silence on Russia’s actions in Ukraine). The multi alignment Posture relates to India’s obsession with “strategic autonomy” and its legacy of not depending on any of the competing countries. So far, India has effectively managed to balance its relations with odd bedfellows, but the sustainability and success of this practice, in the long run, is debatable, particularly if China poses a more urgent threat. Fourth, India’s traditional areas of interest lie in the Indian Ocean, while the US’ focus remains on the Pacific region. Regardless of the increased overlap between their areas and issues of interest more recently, New Delhi will likely remain less involved or enthusiastic about overtly addressing Chinese actions in regions that do not directly impinge on its security interests (case in point, Taiwan or even Ukraine as visible in the present context).Q.Which of the following statements about Indias subdued opposition to Russias invasion of Ukraine is true?a)India possesses intricate diplomatic factors and strategic interests that may not be readily evident to Western analysts.b)It demonstrates Indias comprehensive dedication to global standards and principles, along with its vigorous engagement in global security endeavors.c)It mirrors Indias involvement in counterterrorism endeavors, initiatives for maritime security, and partnerships with other nations.d)It signifies a departure from Western anticipations and casts uncertainties on Indias reliability as a security ally.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of Directions: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions given beside.New Delhi’s muted criticism of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 expectedly led to some frustration in the West, raising questions over India’s credibility as a security partner. These areas of divergences within the broader equation of role compatibility denote the real-world complexities in bilateral and minilateral partnerships. Even with converging Indo-US strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, differences persist between Washington and New Delhi. First, the US views the Indo-Pacific as a region where rules-based liberal international order needs to be preserved vis-à-vis China’s assertive rise and even the Russian threat. By contrast, India does not see the Indo-Pacific as an exclusive group of actors in a region that is against any country (read China). New Delhi considers it an “inclusive” region and has, at times, even signaled the inclusion of China and Russia within its definition of the Indo-Pacific. Second, the US is open about the threat China poses to its interest and is ready to deter and even fight if required. India, on the other hand, is wary of balancing China directly and prefers maintaining the competition cooperation model in its ties with China. New Delhi’s choice to deepen or soften engagement with the Quad is connected with how India wishes to deal with China at a given point in time, which can range from seeking a stable equation to pressurizing it against acting in a particular manner.Third, although New Delhi has been tilting towards the West for the last two decades, it continues to balance multiple partnerships, at times with countries at odds with each other. This is evident in India’s decision to cooperate with the US and its allies on the Quad and other arrangements while maintaining ties with China and Russia (thus explaining Indian silence on Russia’s actions in Ukraine). The multi alignment Posture relates to India’s obsession with “strategic autonomy” and its legacy of not depending on any of the competing countries. So far, India has effectively managed to balance its relations with odd bedfellows, but the sustainability and success of this practice, in the long run, is debatable, particularly if China poses a more urgent threat. Fourth, India’s traditional areas of interest lie in the Indian Ocean, while the US’ focus remains on the Pacific region. Regardless of the increased overlap between their areas and issues of interest more recently, New Delhi will likely remain less involved or enthusiastic about overtly addressing Chinese actions in regions that do not directly impinge on its security interests (case in point, Taiwan or even Ukraine as visible in the present context).Q.Which of the following statements about Indias subdued opposition to Russias invasion of Ukraine is true?a)India possesses intricate diplomatic factors and strategic interests that may not be readily evident to Western analysts.b)It demonstrates Indias comprehensive dedication to global standards and principles, along with its vigorous engagement in global security endeavors.c)It mirrors Indias involvement in counterterrorism endeavors, initiatives for maritime security, and partnerships with other nations.d)It signifies a departure from Western anticipations and casts uncertainties on Indias reliability as a security ally.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice Directions: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions given beside.New Delhi’s muted criticism of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 expectedly led to some frustration in the West, raising questions over India’s credibility as a security partner. These areas of divergences within the broader equation of role compatibility denote the real-world complexities in bilateral and minilateral partnerships. Even with converging Indo-US strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, differences persist between Washington and New Delhi. First, the US views the Indo-Pacific as a region where rules-based liberal international order needs to be preserved vis-à-vis China’s assertive rise and even the Russian threat. By contrast, India does not see the Indo-Pacific as an exclusive group of actors in a region that is against any country (read China). New Delhi considers it an “inclusive” region and has, at times, even signaled the inclusion of China and Russia within its definition of the Indo-Pacific. Second, the US is open about the threat China poses to its interest and is ready to deter and even fight if required. India, on the other hand, is wary of balancing China directly and prefers maintaining the competition cooperation model in its ties with China. New Delhi’s choice to deepen or soften engagement with the Quad is connected with how India wishes to deal with China at a given point in time, which can range from seeking a stable equation to pressurizing it against acting in a particular manner.Third, although New Delhi has been tilting towards the West for the last two decades, it continues to balance multiple partnerships, at times with countries at odds with each other. This is evident in India’s decision to cooperate with the US and its allies on the Quad and other arrangements while maintaining ties with China and Russia (thus explaining Indian silence on Russia’s actions in Ukraine). The multi alignment Posture relates to India’s obsession with “strategic autonomy” and its legacy of not depending on any of the competing countries. So far, India has effectively managed to balance its relations with odd bedfellows, but the sustainability and success of this practice, in the long run, is debatable, particularly if China poses a more urgent threat. Fourth, India’s traditional areas of interest lie in the Indian Ocean, while the US’ focus remains on the Pacific region. Regardless of the increased overlap between their areas and issues of interest more recently, New Delhi will likely remain less involved or enthusiastic about overtly addressing Chinese actions in regions that do not directly impinge on its security interests (case in point, Taiwan or even Ukraine as visible in the present context).Q.Which of the following statements about Indias subdued opposition to Russias invasion of Ukraine is true?a)India possesses intricate diplomatic factors and strategic interests that may not be readily evident to Western analysts.b)It demonstrates Indias comprehensive dedication to global standards and principles, along with its vigorous engagement in global security endeavors.c)It mirrors Indias involvement in counterterrorism endeavors, initiatives for maritime security, and partnerships with other nations.d)It signifies a departure from Western anticipations and casts uncertainties on Indias reliability as a security ally.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CLAT tests.